Does the demonstration of recollection with the slave boy in the Meno really constitute the proof of recollection thesis? Socrates seems there to be asking leading questions I take it that Plato intended to make it uncertain whether the boy is really recollecting his second denial of knowledge 'ou manthano' (85A4-5) can mean 'I am not learning', suggesting that he is not recollecting We can never know the truth about his learning, because the demonstration is a Gorgian type of epideixis (81B1-2), which produces only persuasion However, it is one thing to know whether the boy is recollecting, and quite another to know whether learning is recollection The demonstration is meant to make Meno recollect the latter truth (81E6-82A3) Throughout the demonstration Socrates addresses questions to Meno, thereby making him consider whether the boy is really recollecting (82B6-7, E12-3, 84A3-4, C10-D1) Socrates' remark after the demonstration is that Meno knows that the boy will regain knowledge (85C9-D1), which means that Meno has been successfully made to recollect that recollection thesis is correct According to Cebes' explanation in the Phaedo (73A7-B2), recollection is helped by the use of proper questions and diagrams, and according to the Republic (510D5-511A1, 529D7-530A), mathematicians should not seek truth in diagrams or models made by such masters as Daedalus, but make use of them simply as images The boy's learning is a beautiful image of true learning created by Socrates, an offspring of Daedalus We should not seek truth concerning learning in this image, but make use of it to find truth about true learning Socrates' proper questions with the help of this image made Meno recollect that learning is recollection However, inquirers are rather misled by perceptual images when the object of inquiry has no lustre in its earthly image(Phaedrus 250B), as is the case with virtues, knowledge, education and learning In order to establish that learning is recollection, it is then necessary to have recourse to another kind of proof, in which one relies on rational thinking Plato embarks on this task in the Phaedo Recollection itself can be taken to be an image or metaphor (eikon) of learning, presented by Socrates, just as the torpedo is an image of Socrates, presented by Meno (80A-C) But they are different in that while the latter is intended to stop inquiry, recollection is a metaphor that stimulates inquiry and helps to develop new ideas expressible in literal paraphrases ('the illustrative thesis' in E E Pender, Images of Persons Unseen, Sankt Augustin 2000) In the Phaedo Plato continues his quest for the truth about learning, with the help of recollection as the image of learning, and thereby develops such new ideas as the existence of Forms and the immortality of the soul His further inquiry about knowledge, the object of learning, in the Theaetetus is taken to be its further continuation

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At present, line 136a of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (h Ven) is almost always deleted from the text Editors include 136a in apparatus cnticus, or insert it between the text and apparatus cnticus, or omit it completely In fact, 136a is found in its full form in only nine out of the 23 existing manuscripts However, theoretically, this line must have been present in the archetype in its full form This line should receive equal treatment to the lines preserved in full in every manuscript So if 136a is to be deleted, the main text should be printed in the following way ου σφιν αεικελιη νυοζ εσσομαι, αλλ εικυια 136 [ει τοι αεικελιη γυνη εσσομαι ηε και ουκι] 137 As a matter of fact, line 136a is deleted since it is considered that 136 is the original and 136a merely its variant But the basis for the deletion of 136a is not very strictly defined, and the text after this deletion becomes problematic, specifically in view of the asyndeton in 136 and the omission of the digamma in εικυια On the other hand, if one deletes 136, ηε και ουκι does not have a corresponding η, η of γυνη must be shortened, and δειξον of 134 takes an ει-clause as its object All this is highly unusual for epic language In any case the deletion leads to some problems, so it is better to avoid it The reason is that the deletion of one line brings about radical changes to the reading of the archetype Actually, there is no evidence that only one line, either 136 or 136a, is original, and the other one merely its variant, in the first place I argue that instead of deleting the line, it is necessary to preserve the reading of archetype So I print text m the following way αδμητην μ' αγαγων και απειρητην φιλοτητοζ 133 πατρι τε σω δειξον και μητερι κεδν' ειδυιη 134 σοιζ τε κασιγνητοιζ, οι τοι ομοθεν γεγαασιν, 135 -ου σφιν αεικελιη νυοζ εσσομαι, αλλ εικυια- 136 ει τοι αεικελιη γυνη εσσομαι ηε και ουκι 136a Certainly, it contains the problems of 136 and 136a described above These constitute a problem only if h Ven was created in 7-6 century B C following in the oral tradition of Homer and Hesiod The fact that h Ven was created in 7-6 century