In Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus 729 sqq., Oedipus, who has just been shocked at Jocasta's news that Laius was slain at the intersection of three roads (716) , restlessly asks her one question after another for further details of that occurrence. Professor M. Oka, in his Japanese translation of the play(Iwanami Shoten, 1990) , presented the view(with A. Schmitt)that Oedipus asks these questions not because he is seeking the truth, but because he is trying to escape it. Oka contends that Oedipus' evasion of the truth is seen in his restating Jocasta's words "εν τριπλαι&b.sigmav; αμαξιτοι&b.sigmav;" (716) as "προ&b.sigmav; τριπλαι&b.sigmav; αμαξιτοι&b.sigmav;」" (730) , the preposition προ&b.sigmav; being(accoring to Oka) vaguer than εν. The present writer examines and criticizes these contentions as follows. (1) On προ&b.sigmav; with dative at 730. Though προ&b.sigmav; with dative and εν with dative express differently the location of an object differently, there is no example among the Sophoclean usages of προ&b.sigmav; with dative to show that, in regard to the function of identifying a place itself, προ&b.sigmav; at OT. 730 is vaguer than, and as such contrasts with, εν in the way Oka(with S. Berg & D. Clay, and R. D. Dawe) construes it. In that respect προ&b.sigmav; hardly differs from εν (Tr. 371, cf. 423; Aj. 95 ; OC. 10 et al.)or from simple locative dative(OT. 20), and can even be emphatic in identifying definitely the place concerned(OT. 1116, cf. Plato Phdr. 249C). In view of these usages, the contention that Sophocles used προ&b.sigmav; in place of εν at OT. 730 with the intent of showing that Oedipus was evading the truth by expressing the place of Laius' murder more vaguely becomes less credible. (2) On Oedipus escaping from the truth. It is true that Oedipus in 729 sqq. is afraid that he himself was possibly the murderer of Laius, and therefore his rapid successive questions to Jocasta about further details are, as Oka says, motivated by the desire to determine wherther his fears are justified. However, that does not mean that he is trying to evade, or escape from, the truth. In order to prove his own innocence he must bring the truth to light, even if doing so is risky and may have fatal results for him. It would be absurd for anyone to ask questions about a matter in order to evade, and shut his eyes to, the truth of that matter ; rather the only possible way of evading the truth is to refrain from questions. When Oedipus, in the fourth epeisodion, is about to finally face the truth concerning his paternity, he cries at 1170, "And to me dreadful thing to hear ; nevertheless I must hear !". We see in these words his basic attitude to the truth in the scene in 729 sqq. as well : "dreadful as the truth is to know, nevertheless, I must seek to know it". Neither "Oedipus as a fearless truth-seeker" nor "Oedipus as a truth-evader" is the real Oedipus in this Sophoclean tragedy.

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From the time of the Alexandrian scholars down to the present day, it has been argued that Iliad Ω vv. 614-7 should be athetized because these verses seem to impede Achilles' exhortation to Priam to eat. However, some scholars(P. von der Muhll and so forth)defend vv. 614-7 on the grounds that the description of the petrified and lamenting Niobe in these verses corresponds to the mention of Priam's lamentation(vv. 619-20), and that there is an intentional repetition at v. 617 and v. 639. In addition, the following three points should be taken into consideration in defence of vv. 614-7.(1)The image of Niobe in the lonely rocky mountain overlaps with her image in the city where she is surrounded by petrified people(v. 611), her loneliness being stressed as a result, and this emphasis contributes to the persuasiveness of this paradeigma. (2) Achilles' mention of Priam's lamentation(vv. 619-20)plays an important part in the larger context, since it indicates that Achilles' sympathy for Priam's lamentaion has deepened. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that the poet included the description of Niobe's lamentation as a counterpart to Priam's in order to emphasize this change in Achilles' attitude.(3) θεων εκ κηδεα πεσσει (v.617)gives an apt ending to the Niobe-paradeigma, in which misfortune sent by the gods is taken very seriously. Therefore, the Niobe-paradeigma, with vv. 614-7 included, is not only a means of persuading Priam to eat, but also especially appropriate for Achilles to tell this story in the scene where he invites even his enemy, Priam, to eat with him, finding a common destiny in that they suffer misfortune sent from the gods.

