The essay sketches some conspicuous aspects of Ovid's usage of color-terms (voc. suggestive of colors, incl. n., adj. and verbal forms) in his epic narratives, in an attempt to restate the lines of demarcation between the poetic colors and those of (in his case)often-compared visual arts. Materials of the discussion are mainly drawn from the Metamorphoses, and treated in the following order, I. Epitheton ornans and its various modifications : i)suggestive of concrete texture of color-bodies(e.g. I 332-3, II 852-3) ; ii)merging of color-similes in actions (e.g. IV 354-5, X 594-5) ; iii)metrical device to enhance coloration(e.g. VIII 354-5, X 90-105). II. Symbolic uses(or suppression)of color-terms: Aurora in III 145-252; colorless effect of quod rogis superest in IV 164-6. III. Significant color-contrasts in Ovidian narrative: i) green and earth-colors (e.g. I 112, 632-41, II 864-5, limum infronde relictum I 347) ; ii)blood on green grass(e.g. Ill 86-7, IV 504-5, X 210), murder of Orpheus(XI 18-9, 27-8) and death of Ajax(XIII 394-5), guilty civilization(XV 96-8) ; iii)red and white: cliche split into multiplicity of meaning(e.g. Ill 418-24, 481-4, 491, 509-10), beauty-spot turned into the utmost misery(e.g. XIII 492) ; pristine freshness of Dawn, distilled from cliche by magic art, X 291-4.

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Aristotle attempted to reduce the thought structure of Empedocles' On Nature to his own unique philosophical pattern by interpreting Empedocles' four indestructible elements as being the material causes, and interpreting Love and Strife as the efficient causes. Judging from Theophrastus' Physical Opinions, Frag. 3, the basis for Aristotle's reasoning is thought to be contained in the couplet of Empedocles' Frag. 17. 7-8; αλλοτε μεν φιλοτητι συνερχομεν ει&b.sigmav; απαντα αλλοτε δ' αυ διχ' εκαστα φορευμενα νεικεο&b.sigmav; εχθει and particularly in the participle φορευμενα found in the latter half. In other words, Aristotle interpreted (φορευμενα to be a passive voice, from which he deduced his understanding of the four elements as being the material causes, and Love and Strife as the efficient causes. The present writer, however, cannot agree to such an interpretation of φορευμενα. The writer here attempts to reject one of the traditional viewpoints in the history of philosophy-the Aristotelian schematic understanding of Empedocles-by elucidating that the φορευμενα in question is not a passive voice but rather a direct reflexive intransitive middle voice, through the examination of three points, namely: (1)other groups of expression illustrating the spatial movement of the four elements; (2)similar verses in Empedocles Frag. 20. 2-5; and(3)usage of the verb φερω which has the same etymological origin as φορεω.

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It is well known that the sykophantai did various kinds of evil in ancient Athens. In Aristophanic plays, too, they are called evil men without exception. The greatest reason why they are evil lies, as J. O. Lofberg, V. Ehrenberg, Bonner and Smith say, in their extortion of money by levying blackmail upon ordinary citizens for their personal profits. Under the system of free lawsuit they relentlessly brought charges against even those persons suspected of a slight violation of law, and represented themselves as men serviceable to the state and citizens. Their livelihood came from such a "patriotic" action. The law courts were where they could make a living. At the same time by threats of accusation and blackmail they extorted much more financial interest from ordinary citizens, who wanted no accusation, than they could earn from the popular court. Their excessive activity in the courts made ordinary citizens frightened. As long as they legitimately utilized the courts, it was difficult to draw a sharp line between them and the plaintiffs of ordinary citizens. If this can be distinguished, it was only by the difference of their motives(Lofberg) ; sycophants brought γραφαι for their private interest and the others for public profits. For Aristophanes, however, I am of the opinion that the target of his attack against sycophants is not their motives, but their excessive thought and behavior. He does not think that sycophantic evils are peculiar to sycophants alone; the elements of their evil are, in practice, found in the state, citizens and even impersonal "war"; on the stage the characteristics of evil of the state are represented by the threat of political leaders and those of the citizens by their flattery. They are the characters and things in which the idea of evil Aristophanes had was embodied. In sycophants the idea of the evil of excessiveness or arrogance was characterized. The evil Aristophanes represents on the stage is not always proper to someone in actuality. Cleon in reality, for instance, is a politician who, for Aristophanes, is to be blamed, but Cleon in his drama is not real. He is represented as Paphlagon or a servant, and Philocleon, a citizen fond of lawsuits, may also be regarded as a part of Cleon. Furthermore the evil of the sycophant is overlapping in these characters. Sycophantic evil is usually common to other evil persons in his plays. The cause of their evil may have lain in the democratic system of freelitigation and in "defects in the general political conditions" (Ehrenberg) , but on the same ground as that, Aristophanes never censures them. He seems to realize that their evil does not come out of the defects in the social system, but out of insolence deeply rooted in the mind. Accordingly he tries to have them awake to their own humanity rather than to reform the social system of Athens. This is testified by the good evidence that he attacks the sycophants in a furious tone, but at the some time he always urges them to reform their behavior in humane language.

