This is an analytical interpretation of De Opificio Mundi § 16 to § 25, in which Philo's theory of ideas seems to be most clearly expressed Philo's concept of ideas, which he discusses in these sections, will be analyzed as follows (1)the Idea as the "Thought of God" (Op 16, 19), (2)the Idea as "δαραδειγμα" in terms of the Platonic 'Idea" (Op 16-19), and (3)the Idea as "δυναμιζ" in terms of the Stoic "Logos" (Op 20-25, cf S L I 45 f, 329) But how are these three kinds of ideas synthesized in his philosophy ? This article explains Philo's hierarchical viewpoint, namely, why and how he intended to subsume the latter two under the former by showing that, on the one hand, God expressed His "Thought" outside of Himself as "παραδειγμα", according to which He created the world, and on the other as "δυναμιζ", by which He governed the world In this sense, Philo's theory of ideas can be said to have made an important contribution towards explaining how the encounter between God and the world would be made possiblev

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Many scholars of Hesiod have found it inconsistent oi eontradictoiy that Eros is represented, on the one hand, as a primeval god (v 120 sqq), and, on the other, as an attendant of Aphrodite (v 201 sqq) In this paper I propose, with a view to shedding new light on the solution of this problem, to examine the primary generative force which is seen in the Theogony Two deities can be identified as such generative forces Eros in v 133-v 200, and Aphrodite (followed by Eros) in v 201 sqq Before the birth of Aphrodite, Eros appears chiefly as the "Germinating Force" (See e g v 185-v 187), and also as the "Uniting Force", though his powers are as yet incomplete (See v 133) After the birth of Aphrodite through the castration of Uranus, each of the two aspects of Eros's function conies to be attributed to two distinct deities, to Aphrodite and Eros respectively Aphrodite here embodies exclusively the aspect of the "Uniting Force", and Eros, on the other hand, comes to appear exclusively in the aspect of the "Germinating Force" as an attendant of Aphrodite That is to say, the "Germinating Force" works hereafter as the subordinate of the "Uniting Force" Moreover, it should be noticed here that the very nature of the "Uniting Force" develops through Aphrodite from the incomplete stage to the complete one, that is to say, the "Uniting Force", which was seen in the function of Eros and worked only upon one sex, comes to work for the first time upon both sexes, motivated by the castration We can also see this from the facts that, after the castration, such a cruel (i e loveless) deed as seen in v 156-v 158 is never found, and that the expression for the sexual union has changed form simple ευνηθεισα (v 133) to εν φιλοτητι ευνηθεισα (v 388, 306, 333, 330 and so on) From what we have seen above, we may conclude as follows there is no reason for us to regard the fact that Eros changes itself from primeval god to an attendant of Aphrodite as unreasonable and contradictory, for, in the Theogony, the poet, from the first, intended to sing of the evolution of the primary generative force

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One of the difficult problems in dealing with the Great Rhetra has been that of the authenticity of the text But recently, in spite of Edward Meyer's view, the authenticity of the text has found acceptance with most scholars I share their view and will propose here an interpretation of this Rhetra The text of the Rhetra runs as follows (1)Διοζ Συλλανιου και 'Αθηναζ Συλλανιαζ ιερον ιδρυσαμενο (ν), (2) φυλαζ φυλαξαντα κα ωβαζ ωβαξαντα, (3)τριακοντα γερουσιαν συν αρχαγεταιζ καταστησαντα, ωραζ εξ, ωραζ απελλαζειν μεταξυ Βαβυκαζ τε και Κνακιωνοζ, ουτωζ εισφερειν τε και αφιστασθαι (4) γαμωδανγοριανημην και κρατοζ The first part (1) is read "founding a sanctuary of Zeus Syllanius and Athena Syllania" Of the cult title "Syllanius" many interpretations have been offered, but it seems to me that no decisive conclusion on this term has been reached yet I read the second part (2) "dividing the people into phylai and obai" The phyle in the Rhetra is not a racial tribe but a local one, and the oba is a subdivision of the phyle So this part implies that a new organisation by tribes and obai is being introduced for political purposes The following part (3) mentions the foundation of the gerousia constituted by thirty members including archagetai But it seems to me that the gerousia existed in some form or other previously, and that καταστησαντα here must only mean that the membership of the gerousia was fixed in number and personnel at this time We find in the whole Rhetra three infinitives-απελλαζειν εισφερειν and αφιστασθαι and four aorist participles-ιδρυσαμενον, φυλαξαντα, ωβαξαντα and καταστησαντα The subject of these participles is no doubt considered to be a certain "law-giver" Now, the technical meaning of εισφερειν is "to introduce a proposal" Those who introduce a proposal are, as Plutarch says, the gerousia αφιστασθαι, I think, is not passive but middle Therefore, though its meaning is vague, the subject of this infinitive must also be the gerousia And perhaps, as Hammond indicated, this word implies "to adjourn and dissolve the (assembly of the) people" If so, then, what is the ubject of the infinitive απελλαζειν (=summon <the people> to an assembly) ? It is not impossible to regard it as a certain "law-giver" But those who introduce proposals and adjourn the assembly of the people must summon the people to the assembly So I conclude that the subject of απελλαζειν is also the gerousia In a work, απελλαζειν, εισφερειν and αφιστασθαι represent various powers of the gerousia The last part (4) is corrupt and its meaning is obscure Presumably this part is a statement concerning powers of the people or the assembly Thus we may translate the Great Rhetra (except the rider) as follows "The law-giver shall found a sanctuary of Zeus Syllamus and Athena Syllania, shall divide the people into tribes and obai, shall set up the gerousia consisting of thirty members, the chief leaders included The <new> gerousia shall from season to season summon the people to the assembly between Babuka and Knakion, and thus shall introduce proposals and shall adjourn the assembly The people shall be <the assembly and> the decisive authority" After all these considerations I believe I can affirm that reforms were effected presumably in about 760 B C in comf ormity with the Rhetra, and that thenceforth the gerousia and the assembly (apella) came to be the legislative and the executive organs

