The Journal of Agrarian History
Online ISSN : 2423-9070
Print ISSN : 0493-3567
Volume 18, Issue 3
Displaying 1-6 of 6 articles from this issue
  • Article type: Cover
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages Cover2-
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Akira Hara
    Article type: Article
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages 1-28
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper attempts to give a brief sketch of the Co-Prosperity Sphere during the War period, 1931-45. My conclusions are as follows : (A) The three "bloc economies"-the "Japan-Manchuria Bloc" of the first stage (1931-36), the "Japan-Manchuria-China Bloc" of the second (1937-41), and the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" of the third stage (1941-45)-were ・disruptively constructed systems. Economic policy and administration of the areas occupied by Japan differed in each period and region. The structure of each region's principal investment institution, its trade relations with Japan, and its. monetary policies underwent necessary changes as regional conditions changed and as the Japanese wartime economy suffered setbacks. (B) The Japanese government used three different types of investment institutions. During the first stage, special state corporations, from which Zaibatsu investment was excluded, were chartered with exclusive rights to develop one industry in one region. In the second stage, three large-scale state policy concerns, with subsidiary companies representing many industries, were established. Zaibatsu as well as government funds were invested in these concerns. In the third stage, the Japanese government designated private companies to develop enterprises in occupied areas. In short, private capital contributed an increasingly large proportion of investment funds. (C) The formation of neither the "Japan-Manchuria Bloc" nor the "Japan-Manchuria-China Bloc" helped Japan's balance of payments. Imports of war materials from the U. S. or Europe could not be substituted for by products from occupied areas. Moreover, the intervention of trade between the S. E. Asian colonies and their former suzerain states by Japan's invation caused economic disaster in those regions. (D) During the first two stages, the Japanese government tried to establish central regional banks and to issue notes linked to the yen. In Manchuria, the monetary system was successfully unified. In China, however, puppet bank notes or Japanese military notes were prevented from circulating widely by strong resistance from fapi (Chinese legal tender) and pienpi (notes in communist liberated areas). The different regional monetary policies caused different rates of inflation in different areas of China. Thus, Japan had to strengthen her restrictions on interregional trade. In the third stage, Japan was unable to establish a central bank to issue yen-linked notes in S. E. Asia. Therefore, she changed monetary policy, and issued military notes equivallent to the currencies circulated in each area. Anticipating explosive inflation, she intercepted remittance relations with these areas. (E) The "Co-Prosperity Sphere", in reality, was disruptive both to interregional trade and to the monetary system. The bloc lacked unity; and, a bloc in name only, was indeed a "Co-Poverty Sphere".
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  • Hideo Kobayashi
    Article type: Article
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages 29-46
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper has tried to trace the entire process of rise and fall of military economic structure of the Japanese Imperialism during the War of Fifteen Years starting with the Sino-Japanese War and ending with the World War II, focusing on the development of "Industrialization" policy extended over the entire colonies. As is widely known, Japanese Imperialism started to establish extensive military industry in the colonies as a part of the Military Industry Expansion Program in the late 1930's. This paper, locating the Program in the overall policy of the Japanese Imperialism including financing and labor, has studied how heavy industry could be established in the colonies. For this purpose, the process of invasion by the Japanese Imperialism was divided into three phases: the first phase from the Manchurian Incident to the Sino-Japanese War, the second phase from the Sino-Japanese War to the start of the World War II, and the third phase during the World War II. While defining the characteristic features of each phase, this paper has studied how the colonial economics as a whole headed for a collapse in the course of a downfall of the Japanese military industry triggered by the cessation of trading with the United States and the United Kingdom.
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  • Yasutaka Takahahashi
    Article type: Article
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages 47-67
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Peasant emigration to "Manchuria" was not only the emigration to other countries, but also the important means of colonial agression to "Manchuria". Consequently, the same time when Japanese Imperialism fell down, "Manchurian" emigration was destroyed by the anti-Japanese Imperialism powers. In this paper, I want to clarify some characteristics of Japanese Fascism through the analysis of "Manchurian Peasant Emigration". The essence of Fascism in foreign policy is the chauvinism. Emigration to "Manchuria" was propelled by both axithorities in "Manchuria" (Japanese colonial army) and in Japan. People emigrated were made as important forces of chauvinism ("Gozoku Kypwa") by them. Emigrations were created on the land robbed of "Manchus" and settled as one of the Japanese political forces, that is to say, it existed against U.S.S. R. and anti-Japanese forces. In their mother country Japan, land owners classes were being destroyed by Agricultural Crisis and agrarian disputes which were increasing through 1920's and 1930's. In prewar Japan, the 'Tenno' system did neither abolish nor clear away the landownership. But Japanese Capitalism must do something for the Agricultural Crisis. One of the solution policies of it was the Emigration and the creation of landed farmers. The agrarian disputes among land owners and poor tenants were channelled to the chauvinism by means of "proper scope argument". The "Agrarian Reorganization Movement", having organized for the Crisis in Japan, just included the emigration policy in 1938. It's a fact that the main part of the emigration was the tenants and poor peasants who revolted then against land owners classes. Thus, economically and politically, Japanese Fascism included land owners, landed farmers, tenant farmers and poor peasants as the foundation of the 'Tenno' system. In the period of the Pacific War, one side, agricultural labourers and provisions came short, the other side, a program for the increased production of food became more difficult owing to the shortage of materials. From this time, the land owners classes were gradually abolished about economic side and landed farmers became the main forces of agricultural productivity. In "Manchuria", emigrant farms were cultivated by Chinese agricultural labourers and Korean tenant farmers.
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  • K. Kita
    Article type: Article
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages 68-71
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Article type: Appendix
    1976 Volume 18 Issue 3 Pages 72-78
    Published: April 20, 1976
    Released on J-STAGE: October 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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