B C seems doubtful, however, because some words and phrases are used in the meanings that they only acquired around 5 century B C Besides there is evidence in the text that the author had read Homer and then wrote his poem Moreover, the author probably did not understand Homer's grammar correctly Finally, there is a part of the poem which shows the author to be far removed from the times of the best epic poetry Though it is difficult to decide correctly when h Ven was created, it is possible that it was written in the classical period, as some parallels seem to point Besides the author of h Ven referred to the book of Ilias with all its scribal errors If h Ven was created after 5 century B C and was written down, the reading of the archetype at 136・136a ceases to present problems

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Faced with the unfavourable circumstances of the Athenian public's tacit contravention of the 403 B C Amnesty, Socrates in the Cnto seems to confirm his ideas that the rule of law be obeyed by the citizens of the ideal democratic State The ideas confirmed through his imaginary dialogue with the Athenian Laws(50a-54d) are the realization of the sovereignty of laws (RL(1)), the guarantee of the citizens' right to contest the legitimacy of the laws (RL(2)) and the ensurance of the conditions for citizens' spontaneous assent to the laws(RL(3)) By showing his intention to obey the rule of the Athenian Laws on his own principles of practice, Socrates urges the Athenian citizens to feel a sense of awe and shame-they have, after all, agreed to accept the Athenian Laws including the Amnesty as their ancestral polity In order to realize the RL(1), we should, first of all, continue to ask what is justice of the laws themselves Plato tries to do so through Socrates' dialogue with Calhcles in the Gorgias and the philosophical inquiry to form the just State and the just psyche in the Republic And then, in order to ensure the RL(2) and the RL(3), we should ask how every citizen's concern for his or her psyche is to be realized in the polity Plato, therefore, shows some concrete ways for every citizen to have common ground of argument in the "second" ideal polity of the Laws, for without philosopher-kings or-queens all the citizens must spontaneously obey the rule of law (III 689e-690c), giving to reason's ordering the name of "law" (IV 713e-714a) Now the Athenian visitor in the Laws suggests various means to realize these ideas of the rule of law on the basis of Socratic dialogical philosophy The final means is the Nocturnal Council (NC) constituted as "a means of salvation to our polity and its laws" (XII 960e) The elder members of the NC usually fulfill their proper political functions to realize the rule of law Assembled in the NC, however, they must engage in philosophical dialogues with the younger members independently of their proper functions The NC itself has its three proper functions First, the admonition of the young imprisoned atheists (X 908a-909a) offers them the occasion to contest the legitimacy of the law by which they were judged They provide the NC with viewpoints of a different kind to grasp the possibility of the universal justification of laws Second, the dialogue with inspector newly returned from overseas (XII 951c-952d) offers the NC some external viewpoints to do so And third, the dialectical inquiry with the younger members in "a higher type of education" (961a-968b) offers every member some internal viewpoints to justify his or her legal judgments Thus the philosophical dialogues in the NC are the crucial methods for making the rule of law restore its true nature as the rule of reason and preserving the public confidence in legal judgments in the democratic society where the arguments over justice inevitably arise

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In Against Ctesiphon 32-48, Aeschmes used the proclamation law and the Dionysiac law (νομοζ Διονυσιακοζ) to present the illegality of Ctesiphon's decree by which the proclamation of a crown for Demosthenes in the theater of Dionysus was proposed The Dionysiac law contained the word δημοτηζ, so it has been often discussed in the studies on the demes in Classical Attica But previous scholars have considered this law only within the framework of the relation between the polis and the demes In this paper, I examined Aeschmes' Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes' On the Crown and the related documents, and reconsidered the relation between the Attic demes and the Dionysiac law The examination of the two orations shows that the Dionysiac law seems to have contained four clauses quoted by Aeschines (Against Ctesiphon 44) and an exceptional clause quoted by Demosthenes (On the Crown 121) Therefore, this law generally prohibited the proclamation of crowns in the theater of Dionysus, but if the Council or the Assembly approved, it was possible to proclaim crowns for Athenians there This means that Ctesiphon's decree was not illegal and Demosthenes' interpretation of laws was the more persuasive one Next, I examined the background