This paper points out the situation and some problems of the extant texts of the 7th Tiantai Patriarch Daosui’s 道邃 Zhiguan ji zhong yiyi 止観記中異義. It clarifies several characteristics of a text collected in the Shinnyozōhon 真如蔵本, viz. a 13th century manuscript held in the Eizan Bunko 叡山文庫, introducing its bibliographic information. In conclusion, the Shinnyozōhon has some overlapping parts with the text in the Manji dai Nippon zokuzōkyō 卍大日本続蔵経, which was edited by using various conventional versions as the base, but it also has contents that cannot be seen in that canon. Therefore, the Shinnyozōhon is a text superior to the existing versions of the Zhiguan ji zhong yiyi, and it is necessary to make a new edition based on this text and to complement those missing parts. Thus, it is important to solidify the basic materials of the Zhiguan ji zhong yiyi in order to more fully elucidate Daosui’s ideas about zhiguan 止観.

The Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment 円覚経 is widely known as a very important work for Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密, who wrote and ten times revised his commentaries on this text. It occupied an extremely important and central position in the Buddhist teachings of Zongmi.

The reception of the Tiantai zhiguan byZongmi is principally revealed in his Great Commentary on the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment 円覚経大疏 (hereafter the Great Commentary) and his Compendium on the Great Commentary on the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment 円覚経釈義鈔 (hereafter the Compendium). Study of the Great Commentary and the Compendium reveals that Zongmi’s practice is based on the Tiantai zhiguan 天台止観, especially founded upon the Liumiaomen 六妙門 (Six Wonderful Dharmas) of Zhiyi 智顗. It could be said that Zongmi followed Tiantai Zhiyi’s ideology of practical teaching on indeterminate meditation in the Six Wonderful Dharmas, and this teaching has become the theoretical basis of his practice.

Shindai Sekiguchi 関口真大 was the first to see the relationship between Zongmi and Tiantai zhiguan. In Part One chapter 3 of Tendai shōshikan no kenkyū 天台小止観の研究 (Different Schools’ Commentaries on the Tiantai xiao zhiguan), he observed that both the Yuanjue jing daochang xiuzheng yi 円覚経道場修証儀 (Manual of Procedures for the Cultivation of Realization of Ritual Practice According to the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment; hereafter the Manual) and the Compendium extracted from the Tiantai xiao zhiguan. The Manual incorporated almost the entire Tiantai xiao zhiguan, while half of the Tiantai xiao zhiguan was copied into the Compendium.

Toshio Andō 安藤俊雄 observed in his Keihō Shūmitsu no Tendaigaku 圭峯宗密の天台学 that Zongmi started to study Tiantai doctrine very early, and was particularly keen on the Tiantai xiao zhiguan and the Six Wonderful Dharmas. However, no earlier scholar identified the relationship between Zongmi and the Six Wonderful Dharmas.

By going through the Great Commentary and observing how Zongmi quoted and extracted from the Six Wonderful Dharmas, this study locates the position this work of Tiantai Zhiyi occupied, and how it influenced the thought of Zongmi.

Li Tongxuan’s 李通玄 (635–730 or 646–740) understanding of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra (入法界品) has always been discussed from the perspective of sequential cultivation (修行次第) or the kalyāṇamitra (善知識), without much discussion of “the Assembly who enter the Realm of Dharma 入法界衆.” However, given the importance for Li Tongxuan of all of these in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, part of the larger Buddhāvataṁsaka-sūtra, it is necessary to discuss Li’s interpretation of “the Assembly who enter the Realm of Dharma.”

Drawing a comparison with Fazang’s 法藏 (643–712) Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記, this paper specifies Li Tongxuan’s understanding of “the Assembly who enter the Realm of Dharma,” which is interpreted as a symbol of the Buddha’s teachings. Through it, Li emphasizes the common idea that no obstruction exists between principle and practice embodied in the “faith” and “harmony of three saints” in “the practice methods produced from mundane benefit.”

This paper focuses on the interpretation of the “One Vehicle of the Lotus Sūtra”, a concept created by Zhu Daosheng 竺道生 (355?–434), a disciple of Kumārajīva (344–413 or 350–409). Daosheng’s interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra is based on the viewpoint of 6 factors: “Cause”, “Effect”, “People”, “Teaching”, “Noumenal Principle”, and “Salvific Impetus”. In addition, he implemented his interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra by the theory that the bodhisattva in the three vehicles is absolute Truth, but he ultimately interpreted the Lotus Sūtra as being bound neither by the “Three Vehicles” nor the “One Vehicle”. It can be said that this became the ideological basis of Lotus Sūtra interpretation in Chinese Buddhism, because Daosheng’s interpretation largely influenced later interpreations of the Lotus Sūtra.

