In the traditional Greek epic there is an oft-repeated theme of the confrontation or clash between valour(ανδρεια) on the one hand and stratagem(μηχανη) and prudence (φρονησι&b.sigmav;) on the other, where Odysseus usually stands for the latter, cf. Il. 19. 148-237, Schol. B. E., Od. 8. 77 etc. The fatal contest for Achilleus' arms between Aias and Odysseus also seems to be a variation of the same theme, cf. Pindar, N. 7 and N. 8. Now the opening verses of the Aeneid could be understood in the traditional background of such a theme, if the much-discussed avma virumque is to be interpreted as a hendiadys meaning virum armatum i. e. virum armis insignem (ci. Ovid, Trist. 2.533 f.) ; Virgil may have modelled the opening of the Aeneid on that of the Odyssey in order to bring out the heroic qualities of Aeneas which are clearly opposed to the ανδρα πολυτροπον=virum versutum (Livius Andronicus). This view is made probable through the following observations : 1. Aeneas is noted not only for his pietas but for his military prowess(1.544 f., 6.403., 11.291f. etc.), and especially in the second Book the valour of Aeneas and the Trojans makes a sharp contrast with the treacherous stratagem of the Greeks. Thus arma virumque and insignem pietate virum(1.10) , forming a complementary pair, can be understood as indicating Aeneas at the very start of the poem as a hero who embodies in himself the fundamental virtues of the Romans (cf. 6.768ff., 878 ff. etc.). 2. Compared with the prooemium of the Homeric poems, the opening of the Aeneid shows closer resemblance to that of the Odyssey(1.1-21)both in structure and in contents. In the Iliad the prooemium(1.1-12a)retrogresses into the past (menis→eris→cholos of Apollon) and then the narrative, beginning with the hikesia of Chryses, progresses in the reverse order (cholos of Apollon→eris→menis); in the opening of the Odyssey and the Aeneid, however, such a pattern is not to be detected, while more attention is paid to the earlier events (Troy's fall, the causes of Juno's wrath) and the situation of the hero just before the start of the narrative. Further, the theme of the Aeneid, i.e. the founding of Lavinium=Rome(1.5 f.) , is, as in the Odyssey(1.5), shown as a goal to be attained bythe hero, which then reveals itself as the nostos of Aeneas and the Aeneadae(3.94 ff., 163 ff., 7.239 ff., 8.36 f). It may be said that Virgil, while modelling the theme of the Aeneid on that of the Odyssey, expressed his intention to rival Homer's poem(and Livius' Odusia, v. infra). 3. There existed, in parallel with a legend making Aeneas the founder of Rome, another tradition that Ulixes=Odysseus had founded the city. Livius' Odusia, a first Latin epic and not a mere translation, appears to have been instrumental in making this tradition take root in Italy. Thus Virgil, taking upon himself to sing of Aeneas as the founder of Rome and ancestor of Augustus, may have confronted his arma virumque(=virum armatum)not only with ανδρα πολυτροπον of Homer but also with virum versutum of Livius(cf. Ennius, Ann. fr. 326 f., where the contrast with the opening of Odusia could also be observed). This Aeneas who is quite different from an Achilleus or an Aias in being fato profugus(i.e. in his pietas erga fata), is an entirely new creation of Virgil. In short, in the opening words of the Aeneid literary debt is acknowledged, and at the same time originality within the tradition is proclaimed(cf. the opening of Choirilos' Persika, Ennius' Annales etc.). In this sense arma virumque cano is the sphragis of an epic poet who introduces a new hero in the Augustan Rome. The "ille ego……" verses, on the other hand, show a sphragis of Virgil's poetic career and, as such, cannot be placed side by side with arma virumque cano which proclaims originality within the epic tradition. It seems very likely that someone who was not