of the enactment of the Dionysiac law, the honorary inscriptions of some demes, and the office of the herald responsible for proclamations at the theater As a result, behind the enactment of the Dionysiac law, those who had been crowned by their demotai made the herald proclaim a crown in the theater of Dionysus by their own judgment, and such situations affected the running of the City Dionysia Accordingly, the Dionysiac law restricted the herald who would intend to proclaim crowns without permission of the Council or the Assembly, so this law seems to have functioned as a regulation threatening the herald with atimia for misconduct in office Therefore, the Dionysiac law was not aimed at the restriction of the demes' activities Furthermore, according to Demosthenes, the proclamation of crowns in the theater of Dionysus was to the benefit of the polis Since the polis enacted the Dionysiac law for that purpose, the meaning of a clause μηθ' υπο των φυλετων η δημοτων[sc εν τω θεατρω]αναγορευεσθαι στεφανουμενον in the Dionysiac law is that if anyone wished to be honored with a proclamation in the city theater, he should contribute to the polis, not to the demes or the tribes In conclusion, we should comprehend the Dionysiac law within the framework not of the relation between the polis and the demes, but of the relation between the polis and an individual

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In his Posterior Analytics B, Aristotle shows how demonstration functions in grasping what a thing is The peculiar feature of his theory of inquiry is expressed at the end of B8 that inquirers can grasp "what it is" through demonstration On this feature, I argue that the main theme of the book B is the inquiry of "what it is" The relevant argument through B1-10 depends on the identity thesis of "what it is" and "why it is" The thesis is, I claim, supported by the conception that definition reveals what it is, which I call 'the basicness of definition' Unless we make the identity thesis clear, we may fall into either of two possible moves (1) Some scholars claim that the aim of the book B is to establish the theory of definition which reveals the essence But, Aristotle's theory of definition requires further arguments, which are deployed in the Topics and the Metaphysics (2) Some other scholars claim that the main aim consists in investigating how demonstration appropriately works in the theory of inquiry However, then, what at all does demonstration make clear in an inquiry ? I diagnose they are forced to claim that the goal of the theory of demonstration is confined to offering a method of inquiry into "why it is" which is revealed by cause We have to clarify the role of "what it is" question which is another engine of Aristotle's inquiry In order to show 'the basicness of definition' which runs underneath his argument throughout B1-10, I examine the identity thesis which is mentioned four times and expressed in different wording Especially in B8, "what it is" is identified with "the cause of if it is" "If it is" and "what it is" are within the same route of inquiry which is expressed by the single term We seek for "if it is" (Does X exist?) When we grasp that it exists, then we seek for "what it is" (What is X ?) In both cases the question is rendered in a simple form We can find in the identity thesis above quoted in B8 both the question form in a single term and causation The question form is not merely confined in the linguistic level, rather the simple form of the question "what it is" is epistemologically connected with inquirers' recognition of the thing in itself by the basicness of definition The basicness of definition is led through the argument in the traditional framework of the theory of inquiry which is developed in B3-7 Therefore, the basicness of definition does not presuppose the Aristotelian theory of demonstration which is developed in B8 Since the basicness of definition proffers an epistemological framework which corresponds to the simple form of question "what it is", both "what it is" and "the cause of if it is" of the identity thesis are connected with each other in terms of the same form of question which belongs to the simple route of inquiry

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In his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian bases his concept of the ideal orator on that of Cicero However, there is sometimes a gap between this Ciceronian ideal and Qumtilian's own theory, which was influenced by his own age This gap can be seen most clearly in his theory of deliberative oratory, because genuine deliberative bodies had ceased to function under the empire and Q really wrote about declamatio and other non-practical forms of oratory The following arguments prove this (1) In distinguishing the three 'genera causarum'(3 4 6), Q first divides the whole task of oratory into that which is inside the courts and that which is outside them This strange division reveals the influence of Q's own age over his theory while former rhetoricians had regarded both the courts and the deliberative bodies as the