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1) Almost all the so-called modern interpretations of Plato's idea tell us that the idea is nothing other than a general concept It is true that Plato endeavours to find out the general concept for the benefit of science against subjective opinion (δοξα), but it does not imply that his sight does not reach the transcendent, which is the real object for philosophy Through philological analysis and philosophical reconstruction of Plato's original texts, the author concludes, in opposition to the currently accepted interpretation, that Plato makes an effort to discriminate ειδοζ as the universal, and ιδεα as the transcendent, the transcendent being often modified by the phrase αυτο το Such an inclination in the use of words is clearly perceptible both in Plato's dialogues after Phaedo and in the various texts of his successors, Aristotle, Theophrastus and later Neo-Platomsts 2) The necessary condition of true judgement is that the predicate is not subjective but objective, not individual but general Such generality depends on the nature of the thing which is intentionally designated by the subject-term in question, namely, the immanent form of the thing, that is to say ειδοζ which itself consists in genus-species-relation, and which, therefore, is determined in definition So the ειδοζ is no doubt μαλιστα οργανον for the science in general whose construction is a system of definition 3) But there is something which may not be comprehended by definition For Socrates can never succeed in dialogues in finding out the perfect definition for the real value such as beauty, or virtue such as justice (Meno 100 b 7 etc) We realize here that there is something which is super-ειδοζ, trans-ειδοζ, "au dela de" ειδοζ, επεκεινα τηζ ουσιζ, that is to say ιδεα 4) Through strictly philosophical reflexion, which may not be summarized here, the author enumerates the following kinds of ιδεα a) The ground or criterion of thought and judgement, such as το ισον (equality), το μεγα και μικρον (great and small) (Phaedo 75 c 1-2, etc) b) Ideal form of natural beings, referred to in Timaeus (Tim 39 e 7-9, etc) c) The highest prime cause of cosmological dynamics (Phileb 27 b 9-cl, etc) d) The real value such as Beauty, Good, One, Justice etc e) Some artefacta (artificial things) which have essential relation to βιοζ θεωρητικοζ or βιοζ θειοζ (Arist Met 1070 a 18-19, Resp 596 b 3-4, Soph 265 e 3-4, Phaedo 62 b 7, etc ) But all such kinds of idea are condenced in, or included by, that mentioned in c) above, namely, the real transcendent that in nature is God 5) The idea of the Good ιδεα του αγαθου as αρχη will, according to Plato's own text, be apprehended only after the dialectical speculation through ειδοζ (Resp 510) This transcendentality of idea is confirmed by the analysis of Plato's VIIth letter (VII Epist 342 a 8-e 2)

