The political process from the first year of Meiji to the fourth is regarded as the development of centralization by means of the policy which makes fiefs the same local administrative district as prefectures ("Sanchi-itchi"). And the core of it is to dismember "Shizoku" (ex-Samurai) by "Chitsuroku-shobun". The subject of this paper is to make it clear that "Chihanji" (land administrators) abolished fiefs of their own accord or intended to do so when they found that policy unable to realize because of "Sizoku"s strong request of the maintenance of their privilege. The execution of "Chitsuroku-shobun" was an important authority of "Chihanji", which made him meet with accute opposition of "Shizoku" and "Chitsuroku-shobun" insufficient. This is the cause of the difficulty of the realization of "Sanchi-itchi". They found a way out of the financial deadlock in the dismemberment of "Shizoku" by returning them to the farm and changing their stipend into securities. But because of the strong request of the maintenance of their priviledge, both the ways were insufficient, so that the financial condition of fiefs were still in difficulty. Thus "Chihanji" was confronted with the difficulty of the realisation of "Sanchi-itchi", so that he lost his confidence of managing fiefs. And he decided to abolish fiefs at their own will or accepted "Haihan-chiken" as unavoidable. In the case of the former, most of them did it after the promulgation of "Hansei". (institution of a fief) in September the third year of Meiji. For "Hansei" compeled the reform to make old fiefs new which was the same as "Fu, Ken" mainly from the regulation of a finance whose core is "Chitsuroku-shobun" to raise funds to redeem the debts of fiefs.

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Japan, a backward country in the 19th century, applyed the most modern banking system from the advanced countries in Western Europe. The Industrial Bank of Japan, incorporated in 1900, was modeled on the Credit Mobilier in France. However, contrary to the planners' expectation, the real which the Industrial Bank of Japan played in 1900's was quite different from the roal which the Credit Mobilier played in France in 1850's. The points of difference were as follows. (1) Credit Mobilier made long-term loans to capital using firms as railway firms, but, in Japan, long-term loans to such firms were made by zaibatsu holding companies and zaibatsu banks. The Industrial Bank of Japan could only take an active part in the investment to the colonies such as Korea and China, which zaibatsu hadn't dare because of the possibility of suffering loss. (2) Credit Mobilier could raise the funds; collecting the savings of the French people, and even made loans to the foreign countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy. On the contrary, having difficulties in raising funds, the Industrial Bank of Japan issued bonds in Western Europe and U. S./In Japan, the savings of the people were very few as the feudalism survived till 1873. (3) In France, after the violent conflict between "old wealth" (the haute banque) and "new wealth" (the Credit Mobilier), the Pereires-the representatives of "new wealth"-beat the Roths-childs-the representatives of "old wealth". In Japan, "old wealth" (zaibatsu such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi) mutilated the bill of the Industrial Bank of Japan which had been advanced by a part of the Bureaucrats and the small class industrial bourgeoisie.

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Under Japanese fascism, sangyo-kumiais (agricultural co-operatives) controlled the household and the management of the peasantry. They became indispensable institution for the implimentation of the agricultural policy of the state in wartime. In order to make clear the causes which urged the rapid development of this institution, it might be important to analyse the tention between the managenial aspect of this sangyo-kumiai and its political function which meant to harmonize the interest of landowners and that of peasants. In the 1920's agrarian disputes over the landowner-peasant rerationsbip had spread all over Japan. The government used police force to suppress the peasant movement to prevent their bringning political unstability, while planning to improve the deteriorating economic conditions of the peasantry. Thus sangyo-kumiais were encoraged and given aids by government officials, whose policy strongly reflected the interest of landowners. With sangyo-kumiai, officials intended to bring small profit to peasant members. However, the weak managerial and financial position of small and poor peasant members, for whose economic stability this institution was encouraged publicly, brought managerial and financial difficulties to sangyo-kumiais. By the way, Japanese imperialism did not have the ability to harmonize the two classes (landowners and peasantry) by spending policy or easy finance for peasantry. So each sangyo-kumiai, whose membership covered the peasants and landowners in a village, was obliged to expand by itself without much financial help of the state. Although this applies in the 1930's typically, in the 1920's too it did cleary. After 1933, when "sangyo-kumiai expansion movement" started, two types of policy to relieve peasants economy were pursued. One is the policy of financing low interest money suuplied by landowners to sangyo-kumiai, the other being the policy of making the household of peasantry more frugal. This policy was pursued too in the 1920's at the area where peasantry movement was fiercely fought. In the 1930's such policy spread all over Japan and was thoroughly pursued. Therefore, the agrarian policy pursued by Japanese fascism originated in the 1920's. Now, the policy intended to protect the interest of landowners through suppressing agrarian disputes. However, it led landowners to bear much expence snch as making them finance sangyo-kumiais. Thus the agrarian policy, served monopoly capitalism, was being strengthened after the 1920's.

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