Of the two tales which we find in Herodotus (4, 5-10), both recounting the origin of the Scythian race, there is no more doubt today that the first one, which is said to be an account given by the Scythians themselves, preserves for us a valuable fragment of the otherwise almost entirely lost mythology of the Scythians. For as it has been convincingly demonstrated by G. Dumezil and E. Benveniste, it reflects, in the composition of the group of golden tools fallen from heaven, and perhaps also in the names of the four Scythian yivq descended from the three sons of Targitaos, a genuine Indo-Iranian conception about the ideal tripartite social organization, attested in the Avesta as well as in the Rig-Veda, that recognizes three social classes (priests, warriors and producers of food) as basic components of the community. The second myth, told by the Greeks dwelling about the Pontus, may appear at first sight to be quite different from the first tale; it in fact is, however, undoubtedly a variant of the same myth. For in the Heracles of the second myth, we have surely to do with the very Scythian god, whom the first myth calls Zeus and whose native name was Papaios, while the Echidna, who, inhabiting a cavern in the Hylaia district near the banks of the Borysthenes, exhibits a shape quite befitting a river-goddess, is without doubt identical with the daughter of the Borysthenes river mentioned in the first myth as a consort of Zeus and the mother of Targitaos. In the story about Heracles' loss of his horses in the wilderness during a sleep and the copulation he is obliged to effectuate with Echidna with a view to recovering the lost animals, we may have then a part of the original Scythian myth, which precisely happens to be lacking in the first version: a narrative accounting the circumstances under which Papaios had intercourse with the daughter of the Borysthenes. The story about Rustem's brief union with Tehmine, in the Shahname of Firdausi (A. G. Warner & E. Warner, The Shahnama of Firdausi, II, London, 1906, 120-126), should be regarded as an epic transposition of the same myth, whose scheme is combined here with the story of the combat between father and son to constitute the famous tragedy of Sohrab. As is well-known, the Father and Son Combat theme forms a common element in the biographies of a number of typical Indo-European warlike heroes, such as Cuchlainn, Arjuna, Ilya Murometz and Odysseus. It may have belonged also to the Scythian tradition, because its traces may be detected in the Ossetic legend about the Nart Uryzmaeg and his anonymous son. The major part of the Sohrab legend in Shahname thus seems to have derived ultimately from a mythicolegendary tradition of an Eastern branch of the Scythians, that is to say, the Sakas of Seistan.

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Thucydides did not use his customary remarks (τοιαυτα ειπεν and ον θουκυδιδηζ ξυνεγραψεν)-immediately after the Funeral Oration. (II. 47. 1) This paper tries to clarify the causes of these unusual facts and to suggest the necessary background for them. If one assumes that the Funeral Oration was inserted later between the State Funeral and the Plague, and that the State Funeral and the Plague had originally been directly connected, one can see why τοιοσδε μεν ο ταφοζ εγενετο εν τω χειμωνι τουτω was left untouched and τοιαυτα ειπεν had no place when the Funeral Oration was inserted. The deletion of the Funeral Oration from its context reveals a sharp contrast between the State Funeral and the Plague. The fact that this contrast can hardly be detected as long as the Funeral Oration exists at its present place indicates that the Funeral Oration was inserted after the State Funeral and the Plague had been completed. Since Thucydides seems to have hoped to make a contrast between the State Funeral and the Plague, it would have been contrary to his intention to write ον θουκυδιδηζ ξυνεγραψεν here, which would have only helped to sever these two episodes. The composition date of the Funeral Oration cannot be earlier than 404, for its basic theory, that the prosperity of a city-state can only be achieved through two well-balanced pairs, between κοινοζ and ιδιοζ, and λογοζ and εργον, is common to the idea at II. 65, which was clearly written after 404.

