To show that he has no gift for natural science, Socrates successively cites at Phaedo 96C2-97B7 several cases revealing a way of conceiving aitia. These cases have perplexed commentators and have often been regarded as a confused treatment of problems of a completely different nature (Hack forth, Crombie, Annas, etc.). Rejecting such an interpretation as well as those so far submitted by other scholars(e. g. Vlastos, Gallop) , this paper tries to elucidate the continuous sequence of thought presented in this passage as follows: Socrates begins by giving a simple example of the scientist's type of explanation, namely,(1)a human being grows, i. e. becomes larger, since eating and drinking cause the appropriate matter to be added to each part of the body(96C7-D5). Now, if this explanation of "becoming larger" in terms of "coming to be added"(προσγιγνεσθαι)is correct, it must be the case, more basically, that "being larger" is due to "being added" (προσειναι) of extra magnitude : (2) one person is larger than another, because an extra length(e. g. of a head)is added(96D8-E1), and(3)ten is greater than eight because of an extra two being added(96E2-3). However, Socrates could not accept these explanations, nor could he even accept (4) the simplest explanation that the aitia of things' becoming two is the addition or propinquity of one to one(or, for that matter, division of one) (96E7-97B3), and thus finally he abandoned such a method of investigating aitiai(97B5-7). Thus we can see that Socrates(Plato) is examining the conception of aitia stated in(1) , simply by shifting to more and more basic levels of thought, (2) (3) and(4), without the slightest "confusion" alleged by critics. All these "puzzles" are resolved seriatim by applying the theory of Forms to each(100B-101D). However, various objections to this method have been raised by scholars : the theory is wholly uninformative(Shorey, Vlastos, Crombie, Gallop) ; contrary to our expectation of an explanation of the coming-to-be of concrete things rather than the acquisition of attribures by already existing things, we actually find that the theory is concerned only with the latter(Hack forth, Gallop). Defending the theory of Forms against these and other objections, the present writer argues why only Forms should have the full status of aitiai of "being", and that the theory thereby offers a firm foundation for a correct understanding of the problem of "coming-to-be", even though the theory is not a wholly adequate explanation for the alteration implied in the concept of becoming, as Aristotle pointed out(De Gen. et Corr. B9, Metaph. A9). While it admittedly leaves several points for future discussions including the point cited above, the Phaedo passage of 95E through 101D can and must be regarded as laying a solid foundation for Plato's later natural philosophy and cosmology as fully developed in the Timaeus and Laws Book X, which, with Psyche(the source of all motion and alteration in the universe)and Forms(the principle of(meaning) and(value) )as its most basic factors, undoubtedly incorporates a view of nature that we need today.

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This paper proposes a new interpretation of "the Socratic Paradox", the doctrine that no one does evil things voluntarily and those who do evil things do so through ignorance. To understand the significance of this doctrine, we should first look into the confusion over Socrates' comments on the doctrine and related problems. Socrates asserts the Socratic Paradox many times in Plato's early dialogues, but when we look at the texts carefully, we find out that his comments are frequently not very consistent with the Socratic Paradox. 1, The Socratic Paradox needs as its prerequisite a very special psychology that denies the existence of good independent desires. Once the existence of good independent desires is admitted it is quite difficult to reject the possibility of akrasia which the Socratic Paradox never admits. However, in the Gorgias, though Socrates strongly maintains the Socratic Paradox, it clearly seems at the same time that he admits the existence of good independent desires. Some scholars maintain that this inconsistency is only apparent and deny that he truly admits the existence of good independent desires. However, their interpretations cannot be squared with Socrates' comments at 503c-d, where he clearly admits that a good person who knows what is good does have bad desires. Socrates also admits the existence of good independent desires in many passages, in almost all of Plato's early dialogues which express Socrates' desire for beautiful persons. When we consider these passages carefully, it is difficult to assume that he considers this desire of his as anything other than a good independent desire. 