Both isegoria and parrhesia have the meaning "free speech", which seems to have been indispensable to the Greeks, especially the Athenians The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between isegoria and parrhesia, two ways of realizing free speech at meeting It is noteworthy that the parrhesia, which came into being about the last third of the fifth century BC, came to be used widely in a short time and invaded the large sphere of the word isegoria What does this mean historically? The essence of isegoria is manifest in the expression heralds conventionally used to urge free speech in the assembly "Who wishes to address the assembly?" On the other hand, according to Aischines, the expression was formerly as follows . "Who of those above fifty years of age wishes to address the assembly?", this practice of addressing according to age was aimed at obtaining the best counsel for the polis, though it went out of fashion in Aischines' day An attitude of πολει χρηστον (rendering service to polis), which also is proclaimed in Euripides' Suppliants' "Who desires to bring good counsel for his polis to the people?", predominated among Athenians in the moderate democracy It declined remarkably, however, with the rise in radical democracy and the spread of individualism Moreover, we must consider the growth of class antagonism between οι χρηστοι and οι πονηροι, as is proven in Pseudo-Xenophon, Ath Pol 1 2, 1 6, 1 9, 3 12-13 In this situation, the word χρηστοζ might be viewed with a strong tincture of classconsciousness The multitude must have had some doubt as to whether the practice of addressing according to age and the principle of πολει χρηστον were serviceable to them or to οι χρηστοι alone They did away with that practice and introduced the parrhesia, by which every citizen could speak out on whatever he regarded as important and right, free of the restrictions of πολει χρηστον The shift in stress from isegoria to parrhesia corresponded with the momentous change in the actuality and the sense of polis-community

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Herodotus says that king Xerxes led his unprecedentedly huge forces and invaded Europe in 480 B C The size of the expeditionary force, including troops from Europe and non-combatants, was more than five million persons Other ancient sources agree that the great king's forces were vast in scale, but differ as to their number The German empire mobilized seven armies, i e, one million, five hundred thousand soldiers, on the western front at the beginning of the First World War The German troops were supplied, via thirteen railways, five-hundred-fifty trains a day Nevertheless, they were distressed by shortage of provisions Could the Persian empire, which had only primitive transport, maintain such huge forces for a long time and in a far distant country? Her transportation capability was meager It seems impossible that she mobilized and continued to supply such huge forces Modern historians doubt the size of the Persian forces which Herodotus gives They try to reduce his number to reasonable levels For that purpose they use two methods One is the philological method, used by many historians They criticize the texts and make known the organization of Xerxes' forces and the commanders' names There were three infantry divisions, three cavalry brigades, the Immortals, the guard troops and the non-combatants But, if one doubts about Herodotus' number, the size of the forces remains unknown The other method used employs logistics Gen Maurice and Gen v Fischer used this method They heed that the volume of provisions carried by the transport corps determined the scale of the forces This necessitates the fixing of some variables the mean speed, the size of the files, the carrying capability of pack animals and the rate of consumption of provisions What was the Persians' speed? It must have been that which reached the maximum value of the rate of flow There are some models for inquiring into the relation between the mean speed and the rate of flow I use Greenschields' model The outcome of my computation is that six parasangs a day is best, five a day next best and seven a day third best According to Xenophon's Anabasis, the Persians frequently marched six or seven parasangs a day When they crossed a bridge or river, their speed slowed Five parasangs a day was the usual speed So, I think that Xerxes' forces crossed the Hellespontos at the rate of five parasangs a day The rate of flow of animals was 500 4 heads/h, the rate of flow of infantrymen 1,429 7 persons/h What was the size of the Persian files? Gen v Fischer thought four files to be the usual size of the infantiy and two files that of the cavalry and transport corps I follow his view As the transport corps continued to cross for 7 days and nights, the total number of pack animals is 168,134 The transport corps carried 33,626,800 Ibs, consumed 31,945,460 Ibs, and could offer 1,681,340 Ibs to the combatants Such volume of provisions can maintain 41,000 infantrymen and 4,000 cavalrymen The number of an infantry division was 10,000 men, the number of cavalry brigade 1,000 men Xerxes' forces numbered 45,000 men Many historians think that the Persian fleet was far superior to the Greek Some believe in Herodotus' number, some modify his number to 1,000 or 800 or 600 Before the battle of Salamis, all Persian ships anchored in Phaleron bay I use this fact as a clue to estimating their scale I divide the length of the seashore by the width a trireme occupies in action The outcome is 300 ships The original fleet probably numbered about 400 ships My conclusion is that the land forces numbered 45,000 persons and the fleet 400 ships

