In the Aeschylean "Persae", Xerxes is contrasted, in a most simplified way, to Darius, his father. He is a fool, or at least a very thoughtless young man, who, by his reckless attempt to subdue Greece, has endangered the safety of the kingdom, which his predecessors, with Darius at their head, had laborously built up, guided by laudable foresight. The same person, as described by Herodotus in his Histories, can, however, hardly be done away with so easily. That Xerxes was endowed with royal dignity as well as lordly generosity, is well illustrated by episodes in the Histories: he is not inferior to his predecessor in this respect. What separates him from Darius, is the lack of firm mind and resolute will, while these are the very characteristics that principally made out the greatness of Cyrus and Darius. Xerxes was, unlike Cambyses who had a born inclination to insanity, a man of perfect normality. But the two shared the same fate to be heirs to their great predecessors, Xerxes to Darius, Cambyses to Cyrus. Both of them painfully felt their obligations to cope with their predecessors or even to surpass them in merits. However, they lacked the firmness of mind, which was most essential to actualize this ideal; hence their frustration. The way Herodotus presents us Xerxes in VII 187, with description of his physical characteristics, is most impressive and dramatic too, reminding us of the scene in the τειχοσκοπια, where Agamemnon is shown to Priamus by Helen. The lordly figure of the Great King, with his immense host behind him, is really that of a tragic hero, who proudly stands on the summit of happiness, not knowing what fate awaits him at the next moment. Does then Xerxes in fact deserve the name of a tragic hero? Perhaps in the modern, sentimental sense of the word, but surely not in its true sense. The present writer believes that Herodotus was well aware of it. In that he nevertheless dared to stage Xerxes as a tragic hero, one might discover some ironical implications of the author. It is indeed a typical tragic situation that Xerses is placed in. But it seems as if the main concern of the author lies not so much in the fate of Xerxes as in his character itself. Tradition assigns Sophocles, among the tragic poets, the nearest place to our author. It is a pity, however, that no record has been preserved concerning the contact which might have existed between Herodotus and Euripides.

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The above is the beginning of Achilles' answer to the speech of Odysseus, a member of the delegation sent by Agamemnon. It is my intention to examine some essential problems by interpreting these lines, especially the last two lines 312-313. These two lines, though unspecific in expression, reveal Odysseus' cunning technique of persuading Achilles while at the same time 'cheating' Agamemnon. Odysseus, as a member of the delegation, conveys almost verbatim the conditions of reconciliation offered by Agamemnon. Nevertheless, concealing Agamemnon's acknowledgement of his own 'blindness of mind' and his intention to make Achilles yield to his power as overlord, Odysseus extends the request for Achilles to return in order to secure 'the safety of all the Achaeans' an axiom, so to speak, common to Achilles and to Agamemnon. Furthermore, Odysseus adds a few other tempting and encouraging words. The warrior-hero, Achilles, angered by Agamemnon, had retired from the battle-field. From the warrior's standpoint, the bestowing of honour should be proportionate to his achievements on the field of battle. Achilles' anger and retirement were caused by the violation of this fundamental rule, and, moreover, by his having been deprived of the girl, Briseis, who had belonged to him. Hearing the speech of Odysseus, Achilles conceived that Agamemnon had 'cheated' him and now intended to 'cheat' again. But, in fact, Agamemnon had no intention of 'cheating'. The subordination of warrior-heroes to the power of the overlord was considered by him to be quite proper. If so, whence arose this discrepancy in their conceptions? Although it is true that the personal excellence of a warrior-hero such as Achilles afforded his side constant advantage over the foe, this in itself was not sufficient to sack the firm citadel of Troy. On the other hand, although the power of an overlord such as Agamemnon was, of course, necessary to organize the allied forces of the Achaeans, it could do nothing more. That is to say, there was a basic need to change the whole method and strategy of conducting the war. Nevertheless, no improvements were made in the armaments nor in the organization or strategy of the armed forces. Here we can find the reason why the two heroes persisted in maintaining their widely divergent opinions. (In this examination of the above problems I have purposely not mentioned the story of the wooden horse.)