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In the Timaeus, Plato starts his cosmogony, or more likely his cosmology, with describing the Creator's work, saying, "the god took over all that is visible (ορατον)-not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion (κινουμενον πλημμελωζ και ατακτωζ)-and brought it from disorder into order "(30A transl by Cornford) Now what is meant here the so-called 'disorderly motion' ? It comes to our mind first of all that in Plato in his works subsequent to the 'Phaedt us' the cause of motion was always nothing but ψυχη Are we, then, to follow e g Plutarch and Martin, who admitting so to say a temporal creation, argue since ψυχη is the αρχη κιχησεωζ, if there be pre-existing disorderly motion, the cause of this sort of motion should only be to the soul not yet reduced to order, or to follow e g Cornford, who insists on the uncreated world of κοσμοζ, and accepts at the same time a sort of disorderly motion in this very κοσμοζ, thus concluding that the World-Soul should not be completely rational ? These opinions, however, might be put in question, for the text tells us that the "chaos" existed before the creation of the World-Soul, and the ψυχη seems to be described here as being wholly rational and divine exactly as in the Phaedo Besides there is to be found no explicit allusion to ψυχη in its description there as the cause of motion Another possible solution might thus suggest itself Since ψυχη is the ορχη κινησεωζ, and ψυχη is rational, so there is no room left for any irrational motion at all This argument, held by Archer-Hind and Taylor, was, however, open to attack for entirely eliminating the irrational element from the scheme of Plato's sensible world, introducing thereby the idea of Jewish-Christian omnipotent God into Plato's Demiurge Thus comes the third alternative, i e, the attempt to ascribe the cause of the disorderly motion to something else than ψυχη This opinion, held by Aristotle, by Proclus, and recently by Hackforth, seems to be incompatible with Plato's fundamental doctrine that ψυχη is exactly the αρχη κινησεωζ Something, it seems to us, is still left in the text to be examined more carefully concerning the 'chaotic motion' The disorderly motion is described as one wherein the perceptible qualities are moving and tending like to like in space, and different kinds are coming to different regions, just as dense and rare corns are being shaken in a winnowing basket And it seems that such a motion would necessarily cease to be, as soon as the process of separation would have finished, as suggested in 53 A 6 ff and 58 A 2 ff Is such a chaos to be conceived of as being animated by some self-moving, living soul, as Cornford says ? The chaotic motion, I should say, is described in the text as being completely deprived of the ψυχη which is animating, guiding and rational So that the principles opposing to each other in the Timaeus would not be the rational and the irrational within the ψυχη itself as defined as the cause of all motion, but the animating rational ψυχη and the resisting chaotic bodily motion which, if left alone, would lead everything into destruction But one may raise a further question Why did Plato start with chaotic motion at all, instead of starting with something static ? With this regard we should like to refer to the Theaetetus, in which sensible objects are reduced to sensible qualities, and sensible qualities to change or motion (κινησιζ) So if Plato presupposes something chaotic and material (ορατον) at the outset of his cosmology, it was probably natural that he should describe it as being m chaotic 'motion' In this sense the 'pre-existing' chaos should certainly have been in discordant motion only it could not be due to self moving rational ψυχη

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The aim of this thesis is to present an aspect of Martial through money matters I have treated the poems of Martial that are connected with money matters in some way or other There is an excellent thesis on legacy-hunting by Prof Katsuhiko Higuchi, entitled "'Captatio' as depicted by Martial" (in Journal of Classical Studies, Vol I, 1956, Tokyo), I have expanded the theme from "captatio" to money in general, and attempted to survey Martial's way of looking at money through some of his works, in so doing, I have tried to carve his profile in relief as an epigrammatist While "captatio" and the system of inheritance at the time are only briefly treated in order to avoid overlapping with Prof Higuchi's thesis, emphasis is put on the economic background of Roman society from which the custom of "captatio" was originated Vergil's first Ecloga-which suggests the situation of a poet deprived of his estate by political pressure-seems to me not irrelevant to numerous epigrams on money written by Martial He was one of the "client-poets" -the status of poets had already been lowered to that of mere entertainers under the reign of Emperor Domitian It is interesting to note that Martial, a "client-poet", did not care to show any sympathy towards the victims of "captatio" To illustrate Martial's view on money matters, examples were taken from his satire on "eques"-hood Martial went further to attack wasters-those who waste money on costly food, clothes and other luxuries But Martial's scorn of wealth is not the distaste that the labouring poor feel towards those who enjoy their unearned incomes It is the scorn of a poor intellectual for the unlettered new rich His satirical epigrams on niggardliness were written in that spirit Poems treating sexual affairs in connexion with money are not confined to Martial "Money rules the sexual world" is, as it were, one of his favourite mottoes, and its living examples could be seen in the everyday life of corrupted Rome Woman, he thought, is nothing but a means to satisfy his sexual desire, hence, the cheaper the better a common opinion at the time, which one sees already in Horace What has come under my notice is his masochistic lowering of himself Martial was over-conscious of his poverty His poems often suggest that wealth and honesty do not go together-and perhaps this view represents a correct comprehension of the society in which he was living But we must bear in mind that the words were uttered by a man whose worldly ambitions were frustrated, and to whom his provincial origin was a lifelong burden Martial must have found a vent in bitter words, pretending to be sometimes a picaro Flattering and begging poems "dedicated" to Emperor Domitian and other men of power may have had the same origin Cynical words are hurled at the absurd custom of salutatio His attitude on composing poetry is naturally affected by these feelings Never believing in the eternal value of literature, yet proud of his being a rather famous poet hence conies his mocking attitude Literature yields little profit, he declared, while always having scorn for profit-chasers It is quite doubtful, however, whether Martial himself was really in extreme poverty He often sang about his straitened circumstances Indeed, he had much interest in his economic situation, he was much too interested in it, in fact, to have let himself starve This paradox may account for his pretence as a picaro Wasn't Martial merely a normal, ordinary person ? His witticism seen through the poems on poverty seems to be a proof of his normality To conclude, Martial belonged to the lower middle class, be himself being excessively conscious of his status as one of the poor populace On the one hand, he did not hesitate to ask for material aid from the Emperor and his rich

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The twelfth century was an epoch of abundant vitality It is remarkable for its classical revival as well as for its histonographical activity John of Salisbury, who had been a student at the cathedral school of Chartres, was a typical humanist, imbued with classical culture But in spite of the fact that he might have been an excellent historian, he disdained to become one Orderic Vital, a monk of St Evroul, who wrote a voluminous "Ecclesiastical History", was scarcely influenced by classical culture

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