2, At Gorgias 474b, Socrates seems to clearly declare that he can construct for anyone an elenchtical argument that would truly convince the listener of the logic of his comments on justice. However, at Gorgias 525b-c Socrates also speaks in a way that clearly indicates that some very wicked persons can not be rehabilitated. In that passage, Socrates indicates that even gods cannot rehabilitate some persons. But what gods cannot do, human beings can never do. This can hardly be explained unless we assume that he admits the existence of good independent desires. 3, At Gorgias 488a and Apology 37a, Socrates says that he never does evil things voluntarily, but it is clear in these passages that he says this not because he thinks that no one does evil things voluntarily. It is also clear that in these passages he contrasts his way of life with those of other people. From his comments and context, it is hard to determine whether he assumes the Socratic Paradox. One might protest that at Apology 37a he only says he never does injustice voluntarily because he knows injustice is evil, while many people do not know that injustice is evil. However, in the Apology, Socrates' use of the phrase "to do injustice" is almost the same as "to harm others" and he asserts that to understand that harming others is evil is very easy(25a). So it is not easy to understand why Socrates, who maintains the Socratic Paradox, says at Apology 37a that he never commits injustice voluntarily. I propose a new interpretation of the Socratic Paradox to clarify this confusion. I think the language used in Socrates' elenchtical arguments does not describe a given fact, but is rather a kind of speech act. When we are asked "You desire happiness, so you desire only what you think to be good, don't you?", we are apt to answer "Yes". When we say this(not just "We will(or should)desire good things" but "We do desire good things"), the response does not describe a fact, but is rather a speech act with which we determine how to live. It seems clear that this kind of language is at work when Socrates obtains agreement from those he argues with that they desire good. So, since he must construct his

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How are the following three propositions related to each other in the Phaedo? A Something is beautiful. B Something has(echei)beauty(immanent form or character). C Something participates in (metechei) beauty (transcendental Form). Some scholars(e. g. Vlastos, Fujisawa)identify A with B and consider C is the cause(reason) (aitia)of both A and B, but in my view this interpretation is open to further discussion. Plato does not identify A with B, but rather thinks B may also be the cause of A. This paper further considers this point. If anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is so only because (dioti) it participates in that beauty(100c4-6). This sentence suggests that C is merely the cause(dioti)of A, and in the following passages of the Phaedo it is never said that B is caused by C. Simmias overtops Socrates because (hoti) Socrates has smallness in relation to Simmias' largeness(102c2-5). "Simmias overtops Socrates" is similar to "Socrates is smaller than Simmias" and "smallness" is immanent form. If so, the import of this sentence is that B is also entitled to be the cause(hoti)of C. In this respect, the next sentence is important. Nothing else makes a thing beautiful except beauty itself, whether by its presence or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be(100d4-6). The meaning of the word "presence(parousia)" is close to "echein" and "communion(koinonia)" to "'metechein". Of course the immanent form (beauty)does not appear clearly in this sentence, but the ambigious expression "whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be" alludes to it. If this understanding is correct, the role of this sentence is to suggest that A can be caused by either B or C. At 103c10f. Socrates introduces some other items, namely, "fire", "snow", "three" etc. The status of these is controversial, but I take them as immanent forms, because at the advance of their opposites, say, "cold", "hot", "even", they get out of the way or perish. Since immanent forms, "largeness", "smallness", are prescribed similarly at 102d5-103a2, "fire", "snow", "three" must be immanent forms(cf. Keyt). At 104d1-7 these items are defined thus : There would be those that compel whatever they occupy to have