In this paper, taking the matter of Penelope's remarriage in the Odyssey (18 : 158-303)as an example, I attempt to show how this epic is created from the folktale "A Husband at the Wedding of His Wife." A husband has left home and has been away for a long time. His wife is convinced that he will never return ; consequently she accepts a man who is eager to marry her. During the wedding ceremony, however, the husband suddenly reappears. This is the basic plot of a folktale found in many parts of the world, and it serves as a basis for the Odyssey. In the folktale, remarriage does not seem to be at all painful for the wife. Penelope, however, is deeply grieved at the separation from her husband, Odysseus, whom she loves even now ; and, despite the pressure exerted by her many suitors, she is reluctant to remarry. What has finally led Penelope decide to remarry is the circumstance that her son, Telemachus, has now reached manhood. On leaving for Troy, Odysseus had spoken these words to her : "-when you see our son has grown a beard, marry the man you wish, and leave your home"(18: 269-270; trans. D. B. Hull). She informs the suitors of these words, painfully announced that she decided to remarry- "There will be a night when hateful marriage comes to wretched me" (18 : 272-273 ; trans. D. B. Hull)-and goads them into bringing gifts to her. It is just at this point that Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, returns after twenty years' absence and so hears his wife's reluctant declaration. His feelings on this occasion are naturally complicated : pain at the prospect of losing his wife and delight in her faithfulness and continuing love for him. It would be only natural to suppose that the husband in such a situation would be in agony ; Odysseus, on the contrary, is strangely glad. By charming her suitors with carefully chosen words, Penelope, though placed in a miserable situation, will receive rich gifts. It is the opinion of some scholars that Odysseus' parting instruction is a fabrication ofPenelope to put off the suitors and delay the time of remarriage. Believing the prophecy of the seer Theoclymenus, she is convinced that Odysseus will return home safely ; therefore, Odysseus, hearing her invent his parting words, is aware of her scheme and is reassured that she does not desire to remarry. Consequently, he is delighted. If this is the case, then why, if she strongly believes in her husband's return, does Penelope pray to the goddess Artemis asking that she "would shoot me[Penelope]so I'd take Odysseus' image underground with me, and not delight some lesserhusband's heart"(20 : 80-82 ; trans. D. B. Hull)? Such words seem to indicate that, on the contrary, Penelope strongly believes that Odysseus will not come back. Why, then, is he glad when he hears her announce her decision to remarry? The answer may lie in the fact that the plot of the epic develops beyond the bare outline of the folktale. The Odyssey proceeds to the reunion of husband and wife following the husband's revenge on the suitors. This revenge is carried out with the assistance of the goddess Athene. She incites Odysseus to action with the words "Think how you'll lay your hands upon the suitors"(13 : 376 ; trans. D. B. Hull)in the great hall of his own house. Therefore, Odysseus' delight in Penelope's announcement that she will remarry in spite of her hatred of the suitors also has to be understood in relation to his revenge on them. When Penelope appears in the hall, one of the suitors informs her that more suitors will stay at her house from the next day on. She tells him of the parting words of her husband, informs him of her decision to remarry, and demands gifts. Another suitor proposes that all the suitors bring their gifts and remain in the hall until she finally chooses a husband from among them.