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In fr. B7. 3-7(DK)of Parmenides, the goddess urges him not to be forced on the wrong path by habit born of experience, to 'ply an aimless eye and tongue', but to 'judge by logos the much-contested elenchos' spoken by her. The passage apparently suggests that senses and logos are contrasted, and logos here has often been taken to represent reason or reasoning. Closer examination, however, will show that it is a little too rash to make such a contrast. Our chief purpose in this paper is to argue that Parmenides did not use logos in contrast to senses and to suggest a more appropriate reading of logos. To begin with, what is the elenchos which is to be judged by logos? Most modern commentators translate elenchos as 'proof or 'refutation'. However, it is doubtful that elenchos refers to proof or refutation, since no such procedure is mentioned befere fr. 8. Additionally, the ordinary use of elenchos in the early fifth century strongly suggests that it should be taken in a juridical sense of 'test' or 'examination'. This interpretation is supported by imagery characteristic of a court of justice in the poem. The elenchos is a critical examination of the doxa of mortals, whose thought is summarized by the goddess to the effect that 'to be and not to be are the same and not the same'. Now, to turn to the logos in question, it seems impossible for it to mean 'reason' in Parmenides' time, since this is a relatively new meaning of the word. Also, the fact that noos, in the sense of 'mind', 'intellect' or 'reason', is said in fr. 6 to be erroneous, warns us against identifying Parmenides' Logos with reason. It is quite strange that the goddess should urge him to judge her elenchos by such an unreliable human faculty. This consideration excludes the possibility of interpreting logos as 'reasoning', because reasoning is one of the functions of noos. Because of the supposed contrast between logos and senses in fr. 7, interpreters have been misled into taking logos as 'reason' or 'reasoning'. However, when we look more closely at fr. 7, it becomes difficult to sustain such cuntrast and to say like Guthrie that what the goddess is enjoining is not to trust the senses, but instead to judge by reason. This contrast presupposes that both senses and logos deal with the same thing, reality. However, although senses are certainly criticized for their inadequacy in comprehending reality, the object of judgment by logos is the goddess' elenchos rather than whatever is to be recognized as real, and thus the supposed contrast never materializes, contrary to the expectation of many interpreters. Moreover, if logos is viewed as some mental faculty or thinking process inherent in the cognitive subject, what is it that guarantees noos to have an immaculate grasp of eon? Logos or noos as mental faculty or thinking process is unable on its own to attain eon because of its fallible character. The fact that eon is the condition of realizing noein is not enough, and some other thing is needed to help fallible noos attain eon. The logos in question is in the dative, and the dative placed with verbs of judgment generally denoting 'standard of judgment'. Therefore, it is quite natural to take the logos as the standard or criterion of judging the goddess' elenchos. This logos, is objective, fundamental and normative as the standard of judging the elenchos. In fact, it is none other than the words the goddess utters in fr. 2 to show the two possible ways of inquiry : 'is and it is not possible not to be' and 'is not and it is necessary not to be'. It was decided that the latter should be rejected and the former adopted as the point of departure for and the basis of the cognition of Truth. Accordingly, by saying in fr. 7 'judge

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This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the

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At the last stage of the Corinthian war, Anytos, one of the sitophylakes of Athens in 388/7, advised corndealers (sitopolai) to stop striving against each other, because he believed that it would be advantageous to consumers if the corndealers bought grain as cheaply as possible. Complying with the advice of Anytos, a considerable number of corndealers must have bought grain cooperatively. Soon, this caused the repulsion of importers (emporoi). Their collusion seems to have violated a law that no one must buy more than 50 phormoi of grain, so the corndealers were accused. Lysias' oration 22 Against the corndealers', written for an unknown speaker, has produced a difficult question. What caused the accusation against the corndealers? Most scholars have thought that they bought more than 50 phormoi of grain striving for individual monopoly. However, as T. Figueira pointed out, this interpretation has a weakness, when we take into consideration the pattern of grain importation and consumption in Attika. The law forbade anyone or any group in Attika to buy more than 50 phormoi of grain at a time. The purpose of the law was to prevent the wealthy from hoarding more grain than was needed. The corndealers admitted that they contravened the law and bought more than 50 phormoi of grain in cooperation. However, they explained that they acted according to the advice of a sitophlax for the benefit of Athenian citizens. We do not know the result of the case, but it is clear that the plan of Anytos to hold down the price of grain failed.

