As editor's critical sign in the present editions of Bacchylides shows, the supplement α[ιξν, ω] at Bacchylides 2. 1 will certainly be correct. The reference, however, to Pindaric parallels, "N. 5. 2 etc."(etc. means 0. 14. 20 as the history of the supplement demonstrates), which was first made by Kenyon and has been made by Teubner-B. editors and still stands in the ap. cr. of the present edition, is, I am afraid, misleading. αιξον, ελθε (0. 14. 20), and στειχε(N. 5. 2)are of similar meaning(of human physical actions, of going and coming), in the same person(2sg.)that represents "my song", in the same mood(imperative) , and belong to the same poetical tradition(as the variations of homeric "Sing-Muse"). Moreover, all these verbs work as a principal part of the same grammatical pattern, that is, they all work as the finite verb in the same structure[finite verb in the first person or in the persons related to the first person with a connotation of human physical action(go, jump, stop etc.) +participle which stands on human verbal capacity(sing, talk etc.)] Therefore, the reference made by the editors since Kenyon to these Pindaric "parallels" seems on the surface to be reasonable enough. The stylistic backgrounds, however, of each poet are entirely different. In sing-Muse-motif or in I-sing-motif, Pindar consistently uses verbs with connotation of human physical action ; Bacchylides uses them only here. In Pindar's epinicia we find 23 sentences in the grammatical pattern which is just mentioned ; in Bacchylides', on the contrary, αιξον φερουσ' αγγελιαν is a unique instance. Behind their differences in terms of style and sentencestructure shown here I see their basic difference in the mode of epinicionmaking: Pindar heavily relied upon the chorus'(i. e. ego in his epinicia) physical competence in their performance as well as on their verbal capaclty; their physical competence, on the other hand, never entered Bacchylides' mind when he was making his epinician text. Concerning, therefore, both poets' mode of epinicion-making, the ap. cr. could be considered misleading.

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In the study of the Delian League or the Athenian Empire, how and when Athens transformed the alliance against Persia into an empire of Athenian subjects has been a major problem. Since the publications of The Athenian Tribute Lists (1939-53) and Meiggs' The Athenian Empire in 1972, 'the crisis of the forties' has generally been considered a vital stage of this change, and the disaster in Egypt in 454 B.C. and 'the Peace of Callias' in 449 B.C. have been thought to cause this change. In this paper, first, I discuss that 'the crisis of the forties' was created, strengthened and distorted through the debates on the dating of the fifth-century Athenian inscriptions, i.e. the forties or the twenties. Since these debates have dealt exclusively with the development of the Athenian imperialism in the forties or the twenties, the students of the Athenian Empire have relatively ignored Thucydides' Pentekontaetia. Second, I argue that, for Thucydides, the Athenian αρχη emerged only through their military actions, and their attitudes to the allies were consistent from the time of the Naxian revolt to that of the later revolts(i.e. to the time of the Euboean revolt in 446 B.C. and the Samian revolt in 440/39 B. C. etc.). Because Thucydides marks that Athens' αρχη came into being in the course of the Pentekontaetia(1. 97. 1-2 ; 118. 2)and that the increase of Athens' αρχη emerged after her suppression of the Naxian revolt(1. 99) , he seems to think that the revolts of the allies and their suppressions by the Athenians were the fundamental basis of the Athenian αρχη. The Naxian revolt was, for him, the most important phase in which Athens' relationship with her allies changed to a coercive relation of αρχη. In other words, the allies became hypekooi instead of autonomoi after their revolts from Athens. In Thucydides' view, the Athenian αρχη was established through her violations of the allies' autonomia. Third, it is after the battle of the Eurymedon, for many ancient authors' thoughts, that the Athenian power increased and the relations between Athens and her allies changed. Because the Naxian revolt and the battle of the Eurymedon happened in a short period(1. 98. 4, μετα ταυτα ; 1. 100. 1, μετα ταυτα και) , their view seems to be consistent with that of Thucydides. Since the Naxians probably began to rebel in the spring of 466 B.C. or the fall of 466 B.C. and the battle of the Eurymedon was probably fought late in 466 B.C. or very early in 465 B.C., the middle of the 460s B.C. seems to be the most remarkable period that established the Athenian αρχη. Finally I conclude that there is a great discrepancy between the αρχη in Thucydides and that used by many modern scholars. Their discussions are not how Athens transformed their relationship with her allies from hegemonia to a relation of αρχη or power, but how Athens organized the Delian League and therefore made an 'empire' of the Athenians systematically. According to their modern standard, Athens' arche or 'empire' emerged only after her establishing of the firm organizations of the League. In Thucydides' view, on the other hand, Athens' αρχη or power emerged just after the Naxian revolt of c. 466 B.C.