By utilizing previous studies that have identified the biographies of the monks included in the now-lost Mingseng zhuan 名僧伝 from the Gaoseng zhuan 高僧伝, this paper analyzes the uneven distribution of social traits among the monks who were categorized as “shi” 師 and “kujie” 苦節 in the Mingseng zhuan, and proposes the possibility that Baochang’s use of the dual categories of “shi” and “kujie” in the Mingseng zhuan reflected the dualistic class structure of the early medieval Chinese saṃgha.

This article studies the Manchu translation of a Buddhist scripture titled in Manchu Umesi aiman badaraka amba fujurungga yangsangga nomun. When comparing the Lalitavistara with its Tibetan and Mongolian translations, I realized that there also exists a Manchu version. Therefore, here I report on this Manchu translation.

Research on the Manchu Tripiṭaka has not been carried out in detail, and different perspectives on the originals and translation methods of this corpus have been suggested. This article gives the names of 27 chapters of the Manchu translation mentioned above. On this basis, I am able to confirm that the original of this Manchu translation was the Chinese Fangguang Dazhuangyan jing方広大荘厳経. Examples are offered which clarify that this Manchu translation used the “word by word translation” approach, in the tradition of Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhist scripture translations.

The manuscript P. T. 1257 is a bilingual vocabulary in Tibetan and Chinese. It mainly summarizes some of the most basic Buddhist terms, as well as some of the contents of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. Based on the calligraphy of this document, we can find at least five people involved in the writing. In addition, we also can get some historical information about the manuscript’s users. In general, this bilingual vocabulary of Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism is of great value for us to understand the history of monks in Dunhuang who studied and engaged in Buddhist activities in the middle and late 8th century to 9th century.

The germ of Tibetan phonology appeares first in the Sum cu pa composed by Thon mi sambhoṭa (7th century). At the end of the Sum cu pa, Thon mi states that the pronunciation of each syllable (/ka/, /ki/, /ku/, /ke/ etc.) should be learned in accordance with the method of pronouncing phonemes (nga ro, *svara) in the correct position of articulation. However, since Thon mi did not give a detailed explanation of Tibetan phonology in his Sum cu pa, Tibetan grammarians in later periods had to develop a theory of pronunciation of their language with the help of their knowledge of Sanskrit phonology. Among them, Si tu paṇ chen (1699/1700–1774) gives an explanation of Tibetan phonology in his Si tu’i ’grel chen on the basis of the Sanskrit phonology described in Candragomin’s Varṇasūtra. What emerges from Si tu’s explanation is the development of phonological theory that is characteristic to Tibetan but not found in Sanskrit. In addition, he reveals both the applicability of Sanskrit phonology to Tibetan and the limitations of its application. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the major characteristics of Tibetan phonology by examining Si tu’s explanation based on the Varṇasūtra and comparing it with the explanations given by other Tibetan grammarians.

The Dge lugs pa scholar ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson ’grus (1648–1721/22) defines the Wheel of Dharma (chos ’khor, *dharmacakra) as “good qualities (yon tan) that exist either in the doctrine (lung) or in realization (rtogs)” in his Phar phyin mtha’ dpyod, a monastic textbook of Drepung Gomang Collage. As regards the doctrinal Wheel of Dharma (lung gi chos ’khor), there are different opinions among Tibetan Buddhist thinkers. While Mchims chen mo, Chags lo tsā ba, and others assert that the Buddha’s turning of the Wheel of Dharma occurred in succession, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa denies their assertion in terms of both the common view (thun mong) shared by many disciples and the uncommon view (thun mong ma yin pa) that is specific to certain disciples. The underlying idea in ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s discussion is first that the Buddha teaches every doctrine, such as the four noble truths, in all stages of his life as long as there exist sentient beings who can gain benefit from each doctrine, and second that the Buddha teaches all kinds of doctrines simultaneously in all fields in order to save all sentient beings, each of which is characteristic of Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriology.