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The word εκδοσι&b.sigmav;, used in relation to overseas trade, has generally been interpreted as 'sea loan' (ναυτικον δανειον)from the accounts of the lexicons such as Harpocration etc. The author here tries to investigate whether this interpretation of the word is right or not from contemporary literary sources. The author examines five sources(Lysias 32,6; Dem. 27,11; [Dem.] 35, 51; 52, 20; Hyper, c. Demosth. col. 17.) in which εκδοσι&b.sigmav; or its verbal form εκδιδωμι is used in overseas trade and reaches to the conclusion that there are no sources which prove that εκδοσι&b.sigmav; is identical with the sea loan, and that εκδοσι&b.sigmav; should be regarded as a form of investiment which is different from the sea loan. The following seems to be the contract called εκδοσι&b.sigmav;. The investor entrusts a sum of money to the trader with whom he makes a contract. The latter, with this money, sails abroad for commercial transaction and imports the merchandise into Athens. The investor receives the merchandise, sells it and gives a fee to the trader from the proceeds(or both of them divide the proceeds). "Εκδοσι&b.sigmav; was especially used by the wealthy merchant and the owner of the large εργαστηριον which was in need of the continuous supply of raw materials. Probably τραπεζιτη&b.sigmav; also made use of this contract to enlarge his fortunes. The maritime transaction by means of εκδοσι&b.sigmav; was older than the sea loan. While the investors largely consist of non-citizens in sea loan, in εκδοσι&b.sigmav; many of them are Athenian citizens. Most of the traders who were entrusted with the money were, in early times, poor citizens. Throughout the fifth century B. C, however, when many foreigners and metoikoi came into Athens, they have taken the place of those poor citizens.

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About the argument of the συμπλοκη των ειδων in the Sophist 251-259 most attention has been paid to the question how many meaning(or usages)of the verb ειναι Plato here distinguishes. But the argument cannot, I think, be discussed apart from the whole structure of Plato's theory of Forms. I try to show that the argument gives the ontological ground for the theory of Forms. In the examination of the communion of the five μεγστα γενη(255E-256D), three γενη are ascertained as Forms which all the others partake in. The ontological functions of these three Forms are: το ον makes a Form to be(to exist) ; ταυτον makes a Form the same as itself; θατερον makes a Form different from the others. In the so-called vowel-analogy (253A-C) , on the other hand, Plato distinguishes two kinds of all-pervasive Forms. I submit it is most reasonable to interpret το ον as the vowel Form, and ταυτον and θατερον as the Forms responsible for the διαιρεσι&b.sigmav;. The function of το ον for the communion of Forms has no direct relation to the type of the statement 'A is B'. το ον just certifies ontologically that Form A is, which means, for Form A itself, that Form 'A is A. That which certifies the 'is' of 'Form A is' is το ον, while the 'is' of 'Form A is A' comes from the essential nature of Form A. The meaning of the 'is' in the two statements 'Form A is' and 'Form A is A' is, accordingly, ontologically different. In this way, i.e. through this function of το ον, the argument offers the ontological ground for the existence of Forms, which has been a hypothesis since the Phaedo. When Form A is, by participating in το ον, and is A, because of its own nature, it has thus itself the power to participate in others. The relation of participation and non-participation between Form A and Form B is decided according to their essential nature. The function of ταυτον and that of θατερον are co-supplementary. They guarantee ontologically that Form A is relationally(προ&b.sigmav; τι)A itself, το ον, ταυτον and θατερον all guarantee the same fact that Form A is A. But το ον guarantees that Form A is in itself(καθ' αυτο)A, while ταυτον and θατερον, that Form A is προ&b.sigmav; τι A itself. This fact has a great significance in the relation of participation among Forms. When Form A is B by participating in Form B, the relation does not entail the disappearance of the fact that Form A is the same as itself and different from Form B, namely that Form A is A. There can be no relation of participation between Form A and Form B when this consequence takes place. The function of ταυτον and θατερον in the relation of participation among Forms may be justly called the cause of the διαιρεσι&b.sigmav;, when seen in the genus-species relations which construct the realm of the Forms. Here we can understand the internal connection of the two descriptions of the task of the dialectic which Plato just in this argument gives(253B11-C 1, C 1-3).