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In the last argument of the first part in the Theaetetus(184b4-187a8), Socrates tries to refute the first definition of knowledge that it is perception. In the argument he distinguishes between perception and consideration and argues that being(ουσια) belongs to consideration, but not to perception, and therefore that the definition is false, for whatever being does not belong to a being cannot be knowledge. According to the orthodox interpretation, Plato distinguishes between making judgement and having sense experience, and argues that in order to make any judgement one must grasp being, for every judgement has a propositional construction, which requires being as one of its constituents. But in sense experience, for example, in sight we see a colour of an object, but do not see a proposition that an object is coloured in such and such a way. So sense experience does not yield judgement. Hence it is not knowledge. But I cannot accept this interpretation, because it cannot explain why the arguments of the second part restrict kinds of judgement to identity. According to it, the conclusion of the last argument of the first part concludes that perception is not knowledge, but judgement can be knowledge. It follows that any kind of judgement can be a candidate for knowledge. But the argument of the second part deals only with identity judgements. So the orthodox interpretation cannot explain why they restrict kinds of judgement to identity ones. In my view, Plato does not distinguish between making judgement and having sense experience, but between considering basic comprehension in language about our experience and having sense experience. When Theaetetus agress that colour can be percieved through eyes and sound through ears(184c1-185a3), he considers that colour is one thing, sound is another, and that there are 'both things'(αμφοτερω)at once(cf. 185a4-10). Now Socrates analyzes the contents of Theaetetus' consideration in this way: (1) Theaetetus previously considers that there are both(sc. a colour and a sound) (185a8-10). (2) He considers that each of them is distinct from the other and the same as itself(185a11-b1). (3) He considers that both together are two, and each of them is one (185b2-3). (4) He can investigate whether they both are alike each other or unlike (185b4-6). Plato uses the expression 'being(εστον)' in (1), but not in (2)(3)(4) by ellipsis. Plato pays attention to (1). (1) is an assumption for Theaetetus' consideration of 'both things'. So the being(εστον) in (1) means an existential assumption, which is necessary to thinking or saying in language. Theaetetus' consideration of 'both things' is also expressed as the consideration that each is and each is not(cf. 185c5-6, c9). To avoid any jump of logic, the consideration that, for example, colour is colour, and colour is not sound. This is an identifying judgement. So the consideration of 'both things, is composed of four contents((1)〜(4)), namely an existential assumption ((1)), and two comparisons with each other((2), (4)) and calculation of number((3)). We can say, therefore, Plato uses 'being' in two senses, that is, the sense of existence and the sense of identity, in this passage, when we consider the basic comprehension about our experience. But the identifying judgement includes the existential assumption ((1)). Thus, if we don't consider 'both things' as comprehended above, we cannot intend to observe and describe each of them and say that an object is perceived to be in such and such a way. Therefore our experience, for example, perceiving, observing, saying, describing, etc., is based on this sort of comprehension in our mind. Therefore, according to my interpretation, it is reasonable to restrict kind of judgement to identity alone, in the argument of the second part. For it has shown that the last argument

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In this paper, I reexamine a notorious passage in Plato's Sophist 253d-e in order to establish a new relationship between the Method of Division practiced in the scene of denning sophist and the Separation in the scene of the (συμπλοκη των ειδων. The passage begins with following introductory remarks(253d1-2). Το κατα γενη διαιρεισθαι (Intr. 1) και μητε αυτον ειδο&b.sigmav; ετερον ηγησασθαι και μητε ετερον ον ταυτον (Intr. 2) These two items belong to the Knowledge of Dialectic, and someone who is equipped with them discerns sufficiently the followings(ibid. d7 ιλανω&b.sigmav; διαισθανται). (1) μιαν ιδεαν δια πολλων, ενο&b.sigmav; εκαστου κειμνου χωρι&b.sigmav;, παντη διατεταμενην (2) πολλα&b.sigmav; ετερα&b.sigmav; αλληλων υπο μια&b.sigmav; εξωθεν περιεχομενα&b.sigmav; (3) μιαν δι' ολων πολλων εν ενι συνημμενην (4) πολλα&b.sigmav; χωρι&b.sigmav; παντη διωρισμενα&b.sigmav;(ibid. d5-e1) Among various interpretations on this passage, we