not only their own form but the form of some opposite as well(d1-3). Anything occupied by the form of three must be not only three but also odd(d5-7). This definition suggests that when something is occupied by "three" (immanent form), it is compelled to have not only "three" but "odd", so that it must be not merely three but odd. That is to say, in these two sentences too, it is suggested that possession of an immanent form causes predication. This becomes more obvious at 105b5-c6. In this passage, "fire", "fever", "one" are immanent forms. And it is clear that their immanence in something is the cause of predication. If the above consideration is correct, we can conclude that in the Phaedo A(predication) is caused either by B (possession of immanent forms) or by C (participation in transcendental Forms), but C is never the cause of B. Why, then, is B introduced in the argument? Is it necessary to Plato's argument? To answer these questions we must consider two points. One is that this argument is subordinate to proof of the immortality of the soul. In the argument soul is parallel to immanent forms. A body lives by the immanence of soul with it(105c9-11). As "three", which brings "odd" to something, can not admit "even" (104e8-10), so soul, which brings life to body , can not admit death, and therefore is immortal(105d3-e9). To prove this, Plato has to introduce B, namely, immanent

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In this paper, I consider the problem of hedonism in Protagoras : for what purpose did Plato present the hedonistic thesis(HT)in this work? Existing interpretations may be divided into two groups. On the one hand, some scholars claim that Socrates and Plato themselves hold HT(Reading A). They argue that it is knowledge as hedonic calculus which explains the real meaning of the Socratic doctrine : virtue is knowledge(VK). On the other hand, some intepreters deny this(Reading B). They insist that the use of HT in denying akrasia does not necessarily imply Socrates' commitment to HT, for the proof of VK at 351b-358d is argumentum ad hominem(i. e. to hedonist). Admittedly, both of these interpretations contain some flaws. Reading A must explain how HT is reconciled with Socrates' denial of HT in other dialogues. The difficulties in Reading B include the following. Protagoras and the many seem to be forced to accept HT, and if so, Reading B collapses, which interprets Socrates' argument as ad hominem. Moreover, if Socrates denies HT, it is insincere to offer a false proposition as a premise for establishing VK. Zeyl(Reading C)intends to compensate for the flaws in Reading B, suggesting that Socrates resorts to the argument based on HT because Protagoras is a hedonist. It is ascertained at 351b3-e7 that Protagoras is a hedonist. So, this argument has great cogency. And Zeyl proposes another argument(Q)which can support the Socratic Paradox(SP)"no one who knows or believes other things are better than those he is doing does them" without presupposing HT. We can divide 351b3sqq. into four arguments : 351b3-e11 (I), 352a1-353b6 (II), 353c1-357e8(III), 358a1-360e5(IV). In my opinion, Reading C also has some flaws. (i)We cannnot easily determine whether Protagoras is a hedonist or not, especially at 351b3-e7(see. 351c1-2, c7-d7, e3-7). (ii)At I, Protagoras rather questions or rejects HT. However, through II and III, we can ascertain that he holds HT at IV. This development of these four arguments is disregarded by Reading C. (iii) If Q has a defect as Zeil admits, ultimately Socrates cannot prove VK without resorting to an argument based on HT. The aim of III is to support SP in order to persuade the many of a certain opinion concerning knowledge : knowledge is the salvation of human life. However, it is Protagoras himself who declares this opinion(II). Therefore, it is not Socrates but Protagoras who must resolve the problem of akrasia. We need not interpret III as argument in which Socrates himself supports SP to establish his doctrine VK. What Plato wants to show in I-IV is that Protagoras, without committing himself to HT which he hesitates to accept, cannot sustain his opinion that knowledge is valuable. At the same time, the knowledge which he acclaims is proved to be a technique of measuring the pleasure and pain of actions. For otherwise, he cannot maintain the rationality of human action. His opinion of knowledge seems to be declared bankrupt by his own assertions. We can now understand the function of SP. SP is a proposition, that will clarify the notion you have about knowledge and good. In Protagoras, Plato asks us what stance we take on SP.

