Plato said that names are instruments with which we differentiate things according to their nature and teach one another something(388B10-C1). The text is written in the figure Hysteron Proteron. It appears to be commonly unnoticed. By the correctness of names, Plato means two states which concern names. One is the correctness in the sense of using names as instruments correctly(cf. 387C1). The other is the correctness in the sense that names in themselves are fine as instruments(cf. 388D6-7). Plato's view on the correctness of names in the first sense is as follows : Determination is not according to a man's fancy, but according to their nature by names which their nature prescribes(cf. 387B11-C4, D4-8). In this connection 'names' does not mean the sound only, but the combination of sound and meaning. If we pay attention to sound only, we cannot understand why truth-falsehood of names and Protagoras' theory became the topic in the Cratylus. When Hermogenes first argues that the correctness of names is not natural but conventional and arbitrary, names which he has in mind are combinations of sound and meaning. When he later mentions that names for the same things differ with languages(385D9-E3)in order to support his view, names that he mentions imply their sounds only. In this point, he is confused. Plato denies Hermogenes' view, but it is a matter of course that Plato recognizes the fact Hermogenes mentions. Plato describes the fact in the style of a myth(390A4-7). The importance of Plato's view on the correctness of names cannot be understood well if we pay attention to their sounds only. It is best understood, in connection with what is said at Thucydides 3, 82, 4. Plato's view on the correctness of names in the second sense is as follows : It is to have a likeness to "that which is a name(Collective Singular)" (389D7). Also, names given by custom have it to some degree. To what degree? It is the dialectician that judges it case by case(388D6-390C12). If fine names are to be given as custom, it requires the dialectician as its supervisor (390D4-5). The nomothete is not the philosopher(Cf. Guthrie, ib. p. 6. n. 3.), but custom personified. Plato repeats a part of the above-mentioned view after an introductory phrase "Cratylus is right in saying that...."(390d9). Thus, Cratylus' view appears to be approved. However, in the rest of the Cratylus, Cratylus' theory of names is refuted completely. How should this point be interpreted? I understand that Socrates pretends that Cratylus is right in the view assumed to be his(an example of Socratic irony) ; otherwise, it should be understood that the circumstantial participle λεγων is used not modally, but conditionally(cf. Crat. 387C1, Phikb. 34A10, Laws 727A2, 862A1). The rest of the Cratylus considers what the correctness of names is like and shows that it is not as Cratylus thinks. Then, what is it like? I think we can see concretely what the correctness in the second sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 433A8-B1, 533D4-5 and what the correctness in the first sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 476D5-6.

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On investigation into the inscriptions of I.G. I^3236-241 of Nicomachos' Earlier Law Code in Athens, 410-404 B.C., I think they are prescriptions related to the Athenian policy of austerity. The reasons I think so are as follows: Firstly, her financial affairs of 413-404 BC were critical, and the prescriptions describe the reduction of spending on sacrifices and triremes' maintenances and taxes. Secondly, in Lysias XXX Against Nicomachos, the reason for prosecution is that the accused had inflicted a financial loss on the state, and so the purpose of his office was in the state's policy of austerity. Thirdly, some scholars believe that Dracon's Law on Homicide(I.G. I^3104), and possibly the Council Law(I.G. I^3105), were inscribed by "anagrapheis ton nomon" including Nicomachos, but I think that the tasks of inscribing the laws were done individually. Therefor, Nicomachos' task of inscribing the Earlier Law Code was related to reducing the state's spending and differed from the tasks of inscribing Dracon's Law on Homicide and the Council Law.

