哲学
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2011 巻 , 62 号
選択された号の論文の23件中1~23を表示しています
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シンポジウム:現代における家族/親密圏
  • 2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 7-10
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上野 千鶴子
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 11-34_L3
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Interdisciplinary survey on family has been proven to fail in the universal definition of family. The modern myth of “family,” based on the conjugal bond and affection, child-centeredness and maternal love, limited in the nuclear household, has been historicized. Sociological investigation problematizes this question as to how and why such “family myth” was constructed and by whom and for whom. Feminist analysis of family has proven this family myth as false both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, public⁄ private dichotomy, which serves as a logical base for the family myth, is inconsistent and therefore invalid. Empirically, this family myth can not be supported with the empirical evidence in many cases. Yet, when the myth of family as a basic site of freedom and recognition is still maintained after its collapse, we must question why it is supported even as a wish. Since family is experienced as a fatal bond by most people, if we can translate a fate to a choice, it could be experienced as freedom. However, it can hardly be the case in reality.
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  • 金井 淑子
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 35-56_L3
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    The intimate sphere can be defined as something “built and maintained by the concern and the interest for the concrete lives and existences of others, who are not unfamiliar in general but interpersonale and embodied” (Junichi Saito 2003). This paper deals with the intimate sphere in connection with “women's embodiment”,“mother's territory”, and the“family metaphor”, adopting an approach informed by feminism and philosophy-ethics. Even if we focus only on Saito's “interpersonale and embodied others”, this is a concept which requires discussion. Moreover, it is necessary to address the novel notions of “private sphere⁄individual sphere”, “root sphere”, and “life sphere”, in order to open up problems which tend to be disguised by the naive dichotomy between intimate and public spheres. Within this new framework, I explain the intimate sphere as a base or home of life which aims to protect the vulnerability of human beings.
    The theoretical activity of philosophy is a form of narratology, that is, conceptualizing a reality captured by intuition using words and then establishing new theoretical ideas. Issues which may be obscured within in a dominant episteme can then be recognised and investigated.
    Probably, sociology will thoroughly dissolve the fiction or myth that the family is a space of love, by stubbornly discussing the family in a descriptive way and revealing the malfunctioning of families in reality. However, even if the normative family idea is consigned to history, our emotional attachment to the family may still remain. There exist questions about the family from the perspective of childhood and the perspective of aging and death and these are discusssed under the heading “Family as an issue”. From the perspective of human beings endowed with language, “the family is a highly contextualized collective” (Tamaki Saito 2006). In other words, human beings require a space where their existence is unconditionally accepted. What issues arise here at the metaphoric level, over and above a purely functionalist discussion of family? I hope to encourage a discussion which evolves from the concept of intimate sphere toward “root sphere”, “private sphere”, and “life sphere”.
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  • 杉田 孝夫
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 57-71_L4
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Zwischen 1780 bis 1820 standen die drei Elemente, die den modernen deutschen Familienbegriff konstituierten, zur Verfügung. Besonders in den drei Familientheorien Kants (1797), Fichtes (1797) und Hegels (1821) finden wir die theoretische Entwicklung des Konzepts der Familie als die moderner Kleinfamilie (engl. nuclear family). Einerseits lässt sich der Entstehungsprozess der Vorstellung der Familie begriffsgeschichtlich nachvollziehen. Andererseits lässt sie sich auch in Beziehung zwischen der Familie und der modernen individualistschen und liberalistischen Gesellschaft erklären. Die Vorstellung von der Familie symbolisierte die neue freie individualistsche Gesellschaft in Abgrenzung zur alten ständischen und häuslichen Gesellschaft (ancien régime). Die Eheschließung des freien Mannes und mit der freien Fau, die einander herzlich lieben, schafft eine Familie, und sie produzieren freien Menschen (Kinder), ziehen sie groß und pflegen sie. Wenn das Kind erwachsen wird, unabhängig und frei, kommt die Rolle der Familie an ihr Ende.