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Aristotle observes in Met. Z, 6, 1031a23ff. that το κατα συμβζβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον (e.g. το λευκον)may be understood in two ways. They are: (a)ω συμβεβηκε λευκον (i.e. the white thing)and(b)το συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav;(i.e. the whiteness as a pathos). Of these two, the present writer believes that the distinction between το καθ' αυτο λεγομενον(e.g. the man) and το κατα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον(e.g. the white thing)is more fundamental to the Aristotelian grasp of being than that between the substance(e.g. the man)and its inhering attribute(e.g. the whiteness). The reason is that it is the only way to understand that the Aristotelian theory of substance is at the same time a theory of essence. I. Now, what is the difference between "being said per se" and "being said per accidens"? (1)This question is considered in the various realms of science as the problem of "that A is B". When B is A's so called accidens per se, the distinctionwhether "that A is B" is per se or per accidens depends, in the final analysis, on how to determine as a species in a series of genera-species that of which "is B" is directly predicated. (Ana. Post. A, 4-5) And it is there that the proposition in which the demonstration in sciences is made properly, namely the commensurately universal proposition is formed. (2) In what way, however, "being said per se" is distinguished from "being said per accidens" from the ontological viewpoint generally? I do not recognize the distinction between the so called essential predicates and accidental predicates asessential. Rather, what is fundamental is the following: Each term('F')signifies "being F" simply and fundamentally, in so far as it represents something that belongs to any one category. Then, we have the following: (a) On the one hand το λευκω ειναι≠το λευκον, and on the other hand to ανθρωπω ειναι=ο ανθρωπο&b.sigmav;. Properly speaking, the meaning of the distinction between "being said per accidens" and "being said per se" consistsin that. That is to say, oucricc is to be found in that in which εκαστον is identical with το τι ην ειναι(Met. Z. 6). "Being said per accidens", on the other hand, is to be expressed always as the predicate in a statement. II. A problem, however, remains here. To Aristotle, what is represented by the subject of a statement, namely τοδε τι, was συνλον, and was not pure form. Then, what does ουσια mean in the final analysis? This problem is to be solved through a consideration of the meaning of "to be in actu" from the viewpoint of the unity of being and knowing.