This article looks into the concept of the Buddha-nature in the Maṇi bka’ ’bum, a revealed text (gter ma) ascribed to the ancient Tibetan king Srong bstan sgam po, who is considered an incarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the tutelary deity of Tibet. There are two main technical terms that designate this concept in this text. One is the well-known bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po, used to express the idea that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, which is in turn equated with emptiness, reality (chos nyid), and the ultimate (don dam); the other is rang sems sangs rgyas (‘One’s own mind [is] buddhahood’). The Buddha-nature is taught on the basis of these two expressions in the Maṇi bka’ ’bum, with Tibetan esoteric teachings from the Three Greats (chen po gsum) woven in, namely, the Great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po), Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po), and Atiyoga (rdzogs pa chen po). The Maṇi bka’ ’bum equates ‘one’s own mind’ (rang sems), or ‘the true nature of the mind’ (sems nyid), with the state of being enlightened (sangs rgyas); it is one’s own teacher, a buddha (sangs rgyas), and the primordially pure (ka dag) Great Compassionate One, the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara. Purification is attained through a practice of the Bodhisattva’s quintessential six-syllable mantra, oṃ ma ṇi pad me hūṃ. Through this practice one becomes a buddha within a lifetime.

This paper focuses on the symbolism and merits of the six-syllable formula (ṣaḍakṣarī-vidyā), wish-fulfilling jewels (cintāmaṇi), and other symbols that represent the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara in the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra (KV). The paper also indicates differences between the Gilgit manuscript version (G ver.) from the 7^th century and the Nepal manuscript version (N ver.) dating to after the 11^th century.

According to the G ver., Avalokiteśvara has symbolic elements such as the six-syllable formula, wish-fulfilling jewels, a hand gesture for the sign of a lotus (padmāṅkā-mudrā), a maṇḍala in which Avalokiteśvara, Amitābha, and Śākyamuni are depicted, and, additionally, a universal emperor (Cakravarti-rāja) and a lotus that are not integrated into the maṇḍala. Conversely, these symbolic elements are integrated into the maṇḍala of the great six-syllable formula described in the N ver.

Only the N ver. states that those who propagate the KV with a wish-fulfilling jewel, for example, will be welcomed by twelve Tathāgatas in their last moments. This statement is influenced by the larger Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra, which mentions twelve Tathāgatas in the most popular Chinese translation, or nineteen in the Sanskrit version. These Tathāgatas represent a light of the Tathāgata Amitābha, who welcomes a person in his last moments, and the influence of devotion to the paradise of Amitābha is stronger in the N ver. than in the G ver.

Consequently, we may conclude that symbolic elements and merits of the six-syllable formula and wish-fulfilling jewels, along with other symbols, have been gradually improved from the G ver. and/or integrated into the N ver. under the influence of Esoteric Buddhism and the cult of Amitābha’s paradise.

In the present paper, the author examines Māyā and Mahāmāyā mainly on the basis of two works of Ratnākaraśānti, namely, the Khasamā, a commentary on the *Yathālabdhakhasama-tantra, and the Guṇavatī, a commentary on the Mahāmāyā-tantra (abbr. MMT).

In the Khasamā and the Guṇavatī, Mahāmāyā is interpreted as a Super-goddess who integrates other goddesses, and this interpretation of Ratnākaraśānti serves as one piece of evidence to support the author’s hypothesis regarding the relationship of Mahāmāyā described in the Devīmāhātmya and in the MMT (especially, chap. 1).

It is known that Buddhists presented various theories about the duration of the True Teaching (saddharma). This article introduces a work explaining that the period of existence of the True Teaching is 5000 years, namely the Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī nāma vyākhyā written in the 12th century, a commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. It is known that the work follows the traditional interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures described in the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Bṛhaṭṭīkā and the Āryaśatasāhasrikā-pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Thus, in this article, to examine and elucidate the background of the view that the True Teaching lasts 5000 years, I focus on the descriptions in the three above-mentioned works, translate the corresponding portions, and consider how those works influenced each other. As a result, I find it most likely that the explanation that the duration of True Teaching is 5000 years in the Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī nāma vyākhyā is based on the theory presented in the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Bṛhaṭṭīkā and Āryaśatasāhasrikā-pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Bṛhaṭṭīkā.

In Dharmakīrti’s logic, especially in parārthānumāna, the role of example (dṛṣṭānta) is to show three characteristics of the logical reason (hetu). Examples that cannot show them are classified as fallacious examples (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa). Dignāga recognizes ten types of fallacious examples in both similar examples (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) and dissimilar examples (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta). In Pramāṇaviniścaya ch. 3 and Nyāyabindu ch. 3, Dharmakīrti took over all of them, to which he newly added eight types. Apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka, the main topics of this paper, are contained in the new types, and are concepts peculiar to Dharmakīrti’s syllogism which consists of two members, namely vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā.

Apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka mean that a speaker presents only examples and does not state vyāpti in the syllogism of anvaya or vyatireka. In contrast to Jñānaśrībhadra and Vinītadeva, Dharmottara discusses apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka positively, and makes two distinctive interpretations. Firstly, Dharmottara mentions the process of syllogism and sentence of vyāpti (as a member of the syllogism), and concludes that the purpose of examples is to elucidate the meanings of the sentences in anvaya or vyatireka, while depending on the understanding of vyāpti (as the relationship between sādhyadharma and sādhanadharma, i.e., avinābhāva etc.). Secondly, while clearly distinguishing parārthānumāna from svārthānumāna, he makes a clear statement that a speaker’s fault can be the fault of examples in parārthānumāna. Hence, in conclusion, I would like to point out the following: Dharmottara focuses on the distinction between real existence (vastu) itself and right or wrong in the proof which has not been touched by other commentators. Furthermore, he unfolds an interpretation that emphasizes the problem of a statement (vacana) and a form of proof, corresponding to the topic of parārthānumāna.

I recently (Ishida 2020) pointed out that the famous three-stage theory about the development of the apoha-theory, including the views of the positivist (vidhivādin) and the negativist (pratiṣeḍhavādin), was not definitely explained by Satkari Mookerjee, but it is a modified version due to Yuichi Kajiyama. In the course of this investigation, it turned out to be important to distinguish two points: (1) The process of understanding the negation, i.e., exclusion, and (2) The presence or absence of appearance in conceptual cognition. On the basis of this investigation, I reexamine Śākyabuddhi’s philosophical position in the development of the apoha-theory. I think that Śākyabuddhi should be regarded as a forerunner of the so-called positivist, who, according to Ratnakīrti, insists that the negation is indirectly understood when a positive element is recognized through a word.

According to the sākāravijñāna theory of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, cognition possesses mental images in itself. However, this theory was criticized by others, such as Mīmāṃsakās. This article examines the controversy between Kumārila and Prajñākaragupta in the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra on Pramāṇavārttika (PV) 3.385. The reasoning behind the sākāravijñāna theory in this context is that cognition (i.e., grāhaka or the grasping) is necessarily remembered along with the image of its object (i.e., grāhya or the grasped). A counterargument is that some cognition is remembered without the image of its object, where this kind of recollection is explained, such as “I don’t know what I saw then.” In other words, a person can remember the act of cognition during a previous direct experience but not remember the specific object. This argument can be traced back to Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda 82–85. Prajñākaragupta’s answer to this objection is that this kind of recollection is not an instance of remembering only the grasping; rather, it is an instance of indistinctly (sāmānyena) remembering the grasping and the grasped together. A similar idea is found in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha 2075–2076 and its commentary by Kamalaśīla.

Dignāga established a theory of pakṣābhāsa (fallacious thesis) in relation to the definition of pakṣa (thesis). In his Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS), he states:

... anirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena ... // 2 // (PS III 2b²–d¹)

[A property to be proved (sādhyadharma) should] not be opposed by “pratyakṣārthānu-mānāptaprasiddha.”

Dharmakīrti, in his Pramāṇaviniścaya, inteprets the word pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddha of PS as a dvandva compound of the four component words: pratyakṣārtha, anumāna, āpta, and prasiddha, and understands that the last word prasiddha means śābdaprasiddha. Jinedrabuddhi, a commentator of PS, adopts Dharmakīrti’s interpretation.

On considering Dignāga’s own explanation in his own commentary (Pramāṇa-samuccayavṛtti, PSV) on this part of the verse, however, the word can be interpreted as a compound of three component words: pratyakṣārtha, anumāna[-prasiddha], and āptaprasiddha. Dignāga explains that when a sādhyadharma stated in a thesis is opposed by another dharma/atha which is already established (prasiddha) by some valid means, such a thesis should be regarded as a fallacious thesis (pakṣābhāsa). Accordingly, the word prasiddha should not be separated to solely mean śābdaprasiddha.

Intriguingly, Dharmakīrt’s followers mention and criticize such a different interpretation. Śākyabuddhi attributes this interpretation to some commentator (s) of PS (*Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkākāra), who cannot be identified with Jinendrabuddhi. The interpretation which seems to correspond to Dignāga’s intention has never been supported by Dharmakīrti’s followers, including Jinendrabuddhi, and as a result it was consigned to oblivion.

Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of Dignāga’s PS/PSV must be useful for understanding the words of PS/PSV. But it should be noted that Dharmakīrti’s interpretation does not necessarily correspond to Dignāga’s own intention.

The present paper aims to clarify work-titles of writings of Sajjana and his son Mahājana, 11th and 12th century lay Buddhists of Kashmir. In particular, Sajjana is sometimes regarded as a crucial individual for the Yogācāra exegetical tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Although, until recently, their writings had not been known save for works available in the Tibetan canon, further works that are not included in the Tibetan canon have gradually been found in a Sanskrit manuscript, which we call here the Sajjana-Mahājana codex.

As for Sajjana, in addition to his Putralekha, that is, an epistile addressed to his son Mahājana (only in Tib.), two further works, i.e., Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa and Sūtrālaṃkārapiṇḍārtha, have been available (both only in Skt.).

With regard to Mahājana, (1) Sūtrālaṃkārādhikārasaṅgati (only in Skt.: identified by Shaoyong Ye) has become newly available as found in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex, in addition to (2) his Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya commentary (only in Tib.). In (2), Mahājana refers to two of his own writings, i.e., (3) ’Brel pa grub pa chung ngu’i yongs su shes pa and (4) rNam par nges pa’i yongs su shes pa. We can identify (3) as the Pratibandhasiddhiparicaya which is available only as a Sanskrit fragment in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. On the basis of this identification, we can assume the Sanskrit title of (4) to be *Viniścayaparicaya (yet to be found). Accordingly, the Sanskrit title of (1) can be known as Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaparicaya, as attested in the Peking Tanjur (Derge’s reading-arthaparijñāna does not seem to reflect the original). Furthermore, there are two other works with the element paricaya in their titles, i.e., Sūtrālaṃkāraparicaya and *Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya, included in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. Although their colophons that refer to the author’s name are yet to be found, these two are most probably Mahājana’s compositions, as this particular title paricaya and this particular situation (being included in the same codex) suggest.

According to Sthiramati’s commentary (Triṃśikābhāṣya=Tbh) on the Triṃśikākārikā, contrary to our common sense, vikalpa and nirbhāsa occupy the same space. The aim of this paper is to consider this problem. Sthiramati made an important statement on this problem, as can be seen in the following quotation: tam ātmādinirbhāsaṃ rūpādinirbhāsaṃ ca tasmād vikalpād bahirbhūtam ivopādāyātmādyupacāro rūpādidharmopacāraś cānādikālikaḥ pravartate vināpi bāhyenātmanā dharmaiś ca. It is clear from this example that vikalpa and nirbhāsa occupy the same space. So far research on the term vikalpa (=abhūtaparikalpa) has been superficial. As Rishō Hotori acutely pointed out, vikalpa means mental material rather than the subject of cognition. However, strictly speaking, this view is unsatisfactory. We miss the point if we regard the meaning of the term vikalpa merely as mental material. What I wish to show in this paper is that the term vikalpa has two meanings, both subject of cognition and mental material.

The negation of arising from other in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and its commentaries aimed to validate the ultimate Madhyamaka doctrine of non-arising by refuting the Ābhidharmika Buddhist view that a thing arises from its conditions. As epistemology and logic developed and debates took place between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, the theory of causality or the question of how to establish a causal relation became a point of interest for scholars, so that the Mādhyamikas faced the new task of disproving any means of establishing a real causal relation in order to defend their ultimate tenet of non-arising. Kamalaśīla’s discussion in his Madhyamakāloka is remarkable from this viewpoint; he thoroughly refutes various possibilities that ultimately things arise from something other–whether it is permanent or impermanent. Moving beyond the context of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and its commentarial tradition, he devotes a large portion of his argument to refuting the causal relation between momentary entities (kṣaṇika) that are considered to be real. This was definitely a new stage in the negation of arising in the history of Madhyamaka thought, which encouraged later Tibetan interpreters to further expand the scope of the discussion.

The subject of criticism of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) chp. 9, when it criticizes A preceding subject existing prior to whole sensory organs, is known to be the Pudgalavādins in general, but is not specified in the MMK.

However, the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti (BP), an important commentary of a somewhat later time, did not specify the subject of criticism of chp. 9, criticizing A preceding subject by a parable of the window.