    Aber die neue Gesellschaft hat eine neue moderne Geschlechterdifferenz produziert und strukturiert. Der Mann repräsentiert seine Familie in der öffentlichen Sphäre, und die Frau wird die Zentralfigur der Liebe und des Glaubens in der Familie, also in der privaten Sphäre. Das ist die Geburt des Mythos der Mütterlichkeit. Gerade zu Beginn war Die Vorstellung von der Familie die Basis für die Menschenbildung, die Freiheit und die Gemeisamkeit der Geschlechter, aber mit der Vergrößerung der Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten für Frauen und der Verbesserung der Bedingungen für sie in Ausbildung, Arbeit und allen anderen Tätigkeitsfelder wurde die Familie in der Vorstellung so etwas wie ein Symbol für die Hinderniss, welche die Freiheit der Frauen einschränkten. Warum?
    Aus der Gender-Perspektive und im Dialog mit der feministischen Kritik werden die Möglichkeiten und Problematik der Familie als Basis der Bildung und Freiheit des Individuums in unserem Zeitalter diskutiert.
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共同討議 I:ヒュームと現代
  • 秋元 ひろと
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 73-86_L5
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I take up Hume's theories of causation and morality, in particular, his accounts of belief and moral sentiment, and consider what his naturalism really amounts to.
    Hume treats causal reasoning and belief basically as a non-reflective reaction caused by custom. Hence he naturally attributes causal reasoning and belief not only to humans but also to animals. Causal reasoning and belief are mental operations, he thinks, which have their foundation in the nature shared by humans and animals.
    In so far as Hume explains the formation of moral sentiment in terms of sympathy viewed as a mechanism of contagion, his account of moral sentiment is on a par with his account of belief. However, Hume does not attribute moral sentiment to animals, because he does not suppose that animals are capable of reflective thinking, which he regards as essential for the formation of moral sentiment properly so called. Now the process of reflective thinking involved in the formation of moral sentiment can be seen as a process of self- and mutual-understanding of human nature. For example, we understand and mutually understand the fact that a certain degree of selfishness is inseparable from human nature, thereby correcting the sentiment of blame we naturally have toward those who oppose our self-interest. However, a process such as this has no definite end point. It is true that Hume tries to give a psychological explanation of moral phenomena and show that morality is an expression of human nature, but this is not all he does in his naturalism. He also has in his view the openended character of morality and the possibility of its transformation.
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  • 伊勢 俊彦
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 87-103_L6
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Hume argues that the whole plan or scheme of justice is “highly conductive to the well-being of every individual, however single acts of justice may be contrary”. He even asserts that every individual person must find himself or herself a gainer, on balancing the account. This claim is impossible to prove, though, since there is no fixed point of time when we can “balance the account”. Any single person can borrow money, invest, and fail. The goods we produce may or may not find a purchaser. The profit we might gain through the system of fair transactions is, to say the least, uncertain. Still, it seems more desirable than not that people can take risks when they want to. This inclination towards uncertainty is not explained in Hume's quasiutilitarian account of justice. It is rather an aspect of human psychology he takes for granted when he sets out to deal with morals. It is the same mental operation Hume discusses when he examines the passion for philosophy, hunting, and gaming. Thus, it will appear that human social behaviour is not driven only by self-interest but also by playfulness, which gives rise to new discoveries and inventions.
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共同討議 II:サステイナビリティの哲学
  • 菅原 潤
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 105-118_L7
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Mainstream studies of environmental thought in the 90's can be divided into globalist and localist perspectives. Whereas a defender of globalism such as Hisatake Kato insists on the opposition between bio-and environmental ethics, Shuichi Kito as an advocate of localism criticizes the concept of wilderness in order to assess human environmentalism. However, at the beginning of this century, Kato and Kito are coming closer to each other because both agree in their tendencies toward pragmatism in a broad sense. Another recent development in environmental thought to which we should pay attention is the publication of Callicott's The Insight of the Earth which has been translated into Japanese. In this book he asserts that postmodern philosophy of science should carry over into various kinds of native environmental ideas. This multiculturalism of Callicott's supports some arguments about landscape that I developed in my book, referring to Krebs's Naturethik, Seel's Eine Ästhetik der Natur. This idea and the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) found in recent business ethics together combine to illuminate the problematics of the concept of sustainability.
