Japan Farmers' Union (Nihon Nomin Kumiai, or Nichino), which was restored in February 1946, rapidly increased its local branches and membership. Soon it assumed leadership in farmers' movement and exercised political influence on behalf of them. However, it split in 1947 and in 1949 into three factions and lost most of the union members, So Nichinos' influence suffered a precipitous decline. Why Nichino went through such a violent rise and fall? To solve the question, we must grasp agricultural problems in its totality as follows. (a) At the postwar reform, the most pressing issue in the field of agriculture was not land reform but a food crisis. (b) Then, each agricultural organization and political party manifested its own policy, with the aim of taking initiative in agricultural reconstruction. The policy was composed of a comprehensive and long-range plan for agricultural reform or “revolution” and some incidental but urgent measures. Each proposer found it a serious matter who was to win broad support from farmers. (c) Though there was a controversy on the plans, the Government under occupation proposed two reforms. In 1947-48, land reform and reorganization of farmers' co-operatives were carried out. It is one of my arguing points that the highest priority to the recovery of food production was agreed nationally in 1947, and this agreement firmly supported the reforms though it was implicit. I call this agreement with the executive body later mentioned, “Nogyo Fukko Taisei” (the Agricultural Reconstruction Regime). The above understanding requires a new approach to the farmers' movement which was formerly recognized as mere mass straggle. My intention in this article is to throw light on various activities of Nichino synthetically by examining its documents. (a) Nichino confronted various problems, i. e. food requisioning, land reform, disorganization of agricultural associations, taxation on farmers, and offcial pricing of products. We must synthetically understand each of countermeasures of Nichino in relation to its agricultural “revolution” plan. (b) Nichino engaged itself in political activities on those problems, as a corporative pressure group, besides mass struggle These activities were especially important in the period of Nogyo Fukko Taisei when Nichino practiced self-control over its mass struggle. (c) As a national center of farmers' unions, Nichino managed to discharge those duties that could not be performed by local militant unions. There were three stages of the movement according to the change of political situation and food supply. (I) In 1946, a serious food shortage raised furious labor and farmers' militancy. Nichino, against the Government and other groups, advocated an agricultural “revolution” plan, which aimed at socialization through implementation of land reform and reorganization of farmers' co-operatives. (II) The Katayama Cabinet and Nogyo Fukko Kaigi (the Agricultural Reconstruction Council) were both formed in June 1947. The Government and all the farm groups were led into collaboration, which spurred workers in cities and villages on to a campaign for production increase. (III) However, the collaboration collapsed in the next year when the food situation was improving. Nichino Struggled hard again to secure farmers' income, but the Yoshida Government firmly surpressed it. On the other hand, reorganized farmers'co-operatives took place of it in political arena. Nichino soon fell in asleep eternally, but it left behind solid owner-farming system and farmers' strong influence on agricultural policy in the postwar Japan.

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The purpose of this paper is to make clear the character and historical position of key currency crisis (1987/88) which was linked with the unprecedented worldwide crash in stock market. In the first place, the author divides the postwar stage of international monetary system into the period of the fixed exchange-rate system and that of the floating-exchange rate system, and prescribes the general characteristic of key currency crisis in the postwar stage as a flight of capital from the key currency to the universal money, or "the change-over from the credit system to the monetary system". The points at issue brought forward by the above-mentioned consideration are as follows. 1) The reason why "the change-over from the credit system to the monetary system" is unavoidable, regardless of the great change in the foreign exchang rate system, which resulted from the suspension of dollar's convertibility into gold. 2) The difference between the phases of the dollar-crisis and dollar-defence in the fixed exchange rate system and those in the floating exchange-rate system. 3) The character and historical position of the key currency crisis (1987/88) in the postwar stage of world capitalism. By considering these points on the base of Marx's credit theory, this paper insists firstly, that the characteristic of this crisis is the missing of the "last resort", and secondly, that historical position of this crisis is understood as the time when privilege of the US dollar as the key currency has to be restricted, in connection with the transformation of the Japanese Yen into an international currency.

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