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While many phenomena of the transitional phase from Bronze Age to Iron Age Greece have long been attributed to the invasion of one distinct ethnic group from the north, the Dorians, many doubts are now being raised with regard to the historicity of this event because of the lack of proper archaeological evidence. This lack of Dorian material forced Chadwick and others to surmise that the Dorians did not enter the Peloponnese at the end of the Bronze Age but they had already been there all along the Mycenaean era as lower class. This theory surely goes very well with the archaeological data and most archaeologists tend to accept the theory. But since there are so many literary evidences which are related to the story of the Dorian invasion and accordingly there are many ancient historians who still hold the view that the Dorian invasion did occur, it seems a little premature to alter its historical implication so completely. In this paper an alternative solution to the problem is advanced through the investigation of the handmade burnished ware, which is sometimes called the barbarian or even the Dorian pottery. The significance of the handmade burnished ware was first announced by Rutter, who stressed the northern origin for this conspicuous pottery. Since the fabric of this ware is quite coarse, it is not probable that the pottery reached southern Greece through exchange. Although it is usually unsafe to equate a distinct artifact with a specific human group, the appearance of this handmade burnished ware clearly indicates the presence of a human group which is foreign to the traditional Mycenaean culture. The examination of its stratigraphical contexts in several sites reveals an interesting pattern : it has been recovered both before and after the catastrophe of the Mycenaean settlement. The implication is that the people who manufactured the ware did not invade en masse at the time of catastrophe, but infiltrated gradually and sporadically in the Mycenaean society. Even though we cannot tell the exact cause of their infiltration from the archaeological evidence, it is tempting to suppose that the unusual prosperity of the large Mycenaean centers attracted the people from the less developed peripheral area. Though it is not clear whether they might have served as mercenaries or Gastarbeiter, they were fully integrated into the Mycenaean society before the destruction of the palaces. With the disappearance of the narrow aristocracy after the destruction, those who had already infiltrated might become the majority of the society. It is surely one thing to say that several infiltrations of the foreign ethnic groups, such as the people who left the handmade burnished ware, did occur at the end of the Mycenaean palatial period ; it is quite another thing to say that some of them were the Dorians. But unless the traditions on the Dorian invasion were totally fictitious, this process, which is reconstructed through the examination of the emergence of the handmade burnished ware, seems the only explanatory model worth considering to reconcile the ancient traditions to the modern archaeological data.

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In the Iliad, there are fewer great achievements by Aeneas than we usually expect despite his importance as the greatest hero second to Hector among the Trojans. This paper suggests a solution to the problem caused by this inconsistency. Observation of the conditions surrounding Aeneas in the Iliad provides a starting-point. He is closely connected with the gods and is always protected by them. This leads us further into a consideration of the gods surrounding Aeneas. It is no exaggeration to say that the gods in the scenes related to Aeneas in Book 5 and Book 20 appear quite old-fashioned. First, there is not any big difference between humans and gods in these scenes. Secondly, it is not a rare thing for gods to contact humans. Thirdly, almost all of the gods are independent of Zeus. It should also be added that as a feature of scenes related to Aeneas, a remarkable number of fabulous myths are included(5. 221-225, 5. 265-272, 20. 221-229, 20. 231-235). One may note very early pre-Homeric elements in these scenes. Thus, we see that Aeneas must have been an important hero at an early stage of the Trojan cycle. It may safely be assumed that before the Iliad, there had been legends relating the feats of Aeneas in detail. This assumption is based on the following observations of Aeneas in the Iliad : 1. Although Aeneas' achievements in the Iliad are few, he is always described as an important person. 2. The wrath of Aeneas is alluded only once(13. 460-461). 3. Aeneas is often called τρωων βουληφορο&b.sigmav; without any grounds. 4. Aeneas' future is predicted(20. 302-308). 5.It is predicted that Aeneas will be invincible after Achilles' death although that is inconsistent with his rank below Diomede in the Iliad. 6. There are Aeneas' episodes which have nothing to do with the story of the Iliad(20. 83-85, 20. 89-96, 20. 187-194). 7.Aeneas' lineage is explained in detail(20. 213-241). 8. There are several contradictions as follows : Apollo incites Aeneas to battle with Achilles, whereas he hinders Hector to fight Achilles and furthermore, Poseidon, the god on the Achaean side rescues Aeneas. For the reasons given above, we may say that detailed traditions concerning Aeneas must have existed before Homer(and perhaps such a poem as well) and that these traditions are reflected in the descriptions of Aeneas in the Iliad. Let us, for the moment, consider Aeneas as "the son of a goddess." In the Greek myths, remarkable structural analogies are found among Eos-Tithonos-Memnon, Aphrodite-Anchises-Aeneas and Thetis-Peleus-Achilles. Ur-aithiopis, which must have contained the tale of individual combat between Memnon and Achilles is supposed to predate the Iliad. There are a number of vase paintings representing the combat of Memnon and Achilles in which we often see Eos and Thetis assisting their own sons. These suggest that in the early tradition, Thetis also protected or assisted her son in the battlefield just as Aphrodite does in the Iliad. This is an action which Homer did not permit Thetis to do. We must now return to the text of the Iliad, especially 20. 75-352. While Achilles and Aeneas are both emphasized as sons of goddesses here, there is also a contrast between the tragic demigod and another demigod who stands apart from human tragedies like an immortal god. It is likely that in the tradition before Homer, there was an antagonism between Aeneas assisted by Aphrodite and Achilles assisted by Thetis as well as a contrast between them. However, Homer excluded Thetis from the battle-field and invented Hector. With the appearance of Hector, Aeneas became a shadowy figure. The poet purposely rendered Aeneas a minor hero so that we find Hector still more brilliant. Hector's tragedy appears more conspicuous by contrast with the condition of Aeneas, who is often treated as his equal. The Iliad is marked by diminishment of supernaturalism.