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The dialectal aspects of the Homeric language can be ascribed on the final analysis to two dialects, i. e. Ionic and Aeolic, as far as the phonological and morphological planes are concerned. As a rule, non-Ionic forms occur only when they metrically differ from, or lack, the corresponding Ionic forms, while many of the apparent Ionic forms are virtually replaceable by non-Ionic ones. However, there are also found not a few forms which are metrically unreplaceable and thus to be regarded as genuine lonisms of the Homeric language. Consequently, Ionic, a dialect which probably developed between c. 900-700 B. C., is not only predominant on the surface but also to be considered as making a deep-seated and essential part of the epic diction. As for the Aeolic elements, which evidently and undeniably exist in all parts of the poems, their occurrences in most cases seem to be governed by metrical conditions in fairly definite ways; here the artificial and traditional character of the Homeric language can most clearly be observed. As regards the so-called "Achaean" elements which have been pointed out, mainly in the lexical domain, as the third dialectal phase of the Homeric language, the facts are extremely uncertain; none of the alledged "Arcado-Cyprian words" can serve as a dialectal marker in a strict sense. The evidences of Mycenaean Greek, on the other hand, seem to give rather a negative answer to this problem; the vocabulary on the whole shows profound differences between Homer and Mycenaean. Also the phonological and grammatical facts closely connect the Homeric language with the dialects of the historical age rather than with Mycenaean; in Homer as well as in the historical dialects, the old dative in -ei, for instance, has completely been lost except in the relic form Διζει; in this respect, both agree, on the one hand, entirely between themselves, and differ, on the other, markedly from Mycenaean. Thus, Homeric διιφιλοζ must be considered as an archaism of the religeous language, not as an "Achaeism" of the epic diction. As far as can be judged from our present knowledge of the Linear B language, it must be concluded that there can be found no evidence which could surely prove the Mycenaean origin of the Homeric language or the continuity between Mycenae and Homer. Its origin ought to be sought more probably in the local and popular language of the post-Mycenaean (or "Dark") age. Chronological examination of some of the 'old and traditional' elements of the Homeric language, especially those of the adjectives in -οειζ and patronymics in -ιδαζ, formations peculiar to Homer but unknown to Mycenaean, seems to give strong support to this argument. Finally, the Aeolisms of the Homeric language, in recent years, seem to have offered great difficulties to Homeric scholars who presume the Mycenaean origin of the epic poetry, for a hitherto current theory, such as once formulated by M. Parry and others, according to which the epic language is supposed to have developed and been transmitted through three successive and respectively connected stages, i. e. Mycenaean (or "Achaean"), Aeolic and Ionic, is not wholly acceptable from the present viewpoint of Greek dialectology. The real cause of difficulties, however, seems to lie not in the facts but in the theory itself. In this respect, it may be worthwhile today to revaluate the old view claiming the Thessalian origin of the Homeric poetry.

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As the forerunners of philosophy, we have no small numbers of semi-philosophical cosmogonies written both in verse and prose. Almost all cosmogonies in verse such as that of Hesiod and of Epimenides are composed in hexameters. While even in the age of philosophy hexameters were still influential as one of the effective means of expression, lyric meters on the other hand are scarcely found used for semi-philosophical as well as philosophical ideas. Although it has been admitted that lyric poets had perhaps so great an influence on the shaping of philosophy, it is to be noted that no philosopher set forth his thoughts with the aid of lyric meters. Alcman's cosmogony in lyric meters, viewed in this light, arouse a great deal of interest. However, serious problems, such as the fact that the cosmogonical subjects from thenceforward had not been treated in lyric meters are by no means answered here. In this article, as the first step towards solving these problems, merely some remarks on his cosmogony will be given. Though we may regard Thetis, poros and tekmor as characteristic of his cosmogony, we do not subscribe to the opinion which holds that by emphasizing Thetis' character as a craftsman too much, it is alien from the early Greek cosmogonies. It is perhaps more suitable, when considering the nature of his cosmogony, to draw a comparison with the Hesiodic cosmogony than with the Near Eastern cosmogonies. Indeed, some close parallels are found between Alcman and Hesiod: (1) The original state of the world in their cosmogonies is a confused, undifferentiated mass. (2) Thetis, poros and tekmor can be considered to make a group and have the same function, -differentiation; differentiation, however, in the same sense as the formation of Chaos implying a vast gap comes into being. τηζ θετιδοζ γενομενηζ κ. τ. λ. (vv. 15-16) is therefore equivalent to χαοζ γενετ' (v. 116). (3) The formation of Daylight, the moon and stars out of Darkness (vv. 22-27) corresponds well to that of Aither and Daylight out of Night (v. 24). From what we have seen above, we may conclude that Alcman's cosmogony follows Hesiod with considerable accuracy even after having given careful consideration to the point that while Hesiod, as G. S. Kirk (Pres. Ph.) suggests, places emphasis on the nature of the gap itself, Alcman, on the other hand, takes a vivid interest in the act of separation at the first stage in the formation of a differentiated world.

