The telos of the menis is not, as is generally assumed, Achilles' reconciliation with Priam, but the death of Achilles and the fall of Troy The menis, which, personified by the adjective 'oulomenen' (1 2), seems to have a kind of life of its own, does not cease bringing about the desastrous results even after the reconciliation in Book 24 The death of Achilles is foreshadowed by many prophesies and especially by the death and funeral of Patroclus, which obviously are modelled on those of Achilles, in the same way the fall of Troy is anticipated by the death of Hector who alone protected the city These two events, besides the fulfilment of Zeus' promise to Thetis, are implied by the Dios boule in the proem Also in Virgil's Aeneid and in the Odyssey (where the hero's home-coming reaches the telos only when he has appeased Poseidon), the telos of the theme is realized later than the time frame of the poem This interpretation is confirmed by the basic structure of the Iliad Just as Hector is made the sole defender of the city, so Achilles becomes the sole protector of the Achacans, with the consequence that the two heroes inevitably come to a deadly confrontation Hector at first fights with Patroclus, Achilles' substitute (cf 16 838 ff), then with Achilles himself, and his death not only seals the fate of Troy but also completes the destiny of Achilles (cf 18 95 f) The interlocking of their destinies is emphasized by the fact that they fall alike into ate and bring ruin on their countrymen, and finally, fully aware of their own ate and fate, endeavour to win honour Further, Achilles' turning back from the front after the opponent's death in Book 22, though he has been told by Thetis that his death must come immediately after that of Hector, keeps the audience in suspense for the fulfilment of the prophesy, until the poem ends with the impression that both the death of Achilles and the fall of Troy occur almost simultaneously in the reopened battle after Hector's burial This impression is strengthened by the truce of twelve days Thus the two events, which seem to have been narrated separately in the tradition, are placed in the immediate future beyond the end of the poem and made the telos of the menis. In the epic tradition before the Iliad, it was Odysseus' ruse of the wooden horse that destroyed Troy It is against this background that Achilles has become the sacker of Troy Giving priority to Achilles' bie over Odysseus' metis, the poet nevertheless has respect for tradition. e g. Odysseus too is ptohporthos in the Iliad He appears, however, to assert that Achilles, by killing the sole defender of Troy, had virtually destroyed the city before the wooden horse gave it the coup de grace The implication of 'the sacker of the city' can be contextually evoked in the passages where the name of Achilles is accompanied by this epithet (15 70-7, 21 544-550, 24. 108 etc) In the age of Homer a poet is praised for telling his story 'truthfully' as well as 'kata kosmon' and 'kata moiran' (cf. Od 8 489 ff, 496) In the Iliad the poet, while adapting his story to the changes of the society, tells it more 'truthfully' by identifying Achilles with 'the sacker of the city', and more 'kata kosmon' and 'kata moiran' by making the fates of Achilles and Troy the telos of his theme In such a reinterpretation and refinement of traditional stories is to be sought the originality of Homer

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There are two primary arguments concerning the purpose of dokimasia in the fifth and fourth century B. C Athens. Dokimasia was the process that all officials underwent before assumption of office. These officials were scrutinized by a jury to determine whether they were to be elected or chosen by lot In one argument, J W Headlam in 1891 asserted that the dokimasia was an institution to review only the official's legal qualification both as a citizen and for office. The second argument by G Adeleye refutes the above by stating that the dokimasia was primarily concerned with the candidate's loyalty to democracy and moral probity and not just a simple review of his legal qualifications. This paper attempts to determine which of the following was the actual process of dokimasia (1) was the moral probity of life taken into consideration during the dokimasia apart from a legal review? or (2) was loyalty for democracy considered along with the candidate's legal qualifications? On the first point, the candidates could not be eliminated from office just because of his immorality, since in classical Athens immoral deeds lead to atimia, i e, the loss of legal status of a citizen, which automatically eliminated him from office It seems evident that after the events of the Thirty (403 B C.) critical examination of the candidate's loyalty to democracy was necessary in addition to a review of his legal qualifications to protect democracy It can be concluded thatthe dokimasia succeeded in weeding out unqualified candidates through the examination of both moral and legal qualifications and therefore provided officials that were loyal to democracy