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Circe is given much weight in the Apologoi of the Odyssey ; she occupies approximately four-fifths of Bk. 10 and one-third of Bk. 12. The goddess makes her appearance in two sequences : the first runs from 10. 133 to 486, and the second from 10. 487 to 574 and from 12. 1 to 150. In terms of plot the importance of the Circe-episodes derives mainly from the latter one, in which she provides Odysseus with an instruction to pay a visit to Hades and practical advice to cope with the risks awaiting him on his homeward journey. It is often pointed out that 10. 487 to 574 and 12. 1 to 150 are tightly connected with Bk. 11 and Bk. 12 respectively, and that her warnings, in constructing a framework for his adventure in Bk. 12, associate the episode with the story of the Argo. In comparison with the latter, the former one, at first sight, seems to have nothing to do with the development of the entire narrative. However, it contains the impressive episode of the transformation of Odysseus' companions into swine by Circe. A careful scrutiny of the first Circe-episode will reveal that it is tightly incorporated into the rest of the narrative and the motif of transformation foreshadows Odysseus' disguise in Bk. 13. The first clue to clarify a firm link between her first sequence and other books is to be gained from an extraordinary resemblance between Circe and her doublet in Bk. 5, Calypso. It is true that both goddesses are exactly like each other, but Circe does not display these similarities in both of the Circe-episodes. It is only in the first of her episodes that one finds not only affinities in the environments surrounding the goddesses, but also much of the same diction is used to describe them. Their relationship is often discussed by the critics : which of them was modeled on the other. There has been the same kind of argument over Odysseus' visit to Hades in Bk. 11 and Menelaus' trip to Pharos in Bk. 4. Both journeys are based on the same narrative pattern, and one of them is said to be derived from the other. It is remarkable that the doublets in terms of characters are placed in Bk. 5 and the first Circe-episode, and the doublets in terms of plot are presented in Bk. 4 and the second Circe-episode. It means that two different kinds of doublets are repeated in successive books and the Circe-episodes. Polyphemus provides a second clue. His story in Bk. 9 has its origin in folktales, just as Circe's does. Both stories show a close affinity in narrative sequence ; many of the same details in the stories are arranged in identical order. Besides, the scenes of Polyphemus and those of Circe share a peculiar feature of deceit, which is not found in ordinary hospitality scenes in the Odyssey. A third similarity between their stories can be found in the manner both hosts recognize Odysseus' identity : they recall a prophecy told beforehand. The first Circe-episode serves to make the hero's character clear. The appearance of the huge stag preceding the transformation scene reminds us of Odysseus as a stout warrior in the heroic world by means of diction used in typical battle scenes in the Iliad. The process of his encounter with Circe sheds light upon his awakening consciousness as a leader of a group. At the same time, the diction describing the parallel situations of Odysseus' and his companions' encounters with her gives a contrastive illustration of his superiority to them. The motif of transformation in the first Circe-episode comes originally from a folktale, but magical elements peculiar to fairy stories are reduced to a minimum in the Homeric epic. His manner of dealing with the motif is innovative, in that the transformation of Odysseus' companions by Circe realizes the function of foreshadowing the essential device of his disguise as an old beggar in Bk. 13. Although his disguise does not coincide in every respect with the

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In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his. "I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b) What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident? G. Vlastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Vlastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i. e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities. In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we(and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b, he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction. Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledge-claim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i. e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity

