What were the relations between Cicero and Octavian? The present writer tries to consider them from the references to Octavian in Cicero's works. The chronological sequence of their relations are as follows : In his letters to Atticus, Cicero observes Octavian attentively, but reserves his judgement on Octavian. In his Philippic orations, especially the third, the fifth, the thirteenth and the fourteenth, Cicero advocates Octavian for the restoration of the Republic; here comes up a collaboration of Cicero's speeches with Octavian's action. In his letters to M. Brutus, Cicero answers Brutus' claims upon Octavian. Soon Octavian parts from Cicero, but later he accounts for his accomplishments, in Ciceronian terms.

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The meaning of the first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics depends on the interpretation of the four words it contains, i. e., τεχνη, μεθοδο&b.sigmav;, πραξι&b.sigmav;, προαιρεσι&b.sigmav;. Traditionally there were found allusions to the Aristotelian distinction of θεωρια, πραξι&b.sigmav;, ποιησι&b.sigmav; in them and they were regarded as meaning "every exercise of the human powers" (Grant, Stewart). Opposing this view, Burnet interprets these words in the Platonic sense and takes this sentence for an ενδοξο&b.sigmav; προτασι&b.sigmav; of a dialectical argument addressed to a Platonic audience. Gauthier proposes a modification of this opinion. He holds that the first two words are to be understood in the Platonic sense and the last two in the Aristotelian sense, and thinks that Aristotle is here paraphrasing Plato's texts. (1) I propose to take the first two words as referring to the intellectualability that guides human action in general-whether ποιησι&b.sigmav; or πραξι&b.sigmav;-which the last two words refer to. The former two are concerned with the universal (καθολου) , the latter two with the individual(καθ' εκαστον). That is the only possible sense, I believe, in which one can interpret this passage. Both Gauthier's attempt, which. results in introducing the distinction between ποιησι&b.sigmav;s and πραξι&b.sigmav; into this passage, and Burnet's, which sees only an ενδοξο&b.sigmav; προτασι&b.sigmav; in this sentence, seem to me inadequate. (2) One should further pay attention to the fact that the argument 1094 a 118 and the argument 1094 a 18-22 refer to entirely different aspects of human action. The former is concerned with the formal structure of action. All actions have the formal structure in that they receive their formal differences from their specific ends. All arts have their foundation in this formal structure in view of which they fuse different particular actions into a coherent system of conduct. The latter passage(a 18-22) is concerned with the teleological structure of action in its true sense. All actions have this teleological structure in common in that they originate in a person and are taken by him as means with which to attain his ultimate end. It is in this latter argument that ταγαθον and το αριστον are required as the sufficient reason for any action originating in a person. Only by distinguishing these two aspects of the problem, I believe, can the whole passage be understood properly. In this light, the first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics reveals itself as a universal proposition which lays the ground for the argument of the whole work.

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In this paper the author attempts to make clear the meaning of 'αωυο&b.sigmav;' which 'has a very ambiguous character, especially in Pindar. Though scholiasts interpreted it as 'το ανθο&b.sigmav;' or 'το απανθισμα', we can hardly accept this interpretation literally, because its original sense is not 'a flower' but 'a breath' (?)and because there are some differences between Pindar's metaphorical usage of this word and ・our flower(for example Py. X-53). Nevertheless there is an interesting fact that Pindar often uses it in a similar way as he uses 'ανθο&b.sigmav;'. (see Chart A) Through a comparative examination of 'ανθο&b.sigmav;' and 'αωτο&b.sigmav;' in Pindar, the author finds two points which distinguish those words. The first is that 'αωτο&b.sigmav;' cannot be used for anything living or growing in the actual sense in which 'ανθο&b.sigmav;' is always used. On the other hand, 'αωτο&b.sigmav;' covers such metaphorical meanings as 'anyone the best in a group' and 'anything concerning concepts like δικη or σοφια', which 'ανθο&b.sigmav;' never has(while Aeschylus says 'ανθο&b.sigmav; 'Αργειων' (Ag. 197) or 'ερωτο&b.sigmav; ανθο&b.sigmav;' (Ag. 743)etc). Secondly, when someone wins a victory in a game, or when an ode is sung for another, 'ανθο&b.sigmav;' is given to athletes, citizens or poets by the divine will, while 'αωτο&b.sigmav;' is culled or dedicated to the mother land by man's own will. (see Chart B) Behind his different use of these two words there must be two opposing views to the world with which Pindar, as an epinician poet, is destined to be concerned whenever he celebrates 'arete' of the mortals. One of these two considers that the radiance of man appears periodically through the unseen mechanism of the divine cycle, while the other view holds that it is only with man's own endeavours that he can gain this radiance. And if anyone succeeds in it, it must be a job of a poet to make it immortal. The world of Pindar's epinicia is based on these two opposite viewpoints, which gives a continuous tension to his works, and also, as the author believes, makes Pindar dare to use 'αωτο&b.sigmav;'.

