We examine that the gender differences in the sensitivity of the influence from others using swimming data. We focus on the existence of competitor and existence of co-worker, and measure the impact of both effects. Using absent-competitor data, we can compare directly the performance of individual swimmers with and without an adjacent competitor. We found female swims faster with competitors than male. We also compare the records of medley relay records and that of the individual event, and found female cannot do better with co-workers than alone.
We demonstrated that hyperbolicity in time discounting is due to non-linearity in psychological time for both gain and loss. We examined how psychological time influenced time discounting of gain and loss in 50 Japanese college students. Psychological time of gain and loss was nonlinear with physical time. Once we introduced psychological time, the time discount functions of both gain and loss were closer to exponential models rather than hyperbolic models.
This paper investigates the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in formulating rice planting contracts of the Philippines. Intriguingly, in our study area, despite the potential of infestation of opportunistic behaviors by workers, a fixed wage (FW) contract has been dominant for rice planting since the 1960s. To account for such a seemingly-inefficient contractual arrangement, we conduct field experiments by randomly assigning three distinct labor contracts, i.e., FW, individual piece rate (IPR), and group piece rate (GPR) contracts. Individual workers_p’ /performance data from field experiments are then combined with data on social preferences elicited by laboratory experiments. Five main empirical findings emerge. First, our basic results show the positive incentive effects in IPR, moral hazard problems in FW, and free-riding behavior in GPR, which are consistent with standard theoretical implications. Second, while, under FW, social preferences such as altruism and guilt aversion play an important role in stimulating incentives, introducing monetary incentives crowds out such intrinsic motivations. Third, other non-monetary factors such as self-selection of team members and social connections significantly change incentives under FW contract. Fourth, as alternative hypotheses, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of intertemporal incentives arising from performance based contract renewal probabilities. Our results are also supportive to implications of the interlinked contract of labor and credit transactions in mitigating moral hazard problems. Yet, we reject the optimality of FW contract due to large effort measurement errors.
This paper presents the results of a longitudinal survey study (N=11,984) that examines how collective (group) action lawsuit, in particular opt-in or opt-out, affects decision-making by individuals if they participate in consumer detriment cases. This dataset was made up of Japanese in their 20s and 30s from all prefectures. When consumers suffer consumer detriments, their appropriate actions through courts or other alternative dispute resolution system contribute to eliminate unconscionable business practices and to correct market failure. However, even if consumers have this important role, it is wonder whether these consumer victims are always rational to take action. Behavioral economics reveals that default effect is one of behavioral bias and a review in the UK suggests that consumer collective action may have default effect through victims’ decision-making by choosing “opt-in” or “opt-out” basis in a country. The results here show existing default effect because rates to participate in hypothetical consumer cases in opt-out scheme are statistically higher than in opt-in scheme. Logit analysis with other factors also supports this conclusion. This suggests that policy makers should take into account of individual behavioral bias and opt-out scheme is better for consumer collective action to obtain enough participation rates.
This paper investigates whether smokers exhibit greater time discounting than non-smokers, and how short-term nicotine deprivation affects time discounting. A unique feature of our experiment is that our subjects receive rewards not only of money, but also of actual tobacco. This is done in order to elicit smokers’true preferences. Smokers are more impatient than non- smokers, consistent with previous studies. Additionally, nicotine deprivation makes smokers even more impatient. These results suggest that nicotine concentration has different effects on time preferences in the short and long runs.
This thesis is devoted to the study of whether or not a traditional double auction trading process in a model with many securities and money can converge to a general equilibrium price. In addition to the traditional presumption of double auction markets we assume in several experiments that artificial subjects with least rationality buy or sell such that their utility never decrease and choose calling prices randomly from a certain possible range which is given by the past history of calling prices and their utility function. This thesis asserts that a double auction process under this assumption tends to approach a general equilibrium price, while the distribution of final allocations may be somewhat dispersed.
While it is common to estimate the age effect on happiness with parametric terms (such as age and age- squared), this paper applies a semiparametric regression model that imposes much milder restrictions on the shape of age-happiness profile. Using data from the British Household Panel Study, the paper confirmed that the age-happiness profile remained U-shaped in the semiparametric specification as well. To trace sources of the U-shape, I applied the varying coefficient model of Hastie and Tibshirani (1993), and estimated differentiated age-profiles for major life circumstances, such as differences in marital status, the presence of children at home, and whether children were dependent or not. After introducing these differentiated age effects, the shape of the overall age-happiness profile changed in a notable way: it was no longer U-shaped, but flat. In contrast, the differentiated age profiles continued to have significant effects on happiness for most life circumstances. Evidently, the common finding that happiness is U-shaped in age may reflect a composite effect from differences in people’s adjustment to major life circumstances over the life cycle.