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There remain two rhetorical works of Gorgias, Helene and Palamedes. Of these works Helene has attracted the attention of scholars because it contains the argument in which Gorgias' own view on the function of language seems explicitly stated. The first aim of this paper is to criticize Guthrie's and Kerferd's interpretation of this work, which seems to be the standard interpretation. The second aim is to suggest a possible interpretation of "deception", which is the crucial notion in the rhetorical theory of Gorgias. From the philosophical point of view, Gorgias is one of the most interesting figures of the sophists. It is known from his philosophical treatise On Not-Being that he was familiar with Eleatic philosophy. In this treatise, Gorgias proves three theses, the second of which is "If anything exists, it cannot be known.", and the third is "If anything can be known, it cannot be conveyed to others". Guthrie and Kerferd insist that the the third part of Helene(pars. 8-14)which demonstrates the power of language on human mind is supported by these doctrines and find in this part the following two epistemological theses : (1)it is impossible for man to acquire knowledge and his understanding always remains on the level of doxa, and(2)all Ianguages are false. But I think that it is impossible to find either of these two doctrines in Helene. They draw the thesis(1)from par. 11. But reading carefully, we find that it never denies the possibility that man has knowledge. It only says that it is difficult and rare for man to have knowledge. This implies that man can attain knowledge even if it is rare. In Helene Gorgias does state one case that he himself regards as knowledge. It is the assertion that Helene is innocent, the assertion that this speech tries to demonstrate. In par. 2, he declares that he "will make the truth clear and remove the ignorance." This means that there can be knowledge for Gorgias. The thesis(2)cannot be extracted from the text of Helene, either. In the third part of On Not-Being, Gorgias states that language itself differs from what it refers to. This fact implies that all languages are inevitably false. Guthrie and Kerferd suppose that the expression "false word" in par. 2 of Helene refers to this fact. But in this place Gorgias says that "How many people persuaded how many people about how many things by false words?". This expression seems to mean that most of the words used for persuasion are false but in rare cases they are true. Gorgias does not deny the possibility that words are true. Thus in Helene he argues consistently from the ordinary point of view and it is not necessary to import the philosophical doctrines demonstrated in On Not-Being into Helene.in order to understand the argument of Helene. The tendency to detect the philosophical doctrines in Helene has influenced the understanding of the key concept "deception" (απατη) in the rhetorical theory of Gorgias. Many scholars think that this concept refers to the fact that there is a deep gulf between language and what it refers to, as is stated in On Not-Being. But it is not in On Not-Being but in Helene that this concept is stated most explicitly. Therefore we must understand it in the context of the argument of Helene. Through the whole argument of Helene, the function of language is argued solely in connection with its emotional effect. In par. 13, the languages of science, law, and philosophy are introduced. Kerferd finds difficulty in understanding the function of these languages with relation to the emotion another explanation to the function of these languages. But Gorgias' intention to mention these languages seems to demonstrate that even in these fields, the emotional effects of language have more powerful influence on human mind than the theoretical reasoning. Gorgias'

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In this paper, I consider whether Aristotle's distinction between energeia and kinesis is justified, through examining some scholar's challenges against this distinction. In Metaphysics 6 6, Aristotle draws a distinction between energeia and kinesis(1048b18-35) ; the kind of actions whose descriptions can contain compatibly both present tense verb and perfect tense verb is energeia. Its paradigm case is "seeing"(We can say that one is seeing and has seen at the same time). On the other hand, the kind of actions whose descriptions cannot contain compatibly both present tense verb and perfect tense verb is kinesis. Its paradigm case is "house-building"(We cannot say that one is house-building and has house-built at the same time). Besides this distinction, Aristotle characterises kinesis as an energeia in a wide sense, i. e., an actuality as opposed to potentiality. This is because the relation of the potentiality of kinesis to the actual kinesis is analogically regarded to be equivalent with the relation of potentiality to actuality. Kineseis, however, are incomplete as they are shown in the former tense distinction, because they are transitive processes as yet to be directed to their proper ends and limits. Therefore, while the energeia simpliciter in which the end is present is complete in each moment, kinesis, being a kind of energeia, is incomplete. In short, the principle of the distinction is the contrast between completeness of energeia and incompleteness of kinesis. In order to avoid confusion, I here employ the word "energeia" to signify energeia in the narrow sense, which is distinguished from kinesis, and employ the word "actuality" to signify energeia in the wider sense, which can subsume both the category of kinesis and the one of energeia. J. L. Ackrill challenged against the validity of Aristotelian distinction by raising the following two questions.