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One of the provisions of the reconciliation agreement of 403 B.C. concerns property confiscated by the Thirty. We have evidence for this in Lysias' fragmentary speech Agaist Hippotherses. According to lines 34-47, goods which had been purchased were to remain in the hands of the buyers, and the returning men were to recover anything remaining unsold, while immovable property such as land and houses were returned to former owners. Whether previous owners of immovable property had to pay something to get it back, as Gernet and Bizos interpret(pouvus qu'ils payassent(?)), is not certain because the text is fragmentary and corrupt at this point. If we weigh the gains and losses of the exiles against those of the men of the City when the regulations were applied, however, it is more likely that the original owners were to get their land and houses back without paying anything. Otherwise, the exiles' losses would have been too large compared with the losses of the men of the City. It is clear, then, that the regulation was more favorable to land(and house) -owners than to owners of movable property, even though both were exiles. This treatment was not in keeping with social and economic conditions of Athens at that time, since among owners of movable property there must have been a good number of metics, whose economic role was very important in Athens after the middle of the fifth century B.C. Many of the rich metics whose property was confiscated by the Thirty might have been large-scale traders, and Athens grew prosperous partly because of Aegean trade. The three parties involved in drawing up the reconciliation agreement were the men of Piraeus, the men of the City and the Spartan king Pausanias. In defining its terms, they must have had a conception of what kind of polls they wanted Athens to become. This vision is reflected in the agreement. Judging from the regulation regarding the confiscated property, it was a polls of land-owner citizens, which was not what Athens had been in her prosperity. Was it what the Athenian citizens wanted for Athens? We know that the answer is no, since Phormisios' proposal that citizenship be restricted to landowners was rejected. However, the unequal treatment of the exiles coincides with one of the terms that Sparta demanded of Athens in ending the Peloponnesian War, that is, surrender the fleet except for twelve vessels. Abandonment of naval power led to both the decrease in the importance of lower class citizens, who manned the fleet and brought power to Athens, and the subsequent decline of democracy. Thus, it is now apparent that Sparta had a significant influence in the formation of the regulation regarding confiscated property. Metics and xenoi who played an important role during the civil war had been promised isotelia, but in effect were not well compensated for their confiscated property. Thrasybulus must have felt guilt towards them. This is probably the reason why he made the motion to give all who returned from Piraeus citizenship instead of isotelia. The restored democracy started under such a restraint.

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This paper deals with the problems of evaluation of actions and the knowledge which is involved in it. I think these problems occupy the central part of Plato's philosophy of action, and that his Protagoras which is the main concern of this paper is to be read in that context, i.e. in the context of the philosophy of action. The aim of this paper is to show how this dialogue is to be read in that context and why. One of the results obtained here is that at 351b-360e, not just the wel-lknown and problematic, hedonistic view of evaluating actions and the knowledge that involves, but, at the same time, another view of the same issues, totally different from that hedonistic view which has, unfortunately, been neglected until now, is also in question. In order to show that, we need to investigate Plato's terminology for evaluating actions, which, I think, is extremely refined, especially his use of 'virtue adverbs'(e.g. ευ, κακωζ, δικαιω&b.sigmav;, αδικω&b.sigmav;, σωφρονω&b.sigmav;,b.sigmav αφρονω&b.sigmav;) and other adverbs and adverbials. The Protagoras is considered to be a unique dialogue in which the problems of adverbs are extensively dealt with. It is crucial to our enterprise to see what the problems are. They are shown rather negatively, at 332a-e and at 333b-d. I will clarify, however, that at 333b-d the question is how ev in ευ πραττειν, ευ φρονειν, and ευ βουλευεσθαι is to be understood. And indeed Socrates does make an issue of ευ πραττειν and ευ ζην repeatedly in this dialogue(313a-314c, 333b-d, 344c-345b, 351b-360e) , every time in connection with a certain kind of knowledge : the knowledge of the knowledge seller(i.e. the sophist)at 313a-314c, Protagoras' ευβουλια at 333b-d, the knowledge of an expert at 344c-345b, and the knowledge of good and bad at 351b-360e. It would be possible, I believe, to take this as a hint of how the dialogue should be read. I think the real issues in these passages are how ευ πραττειν(and ευ ζην) is to be understood and what the knowledge that is involved in it really is. At 351b-360e, ευ ζην and &b.sigmav;ηδεω&b.sigmav; ζην come into question, as does 'knowledge'. But what knowledge? I argue that the knowledge in question at 358a -360e is entirely different from that which is in question at 351b-357e, i.e. knowledge as a technique of measuring pleasure and pain. This knowledge, which deals with the pleasures and pains accompanying actions or resulting from them, in itself has nothing to do with evaluation of actions. The knowledge which is in question at 358a-360e is just that of evaluating actions themselves.