obvious fields for oratory, at Q's time the latter had already become obsolete, so that he could name only the courts as a definitive field for oratory In another passage (3 8 14-5), Q tries to enlarge the field of deliberative oratory, but his enlargement is vague, which again shows his inexperience in this genre (2) Q treats the 'mores' (of the orator and of the audience) differently in different passages In one passage (3 8 13), the term denotes the orator's good character which contributes by itself to his persuasiveness In another (3 8 35-48), he regards it not as an instrument of persuasion in itself, but as an object to which the speech, if it is to be persuasive, must be adapted This latter concept, which seems to derive from the 'aptum', one of the four virtues of style, is adopted here because it is useful in suasona and prosopopoeia, which are what Q really had in mind when writing about deliberative oratory (3) Q says that the 'genus dicendi' appropriate to suasona is similar to that used in real forensic speeches (3 8 58-61) When this statement is compared to his treatment of the style one should use in controversia (2 10), where he emphasizes that controversia must closely imitate the courts, it seems odd, because we naturally expect him to write that suasona should imitate genuine deliberative speeches His silence about the latter again points to their irrelevance in his time What he calls 'uerum consilium' (3 8 62) turns out to be either speeches from the past or speeches inserted into historiography (4) Beginning the chapter about deliberative oratory(3 8 1), Q states that the honorable is more cogent than the useful in this genre This is in accordance with his concept of the ideal orator as a 'vir bonus' In his more technical discussion (3 8 30-32), however, Q treats 'utile' and 'honestum' equally, disregarding his former statement The issue of the orator's morality therefore seems to be integrated only superficially into his theory of deliberative oratory For this question he also refers the reader to the last book, but there (12 1) it is obvious that Q again has the courts in mind Thus, the issue of the orator's morality in deliberative speeches remains unsolved These arguments also show how Q tries to supplement his theory by borrowing from other fields of rhetoric

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The aim of this paper is to reexamme the policy of Constantius II on the Constantinopolitan senate, which made the Greek city on Bosporus a "capital" of the eastern half of the Roman empire, and to clarify its impact over the eastern mediterranean world First, we examine the thesis of an obligation on the newly recruited senators to reside in the city of Constantinople This thesis was an influential one, proposed by P Petit whose primary concern was to interpret the use of the Greek word "polites" in Libamus' letters, and accepted by other scholars in explaining some individual cases, as a result of which it emphasised the independence of the capital from the other cities of the East, not consistent with the thesis of local senators "honorati" To reexamine its validity, we pick up three representative cases of Constantinopolitan senators, one of which is a basis of Petit's interpretation and the rest of which are principal models treated by later scholars, that is, Olympius, Themistius and Caesarius In Libanius' letters on him, we can find references to Olympius' expenditure of different grades, which implies his nomination as a praetor Considering the information which can be obtained from legal texts in the Theodosian code, we an find the summon of Olympius is not of senators but of praetors Themistius' and Caesanus' cases also need to be set in the context Though the imperial letter in which the former is recommended as a senatorial candidate mentions "ananke" to reside in the city, it doesn't mean any obligation of residence but an economic condition under which a poor teacher was forced to migrate into the capital Alike Caesarius, though represented as an "oiketor" of the city in a Gregorian oration, is found "archiatros" whose place of activity is in the imperial palace From these considerations, we can get a conclusion that none of these typical cases prove the existence of the obligation and that we should reconstruct an interpretation of the imperial policy Secondly, we aim to reconsider the senatorial policy of Constantius II Taking into consideration the information drawn from the Theodosian code, we cannot accept the imperial motives presented by scholars that the emperor aimed to populate and enlarge his capital Rather, a prosopographical examination confirms that many cases are concomitant with holdings of imperial offices and that some receive provincial governorships shortly after their senatorial nominations, while an association of office holdings with senatorial recruitment can be confirmed in other sources In sum, Constantius' policy isn't primarily concerned to the enlargement of the eastern capital, but to the implantation into the eastern half of the empire of senatorial rank that is some reward of imperial office holdings, which doesn't prevent appearance of local elites with senatorial rank

