The Greek vase-painting is to be at once decorative and narrative. These two fundamental elements of Greek vase-painting, decorativeness and narrativeness, are, however, separate and not easily compatible with each other. Works of vase-painters' great periods-the best black-figure and red-figure of the ripe and late Archaic Period-are therefore not produced until the difficult task, to effect a compromise between these two opposite elements, was achieved. What are then the principles that made this compromise possible, by controlling figures and composition of paintings? In black-figure painting, the head is shown in profile, the trunk in front, legs in profile, one arm and one leg extending forwards and the others backwards. But the form of figures is still rigid and is little varied. Compared with geometric style, the narrativeness is in black-figure painting strengthened and amplified, owing to introduction of running figures and more or less exaggerated motion of arms. It is, we may say, the tectonic principle that dominates here. Black-figure vase-painters are apparently very fond of antithetic (i.e. opposing two persons) composition and also often the so-called three-persons composition. The group of these figures, sometimes with some secondary persons beside themselves constitute the centre of composition. It is again the tectonic principle that rules the composition. It is interesting to note that the technique of black figure also matches with this principle excellently. Exekias marks a limit of black-figure painting. In Exekias, the figures and composition are ruled by the severe tectonic principle, which gives dignity to his art. Sometimes, however, he dares to go beyond this limit and makes some new attempts: in Exekias unlike in other painters' works, the space acquires life and sense of depth and there are more natural and free movements instead of excessive motion of arms, and the composition itself is often asymmetrical. Introduction of a new technique was inevitable, for these new trials by Exekias fully to be developed. The red-figure painter, at least after 500 B.C., was fully aware of the whole possibility of the new technique and established a new style of vase-painting on a new principle. Natural and free movement of figures has now become the main concern of painters. Normally figures move in third dimension (a figure in torsion for example), and the rendering of body suggests certain plasticity. Movement flows through the whole body. The new principle which dominates figures of the new style painting may be called rythmic principle. Compostion of the red-figure painting is normally asymmetrical. The asymmetry, however, does not mean irregularity. There is an order, which is rythm. What makes figures and composition of the red-figure more free and dynamic than those of the black-figure, this we may call rythmic principle. The emotional mood, which usually pervades scenes of the red-figure painting, is probably not alien to this rythmic principle. The principles on which the two main styles of Greek vase-painting were based are both of visual nature. In Classical periods, however, something higher than that, something spiritual, was demanded from the new viewpoint of the art. This demand, we must admit, was beyond the possibility of the vase-painting, perhaps with the only exception of the white-ground vase-painting). It was only natural that the vase-painting had to concede its supreme place in Greek painting to other branches such as the wall-painting.

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Plato often speaks of "seeing the truth" in his dialogues after the middle period, especially in Phaedo, Phaedrus and so on, as well as "seeing the beauty" in Symposium and Phaedrus, and about these concepts he says various things. In doing so, he uses the expression "seeing" instead of "recognizing" or "comprehending". This reminds us of Christian mystics' "seeing God" (visio Dei) or of "seeing the Buddha" in Buddhism. Plato talks in many ways about the conditions necessary to attain the object of "seeing the truth" ; for instance, he enumerates the purification of mind, the emancipation from that which is worldly, or the transcendence above human sensations of pain and pleasure ; and as to what can be desired in consequence of them, he says that a person can be relieved of evils, gain a happy and harmonious state of mind and real virtue, feel life is worth living, be endowed with wings for one's soul, dwell in a beautiful heavenly house, and live together with gods ; that is, he explains both the worldly and the unworldly sense in detail. He says almost nothing, however, as to what the so called "seeing the truth" itself is. Thus, the writer tries to infer, though in a limited degree, what Plato meant and what he wanted to express with the words "seeing the truth", recalling that, for example, Meister Eckhart says the condition of visio Dei is to obtain purity of mind and what is given in consequence of it is exuberant delight.

