In this paper the author discusses whether the phratries could organize all citizens of classical Athens. Though this problem has been referred to by almost all scholars who are concerned with the Athenian phratries, their argumentation is far from persuasive. Having divided the evidences into five groups, the author investigates them one by one, and concludes that in classical Athens the phratries could organize all citizens. His arguments are as follows. (1) Attic citizenship decrees, where the enrolments in the phratries as well as the denies and the tribes are usually inscribed. Four decrees, which do not refer to the phratries(Demosth. LIX 104; ML 94; SEG III 70; SEG XVI 42), show just the fact that the formula was not firmly established during the early years, as M. J. Osborne inferred. (2) The evidences which suggest that the enrolment in a phratry was a necessary condition for the acquisition of Athenian citizenship(Demosth. LIX 122 ; Lys. XXX 2; Plut. Pericles 37; Demosth. XXXIX 31, 34; Demosth. XL42, 48). (3) The evidences on the procedure of the enrolment of Athenian phratries (cf. Sadao Ito, The Enrolment of Athenian Phratries. Legal History Review 31, Tokyo, 1982). The membership of the phratries is almost the same as the demes regarding sex, age and birth. This fact suggests that enrolment in a phratry was the preliminary step for enrolment in the civic body. (4) Dracon's homicide law(ML 86). Phrateres play a certain part in Athenian criminal law. This fact is only possible on the assumption that all citizens were enrolled in the phratries. (5) Two pieces of evidence, which seem to be contrary to the above-mentioned conclusion, are invalid. a) Arist. Ath. Pol. 42. 1. It is because the description is concerned with enrolment in the deme that the phratry is not referred to in this passage. Attention is also to be paid to P. J. Rhodes' remark that Aristotle sometimes fails to tell the whole truth in the second part of this book. b) Aristoph. Ran. 420-423. The ridicule of Archedemos could be effective, when it implied that he had no qualification for citizenship. It is thus induced from the passage that Archedemos was not introduced to phrateres that a citizen used to be enrolled in a phratry. Athenian citizens were all enrolled in phratries. The phratries of classical Athens were composed of legitimate sons of citizens(Isae. VII 16). It is concluded from these two facts that Athenian citizens had to be legitimate by birth, and that even bastards whose parents were both Athenians had no qualification for citizenship. The civic body of classical Athens was extremely exclusive.

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The most important locus classicus of the 'Third Man Argument' (TMA) in Corpus Aristotelicum is found in the Sophistici Elenchi(178b36-179a10). There the TMA, the last example of sophistical refutations depending on the form of expression, is said to presuppose the admission that the common predicate, like 'man', expresses, because of its form, just what is a 'this' (hoper tode ti), that is, the substantial essence of a being (e.g. Callias) , in spite of the very fact that it expresses a quality, a quantity or some one of the other non-substantial attributes. Depending on Alexander's report of the lost work De Ideis and on his comment on Metaphysics 991a2 ff. that the Platonic Form is a 'universal' essentially predicable of individuals, many scholars explain Aristotle's TMA as follows : that which produces the 'third man' is the individualisation of the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars. This interpretation has nothing to do with the TMA above in the Soph. El. which will then assert that 'the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars' does produce the 'third man' without the 'individualisation' of that predicate, for any universal expressing an attribute, once admitted that it expresses an essence, will produce something like a third essence. The TMA in the Soph. El. depending on the similar form of expression of things that are not categorially the same, can be elucidated by a passage from the Topics (103b27-39) which distinguishes two kinds of 'what-is-it' expressions, the intercategorial and the categorial. By the former, one can give the species-genus definition to whatever the given being is, e.g. man, white, a foot length, the latter two of which are not substances, while that definition does not express any categorial 'what-is-it' (the substantial essence), but a quality or a quantity or some one of the other attributes. The truth is then as follows. That which the Form and the particulars have in common is not the eidos qua substantial form, but the eidos qua species (Met. 1059a13) whose one logos is predicated both of the Form and of the particulars as synonymous entities, so that it is limited to setting forth differentiae -a sort of 'quality' {Met. 1020a34)- to the question "what is the species 'man'?", differentiae specific and generic ('biped', 'sensitive' and so on) which are valid to all individual members belonging to the species 'man', but not valid to a substance like Callias himself, endowed with the essence identical with himself. That which causes the TMA is, therefore, to assimilate the inter-categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is in fact an attributive expression, to the categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is, according to Aristotle, the only substantial expression. Aristotle's criticism of the theory of Forms, therefore, does not consist in the following: in spite of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms which makes it express the individual, should recognize not only the second being, but the third being both having the same essence as the sublunary beings, but in the following: because of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms making it express the essence should recognize not only the second, but the third being both having the same attribute as the sublunary beings. By the first formula of criticism one could be inclined to think that Aristotle purports to emphasize the idealistic character in the theory of Forms, while in the second to see Aristotle's tactics to make the Forms 'universalized attributes'-accidental phenomena-separated from the sublunary substances, which inverts the very relation of Paradeigmata of that world and eidola of this world.