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The frieze of the Siphnian Treasury is famous for its monumental relief sculpture, which summarizes the whole development of the archaic Greek art. This paper presents a new interpretation of the north side of this frieze, representing the Gigantomachy, the fight between the Olympian gods and the giants. Despite the remarkable discovery in 1985 of the numerous inscriptions on the relief surface of the north frieze, which indicate the names of the sculptured gods and giants, several important relief figures remain anonymous. In this paper, we consider the problem of identifying two figures, a female figure at the east end of the frieze and a male at the west end. The scene in the west end : the warrior represented at the far right of the frieze, who fights on the side of the gods, has previously been identified variously as Ares, Briareos(a Titan)or Karneios(a local Spartan god). However, we find the theory by Vian more convincing than these hypotheses. Vian suggested that this figure represents one of the giants who has deserted his side. The episode of the betrayal in the Gigantomachy is known from a hellenistic literary version by Diodorus Siculus, who reveals the name of this cowardly giant, Mousaios. Because of this act, Diodorus says, all giants were destroyed by the Olympian gods. The scene in the east end : on the right of the Hephaistos, two goddesses are represented. Moore reconstructed still another goddess to the right of these figures and regarded these three goodesses as representing Moirai, the goddesses of Fate. However, Moore does not seem to have made a strong case. The two preserved goddesses differ from each other not only in size but also in costume. So the two goddesses most probably belong to different levels of hierarchy : the left smaller figure being perhaps a lesser goddess, while the right one a higher Olympian deity. According to our theory, it is possible that this left smaller figure represents Gaia, goddess of the Earth. Gaia is the mother of the giants and so often appears in scenes representing the Gigantomachy. She is depicted as intervening in the fight asking the Olympian gods not to destroy her children. The representation of the goddess in this frieze seems to correspond to the conventional iconography of Gaia. She holds up the left arm, bent in a right angle at the elbow. In the iconographical tradition of Greek art, this gesture indicates that she is speaking and seems to support our interpretation, because representation of a goddess who is not taking part in the fight between the gods and giants could be no other than Gaia herself. It seems that no serious consideration was previously given to this gesture. There are also several vase paintings from the sixth century B. C. depicting the Gigantomachy, in which Gaia appears. In these examples she is represented as intervening in the fight using almost exactly the same gesture as the figure in the Siphnian frieze. If this interpretation is accepted, the next question should be as following : what is the Gaia in this frieze saying, and to whom? A parallel example should help us to solve this problem. The vase painting of the slaughter of Troilos by Achilleus on the famous Frangois vase from the sixth century B. C. provides an appropriate parallel. On this vase, the successive events are depicted in one picture, demonstrating the development of the story. The left part of the vase painting represents the beginning of the story(the warning to Troilos by Apollon) , in the center the main scene(the slaughter of Troilos by Achilleus)and on the right, the end of the story(the father king, Priamos, hears about the catastrophe). It seems that the same narration system with a three-part composition was also adopted in the Gigantomachy frieze of the Siphnian Treasury. The goddess Gaia was, like Apollon, known to the ancient Greeks for her predictions. The Gaia in our frieze also seems, like the

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According to the Athenaion Politeia, Athenian citizens were obliged to serve as a public arbitrator(διαιτητη&b.sigmav; pl. διαιτηται) for a year at the age of 60. They co-operated with the Forty, received cases from the Forty and tried to settle disputes. The public arbitrator was able to give verdict, although this verdict was not binding. If the issue could not be settled at public arbitration, then the dispute was referred to the law courts(Ath. Pol. 53). During the fourth century B. C, these public arbitrators were active in the legal field in Athens. Since the 19th century, there have been many studies of various aspects of the public arbitrator, for example, the procedures for public arbitration hearings, the institutional relation between the public arbitrator and the Forty, the type of suits that the public arbitrator handled, the date and the purpose of the establishment of the public arbitrator, the function of public arbitration, and so on. As a result, there is general agreement on these aspects of public arbitration among scholars. However, what seems to be lacking is a study of the Athenian public arbitration from the perspective of disputants, who actually appeared before public arbitrators. In this paper, I attempt to show the significance of public arbitration for the disputants, firstly by examining how the speakers describe arbitration hearings in the Attic orations, then by considering the function of this institution in the context of the Athenian legal system. (1)There are not many references to the public arbitration in the Attic orations. In these references, some common features can be found : when a speaker refers to public arbitration, he almost always attacks the conduct of his opponent at the arbitration, especially the failure of his opponent to prove something. I think that these descriptions of public arbitration imply how important and tense public arbitration was for disputants, who fought with their opponents to establish their claims before the public arbitrator. (2)Some scholars have thought that the public arbitrator did not contribute much to the settlement of disputes, because his verdict was not final. However, I think this feature of the public arbitrator should be interpreted more positively. It has been correctly pointed out that the Athenian legal system was adversarial. In this kind of legal system, there always seems to be a need for a disputant to measure the relative absolute relationship between him and his opponent and to decide whether to pursue the suit or retreat. In Athens, public arbitration filled this need.

