The author of the article has been investigating the two doxographical positions within the Ratnagotravibhāga interpretation lineages which developed in the latter diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet, based on the two types of negation in the Mādhyamika logic discourses in relation to emptiness and Buddha-nature. This issue is taken up in the Eighth Si tu Paṇ chen （1699/1700–1777） in his Dri lan nor bu’i me long （DL）. Referring to the tradition of the Kālacakratantra, Si tu Paṇ chen allocates the Logic Tradition’s med dgag to ‘lifeless matter’ （bem stong） and the Meditation Tradition’s ma yin dgag to ‘mirror divination’ （pra phab）. The definition of emptiness is crucial to understand the relationship between the mind and Buddha-nature as exemplified in the Meditation Tradition that carries the doctrine of ‘the Buddhahood of one’s own mind’ （rang sems sangs rgyas 自心仏） taught in the tradition of the Mahāvairocanasūtra dating to the early diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet. DL reflects the surrounding environments in eastern Tibet in the eighteenth century, in which doctrinal confusions occurred in Si tu Paṇ chen’s Karma bKa’ brgyud school to the extent that one member of his school made a request for permission to convert to the dGe lugs on account of its positions on negation. Si tu Paṇ chen points out the two positions held by Tsong kha pa’s disciples regarding negation; mKhas ’grub rje held med dgag, while Gung ru rgyal mtshan bzang po agreed with the rNying ma and bKa’ brgyud position, which resulted in Gung ru’s demotion. In DL, having cancelled his earlier statement made in his Catalogue to the sDe dge bKa’ ’gyur in which he took the Middle Turning of the Wheel of Doctrine as belonging to the category of definitive meaning, Si tu Paṇchen confirms the Third Turning of the Wheel as belonging to the category of definitive meaning for the Karma bKa’ brgyud’s orthodox position, excusing himself that his former position was due to circumstances of the time. Based on scriptures and treatises belonging to the Last Turning of the Wheel, Si tu Paṇchen affirms the existence of the Buddha-nature on the ultimate level. DL proves that in the eighteenth century the rNying ma and bKa’ brgyud shared the same doctrinal position called Great Madhyamaka of Extrinsic Emptiness, based on the Last Turning of the Wheel, in whose tradition the nature of mind （sems nyid） and the Buddha-nature （bde gshegs snying po） have the same meaning. He introduced the nature of mind/Buddha-nature to Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen practices.

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In Chapter XI of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, we find an exploration of the simile of māyā. In particular, the interpretation of kk.15–16, which is considered to explain the structure of the Three natures （tri-svabhāva） theory by the simile of māyā, has been debated in previous studies. Regarding this simile, Tsong kha pa’s Drang nges legs bshad snying po gives Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the simile of māyā from the standpoint of the Mind-Only School. Tsong kha pa explains that what is referred to in kk.15–16 as “like māyā” or “like māyākṛta” is other-powered nature （paratantra-svabhāva）, and that the existence of other-powered nature based on the philosophy of the Mind-Only School is explained by the simile of the māyā. He also explains that the non-existence of the imputational nature （parikalpita-svabhāva） on other-powered nature is the ultimate （paramārtha）, and to understand imputational nature as existing as the ultimate is conventional truth （saṃvṛti-satya）. This interpretation of Tsong kha pa expresses Tsong kha pa’s understanding of other-powered nature. If we can understand the meaning of the simile of māyā in this way, we can understand that what is explained in kk.15–16 is the structure of the Three natures theory, but it is other-powered nature that is likened to māyā, and it can be understood as a simile in which the structure of other-powered nature, and the structure of superimposition （samāropa） and disparagement （apavāda）, are likened to māyā.

In Buddhism, the view that the five aggregates （pañca-skandha, phung po lnga） are “self” （ātman, bdag） or “mine” （ātmīya, bdag gi ba） has been traditionally termed the view of a real body （satkāyadṛṣṭi, ’jig tshogs la lta ba）, and is considered false.

Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa （1357–1419） argues that the dBu ma thal ’gyur ba （*Prāsaṅgika） school has its own theory on how to define this view. In Tibetan, when one considers A to be B, the contents of A and B are expressed as the basis （dmigs pa） and the apprehension aspect （rnam pa） respectively. As mentioned in my earlier article 2023, 29–31, Tsong kha pa asserts that the basis of the view of a real body is “self” or “mine,” and the apprehension aspect is “what is established as truth.”