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Die Frage der Sagenbilder auf den Kunstwerken geometrischen Formgehalts bedarf m. E. einer genaueren Untersuchung: der s. g. "Odysseus' Schiffbruch" auf der Munchener Kanne (8696) z. B. hat inhaltsmasig mit der Hasenjagdszene oder mit dem Wasservogelfries auf demselben Gefas nichts zu tun; auch uber einen Zusammenhang zwischen der "Ariadne- bzw. Helenasage" und den Reiter- und Wagenzugen auf den beiden Seiten des Londoner Kraters (1899. 2-19. 1) kann man keine eindeutige Erklarung abgeben. Die innere Beziehung zwischen solchen anscheinend voneinander unabhangigen Szenen tritt aber deutlich hervor, wenn wir sie nicht als Sagenbilder, sondern als alltagliche Szenen, besonders des Todes und des Begrabnisses, betrachten. Auch die Darstellungsweise geometrischer Kunstler, die ihre Figuren noch "wechselansichtig" und "hieroglyphisch" zeichneten, berechtigt kaum zu der Annahme, das sie ein Sagenbild, das doch eine Wiedergabe unverwechselbarer Einmaligkeit erfordert, darstellen wollten oder konnten. Als man aber am Ende der geometrischen Zeit Gegenstande einheitlich und organisch zu sehen anfing, wie wir es an den spatgeometrischen Figurenbildern beobachten, scheint man sich zuerst vor allem fur die Existenz einer anderen Welt interessiert zu haben. Es wird wohl dies u. a. ein Grund dafur sein, das verschiedene damonische Wesen der Sage bereits zum Bildvorrat der spatgeometrischen Zeit gehoren.

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Heraclitus' Fr. 101 (DK) is regarded as one of the fragments referring to the basis of his philosophical thoughts. But there is little reference to it in most of the studies of Heraclitus' philosophy. This is, I suppose, because of some difficulty in the interpretation of Fr. 101. For instance, the fragment is given different interpretations from the two different sources and it is isolated from any of his other fragments. The purpose of this essay is to approach the problem of its interpretation with the help of his other fragments, especially Fr. 22 which is something like a proverb. The author examines the meaning of each word of Fr. 22 in which there is the participle form of the same verb as used in Fr. 101. In Fr. 22, where are found at least four terms of his philosophy, i. e., 'much', 'little', 'earth' and 'gold', the verb 'search' is paraphrased in his analytical way into two other verbs, 'dig' and 'find'. Then my work is to make clear the meaning of the whole passage. Fr. 22 is a kind of proverb saying that whoever seeks for something valuable will. take much pains and get small profits. Now there rises some doubt whether he was talking by metaphor about his own philosophical method. The preferable way to get the true meaning of this metaphor is, I believe, to refer to the following fragments one after another: Frr. 29, 104, 41, 32, 90, 118; 10, 40, 35; 55, 107, 56. The conclusion is as follows: (1) Fr. 22 suggests his philosophical method of recognition and so its metaphor proves to be a formula of recognition. "The subject that searches 'digs' (se. perceives or inquires) the medium and 'finds' (sc. understands and recognizes) the object." (2) The object is called by many different names, but in fact it is 'one'. (3) On the other hand the medium is a sensible object whose structure is of many forms. The medium is significant for the investigator only when it is related to the object. (4) The subject is the soul, ψυχη. Now self-search is one way of philosophical research. To this, therefore, must be applied the formula. If not applied, it is obvious by reference to Fr. 45, that self-search does not take any means i. e., the medium. But the same fragment seems to say that to "discover" is needed for the soul to know everything. So to "find" or "discover" is to research without digging or perceiving. Self-search is research in absence of the medium. It is self-discovery. I think self-search may be proposed to be a major premise of Heraclitus' philosophical thoughts of ψυχη.