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Though ethnonyms for identifying people were multiple in the earlier Ptolemaic era, they declined in the course of time and, to the end, no more than a couple were to be observed in the period under the later Ptolemies : Μακεδων and Περση&b.sigmav;. Its cause might be reasoned as that the recruitment from overseas would have ceased before the third Ptolemy Euergetes, and hence followed less and less need to identify people by ethnicity. Why then were only the two ethnika, Περση&b.sigmav; and Μακεδων, preserved? Here we face a challenge to seek after some clue to the enigma of Περσαι, particularly Περσαι τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;, since these terms still remain obscure and inconsistent. The primary inconsistency is that such people appear well-to-do in documents from Pathyris in the second century B. C, for all that they were specified on their own ethnonymic pretence as such obligors as were detainable for personal execution(αγωγιμοι) as seen in a multitude of συγχωρησει&b.sigmav; from the latest period of the Ptolemies and the succeeding era under the Romans. So we assume with P. W. PESTMAN(Aegyptus 43) such transitions of Περση&b.sigmav; τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav; in four runs as : I. (ca. 330 down to the earlier IIIrdc. B. C): Persians were one of the major elements in the Ptolemaic army. II. (IIIrd c. to ca. 150 B. C): Persian troops receive other non-Hellenic alien soldiers. The ethnonym Περση&b.sigmav; comes to lose its meaning, while the epithet "τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;" may have appeared during this time. III. (ca. 150 to 84 B. C): Pathyrite Περσαι, or Περσαι τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;, flourished. They were mostly garrisoned κληρουχοι, mingled with Hellenic and Egyptic elements, and so often aspirant Egyptians. IV. (ca. 84 B. C. to ca. A. D. 160): The epithet "Περση&b.sigmav; τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;" became fully fictitious, hence in no relation with the military, but with the qualification for bondage. Questionable but also suggestive is the demotic phraseology "Wynn ms n Kmy", the alleged equivalent for "Περση&b.sigmav; τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;", on one point that the "wynn" does not mean Persian but a Greek/Greeks(ionis) , while on the other, "ms n Kmy" revealed that "η επιγονη", utterly mistaken previously, should denote "born of the land(i. e. in Egypt)". As far as "ms n Kmy" concerns, the enchoric hand discerns minutely the local tribes such as Blemmyans, Megabarians, Rempilak and the like, though less against "Mdy/Mty" as well as " Wynn", both naturalized from foreign naming. None of these seem to have a definite category of its own ethnicity, as was the former sometimes the Mede, i. e. a Persian, otherwise a soldier, and the latter properly a Greek or Greeks, but also applied to Περση&b.sigmav;/Περσηαι, most likely confused with the genuine Persians. Leaving, therefore, the ethnic standpoint for the Περση&b.sigmav; τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav;, our concern inclines to those natives aspirant towards the Hellenic level of status. Among Pathyrite as well as Oxyrhynchite Περσαι τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav; we find a lot of hybrid families and double names as well of Hellenic and Egyptian elements. They supposedly provided bilingual services such as cadre in the garrison, notaries(κωμογραμματει&b.sigmav;)and so on. We are tempted to call these aspirants "Helleno-Egyptians", that is, their stock was Egyptian, but their habitude Greek, Περση&b.sigmav; τη&b.sigmav; επιγονη&b.sigmav; was one such as this, of which example was well-known Menches, a notary of Kerkeosiris, whose affiliation was far from Greek against common acceptance, but Egyptian(W. Clarysse, Aegyptus 65). The revision of the

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This paper reexamines an inconsistency considering the fatal spear in the Cephalus-Procris episode in Met. 7 : one of the companions of Cephalus says that the spear flies back spontaneously after hitting the target, whereas it remains stuck in Procris at the ending of the story told by Cephalus. It will be suggested that the inconsistency hints at a transformation of the story as narrated by Cephalus. I have observed three recurrent story patterns in the episode : someone (thing)comes back after being lost(or gone) (P1) ; a rumor is believed before eventually turning out to be false(P2) ; happiness follows a disaster (P3). P1 fails only at the ending, where Procris dies, never to return. This failure of P1 corresponds to the inconsistency about the spear, since its power to