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Aristotle characterizes matter both as 'that out of which' and as 'the underlying thing.' But these characteristics don't imply the same. Though 'that out of which' may have several meanings, matter is also described as 'that which persists', so it is meant to be a sort of constituent. Being a constituent implies that it has positive content or substance. When the artists are said to know the matter, they recognize its quality and necessity. Since it is also maintained that matter is unknowable in itself, the knowable aspect of matter must be form in a sense. The four 'primary qualities' are examples of this material form. 'That out of which' can mean terminus a quo as well as constituent. But 'privation' is more properly said to be terminus a quo. For there must be not only a pair of contraries that change from each other, but something that persists through that change. This persisting thing is identified with the underlying thing or matter. While in Aristotle's logic primary substances are what underlie everything else, in his physics the underlying principle is formless. 'Matter as constituent' does not imply this. Since he also says that matter, in the most proper sense of the term, is the underlying thing which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away, we must distinguish coming-to-be from the other kinds of change. If we distinguish between them severely, what underlies coming-to-be does not persist in the same way as what underlies the other changes does. What underlies coming-to-be(i.e. matter) has ontologically different status from what underlies the other changes (i.e. concrete substance). This difference corresponds to the distinction between the formal or essential factor and the material factor in a concrete substance. Aristotle makes so much of the formal factor, that he regards the material factor as something as much indeterminate as the accidents, and, further, that he rejects the materialism which might result from the concept of matter both as constituent and as persisting subject.

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Aristotle deals with the method of definition by division mainly in his Analytica Posteriora, Metaphysics Z12, and De Partibus Animalium A2-3. Scholars have found an inconsistency in his treatment of the method and have tried to use it to determine the chronology of those works. The inconsistency is that in Anal. Post, and Metaphysics, he seems to argue for the consequence of adoption of the method, where the species defined is the final difference, while in Part. Animal., this consequence is the very point that is criticised. The aim of my paper is to show that the inconsistency does not exist by distinguishing two aspects of Aristotle's treatment in which he considers the characteristics of the method. The first step is to make it clear that he maintains a consistent attitude toward it throughout the works. A clue to our question is to ask what is the status of that which is defined by the method of division. For in Anal. Post., Aristotle criticises the thought of Speusippus, who is said to have given up the theory of Ideas because it is incompatible with the theory of division. We can find a debate on the status of the definiendum in the Early Academy in Plato's Theaetetus and Aristotle's Metaphysics Z15. Aristotle's conclusion is that individuals cannot be defined in terms of differences found among them and Speusippus agrees with him on this point. The fundamental opposition between these two philosophers can be seen in Aristotle's treatment of Speusippus' claim that one who defines something must know everything. The basis of the claim is that it is impossible to know things' differences from something without knowing that thing, but that without the differences one cannot know that thing-for it is the same as that from which it does not differ and different from that from which it does differ. From this claim and various evidence found in his extant fragments, we can infer that Speusippus identifies that which is defined with the bundle of differences which we attain by the method of division. Aristotle argues that this claim is simply false because things are not different from each other in virtue of every difference, and that the use of dichotomy sets us free from the requirement of omniscience. The criticism derives its force from his so-called essentialism which admits two kinds of difference, substantial and accidental. His definiendum is not the bundle of differences but the substance to which the substantial differences belong. Now we can see more clearly the contrast in their attitudes toward the consequences of adoption of the method that the species defined is the final difference and that the number of the species is equal to that of final differences. Speusippus must accept these consequences as true, while Aristotle still has a right to reject them because his definiendum is independent of the system of division. Those who define things by division have the intention of completing the system of division as a system of classification, which must be hierarchial in that it does not contain anything undefined nor any cross-classification. In Anal. Post. Aristotle concedes that if we use dichotomy, anything undefined will not remain, but he never considers the problem of cross-classification. It is treated in full in Part. Animal., which asserts the inevitability of cross-classification. Aristotle's treatment is, therefore, not inconsistent. In Anal. Post, and Metaphysics he considers the logical consequences which the method of division implies and in Part. Animal, he tries to estimate them.