This study focuses on Tsong kha pa’s discussion of the basis of the view of a real body, and examines the differences between the views of the dBu ma thal ’gyur ba school and those of other schools. Based on these, the characteristics of Tsong kha pa’s perspective on the view of a real body are clarified.

The Udānavargavivaraṇa, a commentary on the Udānavarga, is an important source for understanding how the Udānavarga was received in later periods. This paper focuses on the process of compilation of the Udānavarga, which may provide a clue to the ideological position of the author of its commentary, Prajñāvarman. He presents a biography of Dharmatrāta in the opening part of the Udānavargavivaraṇa, claiming that Dharmatrāta compiled the Udānavarga during the lifetime of the Buddha. He then presents a supposed objection that there may be a “contradiction with the Vaibhāṣika theory” and a response to it. This argument has already been taken up in a preceding study as suggesting that Prajñāvarman was not a Vaibhāṣika, and this paper re-examines this interpretation with reference to parallel passages found in texts related to the Sarvāstivāda. As a result, by considering the “contradiction with the Vaibhāṣika theory” as a question of the compilation period of the Udānavarga, I show that Prajñāvarman can be understood as acknowledging the authority of the Vaibhāṣikas, and that it is not possible to conclude that Prajñāvarman was not a Vaibhāṣika from this discussion alone.

At present, five versions of the Pañcavastuka （classification of dharmas into five categories） exist: four Chinese translations by An Shigao 安世高, Facheng 法成, Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀羅, and Xuanzang 玄奘 and a few fragments of Sanskrit manuscripts. However, the existence of a Tibetan translation has not been confirmed until now. I have now discovered a Tibetan translation of the Pañcavastuka in the Gondhla proto-Kanjur. This paper introduces and analyzes its contents. The five texts of the Pañcavastuka have numerous differences between them. The newly discovered Tibetan translation of the Pañcavastuka corresponds verbatim to the Facheng translation and includes the characteristic contents of that translation, such as space （ākāśa）, four non-defined roots （catur avyākṛta-mūla）, and ascertainment （adhimukti）. Furthermore, the mistranslated passages in Facheng’s translation were similarly mistranslated in this Tibetan translation. Based on the above, it is clear that the Facheng translation of the Pañcavastuka is a Chinese translation from a Tibetan text of the same lineage as the Tibetan translation discovered in this study.

Based on descriptions given in Ratnākaraśānti’s commentary Guṇavatī （Gu）, this paper discusses the “contemplation of Akṣarapaṅkti （garland of syllables）” discussed in the Mahāmāyā-tantra （MMT）.

In Gu, Ratnākaraśānti explains the discussion in MMT on the “contemplation of Akṣarapaṅkti,” quoting the Samāyoga-uttarottaratantra （abbr. SYUUT, chap. 19, vv. 5–6ab）. The “contemplation of Akṣarapaṅkti” in this discussion in SYUUT is related to Vajrasattva as śrī-Heruka, or to Vajradhara. The “contemplation of Akṣarapaṅkti” as discussed in MMT is also related to Vajrasattva.

The Guhyamaṇitilaka consists of five chapters, containing descriptions of the maṇḍalas present in chapters one through three, which follow the contents of the Sarvatathāgatatattvasaṃgraha. However, previous studies have not examined the maṇḍala in the third chapter. Therefore, this paper examines the “Trilokavijaya-maṇḍala” （’Jig rten gsum las rnam par rgyal ba zhes bya ba’i dkyil ’khor） and the “Maṇḍala of Vowels of the Mātṛkās” （Yum rnams kyi dbyangs kyi dkyil ’khor） in the third chapter of the Guhyamaṇitilaka.

It was found that the name and composition of the Buddhas of the former maṇḍala follow that of the Sarvatathāgatatattvasaṃgraha. It should be noted here that in this maṇḍala the central tathāgata is described as Akṣobhya, not Mahāvairocana.

Further, there is no specific description of the various deities to be placed in the latter maṇḍala, although its structure is described in the third chapter. The names of the mātṛkās located in the central tathāgata’s four directions are mentioned in the fourth chapter. However, those names do not appear in scriptures such as the Sarvatathāgatatattvasaṃgraha or other texts.