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  • 丸山 徳次
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 119-137_L7
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the 1980s, the concept of sustainability has been much discussed, particularly in the context of “sustainable development”. One of the most important debates relates to whether we choose a concept of weak sustainability or strong sustainability. Weak sustainability assumes that man-made capital and natural capital are substitutable. In contrast, strong sustainability insists on the non-substitutability and complementarity of natural capital and man-made capital. In this paper, we prefer the paradigm of strong sustainability, with Herman Daly, and at the same time we insist on the need to critically expand his concept of natural capital. Specifically, we take an instrumentalist view of natural capital by adopting the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum, and we make the heterogeneity of natural capital clear and insist on the need to distinguish stocks and funds as subordinate concepts. Moreover, we examine briefly the history of German forestry and forest management that is the source of the sustainability concept, and clarify what we should learn from there. The sustainability of the forest had inevitably collapsed when technocracy joined with commercialism in a situation of immature ecological awareness. We suggest that respect for ecosystemic multiple functions is very important. The forest is not only one of the bases of life activity on earth, but also represents natural capital with multiple ecosystem services that should be sustained for future generations.
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総括
応募論文
  • 稲村 一隆
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 141-155_L8
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper attempts to make clear what Aristotle has in mind as civic friendship through the concepts of ‘sharing’ and ‘reciprocity’: in Aristotle's view, pace Cooper's interpretation that civic friendship is formed through ‘goodwill’, citizens need to be aware of mutual liking, and promote each other's well-being in a reciprocal way. Civic friendship is thus one kind of friendship which citizens develop when they are concerned with each other's benefits mainly through political authority or public service. Unlike Annas, who does not identify the essential characteristic of civic friendship, the present paper points out that Aristotle defines civic friendship as the reciprocal relationship of governing and being governed in turn for the sake of other people's benefits.
    Furthermore, the paper addresses the problem of why Aristotle repeatedly draws attention to the significance of friendship for politics, and does not exclude the possibility that ‘virtue friendship’ is developed among citizens, although he generally regards civic friendship as one kind of ‘advantage friendship’ in his ethical treatises. Concerning this problem, the paper maintains that friendship is a mark of the social environment in which citizens know each other's personality so that they can manage public affairs well. In addition, the reciprocal relationship of governing and being governed in turn through friendship makes it possible for citizens to cultivate their virtue, because citizens need to know how to govern a polis through their experiences of being governed. The paper therefore concludes that the idea of civic friendship plays an important role in Aristotle's ideas of how to govern a polis and educate citizens in the Politics.
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  • 植原 亮
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 157-172_L9
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Which is the ontologically plausible view about artifacts such as pencils, conventionalism or realism? While conventionalism says that human conventions create artifacts as nominal objects, realism says that they are real objects which we can capture in the causal structure of the world. This paper aims to defend realism about artifacts, and to criticize conventionalism.
    First, I describe two features of real objects, especially natural kinds: epistemologically, they are open to empirical investigation; semantically, the causal theory of reference is true of them. These features are supposed to reflect their ontological status. Second, I clarify the grounds for conventionalism: a thought experiment suggests that artifacts have the same features as nominal objects like bachelor. Semantically, the descriptive theory of reference is true of them. And in epistemological terms, they are closed to empirical investigation. Conventionalism says this reflects the ontological fact that artifacts are nominal objects.
    Concerning artifacts, however, realism is superior to this conventionalist claim and can be defended. I discuss a case where we are engaged in the division of linguistic or epistemic labor about some artifacts. This indicates that there are some cases in which reference to artifacts should be explained in terms of the causal theory just like natural kinds, which conventionalism cannot accommodate. Then I present a general realist scheme of artifacts based on these cases. On this account, artifacts have a kind of reality which depends on their specificity in functions, origins, etc. After arguing that the intuition in the conventionalist thought experiment does not seem to be valid or reliable generally, I show that my realist scheme can safely accommodate the conventionalist intuition and explain our epistemic and linguistic practices regarding artifacts in a coherent way.