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It has often been said that if Ajax is manifesting his decision not to kill himself in his third speech, we have to assume that Ajax is lying But this is not true Ajax can at the same time be sincere throughout the third speech After abandoning suicide at the beginning of the third speech, Ajax comes to understand, first at 666 f and then at 677, what will be the result of his longer life, if he purges his "defilements", escapes the anger of Athena and buries his sword to hide it, he will come actually to obey the gods and honor the Atreidae, learning discipline Now these thoughts of Ajax make him realize the fact that reconciliation with fatal enemies will be inevitable if he continues to live A close examination of 666 f and 677 leads to such an interpretation of the third speech And if we are right in this interpretation, there is no question as to how and why Ajax, behind the stage, decided again to kill himself after the third speech, for the first speech has shown how dominant is the hatred for the Atreidae in the mind of Ajax Though gentle enough to abandon suicide in response to his wife's entreaty, he is so obstinate in his hatred as to refuse reconciliation with his enemies at the cost of his own life Ajax' hatred, shown in the play as an element always leading him to ruin, is continued by his wife and brother after his death And again, at the end of the play, dead Ajax' hatred is mentioned as an important dramatic motif Thus the play is unified by Ajax' hatred However, it is always presented in contrast to other mental elements the sense of honour and humanity It follows that Sophocles gave a dynamism (rather than a pathos) of the mind of Ajax to the traditional monotonous image of hateful Ajax

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According to Aristotle, the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism necessarily lead to a conclusion, which is an action itself This account has evoked many different interpretations, but they seem only half-way solutions to this problem This suggests the need to reconsider the exact meaning of voluntanness, and to investigate an aspect of Aristotle's theory of action other than the practical syllogism itself In this paper, I attempt to articulate Aristotle's fundamental view by examining controversial arguments of EN III 5, where he offers the important thesis that a human being originates action In EN III 5, Aristotle argues against his opponent, who denies the voluntariness of vice The opponent's argument is composed of the following three steps S1 A vicious (particular) action caused by some types of ignorance is involuntary S2 A vicious action forced by some types of character is involuntary S3 Vice is 'by nature' Therefore, we have no control over the end (τελοζ) of action. Although S1 seems irrelevant to the theme of EN III 5, which is whether or not vice is voluntary, such is not the case For these three arguments are propounded ta make clear what Aristotle thinks to be a central issue of action theory namely, the relation between particular actions and a human being Aristotle's discussion on S2 and S3, which purports to explain a human being in view of character (εξιζ), has some intricate explanations, especially m respect of the relation between means-end structure and character. Such intricacies, however, do not mean that Aristotle's counterargument is self-defeating and fails to refute his. opponent Rather, these seemingly misleading arguments lead us to the following conclusion The opponent in S2 and S3 is indeed right when he thinks that what is pleasant or beautiful does not make an action involuntary, if such things necessitate his performing the action But he rejects ascription of responsibility to 'himself by means of another criterion of involuntariness, namely, 'ignorance' of τελοζ But the ignorance of τελοζ does not assure involuntariness of action in the same way as do the particular circumstances of the action In other words, even if someone acts 'because of ignorance' of τελοζ, this does not mean that he is not committed to any decision of means In order to make this point clear, we need to distinguish τελοζ, as 'things desirable both in themselves and for the sake of other thing's, from simple instruments For, τελοζ in the former sense has an internal relation between means and τελοζ, and forms character (εξιζ) through the repetition of the same type of particular action Accordingly the most crucial fault of Aristotle's opponent is in not acknowledging the significance of inquiring into the internal structure of his εξιζ Aristotle's criticism would carry validity for someone else who, without understanding the relation between means-end structure and character, simply accepts the opinion that virtue is voluntary

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Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this