It is well known that there are differences in the definition of trairūpya theory between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, especially in the third characteristic. Jinendrabuddhi, a commentator on the Pramāṇasamuccaya （PS） and Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti （PSV）, interprets the two texts while adopting Dharmakīrti’s definition in such a way that even Dignāga’s statement does not cause problems.

Jinendrabuddhi, in his Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, explains the word nāstitā as nāstitā-eva and asati as <abhāva>, <anya> and <viruddha> in the phrase nāstitāsati of PS 2.5cd. Thereby, his understanding of PS comes close to Dharmakīrti’s theory of the third characteristic. This assertion that nāstitā of PS has a restriction indicated by eva also applies to nāstitā in the phrase asaty eva nāstitā of PSV. In addition to this, he states that anya in the phrase nānyatra of PSV means “what is different from asat,” not “what is different from sapakṣa.” Furthermore, na viruddha iti indicates that asat is incompatible with nāstitā. Such an interpretation of PSV by Jinendrabuddhi is aimed at refuting Uddyotakara, who criticizes Dignāga’s definition of the third characteristic.

Although Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of Dignāga’s PS and PSV does not correspond to Dignāga’s intention, it is meaningful in that he tries to bridge the gap between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and defends Dignāga against criticisms of Uddyotakara.

Referring to the seventh chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya （AKBh）, I examine the background of the three terms modifying “cultivation” （abhyāsa） appearing in the proof of omniscience in the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā （TSP）. Four types of cultivation are discussed in the part of that chapter dealing with hetusaṃpad. Three of these four appear to form the background to the terms that modify “cultivation” in TSP’s proof of omniscience. While it is unclear whether the remaining type of cultivation refers to the same thing, I found a corresponding section in TSP’s proof.

Following hetusaṃpad, AKBh’s chapter 7 also discusses phalasaṃpad, and in that discussion again touches on the Buddha’s omniscience. TSP’s proof of omniscience is connected to the four types of cultivation.

In light of the above, TSP may have inherited a view of the omniscient similar to that found in AKBh’s discussion of hetusaṃpad and phalasaṃpad.

However, in this paper I was unable to clarify the difference between AKBh’s view of the omniscient and that of logico-epistemological texts by Buddhists other than Kamalaśīla.

Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā was edited by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and published in 1949. This text was prepared on the basis of a manuscript found in the Srī Saṅghavī Pāḍā Bhaṇḍāra in Patan （Pāṭaṇa）, Gujarat, but folios 6, 21, 27, 52, 117, and 178 are missing. Recently, Francesco Sferra （Sferra 2022） found that Manuscript No. 67 of the Hodgson Collection in the Royal Asiatic Society consists of Ratnakirti’s Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa and Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā. Further, taking into account the contributions of Muni Jambuvijaya, Elliot Stern, and Ernst Steinkellner, we have now almost the complete text of the Hetubinduṭīkā. In this article, the author investigates the text which corresponds to folio 52 of the Patan manuscript, by comparing the Sanskrit text presented by Sferra 2022 with that by Muni Jamubivijaya （Jamubuvijaya 1968）.

In Pramāṇavārttika 4.195–204 and Pramāṇaviniścaya 3.34–39, Dharmakīrti attempts to establish a convergence between his own theory of logical reason, which consists of kāryahetu and svabhāvahetu, and Dignāga’s theory of ninefold logical reason. Kṛtakatva and prayatnānantarīyakatva are recognized as correct logical reasons by Dignāga; Dharmakīrti regards the latter as an example of both kāryahetu and svabhāvahetu. When discussing prayatnānantarīyakatva as kāryahetu, Dharmakīrti refutes the permanence and manifestation of sound by Mīmāṃsakas and others. Although this understanding of Dharmakīrti’s arguments has been elucidated by previous research, no examination focuses specifically on commentaries. In particular, Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra by Prajñākaragupta and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā by Dharmottara contain detailed discussions regarding the criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka’s theory. Clarifying these commentaries is crucial for shedding light on the exchange between different schools through the analysis of logical reason, which is a significant component of inference. This paper aims to provide an introductory study of Prajñākaragupta’s analysis of Pramāṇavārttika 4.195–198, while also comparing it with other commentaries.

