The aim of this paper is to interpret the passages 859c6-864a8 of the Leges, which are said to be one of the most difficult passages in this work. παιδεια means the rooting out of αμαθια, and at the Leges 689a the αμαθια is explained as the state of a man 'who hates, instead of loving^ what he judges to be noble and good, while he loves and cherishes what he judges to be evil and unjust'(tr. by R. G. Bury). We may understand this explanation even as expressing the state of εκων αδικο&b.sigmav; so, has Plato abandoned the Socratic Paradox, ουδει&b.sigmav; εκων αδικο&b.sigmav;, in the Leges 859c6-864a8? It is for the purpose of inquiring into this question that I shall try to treat the passages mentioned above. For those passages seem to be quite suitable for the examination of Plato's treatment of the Socratic Paradox which denies εκων αδικο&b.sigmav;, because they discuss the fundamental idea of criminal law, and criminal law cannot be established without taking into account the ακων or the εκων of the criminals. (I am going to give this interpretation on the basis of T. J. Saunders' commentary on 859c-864b, "The Socratic Paradox In Plato's Law",. Hermes 96(1968), pp. 421-34. I am indebted to his valuable paper.) Plato's solution to the question is to distinguish clearly 'the wrong done(αδικημα ; αμαρτημα)' from 'the injustice in the soul(αδικια)', and to apply the cases of both ακων and εκων to the former. On the contrary, to 'the injustice in the soul', according to the Plato's solution, the Socratic Paradox can be completely applied, at least in the sense that it is always ακων(involuntarily) that the disposition of the soul becomes unjust. Next, Plato examines what makes the soul act ακων in an unjust manner. Asthe causes he refers to such emotional factors as ηδονη, θυμο&b.sigmav;, etc., as well as to αμαθια. This is one of the characteristics of Plato's later works. I call attention toth is fact with reference to the Timaeus 86b, d, and treat the pessimism of Plato's later days from the viewpoint expressed in the Timaeus that the soul becomes, unjust 'on account of the intervening of the body(δια πονηραν εζιν τινα του σωματο&b.sigmav;)'. My conclusion is that the means to overcome this pessimism is the νομοθεσια. as a 'healing(ιασθαι)' of the soul's disease, that is to say, the νομοθεσια as παιδεια.

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The knowledge of the philosopher-king, as defined in the Republic V. 475e-480a, is the knowledge of to 6v : concerning to μη ον we cannot have anything but ignorance, and αμα οντα τε και μη οντα are the objects of belief. By το ον Plato means the Form, and by αμα οντα τε και μη οντα the particular things and acts in this world. They are the imperfect copies of Forms. The process of the argument in 475e-480a makes it clear that they are the imperfect copies of Forms not only in their perfect nature but also in their perfect reality; the particulars in this world have only imperfect degrees of reality. Now the Form of the Good is the ultimate ground of the reality and cognition of all beings. Then the degrees of reality of them and the clarity (i.e. the degrees of truth) of their cognition are in proportion to their distance from the Form of the Good. Therefore, concerning αμα οντα και μη οντα there cannot be any cognition clearer than belief. For this reason, in ruling his state in the realm of αμα οντα τε και μη οντα, the philosopher-king has only the belief of affairs of the state, though he has knowledge of the Forms. In this respect it makes no difference whether the ruler is a philosopher or not. The strength of the rule of the philosopher-king lies in his knowledge of the Forms as the paradigm: he should mould the state on the paradigm and drag the many (οι πολλοι) away from the realm of αμα οντα τε και μη οντα up to the realm of the Forms. According to Plato's view of the many, however, their nature is not strong enough to ascend into the realm of the Forms. Then, in spite of his knowledge of the paradigm, the rule of the philosopher-king remains in the realm of αμα οντα τε και μη οντα. We can see from the argument above that the rule of the philosopher-king can be realized to the full only in the state in the soul of the man whose nature is strong enough to ascend into the realm of the Forms, i.e. only in the state in the philosopher's soul. We should take the doctrine of the philosopher-king to be the doctrine of the soul rather than the doctrine of the state.