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  • 岡本 源太
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 173-188_L10
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Lorsqu'il critique l'ignorance dans le De gli eroici furori (1585), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) cite paradoxalement une phrase de l'Ecclésiaste (1.18) : «qui augmente sa science augmente sa douleur». Pour quelle raison cite-t-il cette phrase afin de critiquer l'ignorance, et non la science? À partir de cette question, je tenterai ici de clarifier la relation entre ignorance et science chez Bruno.
    En fait, sa critique de l'ignorance est ambiguë, comme on peut le voir notamment dans le Cabala del cavallo pegaseo (1585), où Bruno examine le scepticisme. D'une part, il critique l'ignorance qui est liée à l'oisiveté. D'autre part, il l'accepte dans la mesure où on ne peut jamais acquérir la science et l'on doit rester ignorant car, selon lui, l'objet de la science, c'est-à-dire la nature, est infini et incompréhensible. C'est pourquoi celui qui poursuit la science sans limites éprouve la douleur due à la conscience de n'obtenir que des résultats incomplets.
    Mais Bruno ne pense point que soit vaine la poursuite infinie dont est issue la douleur de ne pas acquérir la science. Au contraire, cette douleur témoigne de la puissance infinie de l'homme qui peut poursuivre infiniment la nature infinie. C'est la raison pour laquelle Bruno critique l'ignorance, si elle est liée à l'oisiveté qui fait abandonner la poursuite infinie de la science. Sous-jacente à cette critique de l'ignorance-oisiveté, il y a donc la conception brunienne de la puissance infinie qui n'est pas privation mais perfection positive de l'homme.
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  • 小田桐 拓志
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 189-204_L11
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I will examine Nishida's ideas concerning self-awareness, rationality, and agency, and compare them with some related notions in contemporary (Anglophone) epistemology. In particular, I will clarify the so-called “rationality” thesis regarding first-person authority, and argue that some aspect of this thesis is relevant in examining Nishida's philosophical writings. I will also illuminate important differences between Nishida's and Anglophone ideas concerning rationality, and their respective notions of human action and agency.
    The thesis that the concepts of reason and first-person-hood are deeply involved in one another plays a crucial role in the theories of self-awareness in contemporary analytic philosophers such as Burge and Moran. Burge argues that, being a rational person, one already has an epistemic entitlement to one's own thought. Importantly, Nishida's idea of self-awareness has a similar structure. When Nishida discusses human action and self-awareness in the historical world, he often insists that there is a transcendental condition underlying self-awareness, and Nishida calls this underlying structure “reason as such.” In this paper, I will examine a few writings of Nishida (including a passage from Philosophical Writings (volume 2)), and attempt to show that Nishida regards “logic” and “life” as two aspects of the same phenomenon, “reason as such.”
    Nishida insists that reason as such is “irreducible to any object in consciousness,” arguing that one should not consider reason as noema, but as the noesis of consciousness. It is interesting to consider this statement as an analogue to so-called “rule-following” skepticism in the later Wittgenstein. If we can understand Nishida's idea of “reason as such” as the noetic nature of jikaku, which is irreducible to any objectifiable rules, this notion of reason fundamentally separates Nishida from Burge and Moran. The main difference between Nishida's and contemporary (Anglophone) theses about rationality is that, while the latter tend to consider reason in terms of prescriptive rules, Nishida's notion of reason is essentially characterized by rulefollowing skepticism. This is the point at which Nishida's rationality thesis and the theory of action arising from it differ from contemporary analytic theories of reason/action.
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  • 木村 史人
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 205-220_L12
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Martin Heidegger erklärt in seiner Vorlesung Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein« (1934/35): „Nicht wir haben die Sprache, sondern die Sprache hat uns, im schlechten und rechten Sinne“ (GA39, 23). Und in seiner Hölderlin-Interpretation nennt Heidegger die Sprache „das Gefährlichste“ oder „die Gefahr der Gefahren“.