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Plato's argument in Theaetetus 184B-186E, which is his refutation of the thesis that knowledge is perception, has opposing interpretations of even fundamental points, such as, what is the main point of the argument or what is the ground of the refutation: one of which is the interpretation of F. M. Corn ford, H. F. Cherniss and perhaps A. J. Holland, and the otheris that of G. Ryle, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie and J. M. Cooper. I advance my own interpretation in the examination of the views of these two groups. Cornford's interpretation of the argument implies, I think, the same scheme as in Sophist 248A10-12 : [A] αωματι μεν ημα&b.sigmav; γενεσει δι' αισθησεω&b.sigmav; κοινωνει-γενεσιν δε αλλοτε αλλω&b.sigmav;, δια λογισμου δε ψυχη προ&b.sigmav; την οντω&b.sigmav; ουσιαν-ην αει κατα ταυτα ωσαυτω&b.sigmav; εχειν. The case is the same with Cherniss whose view is that Republic 523-525 is 'parallel' to Theaetetus 184-186. But the scheme of Theaetetus 184B-186E is just as follows: [B] τα μεν αυτη δι' αυτη&b.sigmav; η ψυχη επισκοπειν, τα δε δια των του αωατο&b.sigmav; δυναμεων. Cooper's interpretation belongs to the latter[B]and, as far as this point is concerned, Cooper and his group are right. The argument of Theaetetus 184B-186E is, however, in a sense 'independent of the theory of flux', but it is clear that the thesis that knowledge is perception is coherent with the Heraclitian universal flux theory in a wider sense, opposed to Eleaticism(as stated in 160D) , and that the argument here is Plato's final refutation of the thesis. Therefore the theory of knowledge or the epistemology in this place is not 'Plato's' 1 cannot agree to the claims of Owen and Cooper that 'Plato ascribes ουσια to the objects of perception' or 'Plato says about objects of perception that they exist'. But this does not mean that Plato's rejection of the thesis that knowledge is perception is on the ground of the theory of Ideas, nor that the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus is the same as that already expressed in the Phaedo or the Republic. I think that in the epistemology of the Theaetetus Plato refrains from using the theory of Ideas as much as possible, and tries to reveal the difficulties of his opponent's view with the same logic and on the same ground as his opponent: the feature and particularity of the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus is that Plato does not bring forward positively his own epistemological doctrine on the basis of the theory of Ideas, but treats the problems of perception in 'the everyday world'. So the arguments of the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus are not quite enough, and therefore we could not find here simply the development of Plato's theory of knowledge from the middle dialogues to the later ones. My view stated above I try to prove by examining several striking points in the interpretations of Corn ford, Cherniss, Cooper and others.