(1)While we can say that one is seeing and has seen at the same time, it would not be true that one is seeing a movie and has seen a movie at the same time. Then, is it the case that "seeing a movie" is a kinesis?(2)While we can not say that one is house-building and has house-built at the same time, it would be true to say that he is exercising his faculty and has exercised his faculty at the same time. Then, with respect to one's exercising faculty, is it the case that house-building is an energeia? T. Penner has proposed "two-entity theory" as his solution on this issue, by examining Ackrill's challenge. "Two-entity theory" involves two constituents in describing e.g. "seeing a movie" such that "seeing a movie" consists of both "seeing" which is an energeia and "the movie" which is a kinesis. Likewise, "house-building" consists of both house-builder's exercising his faculty which is an energeia and his bodily movement which is a kinesis. To examine Penner's proposal, we should look at De Anima B 6 and Physics Γ 1-3. Firstly, Aristotle distinguishes three types of perceptible objects in De Anima B 6, among of which the relevant case for our purpose is the proper perceptible object. This type of object is characterised to be perceptible "in itself" and "special" to the particular sense faculty. As for seeing, sight's proper object is colour. Moreover, according to the passages 425b26-28, 426a15-16, the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same with the actuality of the sense. Thus, the actuality of one's capable of seeing is one and the same with that of visible thing. That is, two distinct potential beings give rise to one and the same actuality. And that one and the same actuality, i.e., seeing is an energeia due to its completeness. On the other hand, "seeing a movie" is not entitled to be treated as one and the

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In the history of Philosophy there amounts to a considerable number of philosophers who has a book named Logical Investigations among their works. The list of such authors is neither completed without mentioning Husserl and Frege near to the end, nor starts without Chrysippus on the top. His Logical Investigations, Λογικα Ζητηματα, assumed to be identical with the work listed in Diogenes Laertius (VII-198) under the title of 'Ζητηματων εννεα και τριακοντα, is unfortunately preserved in quite unsatisfactory condition, now classified as P. Here. 307, which was found and rescued from the ruin of a private library of former Epicurean κηπο&b.sigmav; of Herculaneum. It seems to be strange that the Stoic book was found in the Epicurean library. But we know early Epicureans wrote books against Plato's earlier dialogues to criticize Socrates, who was treated as a paradigm by their stoic rivals. So mainly for the critical concerns, the Epicureans contain Chrysippus' work among ones of other schools including Academics in their library, so-called 'Villa dei Papiri'. This work as a whole, we suppose, concerns various types of ambiguities (αμφιβλιαι) in linguistic activities, if not the sole theme of it. In this paper I concentrate my discussions on the 12th column of it and propose its new reading B. Inwood characterizes it as dealing with 'ambiguous commands' such as 'Do x or if not doy'. But I think it is not simply ambiguous commands that the column is concerned with, but ambiguities of disjunctive commands-and the ambiguity covers disjunction as well as commands themselves. Before going on to my proposal, we need some preparations. The disjunctive command which we find at the 13th column takes such a form as 'Either walk or sit(η περιπατει η αθου)'. And there is also an ambiguity and it suggests two different interpretations of the disjunctive command- (i) one component of it is canceled from the initial command, or (ii)the disjunction as a whole is under the command. And in the latter case, the disjunctive form is changed into that of 'Walk, or, if not, sit(περιπατει ει δι μη, καθου)'. Why?-we use interchangeably 'or' and 'unless' to express the same disjunctives without altering the truth-value from the propositional logical point of view. According to Galen(Inst. Log., 3. 4. 