fly back after launched exactly matches P1, whereas it did not return when piercing Procris. Why not an ending that would imply a return of Procris, in accord with P1? We note that there is no metamorphosis of a main character in the episode, that the spear is almost identical to Procris with regard to fate (7531, 846) , beauty(679, 730) , and name(Procris<procuris ; cf. Fasti 2.477), and that mirabere(682)is one of the words suggestive of metamorphosis(cf. mirandum 758). Seeing these points, it would not be quite hard to imagine that, the moment Procris dies, her soul enters the spear to give it the miracle power, so that, every time Cephalus launches the spear, it would come back into his hands, as she did in her life. This would have happened, if only Procris had not emitted her soul in the mouth of Cephalus(861) , but into the spear. With this ending by metamorphosis, the inconsistency about the spear would not have occurred, since it obtained its power after she died, but, instead, an eternal, spiritual union of the couple would have been achieved, quite a suitable finish for the story of mutual love (800). Considering P2 and P3, we should note that Cephalus echoes the phrases in the Orithyia story in Bk. 6(esp., 681f.). When Cephalus comments that he was said(dicebar 698)to be happy, he seems to presume that such a rumor is prevalent(cf. also 694), coming from the story told in Bk. 6. He rejects it as untrue with his tragic story, which fits in P2, but, it would be different with the ending by metamorphosis, which implies a kind of bliss for Cephalus as Procris' spear never goes without returning as if to ease his bad conscience, granting pardon for his wrongdoing. This version would match P3, and support the rumor of Cephalus' happy marriage with Procris. Then, we may assume that Cephalus did not speak of the metamorphosis because he intended to deny the rumor about his marriage, and I think this is where the inconsistency arises. What, then, was his motivation? On his arrival at Aegina he was spectabilis hews, which is a reminiscence of what he looked like(496f.), and Procris, when dying, was looking at him as long as possible(dumque aliquid spectare potest, me spectat 860). Then, after she exhales her soul(if exhaled into the spear, there would have been the metamorphosis), that is, at the end of his story, Cephalus appears as lacrimans hews (863). It looks as if, instead of narrating the metamorphosis of Procris, Cephalus himself has transformed from a good-looking hero into a hero in tears. Why, then, in tears? Presumably because it is a mark of great heroes, to Cephalus' eyes. In fact, Cephalus is presenting himself as a great hero like Odysseus or Aeneas, not only in his marital or tragic love as pointed out by Labate and Segal, but also in his story-telling, which takes place at the palace of a king(or queen), whose assistance the hero needs to return home, as in Od. Bks. 8-12 and Aen. Bks. 2-3. It is such an enchanting tale of his own sufferings that causes all listeners to cry. A tragic story like this, which enables Cephalus to play a role of great hero, would have been

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Recently, many books on women in the Roman empire have been published in Italy. They, however, describe only prosopography of the famous women such as mothers, wives, and daughters of commanders, statesmen, and emperors. In this article, I will reconsider one of the most famous women, Livia who was the wife of Augustus. Tacitus emphasized Livia as the diplomatic mother of Tiberius as well as the faithful wife of Augusuts. By analyzing the portraits of Livia, I wish to reinterpret the image which Tacitus provided and to understand how she took part in the politics in the early Principate. I collected and analyzed seventy portraits of Livia, which have survived in Italy and other countries. I can classify these portraits into two main groups by examining the hairstyle as Italian "nodus" or "center-parted". Moreover, I classified them into several sub-groups, by evaluating when they were produced, as follows : Type A. after 38BC when Livia was married with Augustus. Bonn Akademisches Kunstmuseum ; Bologna, Museo Civico ; Paris, Louvre 622 ; Roma, Villa Albani 793 ; Padova, Museo Civico ; Paestum, Museo, Pesaro, Museo Oliveriano 3820 ; Stuttgart, Wurttembergisches Landesmuseum 3 etc. Type B. AD4 when Tiberius was designated the successor of Augustus. Kopenhagen, NyCarlsberg 615 ; Toulouse, Musee Saint-Raymond 3000 ; London, British Museum 1990 ; Hamburg, Kunstmuseum 1967 ; Cadiz, Museo Arqueologico ; Tarragona, Museo Arqueologico etc. Type B^1 and B^2. after AD14 when Augustus was dead. Ephesus, Museo Archeologico ; Cordova, Museo Arqueologico ; Leptis Magna : Volterram Museo