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In Orestes' opening scene, Orestes exposes himself to two dangers; a danger of the soul (συνεσιζ, λυπη, μανιαι) and that of life (death by stoning). Unlike Orestes in Aeschylus, Orestes in Euripides killed his mother unwillingly, and therefore he always feels pangs of remorse about the matricide. Orestes in Aeschylus also is not always prudent and lucid about his immoral act, and occasionally shows mental helplessness (cf. Cho. 899, 1023-25). But Aeschylus only expresses it as mere mental weakness, while Euripides names this disposition συνεσιζ and presents it as a recognition. The signification of this term συνεσιζ is "to know" or "die Einsicht". This ethical portrait of Orestes reminds us of Oedipus. Orestes, however, is beneath Oedipus, who endures sufferings boldly and heroically, in character. To survive is an important matter to Orestes. The words, σωξειν, σωτηρια, μη θανειν etc. are seen from beginning to end in this play. These words express desire for escape from the danger of life. At first Orestes entreats Menelaus to save his life. Orestes is related to Menelaus, the latter being the uncle of the former. In addition, he receives many benefits from Agamemnon concerning Helen and the Trojan War. Orestes, therefore, requires that Menelaus should save his life. Menelaus, however, hesitates to save him, and between them φιλια breaks down. This shows the denial of "old φιλια", which is based on the blood relationship or the concept of favor. After the collapse of this φιλια, Orestes is obliged to rely upon Pylades to survive. These two young men are in close friendship with each other, and Pylades is not only a mere intimate friend, but also an accomplice to Orestes in the matricide. Besides, he must make an effort to save Orestes and Electra in order to make Electra his wife. Between them there is "new φιλια"; the feeling of solidarity which is based on their interests. Namely, these two φιλια are of different nature. A rise of the idea of this "new φιλια" reflects the social circumstances and human relations at the time of the Peloponnesian War (cf. Thuc. III, 82). In the last scene of this play, only the danger of life is saved by Apollo. Apollo, who is supposed to appear as the Saviour of the danger of the soul (414, 416), acts as the Saviour of the danger of life. It is natural that the danger of the soul can not be saved by Apollo. Because it is not what is brought on him by God Apollo, but a mental phenomenon of a human being named Orestes which the matricide itself gave rise to. By an avoidance of the danger of life, the drama tentatively accomplishes its purpose. But the persecution by Erinyes, a fit of madness and above all the pain of the soul i. e. συνεσιζ will go on further. To Orestes "living" is "suffering". In this sense, Deus ex machina is extremely ironical. Orestes has the self-consciousness i. e. συνεσιζ, but he is not a hero. He is no more than a typical citizen in the latter half of the 5th century B. C.. Unlike Oedipus, he did not dare to endure the sufferings heroically and to maintain the dignity of the human being. We may say that it is his tragedy. But he, being not a hero, had not the capacity to endure the sufferings. He, knowing that "living" is "suffering", must continue the endless flight burning with the will to live. This is the tragedy of a so-called petit bourgeois, not that of a hero. And the intention of the poet, I believe, was to write this tragedy of a petit bourgeois.

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At the outset it is necessary to remove the misunderstanding about the aim of the δευτεροζ πλουζ in the Phaedo. Most scholars maintain that its aim is to prove the immortality of the soul. But, as Socrates tells Cebes at 95e, the chief purpose of the voyage is to inquire about the arria of coming into being and perishing. The proof of the immortality is offered only as a by-product of the voyage. There are two passages which give an account of the δευτεροζ πλουζ. They are 100a and 101d. I have tried to reconstruct the formal procedure of the voyage. My conclusion is as follows : I. Take the strongest λογον as a hypothesis (100a3-4). II. Accept as true what seems to συμφωνειν with the hypothesis and reject as false what seems not to συμφωνειν (100a4-7). III. Consider τα ορμηθεντα from the hypothesis, whether it συμφωνει or διαφωνει with each other. (Even if anyone will keep to the hypothesis itself, say good-bye to him.) (101d3-5) IV. When the time comes to establish the hypothesis itself, assume some higher hypothesis, the best you can find, and repeat the procedure I, II and III, until you reach something satisfactory (101d6 ff.). "To make the meaning clearer" (100a7), Socrates gives the illustrative examples at 100b-101d, and 102b-107b. In the former he exemplifies the steps I-II, in the latter that of III. No example of the step IV is given in the Phaedo. A careful observation of these examples leads to the following facts : a) The hypothesis is not an arbitrary proposition that one judges strongest, but is limited to the proposition that ειδη exist. b) συμφωνειν and τα ορμηυεντα do not always denote logical conceptions such as "deducibility" or "consistency". c) In every step the speaker is compelled to consider whether he should accept the existence of ειδη or not. d) συμφωνειν is employed, when the speaker approves the existence of ειδη and succeeds in explaining any phenomenon around us by and through these ειδη. e) τα ορμηθεντα is a series of arguments that reveals the order of the phenomenal world, which is united and penetrated by the power of ειδη. I infer from the above considerations that the δευτεροζ πλουζ is a training for recognizing the vivid power of ειδη which rule over our world. Only if a man accepts the hypothesis that ειδη exist -but not until-, can he grasp that αιτιαν of the whole world. This is "the second-best way" for the investigation of αληθεια which Socrates intended to show. And moreover, this may also be the voyage of life which a true philosopher ought to undertake. He has to seize upon the best and most irrefutable hypothesis that mankind can offer, and "take it as a raft on which to accomplish the dangerous voyage of life" (85d).