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In De Anima II 12 and III 1, Aristotle argues that the common sensibles (movement, rest, figure, magnitude and number)are perceived by each special sense only per accidens and they are perceived per se by a common sense. To understand Aristotle's theory of the common sense consistently, however, we must answer the following three questions. The first is whether the common sense is an independent faculty of the special senses or not. This needs consideration , because at the beginning of De Anima III 1 Aristotle denies that there is any sence faculty or any sense organ other than those of five special senses. The common sense is a part of the perceptual faculties of the primary (central) sense organ. Likewise, in the case of the special senses, their perceptions are achieved ultimately in the primary sense organ. Then, the faculty of perception which belongs to the primary sense organ is also contained in the special senses. Accordingly, for the common sense, we don't need any sense organ other than those needed for the special senses. In a way, the special senses as a whole contain the common sense. The second question is as follows : Aristotle thinks all the senses are the faculties receiving sensible forms, but what are the forms of the common sensibles? In De Anima 424a17-b3 and 426a27-b7, Aristotle insists that the sense is some sort of ratio(logos), and the former passage suggests that sensible forms are some type of ratios as well, This suggestion is confirmed by the arguments in De Sensu. Then, it is possible to take the forms of the common sensibles as some type of ratios. The interpretation above enables us to construe the form of magnitude as the external ratio of an extension of some object to the extensions of other objects, and the form of figure as the internal ratio between some parts of the extension of an object. The third question is how we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles to the special senses against G. Berkeley's arguments which deny the commonness of magnitude and of figure to sight and touch. If we regard the forms of the common sensibles not as extentions as such but as some type of ratios, we can defend the commonness. Having identified magnitude with extention, Berkeley puts two points. (1) The visible objects(colour, light)and the tangible objects (solidity, resistance)are entirely different, therefore, there are fundamental differences between the visible magnitude and the tangible magnitude and between the visible figure and the tangible figure. (2) The tangible extension(i. e. magnitude) is invariably the same, but the visible extension(i. e. magnitude)varies as you approach or recede. If we deny the identity of magnitude with extension and consider(with Aristotle)that the magnitude is a sort of ratio, then these two points are clarified. For, first, although the visible extension and the tangible extension is radically different, the ratio of some extension to other extensions can be common to sight and touch. And, secondly, it is true that the visible extension of the same object changes according to its distance, but it is possible that in different perspectives the changing extension refers to the same ratio. Thus, we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles against Berkeley's arguments.

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The arguments about the "libri Punici of King Hiempsal" seem to have entered a new phase with V. J. Matthews' essay. He presents a hypothesis that these books were a part of Carthaginian libraries which were given to the Numidian royal house after the capture of Carthage, and inherited by Hiempsal II. H.-W. Ritter has already criticized this new theory, but his arguments are not very convincing. In this paper, we try to demonstrate, through an analysis of the ideological structure of the so-called "ethnographic" narrative(bell. Jug. 18-19.1) , said to be a summary of the description in the "libri Punici", that the author of the books was Hiempsal II himself or at least a contemporary who shared his political and ideological views. The main grounds for this arguments are as follows : (1) There are various theories concerning the origin of the word 'Numidae'. In the "libri Punici", this ancient author bases his etymologic explanation on the presupposition that 'Numidae' is a Latinized form of the Greek word 'Nomades' ; 'Nomades' is the plural of 'nomas'(roaming). It is well known that the word 'Nomades' became a proper noun for a group of people in Africa after Polybius at the earliest. Therefore, it is most unlikely that the books in question were written before the capture of Carthage, that is before Polybius. (2) In the "ethnographic" narrative we find, an unmistakable tendency of the author to stress the cultural superiority of the newcomers('Medi', 'Persae', 'Armenii')over the natives('Gaetuli', 'Libyes'). The 'Numidae' are a hybrid of the 'Persae' and 'Gaetuli', while the 'Mauri' and a hybrid of the 'Medi', the 'Armenii', and the 'Libyes'. Then, the author begins a type of comparative study of these two hybrid groups, in which he tends to emphasize the merits of the 'Numidae' who preserved their cultural identity in contrast with the 'Mauri' who were degraded by the influence of 'Libyes'. It is remarkable that a passage from Apologia (cap. 24)seems to have exactly the same ideological structure. In that passage, Apuleius mentions Cyrus the Great and thus tries to humilate the Moors hinting that the Numidians are descendants of the Persians, and therefore, the conquerors of the Medes ('Mauri'). All this indicates that the books were written after the unification of the Numidians by Massinissa(c. 193 B.C.) , especially after the Jugurthine War, when the Moors began to form a political unity under Roman protection and thus became a powerful rival of the Numidians. (3) Again in the "ethnographic" narrative, we find that the 'Gaetuli' are thought to be more warlike than the 'Libyes' and, as such, treated with some consideration, barbarous as they are. We know that the Gaetulians became an antagonistic force against the Numidian kings after the Jugurthine War, and Hiempsal II made conciliatory efforts to absorb their leaders into the state apparatus as 'praefecti equitum'. Without doubt such a situation, too, could constitute a strong motive for his writing-or having someone else write-this kind of ethnographic work which asserts the existence of kinship between the Numidians and the Gaetulians.

