The purpose of this article is to clarify the logic governing the behavior of farming emigrants by analyzing the realities of their village management and living arrangements. In those days, the political purpose in dispatching the first group of emigrant peasants, called the pilot group of emigrants, was to maintain public security, in order to control Manchuria. In order to achieve this goal, it was essential to make these emigrants settle in villages without employing Chinese labor and thus avoid conflict between them and the local Chinese. The first emigrant group of peasants established cooperative management and communal living (the village being divided into ten communities based on member's prefecture of origin) within three years after their settlement in Manchuria (from 1933 to 1935), shifting to unit-based cooperative management and joint living in 1936 (each unit consisted of four farmers). Soon afterwards, in 1937 they changed to individualized farm management and living. In particular, the unit-based joint management did not rely on employing local labor but used draft animals to supplement family labor.This was considered the most rational management style and the most promising agricultural policy. Contrary to this initial policy, however, local labor was employed in the subsequent year of 1937. This facilitated more extensive agriculture, following an increase in the cultivation area for wheat and other grains for animal consumption. Since there was an abundance of forest resources in the first district settled, the migrants decided to branch out into the forestry industry, which would produce greater revenues with the utilization of draft animals. Because of this, migrant farmers easily mastered individualized management. However, none of the massive revenues obtained through forestry operations were ever used for the improvement of agricultural management. In addition,the emigrant farmers cut down trees so recklessly as to drive forest resources to the verge of exhaustion. It is, therefore, concluded that such operations did not reflect the farmer's interest in the permanence of resources ; rather, it resulted from blatantly plunder-oriented colonialism.

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In 19th century Bavaria, as in many other German states, legal restrictions on marriage were adopted to prevent population increase among poor families. Setting aside the original aim of the law this article considers the influences of the legislation upon farmers and agricultural servants in the area. In the rural area of Upper Bavaria, the main region of the present study, the principle of impartible inheritance was general and therefore there were many agricultural servants who were employed by farmers as laborers and lived in their employer's house. They were single. The farmer needed servants to maintain his large farm, but the servants would not obey the employer. Disobedience among servants was a long standing issue for the government authorities, too. It is clear that the Minister of Home Affairs, Ottingen von Wallerstein, sought to improve the attitude of servants, partly by putting rigorous conditions on marriage, which was the earnest desire of the servants, and partly by giving the right to determine whether servants might marry to the village communities i.e. the farmers. Marriage would bring independence from the farmer who was the object of the servants' disobedience. In addition, the legislation was useful in relieving the shortage of able agricultural servants. The legislation required servants to serve an apprenticeship of at least 15 years. Finaly, I look at the social background that enabled the legislation to function-the low removability of the servants reflecting the closed constitution of the village communities and the tolerant attitude to illegitimate birth among the village communities.

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The aim of this article is to clarify the formation of sales networks for artificial fertilizer by researching the role of fertilizer merchants. In this article, we deal with one particular fertilizer merchant, Hiroe Kahei, who lived in the west part of Ibaraki prefecture. The main conclusions are as follows : (1) Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company, the first manufacturer of superphosphate fertilizer, faced difficulties in finding outlets for its products at the time of its foundation, 1887. To promote sales, the company made special contracts with influential fertilizer merchants, and gave them monopoly rights on the products over wide areas. These agents had retailers under them, and sold the products wholesale. Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company constructed its sales network in this way. (2) After the Sino-Japanese War there was a sharp rise in the demand for superphosphate fertilizer. Osaka Ryuso, an Osaka based fertilizer manufacturer, extended its business to produce superphosphate fertilizer, and found its way into the Kanto market as well as the Kansai market. Consequently, both manufacturers launched aggressive sales campaigns in the late 1890s. In this sales war, problems appeared in the sales network of Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company. Merchants who wanted to deal in the products were prevented from doing so because of the wide areas covered by the monopolies. As a measure to deal with this problem, Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company established a marketing cooperative, Ibaraki Nissei & Co, in 1900 and allowed major retailers and newcomers to participate in the cooperative. As a result, major retailers were able to make special contracts directly with Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company. (3) Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Company was forced to reduce the wholesaler's margin during the sales war. This rationalization of distribution made Hiroe Kahei change his role from wholesaler to manufacturer. He compounded several kinds of fertilizer and sold them directly to farmers. The costs of distributing artificial fertilizer were cut down by the elimination of wholesalers. This reduction made it possible to expand the artificial fertilizer market.

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