This article provides an overview of Ravigupta’s excursus on liberation in his commentary on Pramāṇavārttika 2.190. This excursus consists of an opponent’s counterargument and Ravigupta’s response to it. The opponent criticizes Dharmakīrti’s theory of an Arhat’s final moment of mind developed in his Pramāṇaviniścaya, and we can find a similar argument in a passage from Maṇḍana Miśra’s Brahmasiddhi. In discussing the three definitions of liberation provided in the excursus: （1） the annihilation of the mental continuum （*cittasantānoccheda）, （2） the mere cessation of suffering （*duḥkhanirodhamātra）, and （3） a mind free from desire, etc. （*rāgādi­vivikta­citta）, this paper points out a shift in the view of liberation from Abhidharmic to Mahāyānic. According to the third Mahāyānic definition, such a pure mind always exists, and the annihilation of the mental continuum is rejected. This article is based on the original text, English translation, and analysis of this passage presented in my previous article （Mai Miyo, “Ravigupta’s Analysis of Liberation in His Commentary on Pramāṇavārttika 2.190,” in To the Heart of Truth: Felicitation Volume for Eli Franco on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Hiroko Matsuoka et al. [Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2023], 541–564）.

Karṇakagomin analyzes one phase of the process from perception to verbal convention in his commentary on the “exclusion of superimposition” discussed in PV 1.48. The process includes the concept that “the direct object of words is the aspect, not the exclusion of others.” PVSVṬ ad PV 1.48 deals with Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga’s claim in PS 5.14 that “the distinction of apoha depends on the distinction of what is excluded.” The process of apoha assumed by Kumārila in his criticism of Dignāga is very different from the process of apoha that Karṇakagomin reads into PV 1.48. Therefore, Kumārila’s criticism here is refuted by PV 1.48, but what Karṇakagomin emphasized in refuting Kumārila is that “the exclusion of others is not the direct object of words.”

A parallel passage from the First Bhāvanākrama is found in Chapter 4 of Prajñākaramati’s （ca. 950–1000） Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, a commentary on Śāntideva’s （ca. 650–700） Bodhicaryāvatāra, a pragmatic Mahāyāna text. This parallel passage mainly comprises quotations from sūtras, ending with the mention of “Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama.”

Furthermore, this parallel passage of the First Bhāvanākrama is also found in the *Pāramitāyānabhāvanākramopadeśa, a work attributed to Jñānakīrti （ca. 9c）, and in Atiśa’s （982–1054） Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā. Interestingly, Atiśa attributes this passage not to Kamalaśīla but to Jñānakīrti. In other words, Atiśa attributes this parallel passage, which can be traced back to Kamalaśīla’s First Bhāvanākrama, to Jñānakīrti. This observation has already been made by other scholars.

In this paper, the focus lies on analysis of the above-mentioned cited passages, primarily within the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā and the Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā, both originating from the 10th and 11th centuries. By investigating the contextual factors that may have influenced these different attributions, this study aims to clarify quotation practices in Indian Buddhism during this period, thereby contributing to a comprehensive understanding of quotation practices within the broader context of Indian Buddhism.

This study aims to clarify the reception and development of Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the Indian Aṣṭasāhasrikā to Śatasāhasrikā, based on commentaries.

I discuss the differences in the following commentaries: （a）: those on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and （b）: those focused on the Āryaśatasāhasrikā-pañcaviṃśatisāha­srikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-bṛhaṭṭīkā, exploring two viewpoints: 1. Differences based on the authors’ standpoint and key ideas, 2. Differences based on differences in the text of the work being commented on.

I found that the Tathāgatagarbha theory not found in （a） was introduced into （b） in the context of commentaries on the word “bodhisattva” in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. In addition, I found that in the context of discussions of saddharmasyāntrardhāna, while （b） included the theory of the 5000 years’ duration of the true teaching, （a） did not. It became clear that （b） includes commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras that contain the expression “In the final 500 years,” while （a） includes commentaries for Prajñāpāramitā sūtras not containing the expression.