can see two tendencies. On the one hand, some scholars think that this passage refers to the Method of Division, and hold that Plato intended here to describe the genus-species relationship in the world of Idea. On the other hand, some scholars reject this kind of view and claim that it refers to the Dialectic in the scene of συμπλοκη which they treat as a grasp of consistency and inconsistency between Forms. It seems, however, to me that both of these tendencies have a common fault that they cannot help supposing in one and the same dialogue two kinds of Dialectic which are totally different from each other. So in our interpretation these two types of Dialectic should have some suitable relationship. My general strategy is as follows. At the first stage of my interpretation, I investigate the passage in relation to the Method of Division. And among four items cited above, I take (1) as the Collection(219c6-7, 226c5-6), (2) as the Separation(226e6, 227c5, 267d9e1), (3) as the Connection(224c9, 252c5, 268c6), and (4) as the Repetition of a set of those three(223c1-4, 226a6-8, 231c5), respectively. Although most of scholars have took the expression of (2) to mean the Collection in combination with that of (1), I don't commit myself to this kind of view. At the second stage, I connect the passage to the Dialectic in the scene of συμπλοκη by means of interpreting the phrase ιχανω&b.sigmav; διαισθανεται cited above as a grasp of the foundation of the Method of Division(cf. 253a9 ικανω&b.sigmav;, ibid. c3 αιτια). In other words, I regard the Dialectic in the συμπλοκη as the foundation of the Method of Division, and think, accordingly, that there is a certain kind of hierarchy between the two. For example, as far as (2) is concerned, I think two types of separation in this dialogue. One is the separation in the scene of defining sophist. In this scene the Stranger distinguishes one Form from the other exclusive Form, such as the cleansing of soul from that of body(227c5 αφορισασθαι). I call this type of separation Separation 1, and take the expression of Intr. 1 to refer to the Separation 1. The other is the separation in the scene of συμπλοχη. In this scene the Stranger distinguishes one Form from many Forms which are comprehended by the former one, such as Being from Rest and Motion(250b8-c4). And in another passage of the text this type of separation seems to be said in other words that Being is the same as itself but different from any other Forms(254d4-15, 257a1-6, 259b1-4). So I call both of these Separation 2. Depending upon this classification, I consider the relationship between the two types of separation. Indeed many cleansings concerning body are tied up as similar things(cf. 227b3 ομοιοτητα) in comparison with many cleansings concerning soul. But this doesn't mean that the many cleansings about body are the same as the one Form which ties up them. So, strictly

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Critias is known as the leader of the cruel "Thirty Tyrants", who governed defeated Athens after the Poloponnesian War(404/3 B.C.), and killed over 1500 people under their reign of terror. Critias raises two important issues in the history of philosophy. First, as a relative of Plato, he seems to have influenced young Plato ; Plato later says in the Seventh Letter that he was initially attracted by Critias' invitation to the oligarchic government, but soon got disappointed on seeing its evil deeds(324B-325A). Second, Critias is regarded as a major cause of the decision to bring Socrates to trial in 399 ; the Athenians believed that Socrates was guilty of "corrupting youth" because he had educated anti-democratic politicians, such as Critias and Alcibiades(cf. Aeschines, 1. 173). These events kept Plato away from real politics and forced him to contemplate politics in philosophy. I believe that Plato confronted the issues concerning Critias in his early dialogue, the Charmides, in which young Critias plays a major role in discussing sophrosyne(temperance or prudence). However, the commentators have scarcely considered political issues in this dialogue, probably because they take the "evil image of Critias" for granted. First, therefore, I reexamine the historical figure of Critias and show how his image was created. It is Xenophon who is most responsible for making up our image of Critias. He describes Critias as a cruel tyrant and ascribes all evils of the Thirty to his personal motivations. Xenophon's account in the History of Greece II. 3. 11-4. 43 reflects the strong reaction against oligarchy in democratic Athens, and originates both in his hostility against the Thirty and his intention to defend Socrates' education(Memorabilia 1. 2. 12-38, 47). This has concealed the Thirty's real political intentions under the "evil image of Critias". On the other hand, we have some positive evidence to indicate that the Thirty originally intended to restore justice and morality in Athens (Lysias 12. 