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The ancient literary sources and inscriptions provide evidence of the existence in Hellenistic Asia Minor of rural populations held in subjection by cities. The Pedieis are one of the best-known among them. The author tries here, with reference to the Priene inscriptions (1), to examine the nature of their dependence and its significance. It is clear from IP 3 that the Pedieis possessed land and it has been inferred that they were tribute-bearers comparative to the Phrygians in Zeleia. In the Hellenistic period, however, the assessment of phoroi was levied upon citizens as well. We cannot understand exactly the condition of the Pedieis' dependence until we get more information about the difference between their status and that of citizens. The Pedieis had a separate corporate existence. They joined the people of Magnesia on the Maeander in attack on Priene (IP 14, 15, 16). As W. Ruge has pointed out, however, the inscriptions do not refer to the Pedieis as being the revolting subjects of Priene. We notice, moreover, the expression και τουζ αλλουζ Πεδιεζ. A satisfactory explanation of these facts, therefore, is that 'Pedieis' was a vague, general name used by the Prieneans for the native population who lived in the plain on the Maeander. On examining the inscriptions from Priene, we find that during this early period vague expressions such as κατοικουντεζ εν ταιζ κωμαιζ and οι απο τηζ χωραζ were used to indicate dependent populations. Since the last years of the second century B.C., however, fixed terms such as κατοικοι and παροικοι came into use. The word παροικειν in IP 16 does not necessarily indicate the existence of the class of παροικοι, for we have many examples in which the verb παροικεω is used to mean 'to live near' or 'to be a sojourner'. Even if there was such a class in this period, the inscription shows that the Pedieis would not become παροικοι obediently. The Pedieis were practically unassimilated into the social organization of Priene. Early Priene had many difficult problems negotiations with the successors of Alexander the Great, border disputes with other cities, the tyranny of Hieron, etc. and her political situation was unstable. The process of a fusion of the peoples in Priene could not advance rapidly.

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The skolion of four stanzas called Harmodiou melos in Athenaeus XV 695 a-b is regarded as the only source of the isonomia (equality of political rights) before Herodotus, because it contains the word isonomos in its first and fourth stanzas. For example, V. Ehrenberg, C. M. Bowra and M. Ostwald infer that the isonomia was formed in the sixth century B. C., while pointing out the relation between isonomia and the reform of Cleisthenes. But in these cases the word in this skolion is the only authority for them. An examination of Harmodiou melos in this study does not necessarily support the inference that those two stanzas were made in sixth century B. C.. That is, both stanzas contain two false facts and these lies are also contained in a common saying that later came to be generally prevalent. So, the formation of these stanzas seems to be related closely to the formation of this common saying. The main point of this common saying is to regard the murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton as a deed of liberation of Athens from tyranny. But in fact, the overthrow of tyranny should be claimed by the Spartan troops and Alcmeonidai who let the Spartans move. On the other hand, the appearance of the word isonomos seems to be related closely to democracy or democratic principles, as is seen in the early uses of isonomia, especially by Herodotus. Therefore it could be inferred that, on the background that produced the common saying as well as those two stanzas, there must be, as a necessary premise, a sentiment of anti-tyranny, a factor of anti-Alcmeonidai and of democracy. The period that satisfies the three factors seems to be the date when this skolion was written. The date alleged as that of each skolion, i. e., 514-510 B. C., 510-508 B. C. and 508-490 B. C. does not always satisfy these factors. Moreover, the twenty-five skolions in skolia attica can be inferred to have been made not long after the Persian Wars. So, the probable date of these stanzas may be presumed to be 490-478 B. C., the period of Persian Wars or 478-460 B. C., the period of developing democracy. Accordingly, the attractive idea that relates isonomia with the reform of Cleisthenes does not seem to have been given an effective support by these stanzas of the aforesaid skolion. There is, at present, no way to find a proof for this idea except through the consideration of this reform itself.

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