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Although L. Ross Taylor has produced excellent studies, the organization of tribes, especially in the late Republic, hasn't yet been sufficiently clarified. In this paper, by examining electoral activities of the divisores, who distributed bribes on behalf of candidates, the author attempts to elucidate the personal relationship within the tribe, so that the importance of the tribes in the late Republic will also be illustrated. Using a prosopographical approach, it was determined that the divisores, as generally accepted, were men of influence such as equites Romani, and that the position of the divisores could have been a means of social mobility. Although the divisores assisted candidates in an election campaign, they weren't the candidates' henchmen. They were, rather, professionals of electoral corruption whose sphere of activity was within their own tribes. The importance of the role they played in election campaigns is indicated in an event of 67 B. C. The Senate vigorously opposed a proposal on electoral corruption which stipulated that penalties should be imposed not only on offending candidates, but also on the divisores ; agents of electoral corruption. Thus, the divisores, who acted tribe by tribe, were indispensable to election campaigns, as such, indicates the political importance of the tribes in the late Republic. However, still more significant is the fact that in spite of their importance as demonstrated above, the divisores were pejoratively and even negatively treated. The reason for such treatment is probably that the Roman politicians were eager to get the votes of other tribes through the activities of the divisores, while they also feared losing control as patrons of their own tribes through the very same activities. We conclude that the tribe continued to be important as a unit of patronage in the late Republic.

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Seneca's tragedies, written after the model of Greek ones, show, as a matter of course, many originalities and peculiarities. One of the most important of them is certainly the Stoic elements which permeate his drama. But the problem of 'the extent to which Seneca projected philosophical belief into his tragic writing' still remains and 'will remain', as Coffey-Mayer say, 'an area' to be explored 'for fruitful discussion'. In this paper we take up and examine Senecan persuasion scenes and some peculiarities noted in them to find a clue to this crucial problem of whether Seneca's drama is Stoic or non-Stoic or anti-Stoic. One may safely say that the prime feature or peculiarity of Senecan persuasion scenes is their declamatory character which is typically exhibited in the rhesis of Phaedra's nurse(129-77). We first trace the influence of declamatio upon not only Senecan persuasion scenes, but other components of Seneca's drama(especially its rhetoric), and try to show that such peculiarities of Senecan persuasion scenes as a 'character's sudden change of attitude without motivation'(AG. 307, Pa. 250ff., Thy. 542, etc.), 'stereotyped expository monologues in the so-called affect-drama', and especially the 'agonistic or purely argumentative character of the scene' are also derived from and can be, therefore, explained by the declamatio of those days which was, in a sense, a dramatic activity itself. We then consider the meaning of this last peculiarity, namely the reason why Senecan persuasion scenes are rather dycove? than πειθου&b.sigmav;. We must take other features into consideration to answer this question. The persuasion scene of Seneca has two common features which seem to us very important to understand the intention or attitude of Seneca as a dramatist ; (1) First, no persuasions in a true sense convince the personae dramatis persuaded(Even when they obey, their obedience is not only sudden and abrupt, but also reluctant and unwilling. Their consent, therefore, seems to be a mere device to forward the plot). Seneca's personae indeed never change their real intentions as a result of persuasions, or indeed as a result of anything, that is, by tragic events. Even Phaedra, who appears to oscillate between amor-furor (the anti-Stoic) and ratio (the Stoic) , remains in essense the same throughout the drama(cf, 111 and 1180). There is no persuasion scene in Senecan drama that performs the same kind of dramatic function as those in Sophocle's Antigone or Philoctetes. That is why no persona in Senecan drama says 'οιμοι, εχω μαθων δειλαιο&b.sigmav;' (Ant. 1270) This immutability of personae and the function which Seneca assigned to persuasion scenes suggest that the prime intention or purpose of these scenes is not to depict ηθη nor to dramatize the plot, but to present the antagonism of the two attitudes or Siavotat debated(we can call them the Stoic and the anti-Stoic)and the power and reality of the attitude or Siavoia chosen or held to, the very themes, it seems to us, of Senecan tragedy as drama a theme. This intention of Seneca is closely related to the feature, 'absolutely typical of Seneca', of the concluding scenes, almost all of which also are agonistic, that is, without redemption or λυσι&b.sigmav;. (2) Second, the anti-Stoic wins and dominates over the Stoic. Many critiques take this as indicative of Seneca's intention to present negative exempla. But the greatest obstacle to allowing this view is the case of Oedipus and Hercules in Oed., Phoe., and H. F., both of whom, curiously in the same manner, wish for death, obstinately refusing the protrepticon to the Stoic(virtus...malis ingentibus obstare nee se vertere. Phoe. 190ff) , and even after their acceptance (which is unwilling and negative) of persuasions still indulge

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