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This paper deals with the morphological problem of words in -συνη (-συνο&b.sigmav;) and with the etymology of this suffix. The words specifically treated are παλαισμοσυνη, δρησμοσυνη, ιπποσυνη, δεσποσυνο&b.sigmav;, χρημοσυνη, χρημοσυνη, χρησμοσυνη (Hdt.), ιερωσυνηφη, μοσυνη, βασκοσυνη etc. According to Porzig: Satzinhalte p. 223, παλαισμοσυνη is derived directly from παλαιω. The author cannot, however, approve of his statement, but thinks that παλαισμο-συνη is derived from παλαισμα in disregard of the -ατ- stem form (cf. δρηστ-οσυνη: δρηστ-ηρ [or-η&b.sigmav;], βασιλ-ικο&b.sigmav;: βασιλευ&b.sigmav;). (Let the author mention in passing that he doubts the derivational-etymological relation between παλαιω and Παλαιμων [against Frisk: GEW s. v. παλαιω] and suggests that Pindar formed παλαιμονειν from Παλαιμων [not "vom unbelegten Appellativ"] by folk-etymologically connecting this with παλαιω [cf. the relation between Μελικερτη&b.sigmav;-Παλαιμων and the Isthmian games]). Generally speaking, Porzig [Satzinhalte] and Wyss (Die Worter auf -συνη] appear to think that words in -συνη (true if not in all cases) are bound to be derived from "Grundworter" in -ν- stems and suppose or suggest that the "Grund worter" of some of the above-mentioned words are *παλαι(σ) μων, δρησμων, *φημων, *χρημων etc. But these suppositions of suggestions are absolutely unnecessary. According to the present author, the "Grundworter" are *δρησμα (cf. Hesych. δρασματων, though the meaning given by the glossarist is the very opposite of *δρησμα [δρησμοσυνη]) , OR (or φημα Hesych.) (φημοσυνη is not a "befremdliche Bildung [Wyss: Worter p. 64, cf. Schwyzer: Gr. Gr. I p. 529 φημοσυναν(!)]), χρημη etc. ιπποσυνη is not derived from ιπποτη&b.sigmav; and the parallel relation between ιπποσυνη (:ιπποτη&b.sigmav;) and δεσποσυνη (:δεσποτη&b.sigmav;) is rejected, in spite of some influential scholars' opinions (e. g. v. Schwyzer: Gr. Gr. I p. 529). The generally accepted theory (ιερωσυνη<*ιερηφοσυνη) is somewhat doubted. Wyss: Worter p. 49 suggests that χρησμοσυνη (Hdt. IX 33) is derived from *χρησμων and that it means <<die Orakelerteilung>>. But this χρησμοσυνη can hardly be so, judging from the context. Even if it means <<oracle>> or something like that, the derivation *χρησμων is not necessary. The author accepts the meaning <<request>> (v. Powell: Lex. to Hdt. s. v.) and suggests the derivation *χρησμα or *χρησμα (cf. χραομαι, χρηζω). On βασκοσυνη (or *βασκοσυνη? cf. Schwyzer: Gr. Gr. I, p. 263) it is suggested that *βασκ-α-(νο)συνη was changed to βασκ-ο- under the influence of other words in -ο-συνη. It may here be remarked incidentally that Frisk: GEW s. v. βασκανο&b.sigmav; accepts and quotes "Schwyzer 263", altering this for the worse. "Haplologisch fur βασκ(αν)οσυνη" is against the description of Schwyzer: Gr. Gr. I, p. 262 and is not parallel with the other example ib. p. 263. The suffix -συνη is generally connected with Vedic -tvana-. Of the Vedic words in -tvana-, vrsa-tysna-(:vrsan-) and martya-tvana-(:martya-) respectively bear a close resemblance to (e. g.) τεκτο-συνη and(e. g.)δουλο-συνη in the stem form before the suffix. But vrsa-tvana- and martya-tvana- are very likely to have been formed in Vedic (cf. Hopkins: JAOS 17, p. 37 and p. 46). The stem form of all other examples is -i- (five examples, e.g. mahi-tvana-) or -u-(one example, i. e. vasu-tvana-). Apart from such differences, the theory equating -ουνη with -tvana- is based on the improbable assumption that -*τυ- changed to -συ- in Greek sporadically with the result that the precise conditions are uncertain. The examples Schwyzer: Gr. Gr. I, p. 272 gives are along with this suffix, ημισυ&b.sigmav;, πισυρων, πισυρων, οισυη, αισμνητη&b.sigmav; (<αιτυ- ?). Note the difference between this