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Many scholars have discussed where and how Plato places the cognitive power in the divided or tripartite soul in the Republic. Existing interpretations may fall, on this issue, into two broad groups. On the one hand, some scholars have admitted the cognitive capacity only on the reasoning part. On the other hand, more interpreters nowadays hold that Plato assigns some cognitive capacity(and desire)to every part of the soul and makes each one work like an agent. The interpretation I advance in this paper, however, does not belong to either of these groups. My main purpose is to point out the difficulties in specifying the subject of cognition within the divided soul, and suggest that Plato lays down a theoretical limit to the theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic. The argument proceeds through the elucidation of the three passages below, which have been discussed in relation to this issue. (1)IV 437D-438A : In this passage, Plato identifies the relationship between desire (e.g. thirst) and its 'object' (e.g. drink) with that of 'the bigger' and 'the smaller'. This reveals that the relation is internal and(a la Wittgenstein)grammatical. Then we should not judge on the basis of this passage, as some interpreters do, whether the appetitive part has a cognitive power or not. (2)X 602C-603A : The prevailing interpretation of this passage is that Plato here assigns the capacity of perceptual judgement to the irrational part of the soul. I don't adopt this interpretation, however, for the following reasons. First, such a thing as a stick in the water appears crooked even to the reasoning part(603E4-6). And secondly, the distinction between the reasoning part and the irrational one is derived from the contrast of their attitudes toward such an appearance or a verdict reached by measurement (603A1-7). Therefore, even though we can take their attitudes as a kind of 'judgement' (δοξαζειν) , the subject or perception or perceptual judgement is not to be identified either as the reasoning part or as the irrational part. (3)VII 523A-525A. Most interpreters hold that this passage shows that Plato admits a considerable autonomy of the senses(e.g. sense of sight)by assigning them the power of perceptual judgement. They take the recurrence of such a sentence like 'the sense of sight sees this or that, or reports this or that' as evidence for this interpretation. I do not, however, accept this view either. I list here some of the arguments against this view :(i)The senses are to play the role as a reporter or communicator to the soul, so they do not have the kind of autonomy that the parts of the soul have.(ii)The function of intellect(νοησι&b.sigmav;) is also described by such a sentence 'intellect sees this or that', so the construction of the sentences taking a verb of perception or communication as predicate does not necessarily imply the autonomy or independence of the senses from the soul ; intellect is an organ of the soul. (iii)A confusing report from the senses necessarily compels the soul to summon intellect and ask it what is the F. The senses alone, if acting independently of the soul, could not provide such necessity and compulsory force. I think it comes from the soul itself ; the soul already committed itself on the perceptual judgement by the senses, using its own confused conception of the F and the opposite-F in that judgement. I conclude from the above and the other evidence that, at least in the case of perception, the subject is the soul itself, neither a particular part of it nor the senses. This reveals a restriction Plato imposes on the explanatory power of the theory of the tripartite soul in respect of the problem of cognition, for he clarifies the nature of cognition(knowledge, intellect) in comparison with, or by contrast to, the function of perception in books VVII, where the theory of