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According to Aristotle, 'a this' is a substance because it is a subject, and form is the primary substance because it is identical with essence. What notion underlies these two criteria of substantiality? I think the concept of substance has its root in the notion of ipseity or selfhood, by which I mean the character of those things which what-questions are intended to hit and to reveal. The a;to-question is intended to reveal the very self of the thing in question. There are at least three points where the notion of ipseity plays a decisive part in Aristotle's ousiology : 1. The distinction between the category of substance, which Aristotle sometimes calls 'the what is', and the other categories corresponds to the distinction between the what-question and the other types of question. If one asks"What is it?" about something, the thing mentioned in answer to the question, i.e. a this, is not the quality nor the quantity of that something but its very self, which is at the same time the subject of the other characteristics hit by the other questions. Here the subject has the character of ipseity. 2. Form, matter and the composite of both are possible answers to the what-question when it is asked about a this itself. Each of them is not that which a this is, but that which is a this(Met. H2). We may ask in what sense matter, which is not per se a this according to Aristotle, can be the very self of a this. Matter is that which per se changes, aims at something, and so is per se 'not yet...but sooner or later...'. Thus if something is understood to be in such a way as 'for the present...but...', the very self of that something is unambiguously its matter, which the what-qnestion is intended to reveal in this case. Matter is a substance to that extent. 3. Essence, a kind of 'the what is', is identical with form in that both of them hit the very self of something insofar as that something has already reached its own end and has no more 'further' beyond itself, the character of which Aristotle calls energeia. To sum up, the concept of substance embodies the notion of ipseity, which seems to have determined the character of Greek philosophy in general. Unlike any other school of philosophy, it sought for the very self of beings, whether in the direction of matter or of form. In this tradition, Aristotle was the first to notice that the very self of beings is not itself a kind of being, but rather beingness. This enabled him to interpret form and matter in terms of modality. It is with respect to this that he criticized both the Presocratic philosophers who identified matter with a specific being like water, air etc., and the Platonists who thought form to have the same modus of being as beings.

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When we examine Isokrates' writings as historical materials for the socialeconomic situation in Greece in the fourth century B. C, the most important problem to explain is, I think, the effect of the aggravation of poverty on the progress of the mercenary system. In this paper I attempt to glance at the position of the mercenary problem in Isokrates' social view through analyzing his main political discourses in chronological order. I owe very much to L. P. Marinovich's recent work(Л. П. Маринович, Греческое наемничество IV в. до н. э. и кризис полиса, Москва 1975). Through this analysis three major elements which constitute Isokrates' social view are extracted : disintegration of the property relations within the polis through the internal strife, the alarming growth of the roving population(πλανωμενοι)who had been forced to leave their homes because of their poverty, and the necessity of the large-scale colonization in order to defend the interests of the haves against the have-nots. Evolution of all these elements in Isokrates' conception was organically associated with the progress of the mercenary system in the fourth century B.C. In Panegyrikos, written in 380 B. C, all the references to the mercenaries were only used as a means to persuade the necessity of the expedition to Persia. The significance that Isokrates gave to the economic factor in relation to mercenaries is not definite(146, 168) , and there was no accurate reference to the colonization of the poor. Therefore we can not ascertain Isokrates' attitude towards the mercenaries at this stage. Then in Peri Eirenes, written ca. 355 B. C, Isokrates first exhibited the concrete design for the colonization in Thrace and showed some concern about the circumstances of the roving men(24). But this theme was not developed any more in this discourse, so we can only find here a mere clue to the connection between colonization and mercenaries. Finally, ten years later in Philippos, written in the period when the Greek mercenary system attained the acme of development in the pre-Hellenistic age, the growth of the roving men was directly connected with the remarkable increase of mercenaries(96), and further the necessity to remove these roaming bands of mercenaries developed into the very aim of the expedition to Asia(120-123). Thus the mercenaries became one of the major themes of Isokrates' late discourses, as they gave rise to the serious social problem that would need an immediate solution. The social character of mercenaries changed. They were getting the extremely dangerous force to the polis (participation in the social strife, connexion with the new tyrant). In the fact that Isokrates reacted to the mercenaries not only with scorn or reproach, but with an intense fear, we can find the distinct reflection of one aspect of the social-economic situation in the fourth century B. C.