5 ; P1. Ep. VII 324D) ; they executed the sycophants("villains" in democratic Athens). We cannot deny the possibility that Critias and his group seriously aimed for ideal justice, and philosophical examination of the ideology of Critias is therefore necessary. The problem lies in what they understand as justice and sophrosyne. This is the main target of Plato's examination of Critias in the Charmides. Most commentators have ignored the political aspect of the dialogue. Sophrosyne is(unlike Aristotle's definition in the Ethics)a major political virtue along with justice, and the leading ideal for the Spartans and the oligarchs. Sophrosyne is said to bring about good government(Charm. 162A, 171D-172A, D). A crucial point in interpreting the Charmides is how we can understand the shift and relationship between several definitions of sophrosyne which Critias provides. He often gives up his earlier definitions easily and presents new ones ; there seems no logical relation between these. I see his definitions not as logically consequent, but as implying and revealing Critias' underlying ideology. I focus on two shifts : the first comes when Critias abandons his first definition "to do one's own", and gives a new definition "to know oneself" (164C-D) ; the second shift explicates "to know oneself" as "knowledge of the other knowledges and of itself" (166B-C). In each case, the direct cause of shift is Socrates' using an analogy between sophrosyne and techne (skill). Critias opposes Socrates' analogy and tries to separate two kinds of knowledge : self-knowledge and particular skills. Since the relation between the two is explained in terms of "rule" and "supervise" (173C, 174D-E) , I conclude that the clear distinction between the two

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In Metaphysics Δ7(1017a22-23)Aristotle asserts that both substance and non-substantial categories are "per se beings". But H. Maier maintains that this assertion is misleading, because according to Aristotle's usual ontology non-substantial categories are not per se beings but accidental beings. The alleged inconsistency relates to the conceptual frame in terms of which Aristotle's account of per se beings and accidental beings is couched. My aim in this paper is to investigate a way of reading the Al passage which I hope will show that Aristotle is consistent in dealing with all categories, substance or non-substance, as per se beings. The problem is this : how does Aristotle take accidental beings in Al to be? We should consider the second chapter of Met. E, whose central topic is accidental beings. Accidental beings discussed there are said to be material things(1027a13-14)and not any object of science at all(1026b3-4, 1027a19-20), therefore, not the object of the science of being qua being. But is this true of Al, as J. Owens supposed? Ζ4 will give us the clue we need to this question. Aristotle establishes the close relation not only between accidental beings and "compounds from the other categories" (1029b23) , but also between per se beings and "things said to be per se"(1029b14, 29). And he says, "what a thing is belongs without qualification to a substance, but in a way to other things as well."(1030a22 -23), and "there will be a definition even of a pale man"(1030b12-13). So it turns out that he is treating substance and non-substantial categories, or even compounds from the other categories in the same way because of their definability. Something's being "one" not by the continuity but in the respect of what it is or definition, I think, enables him to do that(1030b8-11). Aristotle enumerates three meanings of 'one'(Met. Δ6) : (1) one by the continuity; (2) one by the substratum; (3) one by "the formula saying what it is to be". It is to the third meaning that Ζ4 refers. Since 'being' and 'one' signify the same thing by following each other(Met. 12, 1054a13 ; Γ2, 1003a22-25), 'per se being' in ΔA7 can be also taken to mean 'one' by the formula saying what it is to be. If so, why is it that accidental beings in Ε2 are not regarded as objects of the science of being qua being, while in Ζ4 they are practically studied as such? Notice that matter is the cause of the accidental combination of substance and the other categories(Ε2, 1027a13-14). Accidental beings in Ε2 are material compounds or individuals. But in Ζ4 Aristotle never mentions the concept of matter in discussing essence and definition, for the definition of a thing just states what it is by disregarding its matter. It follows that accidental beings in Ζ4 are not material but essential compounds, and that things said to be per se are without matter. So are per se beings in AT. The idea that being what it is without matter is common to all categories seems to have led Aristotle to the assertion at issue.