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One of the most conspicuous features of the historical thought of Polybius is the fact that he places emphasis on both rationalism and the role of Tyche. In his history the word τυχη appears on no less than 137 occasions, 106 of which show his own judgment regarding Tyche. While a unanimously acceptable classification is impossible, it would appear that the word is used 13 times to mean Providence or the purposive power working toward a definite goal, and 31 times to indicate the capricious power working for instability in human affairs. He admits in several passages that chance(Tyche) could contribute to history, but in other passages insists that to talk of chance is a poor explanation. There has been much discussion as to why he was inconsistent regarding this matter. We consider that it might be understood if we look at his political career. He saw too many cases where fortunes were suddenly and sensationally reversed, the cause of which it was impossible to explain. However, to acknowledge the power of Tyche is not to give up every effort. He insists that those who engage in politics should do their best with sound judgment and rational calculation. Here he stands within the Greek tradition of rationalism. To make this point clear, we tried to compare Polybius with Ssu-ma Ch'ien, a Chinese historian who was born half a century later. We can find many parallels between them. Ssu-ma Ch'ien regarded the study of the past as essentially a means of attaining practical ends by learning lessons. In a short essay at the end of the Basic Annals of Emperor Kao-tsu, he characterizes the governmental principle of the first three dynasties, the Hsia, Shang and Chou, and demonstrates the cyclical theory of history. He makes frequent references to the so-called "Mandate of Heaven", but in some cases expounds the opposite view that men's failures are due primarily to their own faults and may not be attributed to Heaven. It has of ten been noticed that he was afflicted by the problem of the caprice or injustice of Heaven, and he wrote the famous Memoir on Po I and Shu Ch'i, which reminds us of the episode in Polybius(XXXII, 4,3). However, we cannot find such rationalism as Polybius' in Ssu-ma Ch'ien. His Shih-chi or Records of the Historian was intended primarily as a guide to moral conduct. He emphasizes the importance of virtue or high-mindedness, and writes as if most events were caused by psychological motives. We also noticed many accounts about the movements of stars, and pointed out that those of Polybius are astronomical while those of Ssu-ma Ch'ien are astrological. The contrast between them shows that they stand within different traditions.