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If we examine 'Αντιλαβαι in Greek tragedy for form and meaning-Aeschylus has no 'Αντιλαβαι, and in early Sophocles there are a few exceptions-, we can classify them generally into the 4 following forms A, B, C and D. A (Anticipatory 'Αντιλαβαι) occur in 1 or 2 verses near the beginning of a dramatic situation, and serve to awaken the audience suddenly to a movement of the plot, which develops from there on. E. g. Sophocles, Oedipus T. 1120, Electra 1209; Euripides, Hippolytos 310, Phoenissae 896-897. B (Completory 'Αντιλαβαι) occur in a number of verses at the end of a situation and serve to complete the scene, heightening the dramatic excitement of the situation. The usual order of verse-types is: rhesis-stichomythia-'Αντιλαβαι-rhesis (a number of verses)-lyric (stasimon, kommos, μελο&b.sigmav; απο σκηνη&b.sigmav;, deus ex machina). E. g. Sophocles, Oedipus T. 1173-1176, Electra, 1220-1226; Euripides, Alcestis, 390-391, Iphigenia Aul. 1459-1460, 1464-1466. These two forms, A and B, frequently appear in both tragic poets throughout their careers. C (Tetrametric 'Αντιλαβαι: Logical 'Αντιλαβαι) are characteristic of Euripides' later works and are used in many verses to differentiate clearly one section from the preceeding and succeeding parts. E. g. Euripides, Ion 530-562, Orestes 774-798. D (Composite 'Αντιλαβαι: Vivid 'Αντιλαβαι) are characteristic of later Sophocles and occur sporadically throughout a situation, mixed with various verse-forms: rhesis, stichomythia, distichomythia and lyric. This form serves to portray excited movement in the characters. E. g. Sophocles, Philoctetes 1218-1313, Oedipus C. 800-886. Furthermore, 'Αντιλαβαι occur in later Sophoclean dramas (Philoctetes, Oedipus C.)from prologue throughout each episode up to the exodus, appearing at decisive points in the drama. Making skilful use of forms A, B and D, the poet stimulates the anticipation of the audience, heightening the excitement of the scene, and describing vividly the feelings of the characters. If we compare 'Αντιλαβαι C and D characteristic of the poets in their old age, it becomes clear what each poet was trying to accomplish with this verse-form. Sophocles was aiming at a vivid description of human emotions; Euripides wished to emphasize the clearly logical composition of the plot. At this point too, we can say that Sophocles is ethical and dramatic, Euripides logical and rhetorical. The forms are deliberately used by Sophocles in his later works with full awareness of their dramatic function, while Euripides, on the other hand, does not necessarily use 'Αντιλαβαι in important scenes. We can therefore conclude that 'Αντιλαβαι are a splendid dramatic technique in Sophocles.

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The structure of the Archaeologia is a product of three preconceived ideas of Thucydides'; namely, his conception of power, his conception of cyclic history and his conception of proof. 1. Conception of Power: the power of a state consists of four elements; stability (A), unification of city-states (B), seapower (C) and wealth (D). In the Archaeologia each element is surveyed in turn. 2. Conception of Cyclic History: Thucydides seems to have thought, at least when he was writing the Archaeologia, that these four elements of power developed successively from (A) to (D) during a certain period, and that after (D) there was a war, and then another cycle. Since he knew that there had been two large wars before the Peloponnesian War (i. e, the Trojan War and the Persian War), he divided the past into three periods marked by the two wars, and believed that each period constituted a cycle. 3. Conception of Proof: Thucydides seems to have thought that he had to prove that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest war of all. He employs a specific form of proof. First he states what he is going to prove (T); then he explains his theme (E); and then finally he states again what he has proved (T). This TET form is only applied to the parts of the Archaeologia where he wanted to prove his case. (E) can further be divided into two parts, X and Y. [table] Thucydides' a priori attitude is apparent in the Archaeologia. His subjective attitude in the structure of the First Book and in the Pentecontaetia has already been discussed by the writer in JCS XIV 1966, pp. 77-85. By tracing the changes and developments in the character of his subjectivity, one can discover the path that Thucydides' thought took for thirty years. Using the results of this study, one may possibly establish the chronological order of his writings.