This essay compares the theory of the innate purity of the mind of the Mahāsāṃghika with the ālayavijñāna of the Yogācāra school. Since this school inherited not only the theory of momentariness but also the idea of citta caittas from the Sarvāstivādins, it was considered to be contrary to the theory of the innate purity of the mind based on the continuity of mind, that is, the theory of liberation from desiring mind. However, this view overlooks the corresponding relationship between mind and body, called ekayogakṣema found in the early theory of ālayavijñāna, and the circularity between Seeds and occurring mind （Seeds engendering manifest activity, and manifest activity perfuming Seeds） that enables a pluralistic flow of mind. As a matter of fact, emphasizing the liberation through meditative practice, ālayavijñāna is the active theory of purity. In other words, ālayavijñāna is said to be about paratantra-svabhāva, but it depends on one’s own efforts to change it to pariniṣpanna-svabhāva or parikalpita-svabhāva through practice, and it can be said that it is on the line of a kind of theory of the innate purity of the mind.

Previous research on and editions of the works of Candrakīrti did not notice the manuscripts stored in ʼBras spungs monastery. In the Catalogue of Ancient Books in the ’Bras spungs Monastery （’Bras sprungs dgon du bzhugs su gsol ba’i dpe rnying dkar chag）, information on six manuscripts related to the Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā （YṢ） and Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti can be found. One of the Tibetan translations of YṢ within them is now open to access, a version different from those of the canonical texts in the bsTan ’gyur and rather important for a critical edition of YṢ. A previous study compared the version from Dunhuang and the canonical texts, and pointed out that the revision made in the Later Dissemination can be precisely traced, while the intention of many revisions remains uncertain. However, it is difficult to know how far the extant texts reflect the revision of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Therefore, by comparing the different contents between the translations of the Earlier and the Later Disseminations with the recovered Sanskrit texts, the present paper focuses on the topic of the intention for those revised parts. The analysis of relevant materials shows that the intention to revise the translation of YṢ may possibly be classified in five domains.

In his Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, Nāgārjuna critiques the Nyāyasūtra, the foundational scripture of the Nyāya school of Indian logic. One distinctive feature of this text is the systematic analysis and refutation of the sixteen categories （padārtha） enumerated in the Nyāyasūtra from the standpoint of the Madhyamaka school. No Sanskrit original or Chinese translation of this text is known, and only a Tibetan translation is available. As the specific focus of this paper, in the 27th verse, in which Nāgārjuna refutes examples （dṛṣṭānta）, and in the 32nd verse, in which he refutes established doctrines （siddhānta）, Nāgārjuna employs a form of reasoning that is not commonly found in his other writings. In these passages, Nāgārjuna analyzes dṛṣṭānta as dṛṣṭa-anta and siddhānta as siddha-anta, with the aim of negating the possibility of the establishment of anta. This serves as an attempt to deny the existence of examples （dṛṣṭānta） and established doctrines （siddhānta）. The usage of these two passages is highly significant in identifying the context of Nāgārjuna’s composition of the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa. Therefore, this paper aims to compare these passages with examples from Nāgārjuna’s other works while considering the doctrines of the Nyāya school to provide further insights and analysis.

In the text titled Youposai wujie weiyi jing 優婆塞五戒威儀経 （T. 1503; henceforth Weiyi jing）, we find a variant version of the forty or so bodhisattva precepts that appear in the “Śīlapaṭala” of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Although earlier scholars like Ōno Hōdō conjectured that the bodhisattva precepts of the Weiyi jing were a redaction of the Pusa dichi jing 菩薩地持経 （T. 1581）―the Chinese translation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi by Dharmakṣema 曇無讖―by comparing the bodhisattva precepts of the Weiyi jing with those of all known Chinese translations and the Sanskrit text of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, I propose the possibility that the Weiyi jing’s bodhisattva precepts were in fact based on a hitherto unknown translation of the bodhisattva precepts of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Furthermore, by comparing the Weiyi jing’s bodhisattva precepts to those of the Book of Zambasta, I discuss the possibility that the underlying text of the Weiyi jing bodhisattva precepts had a close relationship to the underlying text of the Book of Zambasta’s bodhisattva precepts.