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The purpose of this paper is to show an aspect of Vergil's development in his view of poetry through his early poems, Bucolica and Georgica, by considering the meaning of 'sphragis'(G. 4. 559-66), especially that of lusi audax iuventa to him. As is shown in the sphragis and Eel. 1. 10; 6. 1-2; 6. 18; 7. 17, Vergil used the words ludus/ludere as the signs of his Bucolica. And that he gave some specific meaning to them can be easily understood from the fact that their Greek equivalents παιγνιον/παιζειν are not used as the words meaning "a (playful) song" or "a poem"/"to sing (playfully)" or "to make a poem" in the Greek bukolicpoets such as Theocritus, Moschus and Bion, whom Vergil imitated at first. Their signs are βουκολιαζομαι/βουκολικαι Μουσ・ι etc. Perhaps Vergil borrowed them from novi poetae or Catullus or directly from Callimachus. According to B. Snell, the Callimachean uses of the words are characterized by 'Witz' and 'Spiel' which are in contrast to 'Moral' and 'Pathos' ; and Callimachus, with a tinge of irony, maintained the Kultur and the Kunst iraiyviov has in itself or originally. Vergil accepted this literary slogan and represented it in Bucolica. But the literary milieu of Rome was different from that of Alexandria. The bellatrix Roma (Ovid. Trist. 2. 321) was not always in favour of poetry as Cato had said long before that a poet used to be called a grassator. We can see clearly from other examples of the use of ludus/ludere that the ludus-kind of poetry, i.e. the lyric (cf. Plin. epist. 7. 9. 9ff; 5. 3. 22ff; Ovid. Trist. 2; Hor. epist. 1. 1. 1 ff, etc.) was in particular undervalued, orblamed in Rome whose traditional interest lay mainly in res militaris and res publica. Catullus and novi poetae revolted against these Roman negotia of serietas and gravitas, taking up the Callimachean literary idea as their arms. Vergil too was in this Alexandrin trend in Rome. But something happened during the years of discordia arma and the following land distribution. The present author has tried to set Eel. 9. 1. 4, and the sphragis (lusi audax iuventa) in this context of the Roman literary milieu and interpret the sphragis not as something that states "modest self-pride" in his first introduction of Greek bucolic poetry, or "review of his boldness" with which he criticized and condemned discordia arma, but as something that tells "self-reflection" on his early form of poetry which had no power nor validity, and "realization" of things Roman which only can make a poet a true Roman poet.