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In this paper I allude to the wealth of material and potential for comparison between even such disparate genres as the comedy of democratic Athens and the kyogen skits of feudal Japan While the former genre is of a complex nature, high lyricism and increasingly sophisticated plots and stagecraft, the latter is a brief and light vignette of life, a skit sandwiched between the more serious and poetical No dramas This type of plays has never developed into a western style of comedy Both genres, though to a greater or lesser degree literary, preserve many elements of popular culture My examples focus particularly on the agora, the market-place and the colourful characters that populate it I suggest that Aristophanes kept an eye on non-literary genres (about which we know very little indeed) when he looked at the agora with its scheming tricksters, loud female-vendors, or good-for-nothings loitering around it all day long Markets and fairs must have attracted a great deal of popular amusements of all sorts and A istophanes probably used much of this material Kyogen too found inspiration in market sellers, shysters waiting at the market for country bumpkins, temple visitors during fairs, and so on All these characters frequently feature in kyogen plays and the Japanese genre may in many ways help us refine our perception of Aristophanes I start with a Megarian scheme in Aristophanes' Akharnians (729ff) and compare it to the kyogen play Wakame The Japanese counterpart also depends on the recognizable tricksters of the market-place and their heavy punning I then go on to show how knowledge of kyogen can help us appreciate popular elements in Greek comedy Not only in subject matter with kyogen, we may still admire the actors' cleverness in devising efficient ways of moving in a fluid space without a fixed stage Now the stage is of course uniform and fixed, but movement on it reflects and preserves much of the early practice The art of kyogen exits and entrances, and generally of movement in space is truly intriguing and it may be of some value when reflecting on early Greek practice Folk motifs are a kind of metaphor in Anstophanic comedy The playwright likes to connect disparate images into a humorous but meaningful and evocative whole In order to appreciate such images and their impact on the audience we cannot afford to ignore other available traditions of folk comedy Finally, I briefly hint at New Comedy where too we find hints at panourgoi of earlier comedy However unlike in Aristophanes, they are not at the centre of humorous and unattached episodic scenes, but form an inseparable part of well-wrought plots, often significantly contributing to the resolution that consists of restored domestic bliss-something the panourgos of Anstophanic comedy was hardly ever interested in Here is a domestic version of panourgia, a compassionate trickster, and this bourgeoisification carried with it significant consequences for western literature

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Besides being fit to meet all functional needs of tragic and comic performances, the Greek theatrical setup, having reached its final state towards the end of the 5th century B C, fulfilled a symbolic function which influenced the reception of the plays During the performances, when the seats were occupied by spectators and the plays were going on, the hemispherical edifice, together with the sky above it, constituted an image of the world, an ideogram of the universe as we might call it On close inspection this image proves to be very orderly, everybody being assigned a place according to his nature, status and function on the side of the audience, starting with women, children and slaves in the perimeter we pass first to young men, then to grown-up citizens, to members of the Council, finally to high-priests and officials, and on the side of the play, starting with the anonymous crowd of the chorus, we ascend one step to the venerable heroic characters of the stage, and another step to the gods on the roof, while real gods were thought to watch from the sky above Hierarchical and genealogical as it was, the entire arrangement represented a world where all beings are separated by the two world-regulating principles, law and nature, into distinct and yet interrelated groups, a world where everybody has his proper place, which he rightfully occupies, feeling himself an integral part of the universal order Inside this world-like frame, when the tragic plays began, an action unfolded an action that apart from being elevated, complete and of magnitude (Aristoteles), constituted a disturbance of the world-order, a transgression of the set boundaries, a violation of human and divine law If we examine tragic misdeeds as such, we will not be surprised to find them in conflict with exactly the same principles that governed the world-order nature and law What usually follows in Tragedies is that the heavenly and human powers