Tsarist Russia, as "the largest borrower in Europe", imported huge sum of foreign capital from western countries during 1861-1914. After 1917, among Soviet historians arose a long debate on the thesis of "semi-colonial subordination of Russia" and on the role of the foreign capital, as a part of it. One important problem to be pointed out from this debate is that two forms of foreign investment (investment in state and state-guaranteed securities on one side and investment in private companies on the other side) were argued separately and independently, and that one-sided argument was made for or against the role of either form of foreign investment. It is, I think, essential to the study of foreign capital to connect it closely with the whole structure ot Russian national economy. From this point of view, it is important to investigate the very correlation between two forms of foreign investment in Russian national economy. Tracing the entire process of foreign investment in Russia, we find that two forms of foreign investment, mentioned above, moved in opposite direction in two major stages with minor two and three periods respectively, and that, through these stages and periods, foreign investment moved its center of gravity step by step from investment in state loan, which at first accounted for the overwhelmingly large portion of foreign capital, to the investment in private companies. I think that these characteristic features of foreign investment represent the logic of the evolution of capital import common to many underdeveloped countries. From this point of view, I examined the role of foreign investment in each stage and period, correlation of the two forms of foreign investment, causes and factors which stimulated their transformation, and significance of this transformation in connection with the whole structure of Russian national economy. As a conclusion, I showed that Russia began her industrial development along the same way as the balkan states, based on the large sum of state loan, and in a half way, with the growth of investment in private companies which financial and economic policy and development of domestic industries accelerated, she parted from them, many of which fell into default because of financial difficulties. I also showed that this transformation process in foreign investment went hand in hand with the changes of relations with the capital export countries, trade cycle, the making of economic structure peculiar to Russia, the growth of industrial and financial monopolies and so on.

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This paper is a historical analysis of the currency crisis in 1920's France in its relation to the completion of "Le franc Poincare". The franc depreciation right after the World War I appeared in compound relation to the triple critical situation of the post-war French economy : inflation, trade balance deficit, and financial difficulty. This relation was reorganized through the restoration process from the economic crisis in 1920, and then the currency crisis was directly connected to the financial difficulty. During the process, industrial firms gained export premium, and commercial banks were forming monetary circuit by rediscounting of the accepted government bonds. Early in 1924, the exchange rate of the franc sharply failed. In the socio-economic critical situation, the Cartel des Gauches won the election in May 1924. The Cartel des Gauches administration tried several political measures against the currency crisis such as foundation of capital levy and consolidation of the floating debts. However, heading to the collapse of the administration, the government bond issue which was then the only possible political choice, faced a severe difficulty. In July 1926, after the collapse of the second Herriot cabinet, Poincare was inaugurated the prime minister, and the franc stabilization was set about. In the final phase of the currency crisis, industrial firms and commercial banks had changed their tactics from "anti-inflation" to "the approval of inflation". The financial difficulty and the recession in the summer of 1926 were the background of their decision. "Le franc Poincare" was a result of the inflationist decision.

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The purpose of this paper is to throw light on the theme and theoretical construction of Part V Vol. III of Capital, "Divison of Profit into Interest and Profit of Enterprise. Interest-bearing capital". This problem has been left unsettled in controversies on the question of interpreting "relation between the category of Interest-bearing capital and the theory of credit system". To attain this purpose, the author is based on a scrutiny on Marx's manuskript "Credit. Fictitious Capital", which, in fact, contains the substance of chapter 25 to 35 in Part V, and aims at consideration of "Interest-bearing capital itself" under credit system (Kreditwesen). Points at issue brought forward by the scrutiny on the above-mentioned manuscript are as follows. 1) The logical development of argument from chapters 21-24 on interest-bearing capital to "Credit. Fictitious Capital", namely, the substance of chapters 25-35. 2) The theme and context of "Credit. Fictitious Capital" in the whole logical construction of Part V. 3) The reason why chapter 35 "Precious Metal and Rate of Exchange" on the universal money is placed in the end of "Credit. Fictitious Capital". 4) The significance in Part V, of chapter 36 "Pre-Capitalist Relationships", which has generally been ignored by researchers. By considering these points, this paper insists firstly, that Part V has to be understood as the theory on medern interest-bearing capital, that is, as theory on interest-bearing capital under credit system, and secondly, that the theme of Part V as a whole is to elucidate the peculiar character of the modern interest-bearing capital as fictitious capital, distinguished from that of the real capital.

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