In 1931 the Law regarding the Control of Important Industries was enacted. Under this law the government, the Ministry of Commerce arid Industry was given powers, both to compel non-members of cartels to abide by cartel regulations and also to prevent any abuses of monopolistic power. The purpose of this paper is to make clear the administrative policy of this "Law of Control" and its revision in 1936. Some conclusions are as follows. (1) After 1933, when a trend of price increases began to appear, the administrative policy of government regarding "Law of Control" shifted from encouraging cartels during depression to protecting the public interest. In highly oligopolic Industries, such as paper, sugar and beer manufacturing, the government often supervised the productions, sales and prices policies of cartels. On the other hand, in competitive oligopolic Industries, such as carbide, and sulfuric acid manufacturing, the government intentionally maintained competition between cartel members and non-members, although cartel members demanded that the government compeled non-members to abide by cartel regulations. In the cement industry, which many new enterprises entered and existing companies invested in plant and equipment in spite of law rates of capacity utilization, the government intervened on the basis of the "Law of Control" with the aim of optimizing distribution of resources. (2) In terms of effect, the warnings of the government against highly oligopolistic Industries achived its aim. After this cartels began to hesitate in implementing price rises and production restrictions. At that time it should be noticed that the big businesses which led the cartel activities intended these low prices as a way to increase demand and to prevent new entries. But in the cement industry such intervention failed. Competition became greater in spite of intervention aimed at restricting competition and the enlargement of capacity by outsiders in Korea and new entries were not stopped. As a consequence of this the rate of capacity utilization became quite higher than before. (3) In 1936 the "Law of Control" was revised with the purpose of solveing the problems mentioned above. The points of revision were (i) to enlarge the enforcement district to Korea and Introduce regulations of new entries and investment in new equipment, and (ii) to apply the "Law" to the trusts which were established during recovery period. By this revision, the intervention of government became more positive and effective. But after the outbreak of the war with China in July 1937 the role of the "Law of Control" was gradually reduced because obstructive factors in cartel activities were no longer outsiders, but the lack of raw materials, and inflation made price manipulation by cartels ineffective. For this reason, government controls stronger and more derective than the "Law of Control" were urgently needed. Lastly we should 'mention that the intervention of the government on the basis of "the Law of Control" was a "prototype" for the Industrial policy of Ministry of Industry and Trade in the post-war period.

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Beaujolais, situated in the southeast of France, is known as a region of wine production since the 17th century. The purpose of our inquiry is to make clear the relations between the seignior and the peasantry in the economic life of a seigniory of the region. Some results are as follows. In the seigniory of Saint-Lager the seigniorial rights except for the honorary ones tended to be more or less reduced in the face of the growing royal imposition since the 16th century: the two powers were in competition for taking away the surplus of peasant product. But after the 1640's which were marked by the triumph of the monarchy, the cens (seigniorial rent) was nearly maintained on the same level, and it represented with the dime infeodee (tithe enfeoffed to the seignior by the Chapter of Saint-Paul of Lyon) about 40% of the seigniorial incomme. On the other hand, from a view point of the charges which weighed on the peasantry the seigniorial rights were extremely modest: they represented only 2〜3% of the net product while the royal imposition 29%. The viticulture under the metayage system constituted the central exploitation of the seigniorial demesne. The seignior-proprietor supplied the domaine et cellier which was composed of vineyards, wheat fields, house and agricultural equipment such as vat and wine-press, in sharing out with his vigneron (sharecropper of wine) the rest of the capital such as seeds and fodders. It was not always easy for the vigneron to furnish his part, that made him have recourse to the financing of his master. More narrow was the financial relation between the two persons concerned, more the vigneron looked like a simple farmhand engaged by the seignior-proprietor; the debt in this case resembled the advance. The majority of peasants were the mgnerons of the nobles and of the bourgeois of Lyon. Their exploitations, too small, did not pass much beyond 10ha in the maximum. At the head of the peasant proprietors called in this region habitants appeared some rural bourgeois who were the merchants as such as dealers of wine, and whose vineyards were cultivated by the vignerons and farmhands. The rural bourgeois continued with zeal to acquire the vineyards as did it the bourgeois of Lyon; we know that the vineyard produced 3〜4 times much more than the wheat field.

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