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Whether in terms of external or internal criteria, the Sixth Eclogue has been regarded as a poem which owes least to the Theocritean pastoral. This general opinion, however, seems to be inconsistent with the introductry statement in which the poet decides to return to his early manner of bucolic composition. The use of Hesiodic Dichterweihe, which may follow Callimachean example in Aetia, recalls also the application of the same idea to the Seventh Idyll by Theocritus. So this paper attempts to find another principle of unity in the frequent appearance of the.motif of labor and to show in this thematic adaptation from Id. VII Virgil's deep understanding of an important aspect of the Greek pastoral tradition. The Eclogue can be divided into three sections. In the main part, the Song of Silenus, the labor-motii is presented in various types of myth. The opening cosgomonical passage, emphasizing the autonomic movements of the elements in contrast with a similar account in Ovid's Met. I. 5 ff., represents the existence of labor at the origins of the world, while the Pyrrha-episode and the theft of Prometheus mark respectively, with a happy age (Saturnia vegnd) intermediate between them, the beginning and the aggravation of human struggle with nature. In the next stories, where the passions of love are depicted as cause of labores, the realistic description of Pasiphae's painful wandering is enclosed by brief allusions to the sufferings of Hercules and the suitor of Atalanta. The following two sketches can be also paired as failure and success of labor: Phaethon falls to the ground in his dangerous attempt but Gallus ascends on the top of Helicon after a bitter trial as love poet. Lastly, Silenus pictures Scylla and Philomela enduring through adversity even after their transformations into animals. Thus interpreted, the Song will be closely related with the framework. In the introduction, where Virgil talks about his poetics, stress is laid on the special effort to be spent to make a fine work(ludere-deductum dicere carmen-meditabor), and that this artistic labor should not be disjoined from the poet's own painful experiences is suggested by the scene in which Silenus passes a symbolic bondage. These two aspects of poetic creation, recapitulated and integrated by a phrase Phoebo meditante in the ending lines, explain the reason not only for the stylistic refinement but also for the thematic selection of Silenus' Song. Now, this interpretation will invite comparison with Id. VII. Structural affinities and topical resemblances are observed as in the following: (1) The relation between poetic creation and ponos, hinted at first by the opening mention of Burina and Chalcon, finds its full expression in the words of Lycidas : το μελυδριον εζεπονασα. And this locution, with a preceding phrase βουκολικα&b.sigmav;……αρζωμεθ' αοιδα&b.sigmav;, corresponds to agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam in Eel.VI. (2) But Lycidas is not thinking of his ponos solely from the artistic point of view, because the first part of his song is clearly concerned with his personal experience of ponos. The deliverance from this predicament, as in the case of Silenus, makes it an essential condition for the second subject of his poem. (3) Mythical ponoi which are narrated in this part (αμφεπονειτο : Daphnis, εζεπονασα&b.sigmav; : Comatas) reflect the former situation of Lycidas himself and remind us of various stories sung by Silenus. In the song of Simichidas, too, the bitterness of love is expressed in the form of fantastic and real trials. (4) The ending description of Thalysia, in which the close connection between bucolic poetry and ponos is symbolically summarized, fulfils the function analogous to the conclusion of Eel. VI. Despite Rosenmeyer's view, recent critics tend to estimate the importance of the ponos-motif in 'Theocritus' larger

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From Cassius Dio's proposals spoken by the mouth of Maecenas in Book 52 of his Roman History we can comprehend what intention senators had early in the 3rd century. In chapters 28-29, Dio insisted that all property which produced any profit for its possessors should be taxed. He proposed the tax-system founded on the doctrine of Callistratus that praediorum collationes non personae sed locorum munera sunt. By this tax-system he intended to release the well-to-do from being subjected to the abuses of the cities. The cities compelled the well-to-do, in view of their personae, to contribute more than the value of their possessions demanded. According to the doctrine of Callistratus even those who had obtained exemption from the munus publicum couldn't avoid any praediorum collationes. Nevertheless they preferred to relinquish exemption from the collationes extraordinariae rather than be subjected to the abuses. Dio intended to spare the well-to-do the burden by denying the allotment the cities conducted. In chapter 30 also, Dio intended to reduce the burden the cities compelled the well-to-do to bear. And he insisted that the cities should abandon their nominal autonomy in order to cut down the expenditure of the cities. Therefore the proposal in 30. 9 that the cities of the Empire should not be allowed to have individual coinages is clearly to be regarded as a belief that city coinages should be banned, not as a belief that monetary systems incompatible with the Roman monetary system should be banned. By this proposal Dio intended to release the cities, eventually the well-to-do, from the burden which city coinages caused. Dio's economic proposals as well as his political proposals looked after the interests of the well-to-do, not of the Empire. The burden which the cities compelled the well-to-do to bear was increasingly heavy. To reduce the expenditure of the cities by abandoning the titular autonomy was beneficial to the well-to-do who strove to cut down their expenditure.

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