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An Athenian naval reform by Periandros in the middle of the fourth century B.C. changed drastically the former system of the trierarchy, when expenses were paid for a warship by one or two persons(trierarchs). The law of Periandros charged 1200 people who were members of 20 symmories, each consisting of 60 people with the payments for the trierarchy, and so divided the financial burden for a warship between many people. Recently, at least, this system itself has been studied by some scholars, especially with regard to possible identification with the system of the eisphora, but the historical background of this reform seems to have been scarcely studied as a main theme and in detail. Accordingly, the significance of it is here fully examined. The date of the reform has been regarded as 358/7 B.C. or 357/6 B.C. by common consent since this was argued by Boeckh. The evidence to prove the existence of Periandros' symmories in 357/6 B.C. is [Dem.]XLVII, but there is no evidence to prove its existence before then. For example, as we find no references to the trierarchic symmories in [Dem.]L which relates to an Athenian naval expedition in the late 360s B.C., it seems that the start of the law must be placed after that date. In that period, there were two important events in foreign relations which might have had such a direct impact that Athens was forced to carry out the drastic reform of the naval system. One was the Athenian expedition to Euboea in the summer of 357 B. C. and the other was the Social War which broke out soon after that. There is no evidence to elucidate directly the relative dates of the reform and the expedition to Euboea. Cawkwell does not entirely exclude the possibility that the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII may be identical with that in the expedition to Euboea, and he infers that in that case the expedition to Euboea might have been provided for by the law of Periandros. But while the fleet in that expedition was quickly dispatched and voluntary trierarchs participated in it in response to an appeal of the State, the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII could not set sail so quickly and such an appeal was not made at that time. Therefore these two fleets were different from each other. Seeing that the Athenians were forced to depend upon the trierarchic epidosis, firstly organized in Athens at that time, for the expedition to Euboea, it is more probable that the date of Periandros' reform is later than that of the expedition to Euboea as Boeckh thought. The next important matter is the relative dates of the reform and the Social War. There is a clue about it in the description of [Dem.]XLVII, 20 ff.. The above-mentioned fleet in [Dem.]XLVII can be thought to have been dispatched to cope with the revolt of the allies which led to the Social War. This is a possibility that Cawkwell regards as more probable and his arguments are convincing. Consequently, we can infer the chronology for the three events, that is, the expedition to Euboea → the reform of Periandros → the Social War. And we can suppose from [Dem.]XLVII, 21, etc. that his law was initiated before the outbreak of the Social War but the revolt of the allies broke out before it was completely carried out. This suggests that Periandros carried out the reform being conscious of the unquiet tendency of the allies and as a measure against them. Tod. No. 151 (=IG II^2 126) which records an alliance between Athens and three Thracian kings in 357/6 B.C seems to suggest this, though it does so indirectly. Lastly, it can be confirmed by IG I^I2 1611, etc. that Periandros and the other man performed their syntrierarchy using the state-owned ship's equipment and Periandros proposed the reform presumably sometime during their syntrierarchy. Taking notice of a regulation about recovering the unreturned state-owned ship's equipment in his law, we can infer that he himself, too, keenly realized a

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In Tibullus 2. 5, the last section(105-22)balances the first section(1-18)in length and in words, but the two sections differ in some respects. Messalinus, who is introduced at first as a newly elected priest of Apollo, is later imagined as a triumphant general. What development of the poem causes this change? Moreover, bringing in a new theme, the poet talks about his love for Nemesis and asserts that she is the source of his poetry. How does Tibullus' personal love affair match this national poem which treats Rome's history? In this paper, I attempt to consider Tibullus' attitude to Rome's growth and the new regime by examining these questions. After mentioning the Sibylline Books, the care of which is entrusted to quindecimuiri, the poet quotes the Sibyl's former prophecy to Aeneas(39-64). She predicted