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Love affairs play an important role in the plots of Roman comedy, and that is one of the reasons when the origin of the Latin love elegy is argued, the reference to the amatory expressions of Plautus and Terence is not to be dismissed. Thispaper seeks to estimate the nuances of osculum and savium in Plautus as one of these amatory expressions, which I expect to lead to the comparative study of Roman comedy and the Latin love elegy in terms of their vocabulary and expression. Servius affords a commentary on Verg. Aen. I. 256 to the effect that osculum isof religio, savium of voluptas. This definition is most appropriate to the very passage, it is true, but cannot be valid for all the oscula(five times)in Vergil. Donatus(ad Ter. Eun. 456), on the other hand, gives another definition of the wordsfor kiss, in which osculum, basium, and savium are all mentioned, each of them, given its own separate meaning. But, as is well known, basium was not knwon in Rome at the time of Plautus and Terence, and is generally assumed to have been introduced by Catullus from Celtic. Therefore we cannot apply Donatus' definition to Plautus without reserve. The frequency of the words 'kiss' in Plautus is as follows: [table] The sheer number clearly shows that osculum and its derivatives are used more frequently than savium and its derivative, and that savium is not the principal word for kiss in Plautus, as some scholars think it is. Donatus says in his commentary that osculum is of officium, and we can apply it to such kisses as are found in Amph. 571, 800, where osculum is used with sahitare and manum prehendere. Similar greeting kisses are also found in Epid. 571-4. Savium, however, is not used in such a way as to suggest that it is of officium at all. The kisses between parent and child(Epid., Rud., Stick.) or between husband and wife(Ampk., Asin.) are all described with osculum and its derivative, which are not of voluptas or of libido-amor, but of officium or of pudicus affectus. In contrast to it, all savium are used exclusively between amatores. We have also several passages(e.g. Asin. 222-5; Cure. 51-6)which indicate that osculum and its derivatives are in a striking contrast to savium. The derivative osculari, however, obscures such a distinction in some cases (e.g. Mil. Gl.) , where it is used for kisses between amatores. Later history of the word for kiss in the poetic vocabulary is that of the exclusion of savium from it, with the exception of Catullus. Such a tendency even begins in Terence, who uses 'kiss' quite rarely(only twice). Catullus uses all osculum, basium, savium and their derivatives, and their distribution to the three groups testifies savium belongs to the vocabulary of epigrams. All the words for kiss in Tibullus, Propertius and Ovid are oscula(p1.) and osculor(Prop. IV. 3. 30), except only one savium(Prop. II. 29B. 29). Every kind of kiss, whether it is of officium or of libido-amor, is described with oscula by the Latin love elegists. Thus we can conclude that there was a clear distinction between osculum and savium in Plautus, but that as there was not known the verb saviari at the time of Plautus and Terence, osculari was used in some cases for its substitute. In the Latin love elegy savium and basium were excluded, because they were not regarded as so poetic, nor so appropriate as to enhance the Latin love elegy to a higher rank, but as colloquial and vulgar.

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In reply to Atticist M. Brutus, who regarded Lysias' Plain Style as best to imitate, Cicero is arguing in Orator that the best style(genus optimum)is(1)an ideal never realized, not any historical model(Or. 7: 100-1), and(2)to be defined as the complete mastery of all three styles, not restricted to a single style(ibid. 20 : 100-1). How does he justify this argument? The author examines this problem from three points; 1. the traditional theories Cicero uses as materials for his purposes, 2. his terminology, 3. the basis of his argument. 1. Cicero refers to some of the Greek idealistic theories (including Plato's theory of Ideas)in order to separate the discussion on the best style from historical facts. Thus he introduces a concept of the ideal form of eloquence ideal in the sense of absolute perfection , and he identifies it with the best style at issue. The concept of ideal style thus formed is defined as the proper use of all three styles. Hence this definition depends on the threefold division of styles. This is, in its original form, a relativistic theory, in which every work of art is classified into a certain number of types, each of which is equally praiseworthy in its own way. So this theory has a nature utterly different from that of the above-mentioned idealistic theories. 2. The term for such varied types is 'genus'. In De oratore Cicero, using this term, formulated a relativistic view with regard to style(De or. III, 34). But, when he comes to write Orator, his attitude turns to an absolutistic position, according to which there exists the single ideal of eloquence beyond the plurality of 'genera dicendi' (Or. 36). To designate this ideal, he often uses the term 'forma' or 'species'(e.g. ibid. 42: 101). 3. He often says that his aim is to seek after this 'forma eloquentiae'. What gives the ultimate justification for this statement? The key thereto is the last sentence of Or. 10. Quicquid est igitur de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. Here it is demanded to reduce a thing to its ideal form for the purpose of investigation, on the ground that it is the requirement of the true method of inquiry. This sentence, however, interpreted in terms of the explanation of Or. 16 and 116, proves to express what definition must perform as one of the operations of the dialectical method. Therefore it is the principle of dialectic that is put to the basis of the axiom that the essence of eloquence should be revealed. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the terms Cicero applies to the ideal form of eloquence are 'forma' and 'species', which are also employed to designatethe essence of the thing to be defined. Such being the case, we can see here one of the aspects of the cooperation which Cicero establishes between philosophy and rhetoric.

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