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The author has tried to examine the Nausicaa scene in ζ, in order to interpret her function in the narrative as well as to explore the poet's elaboration of her description. In the interventions of the Homeric gods we can generally recognize "a pattern" : the narration of their approach to the human world, their appearance and removal from the scene. In addition to these, the motifs of transformation and sleep(or mist)are remarkable where Athena helps and advises throughout the Odyssey. Considering these elements, her entrance at the beginning of the Nausicaa episode is a "typical" one. The process of acquaintance between Nausicaa and Odysseus and the growth of her goodwill towards him is prepared by the goddess at every stage 25f., 1121, 139f., and especially, 229f. after which she not only introduces herself but also gives him detailed advice. Here we should remember that the goddess' help and advice are given only to the main characters in the Odyssey. Her maiden beauty is fully depicted in the simile of φοινικο&b.sigmav; νεον ερνο&b.sigmav;(162 f.)as well as in 15f., 102f., and 0 457. Her inner excellence is also noteworthy; even before the unclothed foreigner she is wise enough to judge his personality from his words(187 f.). Her prudence is to be seen in her manner of leading him to the city(257 f.) , which will ward off the gossip of those whom she calls CnrspcpiaAoi (274) , while nevertheless judging their assumptions to be not unfounded (286 f.). Above all, shyness characterizes her(66). Only indirectly in the form of an imaginary rumour can she reveal her name to the hero(276f.). Though she seems rather affected towards him(239 f.) , she bids a brief but impressive farewell(461 f.). Such a farewell is also possible because they have not fallen in love with each other (cf. ε 203 f). Now she stands before him as a trial, a trial of a kind he has never experienced. He has to gain her advice, as well as food and clothes, to make his homecoming possible. Thus he gives his most eloquent speech in the entire Odyssey(149 f). The simile of the lion(130 f.) could be interpreted as preparing this demonstration of his uflTis, i.e., to introduce his apicrTEicc. He has so far been "a hero in a fairy tale" in finding his way out of danger, but is here confronted with a "realistic" trial, which leads by means of her gift of clothes to another trial in the Phaeacian court; both trials seem to make him ready for those to come in Ithaca. We should also like to note 230-4, 235b=ψ 157-61, 162b. In ψ Athena beautifies him before he is recognized by Penelope, in ζ the goddess does the same before he is received by the princess(which results in the first step of his success in homecoming)-both groups of the verses, so to speak, are preludes to the climaxes of the former and the latter half of the story respectively(cf. Athena's influence on both through dreams, the motif of marriage in both cases). Through the elaborate portrayal of Nausicaa the poet seems to have tried to represent an ideal of maidenhood.

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According to E. R. Dodds, the two kinds of αιδω&b.sigmav; which Phaedra describes(lines 385-6)as good and bad are referred respectively to the αιδω&b.sigmav; in 244 and that in 335. The former αιδω&b.sigmav; saves her and the latter destroys her(CR., XXXIX, pp. 102-4). The present writer accepts this interpretation as fundamentally right, though this is nowadays generally rejected. Confronted with the nurse's appeal to reveal her secret, Phaedra found a fit excuse, in the nurse's posture of supplication, to disclose her love of Hippolytus, since αιδω&b.sigmav; forbids a suppliant to be rejected. This is the αιδω&b.sigmav; of 335, and Phaedra's tragedy hangs on her decision to give up silence and to reveal her secret. Nevertheless Phaedra was not simply overcome by her passion. The real cause of her decision lay in the very principle of life by which she was restricted as a typical Greek woman of the aristocracy, the ethics of ευκλεια which regards honour as the supreme virtue. She had endeavoured to keep silence in order to preserve her honour.(The αιδω&b.sigmav; of 244 is considered good in the sense that it had worked, though only negatively, so as to make her avoid a dishonourable disclosure.) According to the ethics of ευκλεια, her love of Hippolytus was not yet a sin, unless it was openly recognized as such. Thus, Phaedra had made up her mind to commit suicide as a last resort to maintain silence. But how was her honour to be preserved, if she should die without the significance of her noble resistance being recognized? (Honour, just as sin, is gained only by recognition.) Ironically enough, she found herself ready to disclose her secret love only when she had decided to die. Lines 388-90 pose great problems. How is the present tense(τυγχανω)of 388 related to the imperfect tense (εμελλον) of 390? ταυτα in 388 is referred to Phaedra's "idea of man" expressed in the whole of the preceding passage(375-87)of this great speech. This "idea of man" was a product of sweet idleness in the palace, an abstract idea which presumed the impossibility of behaving at the dictate of prudence, ουκ……διαφθερειν εμελλον (389-90) should be understood grammatically as a so-called "past un fulfilled expectation". 389-90 is interpreted, therefore, to mean that Phaedra was not likely to abandon her "idea of man", but in fact she did abandon it, when she had fallen in love with Hippolytus, i.e. when the whole problem of honour had become personal and critical to her. This change of mind made it possible for her to start the noble endeavour to overcome her love in silence. But the endeavour ended in a failure, which was to force her to make an existential confirmation of her "idea of man". The present tense of 388 signifies this present situation in which she finds herself. The discrepancy between prudence and behaviour confirmed by Phaedra is not relevant to her forbidden love itself, but to her disclosure of that love, which should have been kept hidden(cf. 391 ff.). All that is expressed in this great speech is, therefore, related to her disclosure of love. The αιδω&b.sigmav; of 335 gives a direct clue to her disclosure, but the nature of an ethic based upon ευκλεια is the real cause of it.