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Orestes slays Aegisthus at the sacrificial ceremony by taking his victim unaware As the messenger's report continues, it becomes apparent that because of the manner in which Orestes had his revenge it is far from a heroic act Yet at the same time the messenger's report is replete with images that suggest a heroic world images such as swordmanship and Olympic games These images represent the code of heroism which Orestes should have followed, and ironically, juxtaposed as they are with the tyranny of his aet, they bring out in full relief Orestes' transgression from this code This ironic juxtaposition is not meant to criticize the unheroic nature of Orestes' character, as Arnott would have it Rather, it is an attempt on Euripides part to underscore the fact that the heroic context for vengeance has been lost In the play, the background situation for the revenge is such that the act itself can no longer be regarded as a great act of heroism reinstating justice (δικη) throughout the whole πολιζ. This loss of the heroism in the background context of the revenge can be clearly seen in a comparison of the scene with that of Aeschylus' Choephoroi (1) In Electra the antagonists are not large figures but are seen in complete isolation from the citizen-life of πολιζ Aegisthus' attendants are not citizens of Argos but are house slaves Clytaemnestra fears aspersion on her morality and lives an exotic life only with Phrygian slave-women (2) The action in Euripides' play is at a distance from πολιζ, whereas Aeschylus centers the action of his play in the heart of political power Aeschylus' Orestes marches into the palace, while Euripides' Orestes is ushered into a farm-house in the countryside, led there hand in hand by the very man he will eventually slay Once Orestes has completed his revenge in Aeschylus' play, he addresses the citizens in apology for his deed Euripides' Orestes, however, shakes his javelin "with courage" ανδρειαζ δ' υπο (845) against Aegisthus' slaves who earlier were scorned (632-633) After they recognize him, they surround him with praise and crown him This last point culminates the irony of the scene Orestes has called his revenge "the crown" στεφανον(614) Eventually he gets his crown, but it is the crown of slaves Having lost the heroic context for revenge, Orestes is no match for the legendary heroes of the past, heroes he nevertheless believes he has imitated. The poet's overall stance towards the protagonists, however, is neither critical nor cynical Rather, as he observes them grappling with their impossible situations, he seems to be sympathetic This sympathetic view is suggested in the noteworthy change that takes place in the attitude of the gods as presented in the play. Moved by the lament of the protagonists, Dioscuri say, "Sad is your plaint to hear For in me and the gods of the heaven, there is pity for the many hardships of mortals" (1327-1330) Apollo is, of course, included among "the gods of heaven" And he is present in this play, as a statue on the stage He keeps silent, but he has seen every detail of the act His silent observation of the protagonists is much the same as that of the audience In Apollo's pity one can see a reflection of the sympathy the audience and the poet feel for the protagonists

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In a well-known paper, 'A Fallacy in Plato's Republic''(1963), David Sachs attempted a critical examination of the central argument of Plato's Republic to the effect that its conclusions which establish the relationship between justice and happiness are irrelevant to the original challenge of Socrates' interlocutors because Plato failed to link the Platonic conception of justice with its vulgar conception My object in this paper is to investigate Sachs' contention and responses aroused by it in order to go a step further in the elucidation of Plato's argument Now, many scholars had recourse to various passages which he scattered in the Republic in order to analyze Platonic justice and to relate it to vulgar justice But I think that by doing so they failed to get to the heart of the matter and rather ended in backing up Sachs' claim It was presumably G. Vlastos that contributed most to the solution of the problem raised by Sachs, because he succeeded in locating at 441 CE an explicit argument for bridging the gap between those two conceptions of justice. However, Vlastos thought that Plato's demonstration was in fact a failure due to his lack of clear understanding of the equivocal nature of "just" Plato did not notice that it can be used as a relational predicate (just_1) as well as a one-place predicate (just_2) Against Vlastos, I consider it unlikely that Plato did not notice the equivocal nature of justice, because at 443 CD "just_1" and "just_2" are clearly distinguished from each other Now, in response to Vlastos, two suggestions have been made One is to interpret the argument at 441 CE on the basis of 443 CD and to regard τα αυτου πραττων (441 E 2) as "just_2", which is to give up Sachs' problem (S H. Aronson, T. Irwin). However, this interpretation conflicts with the context in which the two senses of justice are distinguished from each other (441C-443 D) The other is to read "interstates relations" into 441 CE and thereby to introduce a new proposition the state is "just_1" if its members are "just_1"(L. Galis) But this defence not only requires consideiable modifications of the argument of 441 CE, as Vlastos pointed out, it must also presuppose a clear idea of a "community" of states in spite of its absense in the Republic, because "τα αυτου πραττειν" of any part implies its contribution to the whole A clue to the solution of the problem raised by Vlastos can be found in 434 E-435 A, where I take Plato to be announcing what steps he is going to take in the following argument By comparing it with the subsequent passages (esp with 442 DE in respect of its locution) we can find that the argument at 441 CE is only provisional, to be confirmed later by testing it We also have to keep in mind the fact that Socrates and his interlocutors share the common understanding that δικαιοζ is τα αυτουπρο πραττων: not only has it been assumed by Socrates' interlocutors from the very beginning when they challenged him to prove that justice pays, but Socrates himself accepts and makes use of it at 433 AB Then, if this common understanding is in full play in the provisional argument of 441 CE, "τα αυτου πραττων" can be easily supplied at the end of the argument as its plausible consequence to be later tested and verified This means that δικαιοζ at 441 E1 is intended by Plato to carry both of its two senses, "just_1" and "just_2". On the other hand, Plato's theory of the tripartite soul expressed at 435 B-441 C makes it clear that unjust acts come from the two lower parts of the soul, and that the just action in principle comes from the rational part's controlling and ruling them (cf 441 E-442 D). Thus, when at 443 B1-2 Plato makes a remark to the effect that someone is vulgarly just because each