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My main aim is only to prepare for the interpretation of the Idea of Good. In his famous commentary J. Adam says that the Good is not ουσια in the sense in which the Ideas are ουσιαι, but in a higher sense it is the only true ουσια. I think this is right. And if so, it also may be right to suppose that there are two types of αληθεια. But he says nothing of this, and his notes on αληθεια are very much confused. I dare to suggest that the Idea of Good is the only true αληθεια and the Ideas are αληθεια.

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Very often it is supposed that Aristotle considered the two terms αγαθον and καλον synonymous. But it is a fact that he distinguishes them clearly in some passages. When considered in detail, this question is a rather complicated one and seems to have connections with other philosophically very important quetions. We do not intend here to study the whole problem exhaustively and to propose a complete and perfect explanation of every difficulty. This is impossible since the space at our disposal is too limited and since the writings of Aristotle contain some ambiguities and are far from being completely perfect and clear. Nevertheless we think it worth while to consider the most important places where this question occurs and to try to clarify what aspects of the problem attracted the attention of Aristotle and in what direction he looked for a solution. We may sum up the conclusions very briefly in the following manner; Aristotle, who developed his ethical thought in a clear confrontation with Plato and his Idea of the Good, considered το αγαθον as something which can be achieved or attained and το αγαθον as one of its qualified species i. e. the "bonum honestum". But when he turned to the metaphysical consideration of Unmoved Movers he found no help in this way of distinguishing αγαθον and καλον and was obliged to look for another more appropriate one. The solution he hinted at in the end was very near to the Platonic "participation" both in its wording and in its real content.

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Aristotle's theory of the so-called 'Practical Syllogism' is, though approached from a different point of view in several passages in Eth. Nic., supposed on the whole to be a psychological account of action in accordance with principles, viewed by analogy with the demonstrative syllogism. A deliberate action starts from the desire for a certain object; the intellect deliberates (βολειν) and reasons (λογιζεσθαι) on the images of this, and makes a decision according to 'ορθο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav;.' The Practical Syllogism is considered to be the formalization of the result of this deliberate choice. The major premise of such Practical Syllogism is a universal proposition stating the purpose or principle of action. It is obtained by the intuition of νου&b.sigmav; through επαγγη from particular instances. The author maintains Eth. Nic. VI 11, 1143 ^a35-^b5, one of the most disputed passages in this book, to state this, and maintains especially that 'η ετερα προτασι&b.sigmav;', which is usually supposed to be the minor premise of the Practical Syllogism, indicates the premise of the syllogism arising from induction (ο εξ επαγωγη&b.sigmav; συλλογισμο&b.sigmav;), and the conclusion from this 'other premise' forms the major premise of the Practical Syllogism. The minor premise, on the other hand, is the application of this purpose or principle to real and particular instances, and consequently is a particular proposition, unlike that of the demonstrative syllogism. It is obtained by φρονησι&b.sigmav;, the function of which is to deliberate on the means to the good, the purpose of practice. It is the result of this that we choose and desire, and the proximate cause of action is this desire. The author maintains that the minor premise is a summary form of this process. φρονηι&b.sigmav; is concerned not only with the means but with the end, and is the εξι&b.sigmav; that cannot exist without virtue. Hence the minor premise shows two kinds of relation to the major premise, a means towards an end and an instance of a rule. This is because the Practical Syllogism is the logical expression of the action, the purpose of which, το πρακτον αγαθον, is the whole of the virtuous life, and the means to it is also an action, having itself a value, and is a constituent part of the purpose.

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