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The so-called platonism in the modern philosophy of mathematics rests on two fundamental contentions : [p1]mathematical objects, which are nonphysical, exist independently of human cognitive ability, and[p2]the truth of axioms is intuitively evident. [p1]can be legitimately ascribed to Plato himself, but how about[p2]? It is currently believed that[p2]was Plato's own conviction and led him to[p1]so that geometry thus conceived as a hierarchical structure of truths served as the model of his philosophical dialectic. I wish to criticize this prevailing interpretation and help to understand Plato's philosophy of mathematics better. Now in the Euthydemus, which I assume to be one of the early dialogues, mathematicians are depicted as specialists who discover mathematical reality and describe it correctly. This picture and also the famous doctrine of Recollection(anamnesis)seem to give support to our opponents. However, the middle books of the Republic warn us against such an optimistic view of the nature of mathematics, because there dianoia is definitely distinguished from noesis (the equivalent of anamnesis) and emphasis is laid on the consistency(homologia)in mathematics rather than on its truth. I assume that Plato was well aware of the fervent disputes concerning axiomatization of geometry being carried on among Euclid's forerunners, where the Zenonian paradoxical arguments seem to have played some role, and that he was thus hesitant to place unlimited faith in the truth of mathematical axioms. As to the relationship between mathematics and dialectic, it is very often supposed that inadequacies or defects of existing mathematics can be made good by dialectics. The task of dialecticians is to derive the basic propositions of mathematics by some kind of deductive process from a single logico-mathematical principle(e.g., the existence of a One or the definition of the Good, or a proposition or set of propositions about it), in order to complete the whole system of mathematical truths. Interpreters who support this view usually have recourse to a difficult phrase "kaitoi noeton onton meta arches"(511d2)in the Republic and take it to mean that mathematical objects become intelligible when linked up with the first principle. However, such an interpretation of Plato's text is quite alien to the genuine Platonic way of thinking. Plato simply observes the fact that mathematical subjects form a family(511b ; adelphais technais, 537c ; oikeiotetos), and it is noteworthy that dialectic is supposed to confirm itself and not mathematics (533d). The phrase at 511d2 is open to another interpretation : all that is hinted is that mathematical objects belong to the topos noetos together with (i.e. as well as or just like)the Good, and are not intermediates between sensible things and Forms. In my opinion, Plato suggests that : 1)axiomatization may make mathematical theories clear and stable to a certain extent, but they are doomed to include basic statements the truth of which is not guaranteed ; 2)though mathematical activity cannot fully grasp reality, it aims at doing so (527b ; heneka), and therefore can serve the prisoners of the Cave as a "thread of Ariadne" ; and 3)dialectics leaves mathematics as it is, but it does not follow that mathematics is value-free, since the positing of axioms, which is not a result of deductive reasoning, but of the "upward" process, involves choice (cf. Phaedo 10ld). I hope that the above consideration discourages us from assimilating Plato to a 'full-blooded' platonist or a Neoplatonist.

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R. P. Sailer recently criticized lexica failing to indicate what circle of relatives is included in their definition of "family" for familia or domus. According to his investigation, familia chiefly included agnates joined by a male line. Domus, on the other hand, included both agnates and cognates connected by a female linking relative. Accepting Sailer's suggestion, Makoto Shimada attempted to explain the change of family type in Roman society. He advanced a new theory that the Roman elite shifted from an emphasis on the agnaticfamilia to an emphasis on the cognatic domus in 90/ 89B.C. In this paper, by examining the meanings of familia and domus, the author attempts to answer the following two questions : first, when and how did Roman kin groups change, and, what type of kin groups appeared in Roman society. The results of the examination are as follows. 1)Contrary to the suggestion of Sailer, there is strong evidence for a parallel structure between familia and domus after 200 B.C. Along with the decline of patriarchy after 200 B.C., the category of familia also changed from patrilineal to quasi-bilateral and hence, included cognatic descent, as did domus after the first century B.C. Consequently, the date when Roman kin groups changed was about 200 B.C. and the structure of new kin groups were quasi-bilateral. 2)Around 200 B.C., marriage patterns changed drastically(i.e., the spread of sine manu, divorce and close-kin marriage). This change was the critical point of substantiation of changes in kin groups in that peried. 3)A quasi-bilateral structure was suitable for the political reality, but it also had a defect in that it was hard to maintain unity in the kin group. The spread of close-kin marriage could be interpreted as part of an effort to maintain the unity of the kin group.