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Concerning Pyrrho's argument in Eusebius' Praeparatio evangelica 14 18 1-4, there have been two main interpretations the so-called metaphysical interpretation (MI) which claims that Pyrrho's scepticism is based on his view that the world is indeterminable by nature, and the epistemological interpretation (EI) which accepts Zeller's "dta to" for "dia touto" and tries to understand Pyrrho's philosophy in light of later Pyrrhonism, to the effect that his statement concerning the world's indeterminability is grounded in the weakness of our cognitive faculties MI has the following weaknesses (1)it cannot give an explanation sufficiently persuasive of the reasoning through which Pyrrho was led to his view of the world's indeterminability, (2) if the world, which seems to have determinate characters when we perceive them, is in fact indeterminable by nature, it seems that Pyrrho should have held that our perceptions are simply false, rather than that they are neither true nor false, (3) Pyrrho's holding the firm belief that the world is indeterminable by nature seems to contradict his declaration that our judgements are neither true nor false and that we should not trust them Even if we accept EI, on the other hand, what can we think of as the ground on which Pyrrho asserted that our perceptions and judgements are neither constant truth-tellers nor constant liars? If it is suggested that he made the assertion on the grounds of actual observation of some perceptions' falsity and others' truthfulness, it turns out that Pyrrho did put his trust in some perceptions at least, despite his recommendation to the contrary My interpretation differs from both in that I suppose Pyrrho's statement about ta pragmata to concern not the world as such but what people take ta pragmata to be in the face of conflicting opinions held by them, Pyrrho judges that people's opinions as to what ta pragmata is are all alike (ep' ises) in that they don't excel as representations of the world (adiaphora) and in that they are unstable (astathmeta), being easily shaken by different circumstances and different persuasions ("Anepikrita" doesn't seem to be used by Pyrrho himself) On this evidence, Pyrrho then examines the reliability of our cognitive faculties as the means through which we try to grasp ta pragmata, and infers that our perceptions and judgements are neither constant truth-tellers nor constant liars The fact that Pyrrho is thus inducing others to share his scepticism supports my view that Pyrrho starts from what people take ta pragmata to be, without any presupposition on his part as to the world's nature It is true that his statement about ta pragmata is in answer to the question "What aie things really like?'" But this is no obstacle to my interpretation, because the question may have been posed not by Pyrrho but by Timon, who has not yet been freed from the traditional idea that knowledge is necessary for happiness, even if Pyrrho brought it up, he may have intended to question the status of what people take ta pragmata to be According to my interpretation, Pyrrho turns out to be totally non-commital at all stages of his argument, and thus best agrees with Timon's testimony in his Silloi that no other mortal could rival Pyrrho, in the midst of the famous philosophers appearing in the Silloi he can avail himself of their conflicting views about the world in order to lead them to the adiaphoria of ta pragmata

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Apollonius composed the Argonautica by imitating Homeric poems in style and language However, his epic is not a simple imitation but is one with different kinds of variation of Homeric style, through which Apollonius attempted to show his originality as did other Hellenistic poets In his poem, Apollonius alludes to various aspects of Homeric poems with which he is fully acquainted The contents of his allusion to Homer cover grammar, diction, textual problems etc Apollonius uses chiefly Homeric diction, but also a great number of non-Homeric words What is his aim in using non-Homeric words in a Homeric styled poem? That is the question to which an answer must be attempted Now, the allusion is the essential point of the Hellenistic poem Therefore, I suppose, Apollonius' non-Homeric words must allude to something hidden in the poem which Apollonius expects the reader to discover He disperses various kinds of Homeric problems and his own view through allusion in his poem Here, I will try to show his aim in the usage of non-Homeric words by means of a few examples 1 1282, δροσοεντα This adjective may be picked up from Sapph. 9512(Lobel) λωτινοιζ δροσοεντα λωτινοιζ reminds us of λωτουντα (M 283) Now, we find out that the Apollonian και πεδια δροσοεντα is a simple variation of the Homeric και πεδια λωτουντα The scholia to the Iliad, however, reports that a Marseilles-edition read λωτευντα for λωτουντα here. Therefore, Apollonius may be alluding via δροσοεντα that λωτουντα must be read here for λωτευντα 4 927, αχλυοειζ The Apollonian καπνω δ' αχλυοειζ is a kind of variation of the Homeric ψαμμω κυανεη The editors of the Odyssey record a variant κυανεη, which seems to be a very old one Both phrases occupy the same sedes in hexameter Apollonius must be suggesting via αχλυοιζ that the nominative κυανεη be read instead Of κυανεη 2 543, κατοψιοι κατοψιοι κελευθοι (543)/ κελευθοζ (544)/ ινδαλλεται (545) forms chiasmus Both κατοψιοι and ινδαλλεται occupy the same sedes Apollonius here interprets ινδαλλεται by κασοψιοι Why does he do that? The scholia reports that in P 214 Anstarchus read the dative μεγαθυμω Πηλειωνι for the genitive μεγαθυμου Πηλειωνοζ The problem here is that the genitive case forces us to take the sense of ινδαλλεται(P 213) "φαινεται" and, on the other hand, the dative case, "ομοιουται". γ245-6 has the same problem Apollonius must be suggesting here, through the non-Homeric κατοψιοι, that the Homeric ινδαλλεσθα means only φαινεσθαι 1 473, χαλικρητον Apollonius may have picked up this adjective in Archil 124 b 1 (West), where we find χαλικρητον μεθυ, "unmixed wine" χαλικρητον λαρον μεθυ (473) leads us to remark ξωρον μεθυ(477), which reminds us of 1202-3 What is the meaning of ξωροτερον? That has been a crux since the time of Aristotle The critics in antiquity were not m accord regarding the sense of ξωροζ Here, Apollonius takes ξωροζ to mean "unmixed, pure" by using the non-Homeric χαλικρητοζ Consequently, I propose that one of the aims of Apollonius in using non-Homeric words is to show his own interpretation of Homeric diction and textual problems