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The transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire, Pericles' citizenship-law, and the increasing grant of proxenia-privileges-these almost simultaneous three events seen in the Athenian policy of the 5th Century B. C, the author thinks, were deeply inter-connected. Here, first, the author tries to show how highly the Athenians appreciated the role of the proxenoi as the collaborators for the maintenance and working of the Athenian Empire : his main evidences are the protection-term in one of the oldest extant proxenia-mscriptions (SEG X 23) and Aristophanes, Aves, 1021 ff. Then, the author studies the character of the Athenian imperial magistrates, such as the episkopoi and the archontes. Episkopoi: their non-sedentary, temporal character is clear, and their power was very much limited and surely they hadn't judicial power over the allies. Archontes : contrary to the episkopoi, they were sedentary magistrates and had some judicial power over the allies. But, the power seems not to have been so large, and important cases were sent to the Athenian Court. It is very difficult to talk of the independent character of the Athenian imperial magistrates. They surely supervised the allied cities or districts, but at the same time, in their turn, they were severely controlled by the Athenian ehklesia and dikasteria. They were only the small apparatus, and nothing more. The Athenian Empire, established in the age of the Radical Democracy, was actually controlled from the beginning, directly by the Athenian demos, ekklesia.

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A general survey of the antithesis "παθημα(or παθο&b.sigmav;)-τοιημα" or "πασχειν-ποιειν" in Plato's writings, especially in the Sophistes (247 D-E) and the Theaetetus (156 A-B), seems to disclose a kind of dynamism in Plato, which might be expected to be found in his cosmology of the Timaeus. On approaching to the Timaeus, however, at least following two points seem to present an obstacle to such an expectation: (a)the clear-cut distinction between το γιγνομενον and το ον at the very beginning(27 E-28 A), seems to induce us to assume that Plato denies the reality to the world of "αισθητα"(as Corn ford says: PI. Cosm. p. 31) , and in this case, so-called sensible qualities(παθηματα, 61 C5 a1.) would be, in fact, mere fictions images presented by our δοζα:(b)though within the framework of the εικω&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav;, when Plato gives an account of sensible qualities or sense impressions, he stands on a corpuscular point of view; and in this case 'hot' or 'cold' (παθο&b.sigmav;, παθημα) would be sense impressions forced on us by some external agents, i.e. corpuscles as mere geometrical extensions. In either case we could find no trace of dynamism, but, instead, there is to be found a totally idealistic monism or a mechanism which we might call 'Cartesian'. But what does Plato mean, for example, by "παθηματα αυτων"(61 C5) at all? Are they "les impressions que ces corps nous procurent" (Rivaud)or "their(i.e. of fire, air etc.) qualities" (Corn ford)? Plato insists repeatedly that 'cold', 'white' and so on are applied both to our impressions and the agents. But in this case, what is the point on which Plato puts emphasis? There are some passages requiring special attentions:(1)48 E2-53 C3, where Plato relates in detail why and how "χωρα" must be introduced, and(2)53 C456 C7, where he constructs four regular polyhedrons and assigns them to four bodies. If we examine carefully these passages, especially 52 D-E, where on χωρα or τιθηνη he says "……μορφα&b.sigmav; δεχομενην…… παθη πασχουσαν……κινουμενην……", it seems to me that what we could find here is nothing but a dynamism, and, in my opinion, παθημα or παθο&b.sigmav; must not be limited to "our sense impressions". They are rather "affections" in Aristotelian sense of παθο&b.sigmav;(Met. Δ 22). Moreover they are "affections" both of external agents and of our sense organs (as in the Theaetetus) through which these affections, of course, even reach the realm of θνητα γενη ψυχη&b.sigmav;.

