The objective of this article is to make clear the significance of the contract farming system in Mexico by means of some detailed case studies. The contract farming system usually involves the developed countries' agribusiness and farmers in rigid contracts with respect to their agricultural production and supply of agricultural products. It has often attracted researchers' attention as a strategy of the rural development in less-developed countries, and was formulated as "the core-satellite model" by Arther Goldsmith (1985). The case studies in this article deal with production of asparagus and strawberry. These crops have been grown for exporting abroad from Mexico since the beginning of their production. Both the production and export of these crops have remarkably increased since the 1960s. They are mainly exported to the United States and other developed countries. In the States of Guanajuato and Michoacan, which are the prime producers of these crops in Mexico, the large-scale farmers concentrate a large proportion of the total sales of farm products, irrigated land, farm laborers, and so on. One of the case studies investigates the contract farming of asparagus in Bajio Vally (in the State of Guanajuato), the other analyzes that of strawberry in Zamora Vally (in the State of Michoacan). These case studies make it clear that the most advanced technologies in agriculture have been introduced to Mexico through the contract farming there, and as a result of this, the productivity of the Mexican agriculture has been unambiguously enhanced. The large-scale farmers have further increased the number of their farm laborers and enlarged the scale of cultivation. The small-scale farmers, by contrast, have little opportunity to share the benefits provided by the contract farming. On the other hand, the contract farming system enables the agribusiness to command farmers' production by holding the channels of sales, furnishing credit in kind, and rigidly controlling the production process in agriculture. The agribusiness can also extend their sphere of activities into the farm supplying industries. In short, the contract farming system functions as one of the new ways of comprehensively controlling agriculture by the agribusiness, and creates a new form of the evolution in capitalistic agriculture. Completely commercial agricurture is operated under the total control of the agribusiness, for the purpose of sales in the world market, with the most advanced technologies applied.

View full abstract

In 1897, after Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan colonial finance was established as Tokubetsu Kaikei meaned special account. After Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War, the profits of monopoly system in Taiwan, especially from Opium, Camphor and Tabacco, occupied more than a half of total annual tax revenue. In general, the key of succeeding monopoly system is the exclusive supply of monopoly goods by colonial government, therefore, illicit buying and selling must be strictly prohibited. So, also in Taiwan, Opium monopoly system had accouted huge police expenditure. In case of Camphor, police protected getting material frees of Camphor by manufactures. Moreover, as the profits of Camphor monopoly had depended on its exportation, competitive goods in world market must had been excluded or controlled their prices in order to sell Taiwan's Camphor. Japanese Camphor as competitive goods could have been controlled under Japan-Taiwan common monopoly system, but Chinese or artificial ones couldn't managed. Therefore, they consequently threatened Taiwan monopoly system. In process of circulation of this system, Mitsui Bussan Co., Samuel-Samuel & Co., and Suzuki Shoten Co., Japanese and English trade company had been responsible for importing Opium material and exporting Camphor. In Sino-Japanese postwar, Taiwan colonial finance was protected, for example, by Camphor common monopoly system. But after Russo-Japanese War it was reorganized. Namely, general account of mother country closed support money so long conpensated the lack of colonial revenue. Also Taiwan finance was forced to transfer sugar consumption duty sharing Japanese consumption. So Taiwan needed new revenue, Wine monopoly system had been introduced in 1922.

View full abstract

In a rice growing village of the Kita (northern)-Kanto region, tenancy disputes occured frequently in prewar period. This study aims to clarify the following issues. Why did tenants raise their demands? How could they advance economically? How was the landlordism transformed by disputes? Objects of my study are tenants and the resident landlord Tanami (owned 30 cho of paddy in 1947) who lived in Naka village, Tochigi prefecture. My conclusions are as follows. Tenants won temporary reduction of paddy rent by 1921 's dispute, and permanent ones in 1922, 1924. Subsequently, they demanded temporary rent reduction in years of low rice price, and poor harvest. The reason they demanded rent reduction was that they could hardly fill their household expenditure with agricultural income. Early 1920s' disputes were commanded by large sclae tenants. But profited by rent reduction, they left the front gradually. 1930s' disputes were commanded by small scale tenants, but these disputes were no more effective than those of 1920s'. By early 1920s' disputes, Tanami's rent income was reduced. And land investment turned difficult for him. Then he became enthusiastic in stock investment, and he could enjoy a large stock income. After all, his domestic economy went on scaling up. Thus, disputes couldn't drive landlord's economy to reduction. In spite of frequent disputes, resident landlords like Tanami, did not reduce their land. It was absentee landlord that was forced to reduce his land, who failed to collect rent without difficulty. Furthermore, shopkeepers and salaried workers became small landlords. On the other hand, tenants who could save their surplus not only by reducing rent level but raising land productivity, and consequently entered the land market, were only the owner-tenants of large scale classes. Large number of the landless tenants could obtain no land untill Land Reform after the war. Disputes could reduce landlords' rent collecting power to some extent, but couldn't pull down the high amount nature of rent paid in kind.

View full abstract