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The Hercules-Cacus episode has a special place in the Aeneid VIII, a singularly episodic book. It is different in its character from other "ecphrases" like I. 45393, VI. 20-34 and VIII. 626-728, because it doesn't have any apparent connection with the preceding or following actions, despite the fact that it has the scale of an independent story and can be called an "aristeia" in an elaborately refined style. The typological theory of Galinsky and Buchheit that Hercules and Cacus symbolize Aeneas and Turnus respectively is very helpful in understanding the meaning and function of this episode, but it seems there are still some missing points to mention. , 1) The Cacus episode also plays a certain role in the contrastive composition of the motives in Book 2 and Book 8. In Book 2, after Hector's warning in Aeneas' dream, the Trojans, who believed they had won the war, met suddenly with a reverse of fortune. In Book 8, the pensive mood of Aeneas changed into a valiant declaration against the Latins and Turnus, after Tiberinus' apparition in his dream and the Cacus episode. In this contrasting composition, Hercules' victory over Cacus, the preliminary presentation of Aeneas' victory over Turnus, should be regarded as the counterpart of the Trojans' miserable defeat and flight in Book 2. It also should be noted that the similar descriptions in VIII. 236 ff. and II. 479 ff. have the contrary effects on the Trojans. A similarly arranged contrast is seen also between VIII. 264 ff. and II. 557 ff. The motive of "dolus"-the intrigue of Ulixes and Sinon, and that of Cacus-is another example of the same motive with different effects between those 2 books. 2) The relationship between Volcanus and Cacus, which might have been an invention of Virgil, should be taken into account in order to understand the function of this episode and Book 8. In Book 8, after the episode in which Hercules (who symbolizes Aeneas) kills Cacus is told, Volcanus, the father of Cacus, makes a weapon for Aeneas. Virgil's aim to make the plot in this ironical way should be interpreted with the aid of the ambiguous character of Volcanus, the deity of fire. In the strife with Hercules, Cacus uses his fire and smoke to defend his monstrous and evil being, but suffers a defeat. Then, Volcanus uses his fire for making Aeneas' weapon, which has a special importance in winning the war to construct Rome. Fire can be an instrument for both construction and destruction, and in those two episodes it is shown that the meaning of fire for the Trojans is changed. It is notable that before the Cacus episode, three of the four usages of "Volcanus" have the meaning of flame, which, in those situations, works negatively against Aeneas or the Trojans (II. 311, V. 662, VII. 77). In Book 8, after the Cacus episode, Volcanus appears as a benefactor of Aeneas. In Books 9-12, one of five usages of "Volcanus" or "Volcanius" has the meaning of flame which is used in a simile for the winning fight of Pallas (X. 408), and three of the other four (IX. 148 f., XI. 439 ff., XII. 739 ff.) are for the description of Aeneas' arms which symbolize his final victory. In the remaining two cases, VII. 679 and X. 543, Volcanus is mentioned as the father of Caeculus, the legendary founder of Praeneste. We don't find any invention or innovation by Virgil in these passages or anything to do with the plot construction. We should interpret this drastic change of the meaning of Volcanus for the Trojans not only with the allegory of fire but also with that of war. War, like fire, is ambivalent and can represent destruction and slaughter on the one hand, as it was to the Trojans in Book 2, and, on the other, a fair and proper device to restore the peace and establish a state, as it was to the Trojans in Books 9-12. With the Cacus episode as a

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This paper attempts to estimate the independent and original character of Lucan's method, by the investigation of the speeches of anonymous people in Pharsalia, with the special consideration of their relation to the main theme and the basic concept of the poem, and by comparison with the similar usages in epic poetry and historical works. The speeches of anonymous people in Pharsalia can be divided into two groups : the one is spoken by a delegation(3. 307-55 and 8. 110-27), which reflects the influence of such historical works as Thucydides and Livy; the other group of speeches is spoken by common people or unknown soldiers, which shows Lucan's originality. The followings are such examples I. i)2. 38-42 speech of lamenting matronae; ii)2. 45-63 speech of uiri diuersa castra petentes ; iii) 2. 68-232 speech of parentes. All of these three follow the scelusmotif of the proem. Personification of each speech or speaker(dolor; pietas peritura; senectus)comes from Lucan's original method. Three speeches, forming a unit at the beginning of Book II, serve as a "halting place" and expositio for the coming event. II. 5. 261-95 speech of Caesar's soldiers, mutinying on their way back from Ilerda to Rome. It is identified with pietas and fides bound to perish in the impious civil war. III. i)9. 227-51 speech of Cato's soldiers refusing further active service; their acceptance of servitude and renunciation of liberty is identified with res Romcmae ; ii)9. 848-80 speech of Cato's soldiers, personified as patientia, and emphasizing at the same time Cato's uirtus that supports soldiers' endurance. These two examples of Book IX mark a new phase of the poem in which Cato's uirtus and the theme of libertas dominate. The speeches of anonymous poeple appear at crucial points of the narrative and reflect the voice of the author and underline the basic concept of the poem. This function was unknown to the traditional Greek and Roman epic poetry.