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If we try a historical survey of Japanese view of life, we find that, at the transition from Heian to Kamakura period, there was a remarkable change in their attitude towards the fragility, instability and helplessness of human life, the change from the emotional to the non-emotional attitude. Hakanashi was the key-word to the former, and Mujo-no to the latter. While Hakanashi is an adjective of strong subjective colour, the other may be called a word of objective nature in the sense that it denotes an ontological principle, so to speak. It will be interesting to observe in this connection what view of life was taken by Greek lyric poets. It is true that they agreed wtih the Japanese in maintaining that life is fragile and helpless. But their attitude to this fundamental fact of life is by no means the same with that of Japanese poets. Early Greek poets, Archilochos in particular, seem to grasp the fact not in an emotional way, but rather objectively and intellectually: their key-word εφηερο&b.sigmav; differs from our Hakanashi in that it expresses the attributes of life in the main objectively. It must be admitted, however, that it is the primary concern of the lyric poet to take a view of life and to express it in an emotional, therefore subjective, way. No wonder that we come across a more subjective view of life in the works of melic poets such as Sappho and Anacreon. And it must be noted here that with these poets the word αμηχανο&b.sigmav; was preferred, as it seems, to εφηερο&b.sigmav; as key-word to their attitude to life. Indeed, αμηχανο&b.sigmav; is a word more appropriate to convey the subjective reaction to life of a poet. In the view of the present writer, it is Semonides of Amorgos who stands at the turning-point from the εφηερο&b.sigmav;- to the αμηχανο&b.sigmav;-view of life. We may trace in his usage of the word εφηερο&b.sigmav;, though not quite clearly, a certain sift of Greek view of life. If we come further down to the choral poets, Simonides and Pindar, we find that curiously the εφηερο&b.sigmav;-view of life gaines again the upper hand of the αμηχανο&b.sigmav;-view of life. It means that the objective attitude to life has regained its dominant place in the Greek view of life. But once gone through the αμηχανο&b.sigmav;-stage, the concept εφηερο&b.sigmav; was no longer the same as that employed by Archilochos. The same word has now assumed a new aspect unknown to early iambic poets. One may say, it was deepened and raised to a higher level by going through a subjective stage represented by the αμηχανο&b.sigmav;-view of life. Nevertheless, the concept εφηερο&b.sigmav; could not ultimately succeed in becoming a so-called metaphysical principle of human life and all existence as well. What happened to our Mujo-no, did not happen to the Greek εφηερο&b.sigmav;. This essential difference between the two, in the opinion of the present writer, results from the peculiar Greek way of approaching the existence (ονγα), including human life.

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Athene's Advice to Telemachus in the First Book of the Odyssey contains the following four points : (a) to demand that the suitors return to their own homes, (b) to let his mother, Penelope, return to her father's home, if she wishes to marry, (c) to visit Pylus and Sparta to get some information about his father; to bear up patiently for a year, if he hears there that his father is still alive, and to let her mother marry, if he hears otherwise, and (d) after these, to devise a plan for killing the suitors. A. Kirchhoff-and most analysts following him-finds fault with these elements of the Advice: (a) and (b) are impossible demands for Telemachus, (c) is a demand without taking the consequence of (a) and (b) into consideration, and (d) is pointless, because the suitors have no reason to stay on in Odysseus' house after Penelope's marriage. He proceeds to say that there can be found no inner relationship among the various pieces of Advice; that on the contrary they are incongruous with one another; and that is why, according to him, this Advice of Athene should be regarded as an interpolation; an interpolation based on the Second Book, neglecting the inner correspondence within the Advice. However, I think that the weakness of this theory lies in the fact that they seek to find the inner consistency only within the Advice. I hold that we may come to a different perspective if we examine the Advice in a broader context taking into consideration the scenes which come before and after the Advice. At the gods' assembly on Olympus, Athene proposes (A) to send forth Hermes to the island of Calypso, informing Calypso of the gods' decision that Odysseus should return home, and Athene herself will go to Ithaca (B1) to encourage Telemachus, so that he may say freely at the meeting to the suitors what he has to say, and (B2) to order Telemachus to visit Pylus and Sparta, so that he may acquire fame. In Ithaca Athene tolds to Telemachus hoping that he may understand her intention (B1) and on his own initiative take decisive action against suitors. Telemachus, however, not only disappoints her, but also says that because of her indecision about her marriage, Penelope should be responsible for the present confusion in his household. So Athene openly asks him to be brave and gives him advice (a), (b), (c) and (d). Now advice (a) is naturally to be fulfilled only after the suitors are accused of their injustice at the meeting, and this is why Athene proposes herself (B1) to encourage Telemachus to tell them at the meeting what he really has in mind. Thus it is safely inferred that Athene's intention in (a) is to let Telemachus accuse the suitors. Her intention in (b) is that if Telemachus thinks her mother is responsible for the situation, Athene tries to show that the injustice of the suitors, the source of all grievances, become truly intolerable. Athene, therefore, does not expect her advice (a) and (b) to be fulfilled immediatly. Hence we need not expect any consistency among (a) , (b) and (c). Athene's intention in (c) is to let Telemachus know the heroic world through experienced old Nestor and Menelaus, his father's mate, who has just returned home, so that he may learn strategem, because unexperienced Telemachus is quite powerless against the suitors, if taking a decisive stand he should fall into hostile relations with them. Athene's suggestion to send Telemachus to secure information about his father is a mere pretext-his journey to Starta is consistent with this pretext; her real intention is to give Telemachus a chance of initiation into manhood. Athene advises him, if he hears Odysseus is dead, to let Penelope marry and (d) to kill the suitors in his house; the suitor's injustice deserves a punishment, even if they will not stay longer at his house after her marriage. It is Telemachus' duty to avenge them now that his

