Among the several ship construction programs, which brought a significant increase in merchant ship construction in postwar Japan, the 5th program in 1949 signaled a radical change in policy. Both the number of ships to be built and tonnage per ship were sharply increased. This change was partly resulted from the relaxation of the policies on reparation and the reduction of military industrial production in the Japanese economy. The 5th program reflected a change in the occupation policy as the international political situation was moving towards the Cold War. However, the program was also the embodiment of a plan to create a Japanese economy that was self-supporting, on the assumption that the aid from the United States had to be reduced or discontinued. The purpose of this article is to examine the aims and goals of the occupation forces through the lens of administration of the 5th Ship Construction Program and the export of vessels. The Economic Scientific Section(ESS), one of the occupation authorities that was involved in shipbuilding in Japan, took a firm stance on stimulating the export of vessels and planned shipbuilding. ESS considered that the export of ships was essential in order to create a self-supporting Japanese economy, regardless of whether rehabilitation of a domestic shipbuiding industry would be achieved or not. It encouraged the export and building of steel vessels despite strong opposition from the American shipping industry, and the British and Dutch governments. With regard to the recovery of the Japanese economy, the change in the occupation policy in Washington D.C. did not contradict the ESS's view. Under these circumstances, the 5th program became five times larger than the 4th program. It should be noted that through this process, the dominant industry in occupied Japan had shifted from coal mining to shipping and shipbuilding.

View full abstract

The purpose of this article is to present a new interpretation of the trade policy plan during the First World War, especially from November 1915 to February 1917, while also taking into account the trade policy after the war. Previous research has focused on the clash of the "imperial expansion" and "imperial preference" lines, from the latter part of the 19th century to the 1930s. Most assert that the latter triumphed during the war. A famous Tariff Reformer, W.A.S. Hewins, advocated the trade policy plan on the "imperial preference line". He planned a close relationship between the British Empire and the Allies based on tariff preference, which was closed to other nations. However he shortsightedly neglected the possible problems from such a plan. On the other side, most Chambers of Commerce and Lord Balfour of Burleigh, a free trader and chairman of a famous committee, sought a more open Empire which would trade with as many countries as possible, taking into account the importance of trade with neutral countries. They recognized the tariff policy as only part of over all trade policy, which contributed to the maintenance of a more open Empire. The resolution of "imperial preference" adopted by the Balfour committee also contained the plan of a more open Empire, not excluding the possibility of tariff policy. After the war, Britain had a tariff policy for strategic products, aiming at omnidirectional trades and maintaining a more open Empire. This policy stemmed from the trade policy plan developed during the war and resulted in Britain searching for a 'third line' different from the "imperial expansion" and "imperial preference" lines.

View full abstract

It is alleged that major British Banks became increasingly conservative in the 1890s when the amalgamation movement accelerated. In particular, many researchers contend that general managers in head offices in that period decided to put an end to what they considered to be over-commitments (a close linkage between local bankers and industrialists), so that branch managers were submitted to a close supervision and strict conditions were imposed on their lending by their head offices. However, there is little empirical research to substantiate such a conclusion. The aim of this article is to rethink this picture by empirically researching industrial lending by branches of Lloyds Bank. For this study we use contemporary, confidential bank records, "Private Memoranda" written by branch managers of Lloyds Bank. This documents provide us with rich information on operating accounts. We analyse two cases of lending to small firms from the bankers' records. In these cases, Lloyds Bank extended their limits of overdrafts and made long term accommodations through the rolling-over of short period loans against debentures issued by borrowers. (The bankers' goal with such securities is mainly to obtain a floating charge upon borrower's assets.) The results of the case studies of branches confirms a previous research by Capie and Collins of the lending industry, that aralyses the reasons for negative decisions made by Lloyds Bank and Midland Bank. Therefore, it seems the flexible attitude of bankers towards industries was not exceptional, and the establishment of the head office-branch system did not affect industrial lending to a large degree. Further, the bankers' flexible attitudes toward industrial customers are comfirmed from an another point of view. This is because the major banks made inroads into industrial districts and competed to gain industrial customers. There are ample reasons to believe that branch managers were anxious to help their customers. In sum, our study challenges the view that British banks became conservative from the 1890s onward.

View full abstract