    Im vorliegenden Aufsatz versuche ich, diese spezifische Anschauung Heideggers von der Sprache zu klären. Dazu untersuche ich zunächst seine Auffassung von Sprache in den 1920er Jahren, indem ich die Phänomenologie etymologisch analysiere. Anschließend versuche ich, den Charakter der Sprache in Heideggers Hölderlin-Interpretation in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren zu erläutern. Es hat den Anschein, dass Heideggers Interpretation der Sprache und ihrer Gefahr in seiner Hölderlin-Interpretation vieldeutig und verworren ist. Um seine Interpretation der Sprache und ihrer Gefahr richtig zu verstehen, müssen wir jedoch zunächst begreifen, wie Heidegger in seiner Hölderlin-Interpretation das Verhältnis des Dichters zum Heiligen (d. i. zur Natur bzw. zum Sein (Seyn)) und zu den Götter sieht und wie er das Verhältnis des Dichters zu den anderen Menschen deutet. Erst durch diese Erörterung wird eine eindeutige Interpretation von Heideggers Auffassung von Sprache und ihrer Gefahr möglich.
    Aus den Ergebnissen meiner Arbeit werden Kontinuität bzw. Diskontinuität im Zeitraum zwischen den 1920er Jahren und den 1940er Jahren in der Anschauung Heideggers von der Sprache deutlich.
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  • 小手川 正二郎
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 221-236_L13
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Dans Totalité et Infini (1961), Emmanuel Levinas, en insistant sur la distinction entre la volonté et la raison, affirme que la liberté de la volonté est donnée par l'Autre. Cette thèse, qui caractérise la philosophie de Levinas, risque toutefois de se heurter à beaucoup de problèmes: Levinas n'a-t-il pas avancé cette thèse de manière illogique et dogmatique? N'est-elle pas trop formaliste ou spéculative pour penser notre action? Non. Pour mettre en évidence le fait que la philosophie de Levinas n'est ni dogmatique ni spéculative, la présente étude essaie de rendre visible la logique lévinassienne qui sous-tend la structure entre la volonté et la raison et de donner à cette thèse un sens philosophique.
    En analysant «Liberté et commandement» (1953), nous reformulerons d'abord la théorie lévinassienne de la volonté. Ensuite, nous examinerons la distinction établie par Levinas, dans l'analyse du «discours» avec autrui, entre la volonté et la raison. En pensant concrètement le sens de cette distinction dans la structure de l' «enseignement», nous montrerons que la notion lévinassienne de raison comporte deux aspects: la raison qui objective ce qu'elle entend et la raison qui, d'une certaine façon, «connaît» ce qui n'a pas pu être connu, c'est-à-dire l'Autre, lequel, strictement parlant, n'est pas identifié avec «autrui» en tant qu'enseignant. Nous montrerons que la volonté qui cherche à comprendre ce qui n'a pas pu être connu relie ces deux aspects de la raison. En mettant en relation cette volonté avec la notion augustinienne de volonté, nous tenterons enfin de comprendre, de façon philosophique, la thèse lévinassienne selon laquelle la liberté de la volonté est donnée par l'Autre.
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  • 佐々木 正寿
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 237-252_L14
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Bei Dilthey wird die Dichtung vom Gesichtspunkt der Lebensphilosophie oder der Hermeneutik aus für „das Organ des Lebensverständnisses“ gehalten, und auch bei Nishida wird sie als „der Ausdruck des Lebens“ gesehen. Als ein exemplarisches Beispiel dafür kann man vor allem die japanische Tanka-Dichtung nennen, deren Methode, das „Sha-sei“ (Beschreibung des Lebens), das Selbstverständnis des faktischen Lebens darzustellen versucht. Diese Auffassung der Dichtung kann man insbesondere mit Hilfe der hermeneutischen Untersuchung des faktischen Lebens oder Daseins bei Heidegger genauer betrachten.