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Thucydides was not only the first scientific historian, but also an artist, who heightened the dramatic effect in his narrative by often using antilogia and contrast. As he described the Peloponnesian War as an antagonism between two different kind of cities, Athens and Sparta, the readers probably were able to understand more easily the harshness and cruelty of the war. The constitutions, education, morals, namely all ways of life, were entirely different in the two cities. And the comparison of the different characters of Athens and Sparta is found in the speeches of the Corinthian envoy (I, 68-71), the Athenian visitor into Sparta (I. 74-78), Archidamos (I. 80-85) and Pericles (I. 140-144, II. 35-46). There Thucydides' arguments of the antilogia and contrast, which may be the influence of the sophists, were most effectively developed. It seems that the speech of the Athenian visitor is an antilogia against the Corinthian envoy and that the speeches of Pericles are the antilogias against Archidamos. Again the speech of Archidamos is an antilogia against the Corinthian envoy. On the other hand, it is the Greek way in literature to treat both antagonists with impartiality and equality. As for the antilogia, it is more dramatic if the arguments of both sides are developed with almost equal power and confidence. But how are the substances of the arguments in the speeches of the Spartan side by Thucydides? The Corinthian envoy accused the Spartans as being leisurely, conservative and old-fashioned, while the Athenians were quick, bold and progressive. Archidamos defenced the character of the Spartans in his speech and praised their thoughtfulness, bravery, discipline, etc. But the concepts of the character of the Spartans in contrast with Athenians in those speeches are found also in the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides (as J. H. Finley showed them in his article "Euripides and Thucydides", Harvard Studies in Cl. Phil. 49). And the analysis of the powers and expected strategies of Athens and Sparta by Archidamos is repeated by Pericles more accurately in his first speeches. It is likely that Thucydides inserted the Athenian view on Sparta and its way of life, which was popular among the Athenian citizens since the ascendancy of democracy and the aggravation of rivalry against Sparta. Therefore, the antilogias of the Spartan side in those speeches were not so confident in comparison with the Athenian side. And Thucydides, the democrat and real Athenian, was peeping out, although Thucydides made an effort to treat Athens and Sparta with impartiality in his History.

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An attempt to "state more clearly what Thucydides' notes might have consisted of", this paper specifically deals with two points: the initial purpose of his chronology καγα θερη και χεμωνα&b.sigmav;, and the numerical notations he could have used for his purpose. Assuming the chronological scheme as coeval with the first page of his notebook, the author tries to suggest that the notes were in a sense close to the technical συγγραφη, contract and covenant, to substantiate the promises of Pericles' strategical forecasts. Pericles' strategy, to be recorded, needed special time-space coordinates, which Thucydides provides by his chronological schematization. With regard to the numerals, the writer in the end concludes, on the base of samples of epigraphical and textual evidences, that the bull-spelling of numerals was the only plausible way Thucydides could have written, the aerophonic system being locally limited and varied from city to city, and the alphabetic system coming into use in Athens, somewhat later than the time at which the History was written.