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This article attempts to consider the dramatic structures of Mercator and Rudens, both of which have similar dream-scenes, from the viewpoint of the audience rather than that of chronology-the approach pursued so far Mercator begins with the prologue spoken by a character whose name is Charinus The fact that the speaker of the prologue is a human being who is a character seems to be deeply related to the structure of the play and it means that he can only tell the story, past and present, through his own eyes Such a prologue inevitably differs very much from an impersonal prologue (eg Asin, Capt, Cas , Men, Poen, Ps, True, Vid) or a prologue spoken by a divine being (e g Amph, Aul, Cist, Rud, Trin) Therefore I think II _1 (225-254), which is the scene where Demipho tells his dream, functions as the second prologue, and supplements the limited information provided by the prologue proper As to the dream-allegory, it is only capra=Pasicompsa that Demipho and the audience can easily identify among the animals which appear in the dream Some intelligent members of an audience may conjecture that Channus is the haedus in the dream As for simia, however, neither Demipho nor the audience can understand who he is For the rest of the play the audience are supposed to see it, feeling suspense in identifying the other animals and in comparing the plotdevelopment of the play with the dream-scene Rudens also begins with a prologue, the speaker of which is, however, a divine being, Arcturus This means that with this prologue much more information about the past, the present and the future is to be imparted than with the prologue of Mercator The prologue in such a structure reduces the relative significance of the dreamscene (593-612) in Rudens The animals which appear in the dream of Daemones can be quite easily identified by the audience as well as by Daemones himself, so that the scene does not create so much suspense in the audience as the scene in Mercator Furthermore, the details depicted in the dream-scene in Rudens are not well co-ordinated with the rest of the play Thus we can conclude that the dream-scene is more deeply and elaborately built into the dramatic structure of Mercator than it is into the structure of Rudens

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In his Church History (IX,9,12), Eusebius states that after the Battle at the Milvian Bridge (28 October 312), Constantine and Licinius, "with one will and thought," drew up a "most perfect law" (nomos teleotatos) on behalf of the Christians and sent it to Maximinus Daia There is no other mention of this "most perfect law", and researchers are not in agreement as to its identification On the one hand, the so-called "Letter to Sabinus" mentioned in IX, 9, 13, in which Maximinus orders Sabinus to halt the persecution, has been dated to November/ December 312 , the "most perfect law" would also seem to be dated to the same time. Yet on the other hand, the collaboration between Constantine and Licinius concerning this law would appear to be associated with the two emperors' conference at Milan, which took place in February 313 Many researchers have made much of this chronology and have asserted that the "most perfect law" was in fact the work of Constantine alone, who, for the sake of formality, simply added the name of the co-emperor, Licinius, to the law which he issued in his capacity of senior Augustus after his victory at the Milvian Bridge But in view of the fact that Eusebius exercised damnatio memoriae against Licinius in the final version of his Church History, his expressions as to the collaboration between the two emperors (such as "with one will and thought") do not allow such an interpretation In considering this problem, we should take into account T Christensen's restoration of a document which may properly be called "the Edict of Milan" The restored "Edict of Milan" guarantees freedom of religion to Christians and the restoration of church properties confiscated during the Great Persecution However, it says nothing about freedom of religion for pagans and the possibility of compensation for losses incurred by the restoration of church properties, although these two items are mentioned in the imperial letter promulgated by Licinius at Nicomedia on 13 June 313 (the so-called "Edict of Milan") Christensen assumes that his restored "Edict of Milan" was sent to Maximinus immediately after the meeting of Constantine and Licinius at Milan , I suggest that this document was in fact the disputed "most perfect law" As regards chronology, I have examined the arrangement of themes in Eusebius' Church History, Book IX, and have discerned a change in subject matter between IX, 9, 12 and IX, 9, 13 Eusebius first describes the wrongdoings of Maximinus (IX, 1-8) , then Constantine's victory over Maxentius-the victory which would bring about Maximinus's ruin in the future (IX, 9, 1-8), and Constantine's gratitude to God after the victory (IX, 9, 9-11), mentioning the "most perfect law" as the right finish on such gratitude (IX, 9, 12) He then changes the subject and returns to Maximinus (IX, 9, 13) In the following Chapter 10, he describes the events leading to Maximinus's death in the summer of 313 I therefore believe that the "most perfect law" mentioned in IX, 9, 12, and Constantine's letter to Maximinus suggested in IX, 9, 13, which resulted in Maximinus's Letter to Sabinus, are not identical, and that it is possible to date the "most perfect law" to February 313 My hypothesis is also supported by the fact that the persecutor Maximinus promulgated, in May 313 (i e , prior to the so-called "Edict of Milan"), the Edict of Toleration, the substance of which is almost identical with the restored "Edict of Milan"

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