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The purpose of this paper is to show Hercules' role in the Aen., especially in the Hercules-Cacus episode (8.185ff.) , by examining the correspondence of Hercules in the Aen. to Orestes in the Od. It is well known that Aeneas' journey to Pallanteum in Aen. VIII is modelled on Telemachus' journey to Pylos in Od. III. In Aen. 8.362-5, Euander encourages Aeneas to follow Hercules' example, just as Nestor encourages Telemachus to follow Orestes' example in Od. 3.199-200. Hence there is correspondence of Hercules in the Aen. to Orestes in the Od. as paradeigma (en exemplar). Orestes is mentioned in Od. I, III, IV, XI. Od. I-IV(the story of Telemachus)correspond to Aen. VIII, and Od. XI clearly corresponds to Aen. VI. Hercules plays an important part in Aen. VI and VIII(a parallel to Aeneas and Augustus), like Orestes in Od. I-IV and XI, who is a parallel to Odysseus and Telemachus as an avenger. In this respect, Aen. VI and VIII correspond to Od. I-IV and XI. This view is cofirmed through the correspondence of the prophets, i.e. Sibylla(Aen. VI) , Tiberinus(Aen. VIII) , Teiresias (Od. XI), and Proteus(Od. IV). Now the Hercules-Cacus episode in Aen. VIII, like the Orestes story in the Od., contains the motives of 'treachery' and 'revenge'. In this episode, Hercules is called an avenger(8.201 ultor), and Cacus uses treachery(206 dolus). Likewise, in the Od., Agamemnon's death through the treachery of Aegisthus is told, Orestes is cited as an examplar of revenge, and the method of revenge by Odysseus and Telemachus comes into question(by treachery or openly : 1.296, 11. 120). Hence I suggest the following two points : (1) The motive of 'treachery or valor' (cf. 2.390 dolus an uirtus) is indicated in this episode. Hercules' uirtus, in contrast to Cacus' dolus, is recalled from Aen. VI(122-31, 801-6). (2) Hercules' victory over Cacus foreshadows Aeneas' victory over Turnus, just as Orestes' revenge on Aegisthus corresponds to Odysseus and Telemachus' revenge on the suitors. Therefore, considering the correspondence of Hercules and Orestes, Turnus corresponds to the suitors in the Od. as a man who should be killed. In conclusion, Hercules is described as paradeigma of an avenger by valor (not by treachery).

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the theological development of St. Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory seems to be treated as an exegete in recent studies. Gregory's two works, De vita Moysis(MOY)and In Canticum Canticonum(CAN), are both indeed exegetical works of the Old Testament, but they are different in nature. While the former, MOY is a commentary on the historia, of Moses in Exodus and Deuteronomy, the latter, CAN, is a mystical interpretation of Song of Songs, as a dialogue of love between a bridegroom, Christ, and a bride, the Church. How can these two, somewhat heterogeneous works of Gregory be connected in the context of his theological development? Here, I would like to consider two of Gregory's former works, In inscriptiones Psalmorum (IPS) and In Ecclesiasten (ECC). According to Gregory, Moses and David are both figures of Christ in the Old Testament. In IPS, Gregory interprets the meaning of David's action in the Books of Samuel, along with the explanation of the inscriptions of Psalms. So IPS assumes the character of a commentary on historia concerning David. Accordingly, MOY can be treated in comparison with IPS as a point of the typological interpretation of Gregory. Then, in ECC, Gregory interprets the ekklesiastes as Christ preaching to the Church and, in CAN, Gregory regards the bride as the Church. Therefore, we may say that ECC and CAN have an ecclesiological character in common. As a result of the comparison of IPS with MOY, it becomes clearer that in IPS Gregory has not deepened his typological interpretation of David, while in many passages in MOY, he explains the actions of Moses, especially in contemplation the Incarnation of Christ and the Virgin Mary's conception through the Holy Spirit. As a result of the comparison of ECC with CAN, it becomes clear that in the transition from one to the other Gregory develops the view of 'church community as the body of Christ' in his ecclesiology. This view and the contemplation of the Incarnation are similar, as the Church embodies Christ in this world. In addition, CAN abruptly ends in the commentary on Songs 6 : 9, 'One is my dove, my perfect one'. Moreover, ekklesia occurs less frequently in the last homily of CAN that in the two antecedent homilies. How can Gregory's intentions be explained? I think that Gregory intends 'one dove' to mean the ideal unity of all people through the Holy Spirit beyond the church community. This is because the unity of the Father, the Son, and all people in Johannine Evangel(chap. 17)is regarded as the ideal in the last homily of CAN. I conclude that the Holy Spirit played an increasingly important role in the theological development of Gregory, in his ecclesiology as well as in his typological interpretation. I also conclude in this context that Gregory actually drafted the Creed of the Holy Spirit in the Constantinople Council (381).

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