controlling the universe, powers bound to guard and maintain those regulating principles, cooperate to punish the offender and reaffirm the worldorder Things work differently in Comedy On the side of the audience, discipline remained strict, the contrast to Tragedy lay on the side of the plays comic characters were not supposed to be heroic ancestors of the heroic age, but ordinary contemporary people Hierarchical allocation was totally disregarded, and the main characters were allowed to break all principles and rules without scruple-and go unpunished' In Comedy regulating forces he mostly dormant, and even when they intervene, they not only fail to punish the evil-doer and uphold law and order, but they often make fools of themselves The disorder persists, the trouble-maker achieves his goal and triumphs This line of events, leading from the disruption of the world-order to either its tragic re-establishment or to its comic deformation, is much more effectively experienced by an audience which, together with the theatrical edifice around it, constitutes in itself a μιμησιζ, an imitation of the worldorder, an ideogram of the universe as we called it

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My paper consists of two parts In the first I sketch the trajectory of Aristophanes' adventure on the modern Greek stage during the 20th century, by briefly presenting the emergence of two main trends, the "archaistic" and the "modernistic", in assessing the interpretation of the surviving comedies The former believed that the ancient Greek drama could only be properly interpreted by resorting to the artistic means and conventions of 5th century B C practice, which in actuality means the reconstruction of an ancient performance on a modern stage-a rather utopian aspiration because of a) the serious gaps in our knowledge about the exact situation in theatrical activities of classical Athens, b)the absence of any substantial form of theatrical tradition in Greece, due to a 1500 lacuna of anti-theatrical periods-christian Byzantines and muslim Turks, and c) as a result of the radical changes in social and cultural conditions, the lack of awareness and sensitivity in modern spectators to such a performance The "modernistic" camp of interpretation, on the contrary, maintained that the classical drama could only be appreciated by modern audiences if portrayed by artistic means and in terms of conventions already familiar to them, which actually means the invention of a completely new performance consisting of various, often incompatible, ingredients, as no form of drama even approximately resembling that of classical Greece exists to serve as a model for reference Needless to say, nearly all attempts to interpret the Greek drama naturally use the texts in translation In the case of Aristophanes, however, additional problems are caused by the dependence of his satire on contemporary socio-political reality, on the one hand, and the proverbial bawdiness of his language on the other It is for this reason that the poet became a taboo and, even through the first half of the 20th century, an easy prey at the hands of amateurs or bad touring groups, playing for the mere titillation of male audiences, exceptions were rare The first serious attempts to rehabilitate the maltreated poet only date from the beginning of the 2nd half of the 20th century, under the auspices of National Theatre in Athens, established in 1932, with two productions, representing the two opposite trends The first, with the Clouds, in 1951, undertaken by Sokratis Karadinos, an experienced director, ardent supporter of the "archaistic" approach, drawing his artistic material from various, mainly indirect, ancient sources (vase paintings, testimonies in later texts etc), although attained a remarkable aesthetic result at all levels, failed to appeal to the audience-completely unfamiliar with the grotesque costumes and masks as well as the static movement and conventional acting-but also divided the critics That failure actually ended the attempts of the "archaistic" approach as far as comedy was concerned Aristophanes' real revival was realized by the initiative of two directors, representing the "modernistic" trend, though in slightly different ways as far as the sources wherefrom they drew their raw material and, consequently, the artistic means applied in their interpretation, were concerned Both based their approach on the self-evident receptive capacity of present day audiences, whose referential experiences are drawn from various forms of, not exclusively theatrical, popular entertainment Therefore, with an eclectic method in choosing and utilizing various elements from relative activities and with the mere aspiration of reaching a simply "analogical", as compared with the ancient productions, result, they both created compact, vivid and extremely appealing compositions, which turned the marginalized poet into the most popular theatrical event every summer The main difference between them was that Alexis Solomos, whose production of

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