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It is our purpose, to reexamine the meaning of the well-known sentence of Aristotle's Poetics, i e, (η μεν γαρ ποιησιζ μαλλον τα καθολου, ηδ' ιστορια τα καθ' εκαστον λεγει>, especially focusing on the relation between τα καθολου and οια αν γενοιτο Because the correspondence of οια αν γενοιτο and τα καθολου is less clear than that of τα γενομενα and τα καθ' εκαστον In this respect we find the lack of his explanation of his technical terminology, especially of to καθολου To reexamine this term, we first confirmed that what has happened and the kind of things that would happen could stand in the analogical relation with the common character of 'happening' In this analogy of the historical world and the poetical world, it becomes problematic, what meaning the term <καθολου> could hold The statements of poetry are rather concrete and particular like historical statements, not abstract and general, though the poet has nothing to describe before his eyes In this meaning we cannot so easily translate the term <καθολου> as 'the universal', because the conception of universality is not yet clear Therefore we have for the present adopted 'some essential meaning of the poetical world' as its translation. With this interpretation both καθολου in ch 9 and ch 17 can become essentially alike. <καθολου> in ch 17 is usually translated as 'a general outline'(L J Potts translates it more carefully as 'a significant and unified outline'), but we want to regard it as the formal cause of the poetical world The formal cause as <το κατα ολου> means in this context some essential meaning of a certain <ολον>. On the other hand the historical statement tells only a mere collection of unrelated facts (Potts), not any unified meaning The Poet can realize the poetical unified world with his highest poetical imagination, and with the interpretative imagination we find out in the given poetical world some essential meaning, which could become generally universal in both worlds, if we can accept the existence of the given poetical world without hesitation and any consciousness of the ontological distinction.

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In the twelfth book of the Aeneid, Aeneas is wounded by an arrow and, brought back to the Trojan camp, healed by Iapyx with Venus' help In creating this episode, Virgil followed the Homeric models, the wounding of Menelaos (Il. 4) and the treatment by Patroclos of Eurypylos' wound (Il 11) He did not borrow motifs from the rescues of Aeneas (Il 5. by Aphrodite and Apollo ; Il 20・by Poseidon) because the acts of gods in these scenes are not in accordance with his usual method of giving the divine interventions natural appearances Venus intervenes 'indigno nati concussa dolove' (Aen 12 411) and 'with mother's care' plucks dittany stalk Similar concern is shown by Achates, Mnestheus and Ascanius, the major characters of the Trojan party, who surround sorrowfully the wounded hero Maternal, filial solicitude and that of comrades toward their leader focuses on Aeneas And in this connection, Iapyx the doctor is no less important. Virgil tells the story of his becoming a doctor, according to which Iapyx chose medical art to save his dying father when Apollo offered him the skills of augury, lyre and arrows. Thus he embodies true pietas and therefore recalls Aeneas' choice of his father rather than wealth on departure from burning Troy, though Virgil did not adopt this version of Aeneas-legend in his epic Iapyx now treats Aeneas in the crisis of the Trojans by his Apollo-given skill. Here also Aeneas benefits from an act of pietas When he recovered from his wound and pain, Aeneas armed himself hurriedly. This time it is Aeneas who shows pietas, for, before going to the battlefield he addresses his son Ascanius and declares that he will protect him and lead him to great rewards In short, Virgil cumulates the acts of pietas around the hero Aeneas in this episode

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This paper attempts to assess the conditions of peasants of imperial estates in Asia Minor from two petitions to the emperors (Aga Bey Koy・KP_<111> 55 : Araguenoi: Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 741-2) and an inscription relating to angareta (JRS 46, 47-8) and other evidence The two petitions complain of oppression, by imperial officials (κολλητιωνεζ, καισαριανοι) and military commanders, and indicate that the peasants were hereditary tenants of the estates Many scholars emphasize the subordinate position of the peasants and maintain that they were de facto bound to the soil. The oppressors, however, were not the officials in charge of the estates, but outsiders, who inflicted on the peasants irregular burdens. And their oppression does not seem to have lasted long For in the petition of Araguenoi, peasants say that all wrongdoing and extortions have ceased elsewhere (it cannot be disregarded as mere flattery), and most complaints against oppression appear in the late 2nd or first half of the 3rd century Moreover, the peasants appealed to the emperors and gained the rescripts acknowledging their claims It was their communal solidarity that enabled them such action Their communities, with headmen, leading groups and perhaps treasuries and religious implements, were developing into well-organized ones, though official titles are not mentioned in our sources, with exceptional cases of κωμαρχ[ηζ] and γεραιοι. Therefore, as to the indigenousness and hereditariness of peasants, it would seem to have been sentimental and social ties that attached them to the estates rather than the administrative pressure, and such indigenousness must have strengthened them communal solidarity. In the document of dispute between two villages relating to angareia, we see the activity of such communities, their representatives insisting on their claims obstinately in front of the imperial officials.

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