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This paper, which is concerned with the Poimandres (Corpus Hermeticum 1=CH I) , one of the ancient Hermetic writings, aims at examining H. Jonas' research on the treatise. The question arises from his opinion that the central doctrine of Gnosis lies in the Anthropos myth (anthropogony) of the Poimandres, while its cosmogony is of secondary importance to the understanding of the Gnosticism. No doubt Jonas' ideas are derived from his general concept of Gnosticism, or in other words, he does not analyse the Poimandres in the light of the individual, historical background. It is for this reason that we should first establish the preparatory stage of this Gnostic writing. And then, we will be able to discern its truly Gnostic properties from the non-Gnostic ones. Within the scope of the Hermetic literature, the non-Gnostic treatise, "Key" (CH X)has the most in common with the Poimandres. We can regard it at least as one good parallel to the Poimandres. Now the comparison of these two reveals the following fact. The Gnostic characteristics, in the Poimandres, are not found in the anthropogony but rather in the cosmogony. Therefore Jonas' view is not acceptable according to our analysis.

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On the basis of passages from Eusebios, Hieronymus, Orosius, and other chroniclers, it is generally believed that Gallienus put an end to Valerianus' policy of persecution in 259 or 260, after his father's capture by the Persians. Two questions must be answered. The first is what the measure of Gallienus actually consisted of and the second is why he took it. Did Gallienus make Christianity what is called religio licita or not? Some authors, like Gorres, McGiffert, Keresztes and etc., believe that he issued an edict of toleration and recognized Christianity as a religio licita. They maintain that, after putting an end to persecutions, Gallienus issued the rescripts by which he authorized the re-possession by the Christian Church of their confiscated places of worship and cemeteries; all this means an explicit recognition of the corporate Church and Christian assemblies as collegia licita, and of the Christian worhsip. But others, like Hulle, Frend, De Blois and etc., claim that the legal position of the Christians did not change, but that what Gallienus granted was only implicit or tacit, and that he recognized the existence of the Christian Church as a group, at least de facto. For this latter group the main evidence seems to be the martyrdom of the Christian soldier Marinos in Caesarea Palestina, which took place during the "universal peace of the Church under Gallienus". Moreau and Molthagen regard this event as a proof of the fact that Gallienus did not issue an edict of toleration. But, their opinion evokes opposition in many respects. For example, the Marinos case must have taken place either at a time when Gallienus did not yet control the East, or even when Gallienus was only a co-emperor with his son Saloninus. It is important for our theme to make a careful analysis of all the factors of Eusebios, HE VII. xiii. As the result, the conclusion is that strictly speaking Eusebios refers to five documents. Namely : (1) edicta (προγραμματα) by which Gallienus, immediately after his accession, put an end to Valerianus' persecutions. (2) a rescriptum(αντιγραφη) by which he made Christianity what is called religio licita. (3) a rescriptum in which he ordered the return of confiscated Christian places of worship to the Church. (4) a rescriptum sent to Bishop Dionysios of Alexandria and others by which he authorized the contents of rescriptum(3). (5) an imperial constitutio (διαταζι&b.sigmav;) giving another bishops the permission to recover the sites of Christian cemeteries. Why did Gallienus issue a rescriptum instead of an edictum? Probably, he gave his special consideration to the position of the Roman Senate as a political-religious body. The great proof, however, of the footing gained by the Church through Gallienus' edict lies in the action of his successor Aurelianus in the matter of Paulos of Samosata(Eus., HE VII. xxx. 19). What were Gallienus' motives in putting an end to the persecution of Christians? There is no doubt that the interpretation of Gallienus' measure as a political act contains an element of truth. First, Gallienus wanted to allay a source of trouble in the empire, because he had won over the large group of Christians in the eastern provinces to his side in the struggle against the persecutor and usurper Macrianus. Secondly, he may have been afraid that the Christians in the East might decide to defect from him to the tolerant Sapor I, if the persecution continued.

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