    In der ›Hermeneutik der Faktizität‹ seiner frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen und anschließend in der ›Phänomenologie des Daseins‹ in Sein und Zeit hat Heidegger das faktische Leben oder Dasein phänomenologisch ausgelegt und das Phänomen der Stimmung - „Befindlichkeit“ - als die Erschlossenheit des faktischen Lebens oder Daseins bezeichnet. Der ›Phänomenologie des Daseins‹ nach wird das „befindliche“ Verständnis vor der Auslegung oder Aussage durch die „Rede“ artikuliert, und deren „Hinausgesprochenheit“ ist die Sprache. Da sich dabei die „Befindlichkeit“ als die Erschlossenheit des Daseins und ferner das „befindliche“ Verständnis als das Selbstverständnis des Daseins zeigen lässt, kann die Sprache daher als ursprünglich der Erschlossenheit des Daseins, d. h. aus seinem Selbstverständnis, entspringend verstanden werden.
    Auch die Dichtung als ein Phänomen der Sprache müsste dann ursprünglich aus der „Befindlichkeit“ - Erschlossenheit des Daseins - her, d. h. aus seinem Selbstverständnis her, entstehen. So gesehen könnte die Dichtung als die Artikulation des befindlichen Verständnisses des Daseins, d. h. als die Artikulation seines existenziellen Selbstverständnisses, bezeichnet werden.
    Vom Gesichtspunkt der phänomenologisch-hermeneutischen Philosophie her könnte man in der Dichtung eine Möglichkeit der Artikulation des existenziellen Selbstverständnisses des faktischen Lebens oder Daseins entdecken. In diesem Sinne könnte man das Gedicht als einen exemplarischen Text für die hermeneutische Philosophie bezeichnen, die das faktische Leben oder Dasein als solches auszulegen versucht.
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  • 佐藤 暁
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 253-266_L15
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Inquiry into the theory of meaning (hereafter refered to as “inquiry”) is a new method of inquiry in the philosophy of language proposed in the 1960s. It was considered new in terms of both its subject and method. In this paper, we identify the subject and method of Dummett's analysis, as he advocated his anti-realist theory of meaning. For Dummett, inquiry is the analysis of the ability that a person who can speak a language actually has, that is, a practical ability to speak a particular language. The ability to speak a language is not the ability to speak sentences or a set of such abilities, because one learns to speak a language not by memorizing sentences or their use. An analysis of the ability to speak a language is parallel to that of an ability to cook a particular dish. Dummett says a theory of meaning is a description of linguistic ability.
    However, it is not clear how we can philosophically “describe” an unobservable ability that is distinguished from any observable act. In justifying his project, Dummett asserts that practical abilities can be classified as knowledge or nonknowledge. The former abilities, being knowledge themselves, have propositions the knowledge of which translates to the ability itself. These propositions are not a description of the ability from the outside but an “internal description” of such an ability. The propositions themselves are components of an ability, and abilities can be philosophically analyzed by clarifying these propositions. Dummett states that the abilities to speak a language and cook a dish are both knowledge.
    In cooking, the recipe of a dish is an internal description of the ability to cook the dish. Therefore, we can clarify propositions corresponding to a recipe in cooking as an analysis of linguistic ability. Clarifying such propositions is inquiry, and the propositions constitute a theory of meaning for language.
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  • 佐山 圭司
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 267-281_L16
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Der Einfluss Jacobis auf den Frankfurter Hegel wurde zwar in der Forschung gelegentlich erwähnt, aber bisher nicht eigens thematisiert, weil es in den Frankfurter Entwürfen keine direkte Bezugnahme auf ihn gibt. Die vorliegende Abhandlung legt dar, dass die zentralen Begriffe des Frankfurter Hegel, wie Sein, Glauben und Leben, tief von den Gedanken geprägt sind, die Jacobi u. a. in seinem berühmten Spinoza-Buch entwickelt hat.
    Jacobis Einfluss manifestiert sich vor allem in zwei Punkten. 1) Er interpretiert Spinozas unendliche Substanz als Sein, das allem Endlichen vorausgeht und nicht der Vernunft als diskursivem Wissen, sondern nur dem Glauben als unmittelbarer Überzeugung zugänglich ist. Dieser Gedanke steht im Hintergrund, wenn Hegel im Fragment „Glauben und Sein“ postuliert, dass Sein als Vereinigung nur geglaubt werden könne.