1), the hypothetical forms in Peripatetic logic are divided into two types, κατα συνεχειαν and κατα διαιρεσιμ which correspond to Stoic ones of συνημενον αξιωμα (ει p, q) and διεζευγμενον αξιωμα(ητι p η q). This explains why, not η-connectives, but ει-connectives put the two components of a disjunction, not separately, but as a whole, under the commands. Because the former offers a choice but the latter presents an alternative-this suggests the command in the case of the latter turns out to be a persuasion or a counsel rather than a command in a strict sense. The word 'a persuasive predicate (κατηγορημα πιθανον)' (single, not plural)used to characterize a disjunctive infinitive 'to walk, or, if not, sit(περιπατειν, ει δε μη, καθησθαι)' vindicates this. And these discussions show strikingly curious resemblance to ones which were commenced between B. A. 0. Williams and P. T. Geach on 'imperative inference' in early 60's. Now we move back to the 12th column. At 11. 15-6 of the column, I propose to read κατηγορηματο&b.sigmav;...ουθ' ενο&b.sigmav; rather than ουθαμηι taken by Hulser following von Arnim. Accordingly, at 11. 16-7, I read ουθ' εν rather than ουθεν to make it as a complement i.e. 'nor as one thing' to 'such and such a state of affairs(τοιουτο πραγμα)'. And I make γαρ to γ' αρ' only by changing its articulation, just like the case of ονθ' εν. So we translate the whole sentence as '...for example, "Walk, or, if not,

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It is well-known that there are two Sallustian reminiscences(both from Catilina)in Tac. Ann.(4.1). The one is found in the opening sentence (turbare fortuna coepit, saevire ipse, modeled on Sallust's Catilina 10.1 saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit). The other is found in the portrayal of Seianus(modeled on Cat. 5.1-6, the portrayal of Catilina). As is often said, these Sallustian reminiscences are not limited to verbal similarities. Tacitus seems to be strongly conscious of the context of each Sallustian passage. So in the former, he likens the change of Tiberius to that offortuna which caused the moral decline of Roman society after the Punic War. This suggests that Tiberius' reign turns for worse and he himself is responsible for such a change. And in the latter, Seianus is described as a second Catilina, who will cause a terrible disaster to the Roman State. However, along with Sallustian reminiscences, (4.1)shows some interesting ideas of Tacitus. So in the following, I will reexamine Tacitean accounts of(1)the change of Tiberius and(2)the portrayal of Seianus. In so doing, I hope to add somewhat to the general understanding above-mentioned. (1) The change of Tiberius. Here, I think it is useful to pay attention to the use of saevire. Saevitia is one of the chief vices(the others are superbia, libido etc.)for which Tiberius is criticized. But when Tacitus refers to Tiberius' saevitia through Ann. bkk. 1-3, he rarely provides any evidence of this vice. This coincides with his opinion that Tiberius initially dissimulated himself. So coepit saevire means that Tiberius at last began to reveal himself(i. e. his strong dissimulatio now weakened) and emphasizes the new-phase of his reign. Saevitia is also one of the most common attributes of tyrants. Accordingly, coepit saevire also means that Tiberius began to be tyrannical (cf. his outward show of respect for libertas through bkk. 1-3). The Sallustian reminiscence adds another impression to this. It has been pointed out that at Ann. (6.51) , again referring to Tiberius' change, Tacitus also echoes the Sallustian phrase which the latter used in the context of the end of Punic War and the degeneration of Roman society. So concerning Tiberius' change, Tacitus seems to adhere to the Sallustian estimation of the Punic War. Since in Sallust's works the end of the Punic War is a very important historical turning-point(cf. Iugurtha 41.2-5, Hist. Frag. 1.11, 1.12) , we may think that Tacitus is indicating that Tiberius' change was as important as the former. That a princeps at first rules moderately(concealing his real nature)but later he becomes tyrannical is a recurrent theme in the Annales. Therefore, Tiberius' change is not limited to his own personal matter but it is the opening of an evil habit of principatus which will be repeated later(also in Tacitus' own time, by Domitian). So at(4.1), alluding to Sallust, Tacitus seems to say that there comes another important stage for worse in Roman history. (2) The portrayal of Seianus When we closely compare both character-sketches, we find that against expectation there are not so many common points(except for physical ones, audacity, dissimulation, and of course both are leaders of a conspiracy). As the arrangements in both character-sketches agree and the styles are much alike, we tend to make much of the similarities between the two. However, the portrayal of Seianus has some important points in common with Tiberius' character. Like Tiberius, he conceals his real intention(sui obtegens. This is in common with Catilina, too. However, with the following similarities, the relation to Tiberius seems to be more important). Moreover, he shows himself modest(palam compositus pudor)like Tiberius who often mentions his own modestia, moderatio, pudor. Seianus is also arrogant (superbia, as mentioned above, one of the chief vices of

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