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Aristotle's criticism of Platonic division(διαιρεσι&b.sigmav;) (An. Pr. I. ch. 31, An. Post. II. ch. 5 & 13)contains three important points as follows: 1. The method of definition by division does not syllogize or demonstrate. 2. It provides no guarantee against adding or omitting something or passing over some element in the being of the thing defined. 3. But we can solve this difficulty and establish an adequate definition by division if we (1)take essential attributes, (2) arrange them in the right order, (3)omit nothing of them. Indeed, Aristotle's argument is sound insofar as his theory of the syllogism and his categorial framework are presupposed. But, as Corn ford rightly remarks, "no satisfactory account of the relation of Platonic Forms can be given in terms of Aristotelian logic", and Aristotle's ontology of substance and attribute has no place within the Platonic framework. A detailed analysis of the method of collection (συναγωγη) and division illustrated in the Sophist shows that Plato's method of establishing an adequate definition is different from Aristotle's. Plato determines both necessary and sufficient conditions for being the definable Form, by the preliminary collection which may contain in itself the process of division and by the subsequent division. Thus, as Sayre argues, he establishes the adequate definition of the Form in question by formulating those conditions. Although Plato's method does not syllogize in the Aristotelian meaning, it involves inference which Aristotle doesn't take into consideration. Also it simplifies the conditions Aristotle proposes for the purpose of establishing an adequate definition.

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Republic VII makes a point that a finger appears big or small from different viewpoints, though it always shows itself as a finger. It is because 'big' and 'small' are incomplete predicates. Likewise, anything that is beautiful is subject to be ugly. It does not have the identity of beauty. According to the theory of paradigm, what should be called the very beauty is found in another world. The paradigm of beauty is the only and proper bearer of the name 'beauty'. The 'beautiful' in "The beauty itself is beautiful" is to be different in meaning from that of the many beautiful things in this world(otherwise it would be faced with The Third Man). However, to transform the incomplete predicates into complete ones is to put pressure forcibly upon the language from outside the language. The terms which naturally contain completeness are substantial ones such as 'finger' and 'man'. The analysis of inherence in Categoriae shows that the names and their παρωνυμα of non-substantial terms are complementary. When we use a predicate 'white' for Socrates, we mention that white inheres in Socrates. Therefore Socrates can contain the opposites, such as white and black, bigness and smallness. At the same time the white itself does not exist, that is, there is no such white as is independent of the context in which 'white' is predicated of something. 'White' can be used, without any difference in meaning, on two levels of particulars and universals ; "This rabbit is white." and "Rabbits are white." In this case 'white' does not identify but only characterizes rabbit(s). 'Animal' is also used indifferently on either level; "Socrates is an animal." and "Man is an animal." Genus has a wider application than species. 'Man', however, has only one-level-use in the strict and proper sense; "Socrates is a man." This is because 'man' identifies an individual and reveals it as a man. What we see when we say "Socrates is white", can only be described in termsof the resemblance between Socrates' white and the examples of white(eg. snow,. rabbit, chalk, etc.). In this case we do not require the answer to What is white. But what we recognize when we say "Socrates is a man", can only be expressed in the light of What is a man rather than by appealing to the examples of man (eg. Plato, Aristotle, etc.). Prior to the introduction of any viewpoints, presuppositions or conditions, we conceive and identify individuals in their essential individualities by means of substantial terms.