that Troy would be reconstructed to be Rome and dominate the whole world. Here the marvelous development of Rome is the poem's theme. The poet's intention is to heighten his praise of Messalinus by placing him in Rome's victorious history. Singing of a great victory has been suggested, because Apollo was asked to dress up as he had done when he celebrated Jupiter's triumph over Saturn (7-10). However, as Bright points out, Saturn is also a significant god for Tibullus. In 1.3, he states how happily men lived in the Golden Age of Saturn in contrast to his contemporary men. The coming of Jupiter's age is good and right, but can be viewed from a different angle. Therefore in the description of Rome's history its dark side is hinted dimly, e. g. Romulus' fratricide(23-4), and emerges more clearly when the poet refers to the ominous phenomena associated with the death of Julius Caesar(71-8). Now, facing Rome's painful realities, Tibullus himself predicts a happy future of Rome, which is imagined in the peaceful country(83-104). This joyful picture of a country festival is similar to the former description of the site of Rome before the arrival of Aeneas(23-38), but I agree with Mutschler that these two scenes differ in accent. While the former scene as a whole is very idyllic and fantastic, the latter is rather realistic in that the rural life is depicted more concretely. Especially the charming picture of a united family(91-4)makes a vivid impression on us. Therefore the poet doesn't suggest the restoration of the early pastoral world nor an utterly fanciful ideal society. In the last section the praise of Messalinus which has been reserved begins at last, and Tibullus as uates glorifies Messalinus as a future conqueror. Although war is a target of the poet's criticism in other poems and the dark side of Rome's development has been hinted, here the poet makes a realistic choice to assure a happy future, which corresponds to the more realistic tone of the preceding description of the rural life. What makes possible this realistic choice? I think that is showed in 105-12 referring to love and Nemesis. The poet keenly expresses the ambivalence of love, especially his love, in 107-8, where ars bona makes a sharp contrast with ars...malum, and in 110(faueo morbo cum iuuat ipse dolor). Moreover it is emphasized that Nemesis inspires Tibullus as uates and that she is the truth he reveals, because 111-2 with uati(114)is parallel to 15-6 with uatis(18), and to 63-4 with uates(65). By his sensibility to the ambivalence of love the poet can realize that Rome's prosperity cannot but involve a negative element, and on the other hand that the peaceful rural world he loves may be easily destroyed. Therefore the realistic glorification of a victorious general of Rome becomes possible for the poet, though he does not praise only the political and martial power, as pia...spectacula displayed by Messalla(119)shows. Tibullus is not singing a reluctant and unnatural praise. His song here rests on the same

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'Unreliable narrator' is a term of modern literary theory, applied to a type of narrator who, telling of his past experiences in I-narration, has some defects of character. We readers cannot accept what he says at face value, for he twists the facts according to his peculiar stand point, which is quite different from the author's. The author represents the narrator with an irony, which he expects the readers to notice and enjoy. Few people regard Encolpius, the hero and narrator of Satyricon, as reliable. In short, he is a narrator who tells us wild fancies. What he has to tell are vulgar matters in reality, but, filtered by him, they are transformed into heroic or romantic visions conveyed in lofty language. These basic points about the nature of Encolpius' narration have been understood properly, but it seems to me that scholars have not analyzed the text itself adequately. What I attempt here is to analyze two typical scenes and to reveal the ingenious devices that Petronius uses to show the foolishness of the narrator's vision. It must be noted that Encolpius is not unreliable in all scenes of the novel. He is reliable in such realistic episodes as the 'Cena.' Most of the scenes where one needs to doubt him are in the love affair episodes. First I discuss the quarrel scene between Encolpius and Ascyltos over Giton(Ch. 79, 9-80, 8). Many scholars have pointed out that the lofty style of Encolpius betrays his foolishness, but it may be objected that such a style is appropriate, for it is his dearest lover, Giton, that he was robbed of here. Certainly the grand style is one of the clues the author gives to indicate his irony, but he gives us another clue here. That is the words and behaviour of other characters, and from them we can infer how the situation really was before it