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1) The Original Structure of the First Book of Thucydides' History There are eight episodes in the first book of Thucydides' History. 1. The Archaeologia, 2. The Corcyrean incident, 3. The Potidaia incident, 4. The First Spartan Assembly, 5. The Pentecontaetia, 6. The Second Assembly at Sparta, 7. Themistocles and Pausanias, 8. The First Periclean Speech. The Archaeologia and the Pentecontaetia are omitted from the present consideration, the former being the introduction and the latter a digression (εκβολη 1.97.2). The remaining six parts can be divided into three parts. The first (A) is 2 and 3, which are related to Athens; the second (B) 4 and 6, which are related to Sparta; the third (C) 7 and 8, which discuss the leaders of Athens and Sparta. Thucydides seems to have conceived that a single historical incident always has two causes behind it. In 2. two speeches are deciding factors; one is rational and the other is emotional, and the Athenian decision (1.44) is rational. 2 and 3 are the two direct causes of the war; the former has the speeches (rational and emotional) and the latter none (Cf.1.56. 2). 4 has four speeches. But, as the first Athenian speech is more likely to be a later insertion (Cf.1.77.6) and Sthenelaidas' speech is merely an emotional decision, it can be considered to have only two speeches; the first, the first Corinthian speech, is emotional, and the second, Archidamos' speech, is rational. 6 has only one speech by a Corinthian and there is no debate (hence its decision is non-rational), and his answer to Archidamos' speech misses Archidamos' arguments point irrationally. The emotional decision of 4 and the emotional argument of 6 produce the emotional decision of the Peloponnesians. 7 has two exemplary figures, the Athenian Themistocles and the Spartan. The former is a naturally rational man and the latter is an emotional man. After the two exemplary figures in 7, a most powerful man, Pericles, makes a rational speech in 8. (A) shows the rational decision of Athens. (B) shows the irrational decision of the Spartans and these (A) and (B) create the beginning of the war at the end of (C). Therefore one may conclude that Thucydides believed in reason and he thought that Athens had it and Sparta did not, and that consequently he must have believed in the victory of Athens when he was writing the original form of the first book and therefore the concluding part (1.144) of the Periclean Speech, which advises the Athenians not to wage war, can be considered as a later insertion. 2) A Note on the Pentecontaetia The Pentecontaetia is severed into two parts at 1.97. The first part deals with what happened in the first three years of the period of 50 years, and the affairs of the remaining 47 years are crammed into the latter part. The first part occupies one third of the Pentecontaetia, and the second the rest. This structure is not, as many have suggested, caused either by the different dates of composition or by the amount of information Thucydides had, but his conception of power. Thucydides' intention in writing the Pentecontaetia was to describe the development of Athenian power from 480 B.C. to 430 B.C. His conception of power governs the structure of the Pentecontaetia. Judging from the first Athenian Speech and from the Funeral Oration, one can see that the Thucydides thought that there were two periods in the course of development of power. The first is the period when the elements of power (i. e. money, wall, unification, sea-power) are established. The second is the period when these established elements are developed. This is the conception which separates the Pentecontaetia into two, and 1.97 functions as a copula between the two. After 1.97, he treats no domestic matters but only the external affairs, because he thought that the development of the Athenian αρχη would be best displayed by the description of