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Im allgemeinen hat man bisher fur bewiesen gehalten, dass das griechische Feuer in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. von einem syrischen Ingenieur namens Kallinikos erfunden worden sei. Diese These, die von der Mehrheit der Byzantinisten kraftig unterstutzt worden ist, basiert auf einer kurzen Nachricht von Theophanes Homologetus in seiner Chronik aus dem Jahre 678. In einem der glaubwurdigen Berichte von Malalas aus Antiochia, namlich im 16. Kapitel "Vbev den Kaiser Anastasius I.", ist von einer Feuerwaffe die Rede, die "το λεγομενον θειον απυρν" heisst und die starke Zerstorungskraft besitzt, sowohl zu Lande als auch zu Wasser. In "Kestoi", jener popularen Enzyklopadie der Kunste und Wissenschaften, finden wir ferner eine Mitteilung(cap. 44), wonach es Feuer gabe, das sich automatisch entzundet. Als ihr Teilautor gilt Sex. Iulius Africanus aus dem 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Zwei Nachrichten, Malalas und Kestoi, sind bisher meines Wissens kaum im Zusammenhang mit dem Ursprung des griechischen Feuers erwahnt worden. Studieren wir sie genauer, kommen wir zum folgenden Ergebnis: Das griechische Feuer ist nicht, wie bisher behauptet worden ist, in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts plotzlich erfunden worden. Die sog. Erfindungsgeschichte von Kallinikos stellt nur eine Stufe in der historischen Entwicklung der Feuerwaffen dar. Das Feuer fur die Seeschlacht, πυρ θαλασσιν, wie wir es bei Theophanes vorfinden, ist keine alleinstehende Erscheinung selbst in der Geschichte der byzantinischen Waffenkunde. Wie wir in diesem Aufsatz gezeigt haben, sind seine direkten Vorlaufer "το λεγομενον θειον απυρον" von Malalas und "το πυρ αυτοματον" von Kestoi. Und die vollendete Form von jenem πυρ θαλασσιον von Theophanes sehen wir in der Vorschrift von dem "Liber ignium" von Marcus Graecus. Es lasst sich zugleich feststellen, dass die Bezeichnung "Griechisches Feuer" viel zu vage ist und kaum in der Lage sein kann, um die verschiedene Arten der foyzantinischen Feuerwaffen dementsprechend zu benennen.

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How do phraseology and meter correlate with each other in the dialogue verse ・of Greek tragedy? With this question in mind, we set about analyzing all the extant trimeters with the help of a computer. The following is an interim report on some points of interest. (i) Conversion of texts into machine-readable form. The system we adopted was that of the normal transliteration into Roman alphabet with some modifications; long vowels marked by* , prosodical signs(-for crasis, +for synizesis, &c.) added. At present 6660 lines of eight plays are converted and reposited on magnetic tape. (ii) Automatic scansion. The computer scans trimeter according to the prosodical rules and, recognizing resolutions as such, writes out a metrical scheme to each line. The resulting, completely scanned texts serve as the raw materials for subsequent inquiries. For the symbols used in scansion see Explanatory Note to fig. 1-a. (iii) Automatic production of concordance. Two Concordances were made; the usual, Alphabetical one and the one in which words are classified and arranged .according to their Metrical word-types. These are reposited on MT and serviceable ior various further uses. Cf. fig. 1-a〜c. (iv) Examination of metrical features of lines. Lines with any particular metrical features can be assembled and examined at a stroke with the use of the computer. The example shown in fig. 3 is an inquiry into metrical behavior after caesura of the lines with penthemimeral caesura. (v) Examination of 'correptio Attica'. All occurrences of the sequence of short vowel-mute-liquid were assembled and classified according to the constituent 'Consonants. Refined statistics were drawn there from. The gross figure is 960 short .syllables(resolutions excluded)against 354 longs in 6660 lines. Cf. fig. 2. (vi) Examination of lengthening by position of word-final open syllable. This ・prosodical abnormality occurs 183x in the lines examined, mostly between words that cohere closely together. Each individual case can be examined in the list prepared by the computer. For some of the more conspicuous cases see above p.78. (vii) Study of localization and distribution of metrical word-types. Occurrences of each word-shape, at each metrical position of the verse, were counted and a comprehensive list of distributional figures for each shape was made; cf. fig. 4-a〜b. From the list certain tendencies become apparent: Every shape has its preferred position or positions. For instance, one of the fittest forms to iambic, SLSL, which can be used in four positions, shows a tendency towards localization at the verse-end(cf. fig. 4-b), and SL, iamb itself, too. On the contrary, SLS_0 and SLS_1, which are also shapes suitable to iambic, appear mostly in the former half of the verse. Sometimes preference amounts to restriction. SLL and LSLL are used each in one position only(this is a corollary of Porson's Law). These tendencies are consistent throughout all the plays regardless of their author or the date of composition, although some innovations were made and introduced by using resolution or crasis(cf. fig. 4-b and"-SSL" &c. in fig. 4-a). They may beinherent properties of the iambic trimeter, and if we examine further the words themselves from semantical and syntactical point of view, the system on which poets subconsciously depend in versification will be correctly described. The figures referred to are on pp. 80〜86 above.

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