With the Repeal of Corn Laws in 1846, British agricultural policy turned to land improvement policy. Of those sums of money invested in land improvements under a series of Land Improvement Acts, the one invested under the Land Improvement Companies Acts took the largest share. In this article, I have tried to make clear the characteristics of the English Land Improvement Companies from the view point of money circulation, and in so doing I have especially paid attention to "transferring of the rent-charges in aggregate amounts". From analyzing Minutes of Evidence in Parliamentary Committees, two interesting facts have been found. First, the historical change of the Land Improvement Companies was one from "executive company" to "financial company". The latter did not do any improvement works, but only lent money to landowners. Second, Land Improvement Companies obtained for the money lent a security which was always negotiable in the money market at a price. Selling the rent-charges themselves, they got their money in large blocks from 16 or 20 insurance companies in London. The English Land Improvement Companies were, therefore, agents of the insurance companies from the standpoint of money circulation; that is, they simply acted as mediums between the floating capital in the money market on the one hand, and the landed interest who required money to invest in improvements on the other.

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The purpose of this paper is to make clear the significance of the Hausindustrie-problem in econimic development in Germany by surveying the formation and the change of Hausindustrie in the imperial period, by analyzing the debate on abuses which resulted from this change. In Imperial Germany, when the Industrial Revolution had finished, there were many small industries still in existence and by no means could they be disregarded in the share of production. But these small industries showed a rapid regression. Hausindustrie in rural districts (domestic industry) consisted of textile industry, which was carried on mainly as a by-production of agriculture. On the other hand, Hausindustrie in urban districts (outwork) experienced a growth in the clothing industry, which was based mostly on the women's labor force. Therefore, "Hausinductrie" had transformed from the former to the latter. Because of various abuses which Hausindustrie caused by this change, it was desirable to take political actions to protect Hausindustrie-laborers. This means that the Hausindustrie-problem dissolved into a labor problem and reflects a process in which Hausindustrie-laborers were integrated as de facto laborers in the relationship between capital and labor. But at the same time the possibility of business development in Hausindustrie was mentioned and from that we can guess the diversity in the development of Hausindustrie. It goes without saying that the analysis of these small industries, besides the analysis of monopolies, is indispensable for comprehending the structure of reproduction of German capitalism. Unless both sides are taken into consideration, the general law of capitalist accumlation cannot acquire a historical actuality, which this paper will hope to achieve by presenting a guiding principle to study the process of production and circulation of Hausindustrie.

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The purpose of this paper is to make clear the development of the Japanese machine tool industry from 1930 to 1937. The previous studies have pointed out the dependence on war production and the vulnerability of the machine tool industry as its characteristics. They have not done studies that analysed the market structure and the vulnerable production structure in connection with the increase of heavy industries. The rapid expansion of the market and the production of various types of machine tool capitals in response to it are, therefore, to be examined. In spite of the fact that the start of the expansion of the market in the 1930s was based on the increase of munitions industries, two demand groups sustained the expansion ever afterwards. Army and naval munitions works, automobiles, aircrafts, and big enterprises in the electrical equipment industry constituted one group which needed the diversification of high-grade machine tools. Another was industries relating to the export such as textile machinery, bicycles and the machine tool industry itself. Large, medium-scale builders and some local ones had mainly the former markets and they had developed in size by 1937 showing a technical progress. Growth of some local builders into the medium-scale ones made clear the stratification among the local capitals. Large-scale builders chose small equipment investment in comparison with the tempo of the increase of demand. Economic lessons from the long depression in the 1920s caused the negative investment. By means of the development of subcontracting and mass employment of low-wage workers, the large-scale builders tried to respond the market expansion. The increase of technical level in the large, medium-scale builders was gradual because of their supplementary relationships to imported machines; the core of plants occupied by the imported machines, the fringe by the domestic. The domestic machines, consequently, could not satisfy the demand in both quantity and quality, resulting in the rapid increase of the import. This was accelerated by the sale competition among the European and American builders, exporters who suffered from the depression in the world market. There were great many small-scale builders whose products remained to be very cheap, while the vulnerability of large, medium-scale builders and some local ones were newly actualized in the course of the development of heavy industries. Users for cheap machines were small and petty factories, not having had to be aware of low ability of using machines, that made machinery, instruments and its parts. The weight of small-scale builders in the total production value of machine tools was diminishing, although they were followed by the new entry.

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