Regarded the basic structure of investmentfinance in post-war Japan as the combination (-identity) between outside financing and indirect financing, there are three questions in that case. (1). The first question is that, unlike the normal case, coming into existence of such a relation as this has been done without mediation of the height concentration of production under the lack of the base of private accumulation. There the method of post-war transaction in the inheritance bequeathed by the war economy of 1931-45 context may be asked of us, in order to trace back to its origin. (2). The method of indirect financing become the way which concentrate an enormous money capital on the giant enterprises of the same system as banks, and make it possible for those enterprises to create the "fresh" heavy industries at a stroke. At the same time, the enterprise concerned has not something in reserve the inside reservation through the overweight burden of interest and hence is not able for the future to realize the transformation of the investment finance from outside financing to auto-financing which was so common among the big business in the advanced capitalist countries fifty years ago. This is the second question. That is to say, the matter is what pattern of monopolies were produced by such a relation as this. (3). Now, with the key-note of the process of reproduction change into surplus, the indirect financing become gradually transform from the mechanism of investmentfinance to the mechanism of public financing for the creation of effective demand, therefore, the tie between outside financing and indirect financing rarefy in proportion to the change. This transformation, which is generally regarded as a common law of history, is done without waiting for the establishment of the state monopolistic auto-financing in Japan, however. Thus, the parasitism peculiar to this situation arise in layers of the other parasitism - that is, parasitism that is characteristic of the public financing. There the conclusion of indirect financing in connection with the central government finance which expanded rapidly since the depression of 1965 may be asked of us. It is the main purpose of this paper to emboss the special character of outside financing in post-war Japan focusing attention on the first and second questions, for the present.

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There are the so-called "historical chapters" in Capital - vol.I chap. 24, vol.III chap. 20, 36 and 47 -, which are given an independent position as chapter. These four "historical parts" form an indispensable link in the system of Capital. Nevertheless, their theoretical significance has not been fully ascertained yet. The purpose of our article, in consideration of this point, is to clarify the theoretical position and significance of the historical chapters in Capital as a whole, not one by one. Our opinion can be summed up in the following two points. The first is a problem why Capital, whose principal object is "logical" consideration, needs the "historical", anti-"logical", parts. Here lies the problem of "logic and history". To conclude, the necessity of the historical chapters for Capital is based on the theoretical ground that a theory cannot be a theory without "supplementing by genesis" (Erganzung der Genesis). It is this "supplementing" that constitutes the theoretical mission of the chapters. By making clear the significance of it, the theoretical position of them can be legitimately, in their originality and necessity, understood. The second is a problem what regulates the peculiar arrangement of the historical chapters which are scattered here and there in Capital, in other words, a problem of the pivot and standpoint for total grasp of them. From this angle, it is decisively important to reexaminate the theory of "the transformation of money into capital" (vol.I part II), rather than the chapters in themselves. Only by connecting with this part, systematic and total positioning of them can be made possible. Dealing with the historical chapters, we are always faced with two difficult questions. Are those chapters merely an appendix to Capital? Can "the historical description" in them be a criterion for interpretation of manifold actual processes of history? To these questions, which are both classical and modern, we attempted to give an answer throughout considerations in our paper.

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The purpose of this article is to make clear the historical factors, the contents, and the historical significance of the establishment of the Succession Duty in the Financial Reform of 1853. The conclusions the author could draw are summed up as follows. First, in the Financial Reform Movement started after the Corn Law repeal, Industrial Capital demanded the death duties upon real property as the resources for further free trade. On the base of this demand, the Succession Duty of 1853 was proposed primarily to provide a fund by means of which free trade might be still more promoted. Second, after the Corn Law repeal, Industrial Capital demanded the principle of differentiation in the imposition of the income tax, while landed classes demanded the abolition of that tax. Under such conflicting demands, the Succession Duty of 1853 was proposed secondary to rectify the inequality in the income tax that the operation of the tax was severe upon intelligence and skill as compared with property, and also to provide the means of dispensing with that tax at 1860. Third, landed property, unlike personal property, was hitherto totally exempted from all death duties, on the ground that under a system of settlement the owner of the land had only a life estate and no power to dispose of the land in fee simple. After the enactment of a series of statutes concerning improvement of landed estates in the late 1840's, which conferred a tenant for life almost the same power as to land improvement that a tenant in fee simple could exercise, the Succession Duty of 1853 was established. Fourth, the Succession Duty of 1853 concretized the new principle of taxation that all successions to real property, whether settled or not settled, and settled personal property, should be taxed upon the value of life-interest of successor therein at scale of consanguinity. The new principle was gradually accepted. Fifth, the Succession Duty of 1853 implys a change in the composition of classes of the British capitalism. Namely, by the Succession Duty of 1853 landed classes were for the first time imposed a tax upon succession to the same extent as capital classes, which means that the interests of the capital classes demanding for further free trade were able to be carried through at the partial deprivation of the privilege of total exemption of the landed classes from the death duties. Sixth, and last, from the standpoint of revenue the Succesion Duty of 1853 was a failure because in 1860 the tax yielded only £0.6., instead of £2m. a year, expected. The reason of the failure was that because of the progress of land improvement real property had been more heavily encumbered than anticipated, and also that the base of the tax was value of life interest, not capital value. Therefore a new tax upon capital value came to be demanded in the "Great Depression".

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