Kadu belongs to the Luish group of the Tibeto-Burman language family. It is spoken mainly in Banmauk township, Sagaing Division, Burma. The population of Kadu speaking people is estimated to be approximately 20000 [Lewis 2009]. This paper first provides an overview of the Kadu phonology. Kadu has 8 vowels (/a, i, u, e, ɛ, o, ɔ, ə/), 20consonants (/p, ph, t, th, c, ch, k, kh, ʔ, s, sh, ɕ, h, m, n, ñ, ŋ, l, w, y/) and 4 tones (high, mid, low, falling). Striking features of the Kadu phonology are as follows: (1) no distinction between voiced and unaspirated-voiceless consonants, (2) various types of consonant assimilations of grammatical particles, (3) tonal alternation of the original mid tone into the low tone after the high tone, (4) tonal alternation of the low tone into the falling tone after the mid tone. Particularly interesting is the third character; as the low tone is the result of the tonal alternation of the original *HM sequence, the low tone in the word initial position points to the now lost prefix in the Proto-Luish stage.
This paper aims to present the comparative research perspectives of studies on Buddhist places of worship in mainland Southeast Asia by examining the data collected through a field survey conducted in four districts in Kampong Thum Province, central Cambodia, during the Buddhist Lent seasons in 2009, 2010, and 2011.Theravada Buddhism had penetrated into almost every part of mainland Southeast Asia by about 1,000 years ago. The majority of the lowland populations in mainland Southeast Asian countries are Buddhists, and various kinds of Buddhist practice may be observed in their daily lives. Among the most interesting characteristics of Buddhist culture in this area are its commonality and diversity. To uncover the features of this, this paper examines 87 Buddhist places of worship with a special focus on their differences and formative processes. By doing so, the paper finally points out two rationales for building Buddhist places of worship in the area. In the conclusion, this paper emphasizes the importance of time-space analysis of Buddhist practices, not only to deepen an understanding of the dynamic formation of Theravada culture in mainland Southeast Asia but also to explore the significance of religious practices in human life.
Most of the literatures on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in the local setting tend to focus on the “achievements” of anti-Japanese guerrilla movements. Meanwhile, except for some academic works conducted by the American historian, Alfred McCoy, other aspects of the Japanese occupation in rural areas of the country—such as political strife or factionalism among the local elites—have been avoided in discussions since it has been tabooed since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. Taking the academic gap into consideration, this article examines the memory of the war among local residents in certain area of the Philippines, Leyte. Interviews were conducted in the province of Leyte, focusing on political violence or atrocities in three towns—Ormoc, Abuyog, and La Paz. This article also clarifies that war atrocities in the province were attributed not only to the Japanese occupation policy but also to the political factionalism among the local elites, regardless of their political stance toward the Japanese occupying forces. Their political ambition became quite fierce during the Japanese occupation period, leading to bloody outcomes in each municipality. After the war, the elites’ violence or atrocities were “absolved” by local residents so they could establish their political and economic hegemony over the province.
Thailand made great progress toward institutional democratization through the amendment of the 1991 Constitution, which stipulated that only elected MPs were eligible for the position of prime minister in 1992. This amendment was followed by the 1997 Constitution. However, Thailand experienced a coup in 2006, and the coup group drafted the 2007 Constitution. Since the coup, the judiciary has been pivotal in changing governments. Democratically elected governments have been toppled by the judiciary. Furthermore, people in large cities such as Bangkok, who protested against the military’s extended rule in 1992, approved of the 2006 coup and the unusual methods employed in changing governments, an abnormal phenomenon in a parliamentary democracy.
The common objective that links the coup, the two constitutional amendments (1997 and 2007), and the decisions of the judiciary is resolving corruption among the country’s politicians. Even though several coups have occurred and constitutional amendments have been made for this purpose, the problem of corruption appears to be continually exacerbating. To understand this issue, it is important to recognize what kinds of behavior in politicians have been codified as corruption. Therefore, this paper examines the legal definitions of corruption.
A close scrutiny of Thailand’s constitutions and laws reveals that the legal definition of corruption has widened owing to the former’s consecutive amendments since the 1990s, from apparent corruption (such as bribes or kickbacks) to vague or gray corruption (such as conflicts of interest and false statements of property and debt).
Although in other countries these new legal definitions of corruption are used to control the spread
of corruption among politicians by pre-empting potential corruption, in Thailand such forms of corruption are stipulated as grave crimes that could end an individual’s political career—and they have broader definitions, including forms of corruption that are not serious. This suggests that constitutional amendments have resulted in increased corruption among politicians. This has caused people to distrust politicians and a democratic form of government, leading to the possible destruction of democracy either by coup or by the judiciary. In fact, constitutional amendments may themselves have been excuses for dismantling democracy.
This paper analyzes the water privatization process in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing on the changes in policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, to show the strategic adaptation of domestic business elites to survive after the drastic transition period. During the Suharto era, business elites were able to accumulate capital by drawing patronage from former President Suharto. However, the democratization of the country led to Suharto's ouster and disordered the former interest structure, which was deeply entrenched in the Indonesian political economy. Today concessions in water privatization are no longer sustained by merely relying on the political authority.
In Jakarta, the center of Indonesia's politics and economy, agreements with Suharto guaranteed private corporate interests with lucrative business relating to city development. Recently, however, private businesses, especially those managing public infrastructure, have become increasingly vulnerable to aggressive public backlash and supervision by the regulatory bodies of the provincial government. Despite this increasing vulnerability, domestic business elites have succeeded in regaining their lucrative concessions by seizing opportunities and cooperating with the capitals of foreign countries. These business elites have successfully adapted to the changing democratic environment with sophisticated strategies and shrewd risk management.