Etrusco Guarnacci ; Musei Vaticani Laterano 1812 etc. Type C. Paris, Louvre 29 (Julia Augusta) ; Kopenhagen NyCarlsberg 616. Type D. Roma, Musei Capitolini ; Musei Vaticani sala dei Busti ; Musei Vaticani Laterano 10180. Type E. AD14 or AD19 when the type of "center-part" appeared. Kopenhagen, NyCarlsberg 618 ; Bochum Universtat Museum ; Luxemburg ; Kiel, Kunsthall ; Volterra Museo Etrusco Guarnacci etc. Type F. so called Salus Type, AD22 when Livia fell seriously ill. Pompei, Antiquarium ; Leningrad, Ermitage ; Bochum Universtat Museum. Type E^1. after AD29 when Livia died at 86 years old. Madrid, Museo Arqueologico ; Leptis Magna ; Paris Bibliotheque Nationale ; Atene, National Museum 325 ; Genova, Museo Civico. Type E^2. after AD41 when Livia was deified by Claudius. Kopenhagen, NyCarlsberg 617 ; Parma, Museo Archeologico etc. Type G. Kopenhagen, NyCarlsberg 614; 531; Napoli, Museo Archeologico. And there was another "nodus" type of the Claudian Age : Hague Cameo. As a result, I emphasize two points. Firstly, I can find a strong similarity among the portraits(type B-D)that were produced in abundance from the late Augustan age to the early Tiberian age. So, I say that the politics of the late Augustan age persisted into the early reign of Tiberius. In those days, statues of Livia were shown with those of Tiberius or her children, providing her image as a diplomat. Secondly, why did Claudius set up many statues of Livia? He was born in the famous family "the Claudius", the same family as Livia. He was not adopted into "the Julian", the family of the deified Augustus, although he was a predecessor, Tiberius and Caligula were adopted. Therefore Claudius looked upon Livia as an ancestor of his family and deified her as "Diva". Livia was very important for Claudius giving authority to himself and his family. And he regarded the marriage of Augustus and Livia as an important one, as the fact that the portraits of Livia were made in the old type(the Date of Augusuts)shows. Tacitus and Dio Cassius informed us of Livia's diplomatic efforts to certify Tiberius as the successor to Augustus. According to my research, however, I conclude that emperors made use of the images of Livia to justify their position as Princeps.

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Marcion, a Christian heretic in the second century A. D., is known as a docetist. This is closely related with the widely-accepted assumption that he used a special term, phantasma, with regard to the body of Jesus Christ. Admittedly, there is an exclusive connection between Marcion and the term phantasma. On the one hand, we know nobody else among his contemporaries who referred to the body of Jesus by this term. On the other hand, a number of Early Church Fathers speak of Marcion's phantasma so frequently that it is virtually impossible to deny that he has actually used the term for Jesus Christ. And Tertullian, by far the most important source of information about Marcion/Marcionites, knew two interpretations of phantasma : (a)vision, an noncorporeal entity that can be seen and heard, but cannot be touched ; (b)something comparable to the body of the angels who appeared to Abraham and Lot and associated with them just like normal human beings(cf. Gen 18-19). This juxtaposition of two essentially different interpretations indicates clearly that the term phantasma itself, at least, was not an invention by Tertullian, but a special word actually used by Marcion himself. However, if we investigate Marcion's own texts, i. e. his canon(Evangelium, Apostolicum) and Antitheses, we come to an unexpected conclusion : Nowhere can we find a clearly and directly docetic element in them, as far as reliable textual reconstruction is possible. On the contrary, there are a lot of "nondocetic" passages which show that Jesus undoubtedly had a tangible body(which contradicts the meaning(a) of phantasma ; see below). The word phantasma itself does not appear anywhere apart from Evangelium (Lk)24 : 37. In this verse, according to Tertullian, Marcion's text reads phantasma (cf. also Adamantius/Rufinus) instead of pneuma. But we should not accept this report without qualification. First, it is not a literal quotation. Tertullian may well have employed an anti-Marcionite cliche here, as he often does. Secondly, Jesus' disciples, who think he is a "phantasma", are not praised but scolded by Jesus himself in the following verses. Further, this reading destroys the contextual relation with v. 39, where pneuma is undoubtedly retained in Marcion's text. Last but not the least, this Jesus is the so-called resurrected one, not the proper subject of docetism. For these various reasons, we cannot consider this verse to be sufficient evidence for Marcion's phantasma-docetism. We must