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The contents of this book have long been regarded as a 'theory of propositions', to be naturally placed between the Cat. and the Anal. Pr. -a traditional view originated by the ancient Greek commentators and Boethius, and still presupposed more or less uncritically by most modern scholars. On the other hand, a conventionalism has given currency to 'De Interpretatione' as the title, leaving unsolved the question what 'ερμηνεια' really means; for upon the validity of the definition of 'interpretatio' by Boethius (I.p. 215), though in reality a merely tautological definition, no doubt has been thrown, while the valuable though short and minute suggestion on that point by Waitz (Organon I. pp. 323 sq.) has in fact been neglected. According to the present author our work does not treat of propositions (προτασει&b.sigmav;), of abstract entities, like the Analytics, for the ονομα and ρημα are essentially different from the two οροι that are homogeneous and can easily be represented by alphabetical signs, and we can find nothing of a copula here. Again, instead of a proposition, it is a λογο&b.sigmav;, though of a particular kind, which forms the main subject of our work, and this λογο&b.sigmav; retains such concreteness that it cannot be separated from our ordinary thinking and verbal processes. This way of looking at the λογο&b.sigmav; is precisely shown when it is laid down as an αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (one must think of the phrase 'γνωμην vel δοξαν αποφαινεοθαι'), when it is defined to be a φωνη σηματικη καγα συνθηκην and when 'ο λογο&b.sigmav; λεγων οτι…' is made to correspond strictly to η δαξα η δοξαζονσα οπι…', etc. Besides, 'καγαφασι&b.sigmav;', 'αποφασι&b.sigmav;' and 'αντιφασι&b.sigmav;' ought to be construed with a stress on '-φασι&b.sigmav;'. The peculiar relation of the λογο&b.sigmav; in our work to the πραγμα, or the peculiar extent to which this λογο&b.sigmav; is true, reveals much in this respect, much which is characteristic of the way of thinking and its verbal expression which does not rise above the level of laymen. The relevant points are as follows: (i) The attack against the Megarics in Ch. 9 results substantially in indicating that the power of knowledge corresponding to the αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (though the special αποφανσι&b.sigmav; related to future contingents) can be no επιοτημη since the latter is always true and has only the necessaries for its objects. (ii) Every καγαφασι&b.sigmav; or every αποφαοι&b.sigmav; is is necessarily either true or false and can be neither above nor below that; it is therefore a λογο&b.sigmav; of δοξα or υποληψι&b.sigmav; indeed, but just by being precisely half-true (so to speak), it makes known the πραγμα with the perfection highest possible on this limited and lower epistemological level and with such distinctness as 'either so or not'. (iii) Ch. 11 also, where such an av ripaols plays no role, keeps the same thing in view. The discrimination between the καγα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; and the καθ αυτο does not explicitly lead to a higher-order consideration, e.g. that on the nature of the δοξα and iεπιοτημη, but is performed within the lower range of inquiry, i.e. in the form of an inquiry whether or not a given φασι&b.sigmav; can be regarded as having unity. The recondite question is adapted for beginners of philosophy and something of Aristotle's protreptic intention might be concealed here. Such being the character of the whole contents, the title to be given might be expected to run: 'on Elucidation of realities in laymen's language'; and that is the meaning of 'ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ. But some attestation from other sources is required which may confirm that the term ερμηνεια was in use in at least analogically the same

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The objections to Aristotle's modal syllogistic are of two types, those from the outside of Aristotle's system on the one hand and those relating to the formal inconsistency inside of the system on the other. The two must be distinguished. The former is rather philosophical than logical. The objection of Lukasiewicz is the former. The characteristic feature of the Lukasiewicz system is the rejection of any necessary proposition La and any contingent proposition Ta. Such a curious rejection follows from his protothetical axiom CδpCδNpδq. Although this axiom is equivalent with the ordinary axiom system of classical propositional calculus in two-valued logic, it is not equivalent in modal logic, because δ-axiom contains modal axioms implicitly (the variable functor δ may be substituted by modal functors L, Mand T.), while the ordinary axiom system does not. Therefore, Aristotle's system is one thing and Lukasiewicz' is another. Both systems can be formally consistent respectively. The discrepancy between the two systems is based on the difference in philosophy of modality, not on any logical errors committed by the one or the other. The formal inconsistency of Aristotle's modal syllogistic is found in (1) invalid proof of assertoric-problematic Barbara and others and (2) the contradiction between assertion proof and rejection proof. McCall proposes to remedy the inconsistency by (1) giving up the proof of assertoric-problematic syllogism Barbara and others and adding them to axioms and (2) constructing new rejection axiom system instead of Aristotle's proof by contrasted instances. But McCall's proposal fails to vindicate Aristotle, because the addition of axioms leads to new inconsistency and his rejection system is not equivalent with Aristotle's. Rescher also proposes to clear up Aristotle's difficulty by new interpretation. He interprets modality as status, and insists that the conclusion of apodeicticassertoric syllogism is a necessary result from premises, not general law. But even if modality is status, the difficulty is not solved, and his interpretation of apodeictic-assertoric syllogism cannot be extended to problematic syllogism.

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