was filtered by Encolpius. In this scene Encolpius is lost in a heroic fancy, but the reality is far from such heroism. This is reflected first in the contrast between Encolpius' vocabulary and Ascyltos'. Encolpius thinks his relationship to Giton and to Ascyltos very sublime, as is shown by his moralistic words, 'amicitia,' 'fides,' 'iniuria.' On the other hand, Ascyltos regards Giton only as an object of sex, as is suggested by his 'meam partem' or 'praeda.' Secondly, Encolpius believes that he is fighting a great battle, as is clear from 'parricidali manu,' 'composui ad proeliandum gradum,' while Ascyltos calls it only 'discordia.' In the last scene the behaviour of Ascyltos and Giton reveals the cold fact before filtered by Encolpius. Giton chooses Ascyltos with no hesitation. This means that Giton had long been conspiring with him and had no intention of choosing Encolpius. One can see how foolish the hero is, in that he expected 'vetustissimam consuetudinem in sanguinis pignus transisse.' Next, I analyze the scene of the love affair between the hero and Circe, who is an upper-class lady in Croton. Here Encolpius thinks her like a goddess, and their relationship very sublime, like that between a goddess and her worshiper. This is clear from a series of descriptions of her and from his religiously coloured language in Ch. 127, 3-4. It is Circe's speeches and behaviours that reveal this to be only a fancy. Her speech in Ch. 127 is rather indirect, but what she means is obvious. She is requiring a sexual relationship of him. In Ch. 128, the two discuss the cause of Encolpius' impotence. Circe thinks of sober reasons, while Encolpius insists the cause is a drug. Lastly, her reaction described in detail in Ch. 128, 3-4 is noteworthy. It is a quite unromantic description of her attitude, such as 'excussit vexatam solo vestem.' The goddess-like image Encolpius entertained is completely ruined by the description. It is unlikely that the primary aim of

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So far, it has been considered that the Emperor Vespasian's new government consisted of his relatives, partisans and old friends. In 79 A.D., however, the powerful senator, Eprius Marcellus, cos. II in 74, who has been regarded as one of Vespasian's confidants, was suspected of framing a plot against Vespasian and forced to suicide. It has been questioned why he went to his doom. In the first part of this paper, the careers of the provincial governors from 69 to 73 are examined. The governors of the few important consular provinces were Vespasian's relatives and supporters, but most of the consular governors were appointed not because they were supporters of Vespasian. They are classified as two types. One is the Othonian generals. Under the Emperor Otho, they fought against the Vitellian army in the civil war. Vespasian adopted them to get the support of the Othonian senators. The other type is the senators who held iterated consulships under Vespasian. This fact has led many scholars to conclude these senators were his confidants. But, it is doubtful whether the iterated consuls were his confidants. In the civil war, they gave no substantial support to Vespasian, with whom they do not seem to have had any plausible connection in the Julio-Claudian period. Their honorific and powerless posts from 70 to 73 suggest that Vespasian put little trust in them. Two inscriptions about Plautius Aelianus and Tampius Flavianus record that Vespsian honoured them, not because of their merits in his reign but because of merits in the Neronian period, which Nero had not rewarded enough. Vespasian was famous for his propaganda against Nero. It follows from these points that Vespasian made use of iterated consuls to show the difference between himself and Nero, and to get the supports of many other senators. A mere homo novus like him needed such propaganda to secure his throne. Thus, most of the governors in the early years of Vespasian's reign were neither his supporters nor his old friends. They were appointed governors because his partisans were not yet powerful among the senators at that time. Marcellus was honoured for his influence with other senators. He was not the real confidant of Vespasian. The second part of this paper deals with the appearance of the new powers after Vespasian's censorship in 73-74. Many scholars have considered that, by adlecting the senators to the patricians, Vespasian intended to create a new elite class. But, almost all of the new patricians whom Vespasian used as the provincial governors were originally his partisans from the civil war. After they became the consular governors, only a few other patricians were elevated as provincial governors. So Vespasian's intention toward patricians was to reward his partisans rather than to create an elite class. He intended to fill the important