conclude, therefore, that neither docetism nor the term phantasma is clearly to be found in Marcion's own texts. To explain this contradiction, we must introduce the perspective of chronological development in Marcion : His phantasma-docetism belongs to his "pre-canonical" times. Although the "post-canonical" Marcion did not positively use the term any longer, the polemical cliche against it remained in use on the side of the orthodox church. As regards the two meanings of phantasma attested in Tertullian(see above), (a)must certainly be older than(b). (b)appears to be an alternative, ad hoc explanation given by the post-canonical Marcion or more probably Marcionites, who wanted to remove the discrepancy between their canon and the phantasma-docetism. in the meaning(a). A relationship in the reverse order, i. e. a development from(b)to(a), is hardly imaginable. As a matter of course, it does not necessarily mean that(a)was the original meaning in which Marcion used the term phantasma. This remains an open to debate. Our argument is based on the assumption of a critical change in Marcion. "Critical change" does not mean here a conversion from one definite, ready-made system of belief to another. Rather, it is creation of a new paradigm, which is usually preceded by a long, chaotic period of preparation. There is no doubt that the pre-canonical

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The Life and Miracles of St. Thecle is the one of the monumental works of the community of Thecle shrine near the Seleucia in Cilicia. This work was written by an anonymous writer about the middle of the fifth century. The first part of the story is a recount of the apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecle in the second century, and the second part is the Miracles. The Miracles is a collection of the miracles Thecle performed in her sanctuary and in the neighboring cities and villages. It is an important document recording the daily life in this area in the fifth century. Although a variety of characters is documented in Miracles, I examined the women's activities in it. Thecle's stories are distinguished from other saints' stories by the women's activities. The apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecle admires the independence of the heroine Thecle, and despite the condemnation by Tertulian, her Acts circulated throughout the Mediterranean world. Many people believed that this Acts was based on the true Apostle tradition, and it gave women an assurance of free choice in the religious sphere. The documents of Miracles allow us to examine whether this account of women's activities was based on social reality or not. According to the Miracles, a male priesthood existed in this community, but its authority was not so strong. Dexianos, the male leader of the priesthood, confronted the strong opposition of the revelation of Thecle related through the mouths of virgins sleeping at her shrine. This direct appearance of Thecle to the women believers suppressed the clergymen, who wanted to control the sacred acts as the only agents of the supernatural power. Due to this direct contact, Thecle was fond of women first. Men's priesthood and bureaucratic organizations were developed in the military and economic affairs, but they had never obtained dominant power in this female sanctuary. Women in the community were not limited in a narrow circle of virgin girls who often fall in trance. The women listed in chapter 44 were adult women and had leadership in the community. Xenarchis was a married woman, but because of her fondness for a celibate life, she decided to enter the community of the Thecle cult. She did not know how to read, but suddenly was able to read. The women surrounding her were astonished by this miracle. In this story, we found the existence of a female association for mutual education. A woman in chapter 20 complained of her husband's adultery to Thecle, and remarried here. Another poor woman carried on her metalwork job at the shrine after a fight with her family. In chapter 21, Thecle protected bridal furniture from a thief. In the Thecle shrine, even child bearing was guarded. An Isaurian lady had a baby here, and he, the baby, grew up to make an important contribution to the community. These accounts give the testimony that Thecle was not only the Christianizing virgin goddess, but also the protector of women in daily life. She was not an enclosed, purified, obedient nun as the ideal of the Church Fathers, but an active and independent woman struggling for herself. So, many women expected her to help them obtain freedom from social impositions. The cult of Thecle might have given them asylum and responded to their expectations.

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