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What Piety signifies to Plato is examined, using as an index some suggestive words in his Euthypkro and, at least, what remains unrefuted in it. At first, it is pointed out that a formal definition as one might expect is without meaning, secondly that doubt is thrown on the words that Piety is a part of Justice. In the Protagoras Piety is reckoned among the five cardinal virtues, with overemphasis on the unity of the virtues, hence the meaning of Piety is not clear. In the Republic, in spite of the exclusion of Piety from the cardinal virtues, it sometimes stands side by side with Justice. What does this co-ordinated expression mean? Even if it were a mere idiomatic expression, it should have a background. Taking the background into account, when Piety is excluded from the list, it is not a part of Justice, but it becomes evident that Piety covers all of the virtues. In fact, it is suggested by what Plato said. Namely, because it is understood that Justice is the divine world-order, the just man is one who meets the divine will and stands in awe of it. No body is hidden from the sight of the goddess of Justice, who delivers us from injustice. Before looking to the goddess for judgement, a man who wishes to be healthy ought to accuse himself first of all. Take notice of the words aidos and dike (conscience and justice)to be the principles of regulation of cities and the ties of friendship. Plato's expressions of gods are also the fullest expressions of Forms. Namely, gods and Forms are identical. His world construction is one and the same. To resemble a god is to pursue Forms. As his life's purpose is to resemble a god, it is not difficult to imagine what significance Piety has in his thought.

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According to Aristotle, philosophy is demanded to be both ontology and first philosophy. But how is this possible? We want to search for a clue to the solution of this problem. At the beginning of Met. V. 1, it is said that there is a science which investigates το ον η ον and τα τουτω υπαρχοντα καθ' αυτο. So, at first, referring to το ον η ον, we will consider the position of his ontology in relation to other sciences, and then we will consider to: τουτω υπαρχοντα καθ' αυτο. It will be noticed that ontology is distinguished from special and apodeictic sciences in that it is demanded to be a universal science. It is also distinguished from the dialectic in the Aristotelian sense in that it should be protology. Now, how is it possible for ontology to be a universal science, on the one hand, and protology, on the other? In order to answer this question, we must consider τα τουτω υπαρχοντα καθ' αυτο. Some examples are given in Γ. 2. In addition to them, however, we can collect other examples of τα τουτω υπαρχοντα καθ' αυτο also from these two sources: (1) the concepts which hold good for all categories(e.g. δυναμι&b.sigmav;, ενεργεια, το τι ην ειναι, αιτιον, etc.) and (2)the concepts which can be obtained through the λογοι of το καθ' auTo(e.g. αναγκαιον, καλον etc.). All the concepts collected in this way, together with those given in Γ. 2, hold good for all categories and are in that sense universals. These are indeed the principal concepts that constitute Aristotelian philosophy. But, if his ontology does nothing but investigate these concepts, it will satisfy only one of its necessary conditions; it will certainly be a universal science, but it is still lacking in the other necessary condition; that is, it is not protology at all. And as a result it becomes very similar to, and undistinguishable from, the dialectic. Then, how is it possible for his ontology to become protology? And moreover, how is it possible for it to proceed from protology to first philosophy? In orderto answer such questions, we will have to see what function those principal concepts perform in the context of the pursuit of ουαια.

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According to my diagnosis, when we try to solve problems of Aristotle's modal syllogistic, a key to them, lies in a semantical analysis of which of the three-terminterpretations for 'proof by contrasted instances' and 'proof by instances' is applied to non-modal propositions of each of his syllogisms. I. The analysis of proof by contrasted instances in the case of the non-modal syllogisms shows that the non-modal propositions here are clearly regarded as those which can also be interpreted as necessary propositions. II. On the analysis of proof by instances in the case of the syllogisms with one necessary and one non-modal premiss, we can conclude that the non-modal propositions here are characteristically posited as true in at least one possible world accessible to the real world, on the ground that they are true in the latter as admissible propositions in the strict sense. III. Exactly speaking, there is only one example of proof by instances in the case of the syllogisms with one admissible and one non-modal premiss. Therefore let us direct our attention to his restriction on the term-interpretation in An. Pr. 34b7-18. From a logical point of view, then, this restriction is opposed to the definition of a valid syllogism as dependent only on its logical structure. From a philosophical point of view, on the other hand, it gives rise to the serious problem that the formal language level in which, proper to An. Pr., no semantical distinction is drawn between categories, is confused with another language level which contains this distinction.

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