    2) Jacobi greift in seiner Schrift „David Hume“ auf die Monadenlehre von Leibniz zurück, um die mechanistische Naturauffassung zu kritisieren. In dem der zweiten Auflage des Spinoza-Buchs beigelegten Bruno-Auszug stellt er zudem die spinozistische Substanz als das alle Dinge im Universum durchdringende einzige Leben dar. Hierdurch wird die Substanzlehre Spinozas mit dem Organismusdenken und dem Individuationsprinzip von Leibniz verbunden. An diese Verbindung knüpft der junge Schelling in seiner Naturphilosophie an und mit ihm versteht Hegel das Leben nach dem Modell des lebendigen Organismus als das sich aus sich selbst hervorbringende Ganze. In diesen Überlegungen zum Lebensbegriff liegt der Keim von Hegels späterem dialektischem Denken.
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  • 菅沼 聡
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 283-298_L17
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, reality-in-itself and the absolute whole (of everything) —two of the most radically metaphysical ideas—are critically examined from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint. The legitimacy of both ideas has long been doubted, particularly since the criticisms of Kant's thing-in-itself (by Fichte and others), and since some paradoxes of set theory (such as Cantor's paradox), respectively. In section 1 of this paper, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of something real-in-itself are presented, and examined to confirm (more explicitly than ever before) that the idea of reality-in-itself cannot be easily maintained. Likewise, in section 2, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of the absolute whole (of everything) are presented, and examined to confirm that this idea cannot easily be maintained either. In section 3, however, the concept of an absolute whole of reality-in-itself (hereafter, |R|) is introduced by combining the above two ideas. Because this concept is formulated by combining two of the most radically metaphysical ideas, |R| can/could be called the “most metaphysical” reality. In view of the results presented in sections 1 and 2, the existence of |R| might be expected to be doubly doubtful. However, the results presented in section 3 are quite the opposite. It is argued that both the truth/ justification conditions are exceptionally satisfied in |R| (hence |R| exists), and thus, both ideas can be exceptionally maintained in |R|.
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  • 中野 裕考
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 299-314_L17
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Das Ziel dieser Abhandlung besteht darin, im Rahmen der theoretischen Philosophie Kants zu zeigen, dass die Aufnahme aller Anschauungen von der Spontaneität des Subjekts abhängig ist. Alle sinnlichen Anschauungen entstehen sukzessiv, d. h. innerhalb der Zeit, aber die Zeit ist nach Kant die Form des inneren Sinnes, der seinen Inhalt dadurch empfängt, indem er von der Spontaneität des Subjekts affiziert wird. Wenn alle, sowohl äußere als auch innere Anschauungen der Zeit gemäß aufgenommen werden, dann muss die Spontaneität als eine Bedingung dieser Aufnahme vorausgesetzt werden. Das bedeutet nicht, dass das Subjekt den Inhalt der Erkenntnis von sich selbst bestimmen oder hervorbringen kann. Vielmehr behauptet die These nur, dass die Aufnahme der Anschauungen nicht entstünde, wenn das Subjekt selbst keine „Bewegung“ leistete.
    Um diese Behauptung zu begründen, stellt der erste Abschnitt folgendes Problem dar: Kant schließt die Beteiligung des Verstandes bei der Aufnahme der Anschauungen aus, während er zugleich bekräftigt, dass mannigfaltige Anschauungen irgendeine spontane Synthesis brauchen, um als solche vorgestellt zu werden. Der zweite Abschnitt wirft eine Frage auf, wie es möglich ist, die Bewegung eines äußeren Gegenstandes anzuschauen. Kant zählt manchmal die Bewegung zu den äußeren Anschauungen, obwohl die Zeit, die für die Anschauung der Bewegung nötig ist, die Form des inneren Sinnes ist. Im dritten Abschnitt werden diese Probleme durch eine Interpretation des Begriffes der transzendentalen Synthesis der Einbildungskraft beantwortet, die von Kant als Bewegung des Subjekts interpretiert wird. Aus der Analyse dieser Synthesis der Einbildungskraft ergibt sich, dass die Bewegung des Subjekts eine notwendige Bedingung der Aufnahme der Anschauungen in Raum und Zeit ist. Daher muss die Spontaneität der Bewegung als eine Bedingung für die Aufnahme der Anschauungen angesehen werden.