The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra （MPM） is a middle-period Mahāyāna sūtra in which the fixed expression ekaputraka-saṃjñā （Chn. 一子想）, meaning that the Buddha considers every being to be his own child, is used to express the Buddha’s compassion for all beings. In the same way, the Bodhisattva should follow the Buddha and practice ekaputraka-saṃjñā. Moreover, it is said lay people also practice ekaputraka-saṃjñā. In contrast, in the case of bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī, ekaputraka-saṃjñā is not mentioned. From this it can be said that MPM is highly conscious of lay people. Some examples use the name of the son of the Buddha, Rāhula, meaning ‘obstacle.’ In translations of MPM, the expression containing Rāhula’s name appears most often in the Tibetan, then in Dharmakṣema, and least frequently in Faxian. Early Buddhist texts such as the Suttanipāta explain how one should protect all beings just as a mother protects her only son. Pāli commentaries include a verse stating that the Buddha treating Devadatta and Rāhula in the same way, understanding this as an example of the Buddha treating all beings equally. In terms of the chronology of the word ekaputraka-saṃjñā in Chinese translations, it first appears in reference to Bodhisattvas from the 2nd to 3rd centuries CE, then with reference to the Buddha in the 3rd to 4th centuries, and finally with Rāhula’s name in the 4th to 5th centuries.

The Sarvāstivādin commentary on defilement 随眠 by a representative person presents various research problems. In this paper, I examine the character and episodes of “Qì Xū 気嘘,” a person representative of anger 瞋恚. There is a common episode in the translated Chinese Buddhist texts of “Qì Xū,” a killer carrying out the caṇḍāla’s work of executions who produced a pure heart and was reborn in heaven. A similar figure, “the executioner of bandits with a copper-colored beard,” was also identified in Pāli Buddhist texts. These results provide useful material for examining the definition and specific perception of anger in the Sarvāstivāda.

In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Vasubandhu agrees with the Ābhidharmikas’ assertion that pleasure exists, in contrast to the assertion that pleasant sensations do not exist. Comparing Vasubandhu’s argument with that of Saṅghabhadra in the Nyāyānusāra, it becomes evident that the respective arguments differ, though they are mutually based on the idea of three types of suffering.

Quoting different sūtras on neither suffering nor pleasure, Vasubandhu explains that all conditioned phenomena have the nature of arising and ceasing, and that the aspect of impermanent nature draws the aspect of suffering. On the other hand, Saṅghabhadra associates suffering with the lack of wisdom.

Both hold that external objects alone are not the sole causes of suffering and pleasure; instead, they argue that these sensations depend on the state of the supporting basis. Saṅghabhadra explains that special changes in the transformation of the body-stream cause pain or pleasure of the external object. Vasubandhu illustrates that whenever a certain bodily state is attained, the object becomes the cause of pain or pleasure in a similar manner.

The Sthavira, who asserts that suffering alone exists, cites a sūtra which addresses false representations （saṃjñāviparyāsa）. He mentions that improper mental application （ayoniśomanaskāra） and ignorant contact （avidyāsaṃsparśa） cause pleasant sensations.

Six theories attributed to the so-called Sarvāstivādins of the Western Region 西方諸師 are found in the Nyāyānusāriṇī （NA, 順正理論, T. 1562）. This article examines one of them, in which the supernormal knowledge of the past lifetimes of oneself and others （pūrvanivāsānusmṛtyabhijñā） is debated. The seventh chapter of the NA, analyzing the six supernormal knowledges, examines the relation between supernormal knowledge of the past lifetimes of oneself and others and the ten wisdoms. It is the orthodox understanding of the Sarvāstivādins that supernormal knowledge of the past lifetimes of oneself and others is limited to mundane wisdom 世俗知. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins of the Western Region define this knowledge as the six wisdoms as a whole. This definition was firstly argued by Ghoṣaka in the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā. In addition, the Apitanxinlun 阿毘曇心論 and the Apitanxinlunjing 阿毘曇心論経 accept this definition as orthodox. Furthermore, its theoretical background suggests that Ghoṣaka had an understanding of the ten wisdoms different from the orthodox theory of the Sarvāstivādins. In order to confirm this hypothesis, however, a detailed study of the theory of eight wisdoms in the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa is needed.

