The purpose of this paper is to make clear the characteristics of plant location policies in Japan during the war against China. More specifically, it is concerned with the role of land control and land-use planning in the placement of private munition plants. This approach permits a careful inquiry into the character of land policy in Japan, and how it differed from those implemented by Nazi Germany. In the latter half of the 1930s, the policy of the central government was to entrust local public entities with plant location policies. The central government instructed prefectures to develop the necessary infrastructure for private munition plants and assisted them with reforms of the local government system through fundings programs. Accordingly we analyzed the policies of local public entity, that of Shizuoka Prefecture. The Shizuoka administration absorbed the demands for infrastructure voiced by private enterprises implemented them smoothly. Attempts by members of the fishing industry to oppose these land-use polices were disucussed in the Prefectural Assembly, but no consensus was reached. Plant location policies in the latter half of the 1930s were not the result of plans developed by planning specialists. Rather, they reflected the prefectural administration's attempt to incorporate the demands of the central government and private enterprises. However these policies both reduced farm acreage, and led to the concentration of munition plants. As a consequence of this, the central government began to enforce land-use controls and plans in earnest in the 1940s. However, it was difficult to prevent local public entities from encouraging the building of factories and it was hard to keep private developers from buying up farmland. In fact farmlands was transformed into plant sites. Farmers' resistances arising from the unplanned land-use were eliminated by the military, and the plant location policies of the local public entities continued to function throughout early in the 1940s.

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The purpose of this paper is the examination of export control and import control, which intend to keep the balance of trade by means of increase of the trade. I attempt to research into Japanese wool industry for the purpose of making clear why this control of export and import failed. The wool spinning industry and the woolen textile industry succeeded in import substitution in the latter 1920's. The part of the woolen textile was exported in 1930's. But the profits of wool industry companies were subject to wide fluctuations. Because these companies desperately competed and they depended on Australian wool greatly. The cartel, Japanese Wool Industry Association reduced operation frequently. But the opposition between companies specializing in woolen yarn and companies pursuing woolen textile was hard, so that Japanese Wool Industry Association could not control the prices of wool yarn. The consul residing in South Africa Federation sujested to buy South African wool in order to keep the balance of trade between Japan and South Africa Federation. The purchase of South African wool coincided with the request of Japanese export industries. They compensated comparatively high-priced wool of South Africa. They commended the purchase of South African wool as the regulation of imbalance of trade. But wool industry took part in the purchase charged little margin. When the dispute between Australia and Japan was occured in 1936, wool industry controled import of wool and stopped dependence on Australian wool. On the other hand, they intended to keep the share of each company. The operation of the Commerce Protection Act had no effect. When the dispute between Australia and Japan was over, the excess of imports became clear in Japan. It is impossible to keep the balance of trade by means of increase of the import from other countries. The trade control for the purpose of magnification and balance of trade came to the end, the raw materials policy turned from diversification of suppliers into self-sufficiency.

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