governorships, especially imperial consular ones, with his partisans. All governors of the imperial consular provinces from 74 onwards had been appointed consuls by Vespasian. The senators who had reached consulships before his reign were excluded from these posts. The significant evidence of this is that Othonian generals were not appointed to any governorships, and did not appear until the reign of Domitian. Iterated consuls who had reached the consulship first in Nero's reign existed in 74-75, but, as noted above, their appointment meant a political propaganda. Vespasian rapidly promoted his partisans and senators who began their careers under him, and excluded the consuls of the period from Nero to Vitellius. At the same time, Vespasian began his new policy. From Judaea, Agrippa II and his sister Berenice, who were among the main supporters of Vespasian in the civil war, came to Rome. The former received the ornamenta praetoria, and the latter co-habited with Titus. Although the Romans hated her, Vespasian did not get rid of her, and

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Egypt provides students of economic history of the Roman Empire with plenty of valuable information. Government officials and ordinary people left considerable records of their daily activities. Papyrological evidence reflects the increase of price inflation in the third century and shows us how it influenced daily life. This paper deals with evidence for one specific type of monetary transaction, and by analysing this shows how people acted toward the ever depreciating currency. In the papyri of this period, from the reign of Gallienus onward, we find frequent references to 'the new silver coin' and 'the old silver coin'. Among them, P. Oxy. 2587 is a receipt for payment in the 'new coin' of a loan made in 'the Ptolemaic coin'. This obviously gives a clue to the relationship between the 'new coin' and the 'old coin'. But it is not clear whether this payment was in part or in full. So it has previously been impossible to decide whether there was any difference in value between these coins, or these expressions were only conventional with no technical significance. To solve this problem, we must examine all the documents referring to these coins and inquire whether these transactions have any peculiarity for the use of these coins. Whatever the relationship between them, it follows that there was some difference in value between the 'new coin' and the 'old coin'. And from one document it emerges decisively that the 'old coin' had a higher value than the 'new coin'. P. Stras. 557 from Hermopolis, dated to 291 AD, is a lease contract for land divided between fodder and wheat cultivation. It lays down that the rent for fodder land is 40 drachms per aroura, and it must be paid in the 'old Ptolemaic coin'. Comparing these provisions with other lease contracts of fodder land, we will see the exact character of our document. First, the rent of 40 drachms is very low for this period. In the reign of Aurelianus the inflational spiral set in, and the rent for fodder land leaped to hundreds of drachms. Otherwise it was paid in kind. Forty drachms is rather a figure of the period before the 260s, that is, the period of relatively stable prices. The second unusual feature is the term of the lease. A 4-yearterm is laid down in P. Stras. 557. From the late 260s onward almost all lease contracts are made on a 1-yearterm. The 4-yearterm is instead typical of the earlier period, before inflation. The use of the 'old coin', not the ever depreciating one, enabled the lessor and the lessee to make a contract for a lower rent and longer term than usual for the period. But there may be a possibility that the 'old coin' is an accounting unit in book keeping, not actual cash, as happened in the Tetrarchic and later period, when drachm and talent served as accounting units. However, this possibility is excluded by the evidence of PSI 890. In this account of a vine-growing estate, an exchange fee is charged for the 'old coin'. This shows clearly that the 'old coin' is actual coin. The general preference of ordinary people for the 'old coin' can most evidently be recognized in one private letter. In P. Oxy. 1773 a daughter tells her mother that her arrival will be delayed. She asks her mother to pay the bearers of the letter two and a half talents in the 'new coin', and to accept from them all the 2092 drachms of the 'old coin'. Probably the daughter hoped that the 'old coins' would be handed over to her mother with no loss. And she thought the bearers would be sufficiently rewarded by payment in the 'new coin'. In the late third century Alexandrian tetradrachms suffered successive weight reductions and debasements. Price leap can be traced back to the 270s. At roughly the same time it can be inferred from

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