Jiankai bashi 倹開八事 is a technical term of Chinese Buddhist Vinaya studies that encapsulates the content of eight specific matters documented in the Dharmaguptaka and Mahīśāsaka Vinayas and the Pinimu jing 毘尼母経 （T. 1463）. The term originated from a proposal put forth by Pūrṇamaitrāyaṇīputra, one of the senior monks, who expressed discontent with the assembly organized by Māhakāśyapa. His proposal aimed to relax the regulations concerning eight matters related to eating. The primary objective of this proposal was to broaden the scope of the monastic code, in line with Ānanda’s suggestion that “minor rules could be abandoned.” This suggestion was made with the intention of preserving harmony within the Saṅgha. Conversely, it also represents the viewpoint of senior monks who had received direct teachings from the Buddha. They sought to implement the monastic code based on their interpretation of the Buddha’s instructions after his Nirvāṇa. This divergence in perspectives created a significant dichotomy between the “Sūtra-centric” approach of the Māhakāśyapa school and the interpretation of the monastic code. Ultimately, this schism played a pivotal role in the fundamental split within Buddhism.

In this paper, I examine some examples of the terms pariyāya and dhammapariyāya used in the Pāli Nikāyas, and clarify their aspects. In the Bahuvedanīya-sutta （MN I, pp. 396–400）, the Blessed One’s method of teaching the Dhamma was to preach various contents through the pariyāyas, such as the two types of feeling （vedanā）, the three types of feeling, etc. Although Buddhaghosa commented on the term “pariyāya” as “basis” （kāraṇa） in this sutta, it can be interpreted as “preaching,” “instruction,” etc.

In addition to the pariyāyas preached by the Blessed One, we can find those preached by Buddha’s disciples in some suttas in the Pāli Nikāyas, e.g., the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta （MN I pp. 108–114）, the Mahāvedalla-sutta （MN I, pp. 292–298）, etc.

In the Godatta-sutta （SN IV, pp. 295–297）, the pariyāya preached by the Buddha’s disciple is used by the layman to explain Buddhism. Therefore, it is certain that some of pariyāyas by Buddha’s disciples were widespread among laymen.

Investigating the contents of the Anuruddha-sutta （MN III, pp. 144–152）, Mahāvedalla-sutta, and Godatta-sutta, the difference between pariyāya and the dhammapariyāya is whether it is called dhammapariyāya by the Blessed One and his disciples.

In this paper, I present a list of the sources of kāya- suffix compounds in the Pāli canon. Due to limitations of space, the list deals with compounds in which, of the three meanings set by A Critical Pāli Dictionary （s.v. kāya-）, -kāya means “（inanimate） mass, multitude.”

I note two characteristics of these compounds based on their description in the Pāli commentaries: First, they can collectively describe all constituents （creatures or things） in a given range （e.g., “collection of hair [kesakāya-]” in a human body）. Second, a compound can be synonymous with its prefix noun （e.g., “earth [paṭhavī-]” and “collection of earth [paṭhavīkāya-]”）. According to the Pāli commentaries, nouns capable of forming kāya- suffix compounds include those that denote a wide range of items （bahuka-）, such as hair （kesa-） and bone （aṭṭhi-）. In contrast, nouns referring to a restricted set of items （paricchinna-）, like kidney （vakka-）, do not participate in such compounds.

I also present an overview of the usage of kāya- in the Vedic literature and the so-called “Seniors” of the Śvetāmbara Jain canon.

The concept of anirvacanīya may have already been used as a technical term of the non-dualism school in Śaṅkara’s time （756–772AD）, but there are clear differences in its usage between Śaṅkara and many later non-dualists. Śaṅkara did not use the word anirvacanīya on avidyā in the BSŚ. This contrasts obviously with the frequent use of anirvacanīya with regard to avidyā by many post-Śaṅkara non-dualists, and its use with sadasadbhyām is also characteristic. On the other hand, it is also characteristic that Śaṅkara used anirvacanīya only with nāmarūpa in the BSŚ, and in that case it was always accompanied by tattvānyatvābhyām. The aim of this paper is to clarify why Śaṅkara used anirvacanīya in this way, based on previous studies. Śaṅkara’s annotation on nāmarūpa is particularly important for confirming his view of the relationship between Brahman and the phenomenal world. Bhāmatī （Bhā） by Vācaspati Miśra （around 10AD）, the annotation for BSŚ, will also be compared with it.

