The investigators of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 (Peel's Bank Act) have not paid careful attention to the fact that the Act did not work in the way designed, which was-suggested by Thomas Tooke before the enforcement of the Act. If we will study about the Act from the point of view that the actual function was discrepant from the designed function, we will be able to bring the issues missed hitherto into existence. When the Act of 44 was put in force, it was expected by almost every man except writers of the Banking School that the note-issue and gold reserve were centralized to the Bank of England, and that notes in circulation were regulated by the bullion reserve of the Bank. The purpose concealed in this expectation was to keep the bullion reserve (to secure the convertibility). Actually, under the Act of 44, the centralization of the note-issue and gold reserve was achieved to some extent, but the regulation of the notes in circulation by the bullion reserve was never realized. Because the Bank of England was becoming a central bank not only as the single bank of issue but also as the bank of bankers beyond the Currency School's understanding. Although the Act of 44 did not work in the way designed, it does not mean that the Act had no function. The Act worked in the different way from designed, namely as the system of the credit control by the bullion reserve. And, as a result of this actual function, independent of the legislator's expectation, the Act contributed to keeping the bullion reserve, while intensified panics. When we understand the Act of 44 as above, we would be able to remember the significant theoretical problem brought forward by T. Tooke and K. Marx, and also the historical roles of the Act.

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In this paper the writer tries to clear the problem of the farmland lease under the policy of rice production adjustment in the Hokuriku District, taking the survey of the present situation of rural community as a case study. Some conclusions are as follows. 1. In the Hokuriku District, tenant farmers are grouped into the three parts by farming pattern: (1) the largescale rice farming managed by full-time farmers, (2) the multiple farming managed by full-time farmers, and (3) the rice farming managed by part-time farmers. And the influences by production adjustment are various on each farming pattern. Under production adjustment, the trend of peasantry differentiation is changing. 2. Production adjustment develops the lease of paddy field in which it is not permited to raise rice crop. In that case, tenants usually hold paddy field rent free, which means that the lease of this kind exists only in the condition that the administration forces-the peasantry to lease. 3. Rice production adjustment brings about a new type of rent similar to rice farming income, in compensation for the exclusion of rice farming. Tenant rights is in conflict with land owner-ship, the latter claims a right to rice farming income. And so the rent of paddy field are becoming complicated.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the significance of foreign bonds for five big electric power companies, Tokyo Electric Light Co. Great Consolidated Electric Power Co., Toho Electric Power Co., Nippon Electric Power Co. and Ujigawa Electric Power Co. In this paper following the three interested parties which were concerned these foreign bonds are examined; (1) five big electric power companies which issued them, (2) financial organs in U.S.A. and U.K. which underwrote them, (3) the Mitsui Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan which were entrusted with mortgages of them. In the period from 1923 to 1927, electric power companies themselves took a positive attitude to the issue of foreign bonds. Foreign bonds were advantageous means of raising funds to electric power companies for the terms of redemption of them were far longer than those of domestic bonds, and the rate of exchange in those days was under mint par. In the period from 1928 to 1931 the Mitsui Bank and American investment bankers, as Guaranty Co. of New York, took a positive attitude to the issue of foreign bonds of electric power companies. The Mitsui Bank aimed at collecting debts, while Guaranty Co. of New York aimed at gaining commissions. Foreign bonds were not always more advantageous to electric power companies than domestic bonds in those days. In the period from 1932 to 1934 it was impossible to issue foreign bonds, and the companies which previously issued foreign bonds took bad knocks because of a fall in the rate of exchange. Therefore five big electric power companies proceeded to the purchasing redemption of existing foreign bonds positively, and they organized the cartel named Denryoku Renmei (the League of Electric Power Companies) in April, 1932. The balance of money loans for electric power companies from the Industrial Bank of Japan decreased in those days. Consequently the commonly accepted theory is-not adequate, which asserts that the later placing the electric power industry under government management was based on the financing for electric power companies from the Industrial Bank of Japan.

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With regard to the period of late Ming and early Ch'ing, there are conflicting opinions about whether a germ of capitalism is recognized or not. However, both opinions, have a common difficulty neglecting the peculiar characteristics in formation of Chinese capitalism, althouhgh they have different understandings about the beginning period of Chinese capitaristic development. In this article, I try to concentrate attention on the peculiar structure of Chinese feudal system. And I try to direct my attention to the most remarkable ways of production of commodities which this peculiar feudalism had, and to categorize it as the "pseudo small industry". The Chinese feudalism had the patrimonial bureaucratic form of powers. Under this form of powers, the relations around the feudal landed property were ones between tenant farmers and landlords who had not the military system in their own hands. Also, there were pursuited policies to maintain certain numbers of landed farmer as a fender pile for the sake of mitigating conflicts between landlords and tenant farmers. Production of commodities stated above was set about by theses landed farmers, not by tenant farmers as serfdom. Before serfs go up to the "petit bourgeois", production of commodities was developed by the landed farmers. This production of commodities, not originated with serfs, shall be called the "pseudo small industry", as distinguished from the intrinsic "small industry" well known in the West. In this article, I conclude that this pseudo small industry checked the growth of intrinsic small industry.

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