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  • 水野 俊誠
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 315-328_L18
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Three main theories exist concerning the concept of happiness: the hedonism theory, the desire fulfillment theory, and the objective list theory. The hedonism theory states that happiness has pleasure or pleasurable mental states as its only required component. According to the desire fulfillment theory, happiness is obtained when one's desires are fulfilled. In the objective list theory, the pursuit of certain things contributes to happiness, regardless of whether these are desired or lead to pleasurable mental states.
    John Stuart Mill is often labeled a hedonist because he wrote, “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”. However, some of his writings also indicate that he accepts the desire fulfillment theory and the objective list theory as well. Many different interpretations have therefore been presented concerning Mill's concept of happiness, and in this paper I examine some of the main interpretations and clarify Mill's concept of happiness.
    I propose that Mill's fundamental position is hedonism, but argue that his concept of happiness was consistent with some elements of the objective list theoryes. When considering elements of the objective list theory, he admits that happiness comprises the pursuit of certain things for themselves; however, he does not agree that such things contribute to happiness regardless of their pleasantness.
    My interpretation of Mill's concept of happiness is consistent with the evolution of his thought as it developed away from Benthamic hedonism and later incorporated Romanticism.
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  • 宮崎 文典
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 329-344_L19
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In Plato's Gorgias 474c4-475e6, the issue of whether it is worse to do injustice or suffer it is considered. Socrates and Polus discuss this issue, regarding it as a problem in relation to their own choice of action and way of life. Polus thinks that suffering injustice is worse than doing it. He also thinks, on the other hand, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. Socrates shows him that it is by exceeding in evil that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. As a result, Polus concedes that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
    Here, we can find a surface and a deeper significance in the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. At the surface level, (1) a ‘fine or shameful’ judgment has no effect on a judgment of good or bad, and (2) a ‘fine or shameful‘ judgment is not linked to one's choices of action and way of life. However, the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful indicates, deep down, a truer sense of good and bad which are not equated with pleasure and pain, i. e., the judgment reveals what is good and bad for the soul. In this discussion, Polus is, at first, only aware of the surface meaning of his own judgment that doing injustice is more shameful. Socrates shows him the deeper meaning.
    We can find, here, a fundamental problem with rhetoric: rhetoric concerns persuasion about what is just and unjust, and, faced with public opinion, orators cannot deny that what is just is fine and what is unjust is shameful; but rhetoric cannot make clear the true meaning of the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice, because it aims at pleasure without regard for the good for the soul. Rather, the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice are based on taking care of the soul by political techne.
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  • 宮園 健吾
    2011 巻 (2011) 62 号 p. 345-359_L20
    公開日: 2011/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    We can imagine innumerable propositions, including ones that are not actually true. But not all propositions are imaginable. We have difficulty in imagining some propositions, such as logically contradictory or conceptually incoherent ones. So what kinds of propositions are imaginable? How can we characterize imaginable propositions?
    One possible answer is what we might call the Humean Hypothesis, according to which p is imaginable if and only if p is possible. But there are some serious counterexamples to the Humean Hypothesis. For instance, the proposition that Hesperus is not Phosphorus is clearly imaginable, but it is not possible. A better answer is provided by the Same Possible Content Hypothesis, which says that p is imaginable if and only if p is believable. The Same Possible Content Hypothesis is so called, because it says that the possible propositional content of the imagination coincides with the possible propositional content of belief. This hypothesis seems to be plausible, and it is free from the difficulties that the Humean Hypothesis faces. The proposition that Hesperus is not Phosphorus is imaginable and, at the same time, it is also believable.
    The Same Possible Content Hypothesis offers a way to investigate the nature of the mental state of imagination. Some philosophers have pointed out the similarity between imagination and belief, especially in terms of inferential coherence, triggering emotion and causing behavior. And the Same Possible Content Hypothesis adds further weight to their claim, revealing a new aspect in which imagination and belief are similar. By investigating the underlying causes of these similarities, we will be able to learn more about the nature of imagination and belief.
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