The great Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda classified existence into six categories in his Padārthadharmasaṃgraha （PDhS）. These six are: substance, quality, action, universal, particularity, and inherence. On the other hand, the classification in the earliest Vaiśeṣika text, the Vaiśeṣikasūtra （VS）, is more obscure. In this paper, I examine information in texts in the Chinese Buddhist canon, and clarify two variations of the six-category system in the early Vaiśeṣika school. The first type, which I call the “Xuanzang type,” encompasses substance, quality, action, being, particular universality, and inherence. This type seems older than the other six-category system type in India, but was probably introduced into China later by Xuanzang and his disciples. The second type is the “PDhS type,” which follows the same six-category system as that in PDhS. This type gradually became standard in India; however, in China, the delayed introduction of the Xuanzang type overshadowed the PDhS type, and Chinese Buddhism soon forgot the latter.

This paper argues that a jātaka story in which the Buddha in the former life was a thief requires creativity and ingenuity in order to maintain enjoyment of the story and to avoid （or diminish） any inappropriate image of the Buddha. Although a handsome thief, a picaro, a trickster, is an extremely tempting character for storytellers and an audience （or readers）, it tends to be problematic from the viewpoint of Buddhist teachings. In ancient India, there existed a type of story beginning with a motif in which a rich woman falls in love with a thief. The 14th story in the Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā tells us that a rich merchant’s daughter is fascinated by a thief being dragged to the execution place, and they marry by the grace of Śiva in the end. The past story of the Kaṇaverajātaka in the Pāli Jātaka tells us that a courtesan is captivated by a good-looking thief in the above situation, and she makes a scapegoat to save his life, but he hurts her and runs away. According to the principle of identification in Jātaka stories, by samodhāna （application） the Buddha is the thief and Yasodharā is the courtesan in their respective former lives. The Śyāmājātaka in the Mahāvastu is similar to the Pāli version in structure, but there the Buddha in the former life is not a thief but a horse-dealer misidentified as a thief, and Yaśodharā is a courtesan with much more cunning behaviours and a deceptive mind. The Mahāvastu version is a unique one in which the Buddha-figure is almost unproblematic and Yaśodharā plays the role of a trickster.

From around the 4th until the 12th century in the region centering on the states of Gujarat and Rajasthan in western North India, many biographies of the Jain saints were composed. The places where the Tīrthaṃkaras are said to have attained liberation are often regarded as holy places. However, the holy sites of Muni Suvrata, the 20th Tīrthaṃkara, differ from other holy sites.

The holy sites Aśvāvabodha and Śakunikā-vihāra, which are said to have been located in Bhṛgukaccha （Bharuch） in southern Gujarat, are not found in older hagiographies, and some works in later periods do not mention them. This paper aims to identify the references to Suvrata and the holy places in the hagiographical literature, and speculates on the reasons for the biased references to them.

The results show two strains of hagiographical literature: one that mainly uses the Jain Maharashtri language and tries to create a new Jain movement, and the other that mainly uses the Sanskrit and Apabhraṃśa languages in traditional style. This paper suggested that the former lineage led to the Old Gujarati literature from the 12th century onward.

In Vedic literature, mitrá- denotes, first, “alliance; covenant” as a neuter common noun; second, an “ally” who participates in this alliance as a masculine noun; and finally, the god Mitra, who bears this name, as a masculine proper noun. As a neuter nominative/accusative form, mitrám appears in the fixed expression mitrám as/bhū. In this expression, the subject can be either a masculine or feminine substantive, but the predicate noun is always mitrám. There are differences in gender between the subject and mitrám. Moreover, from a semantic perspective, it is quite unlikely that this expression means “the subject is the （abstract） alliance itself.” Therefore, this expression can be a special expression that is not an ordinary nominal predicate sentence.

For this study, a survey was conducted of the Vedic literature, yielding a total of 15 examples of mitrám as/bhū. The parallelism of examples with the usual nominal predicate mitráḥ as/bhū shows practically no difference in meaning between mitrám as/bhū and mitráḥ as/bhū. In conclusion, mitrám as/bhū should be regarded as a so-called idám bhū construction and structurally it is most appropriate to understand mitrám as the accusative of content （“Inhaltsakksativ”）. The transitive expression of mitrám as/bhū as an idám bhū construction also appeared, which helps us clarify the structure of the idám bhū construction.