Since then, the Prajñāpradīpa (PP) has clarified that the subject of the BP is the Sāṃkhya school, and the Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā (PPṬ) succeeded to the commentary on the PP to introduce the Sāṃkhya theory in more detail.

However, the PPṬ commented on the subject of criticism of the BP as rather Sāṃkhya theory, while the Pudgalavādin is also presented as a subject of criticism of chp. 9.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider the differences between the commentaries in more detail in order to clarify the subject of criticism in chapter 9 of the MMK.

This paper examines Dharmapāla’s critique of eternalism found in the first chapter of his Dasheng guangbailun shilun 大乗広百論釈論, and clarifies the following points:

1. It is reasonable to think that the “logician” (tārkika, rtog ge ba) that Candrakīrti refers to and criticizes in the 9th chapter of his Catuḥśatakaṭīkā is Dharmapāla.

2. Three types of logical reason given by Dharmapāla in his commentary on Catuḥśataka 9.4 are similar to the three types of property referred to by Dharmakīrti.

3. Since the logical reason “not being a product” is a property formed by mere exclusion (vyavacchedamātra), its being a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) is ensured even with regard to the subject whose existence Buddhists do not accept (e.g. space etc.), and is classified as a contraditory (viruddha) called dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana.

These results show that Dharmapāla plays a bridging role in the developments in Buddhist logic from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti and his commentators. Further examination of Dharmapāla’s theory will make it possible for us to reconsider the innovations in Dharmakīrti’s theory.

In the twenty-second chapter of the Prajñāpradīpa, which was translated into Chinese by Prabhākaramitra and into Tibetan by Klu’i rgyal mtshan, Bhāviveka, a Mādhyamika philosopher, criticizes the Mīmāṃsaka in a context where he makes a ‘‘digression’’ on the Tathāgata’s omniscience. In the beginning, Bhāviveka introduces a syllogism by which the Mīmāṃsaka tries to reject the Buddhist view of omniscience. Bhāviveka’s counter-argument differs in, respectively, the Chinese and the Tibetan translations. However, previous studies have studied only one of these translations.

The Chinese translation points out that the reason presented by the Mīmāṃsaka would be unestablished (asiddha), arguing that Buddhist scriptures are authorless. This argument is based on Bhāviveka’s own view of the Tathāgata’s teachings, which is found in the twenty-fifth chapter of the Prajñāpradīpa. Conversely, the Tibetan translation points out that the thesis presented by the Mīmāṃsaka would be fallacious (pakṣābhāsa) through an examination of the meaning of ‘‘one who is not omniscient’’ (asarvajña). Both translations can be considered to contain valid arguments, so they should be dealt with equally.

The Vigrahavyāvartanī, one of Nāgārjuna’s main philosophical treatises, gives us an insight into Nāgārjuna’s theory of emptiness as well as his dialectical methods. The first Sanskrit edition was published by K. P. Jayaswal and R. Sāṇkṛtyāyana in 1937, in which they count the number of verses as 72. However, in 1951 when E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst published their edition, which is most widely used today, they reduced the number of verses to 70. Thus, Johnston’s interpretation has become the standard statement of this problem for scholars. However, if we look into this issue more carefully, there are several factors that may not support Johnston’s position. In this article, I will detail three arguments against Johnston’s interpretation.

In 2016, a new manuscript of the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā (AKK) in the Potala Palace, along with photographs, was published by the Tibetan Palm Leaf Manuscript Institution (西蔵貝葉経研究所), and was determined to be identical to the Tibetan translation of the AKK. However, I have discovered that this manuscript has various variants with resepect to the Gokhale manuscript.

In this paper, I present the original Sanskrit text and the translation of two interesting passages (IV.3, V.23) that have been corrected to conform to the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. I point out that the two passages are related to Paramārtha’s (Zhendi 真諦) translation of the AKK.

The vinayas allow special cases of “cooking and preserving food”, “utilizing leftover food”, and “collecting fruits” in case of famine. The famine exception does not apply when the famine is over. Even bhikkhu can work in times of famine in order to support their lives, according to the Vinayas. In the event of famine, the rules loosen. It was generally accepted in ancient India that there was a difference between normal and emergency times. It is common in the Vinayas and Dharma literature that, in the event of an emergency, bhikkhus or brahmins may take on the activities of someone with a different social status, while keeping their status as bhikkhu or brahmin, respectively. It can be said that the Buddhist sangha had the same character as the broader Indian society in that avoiding poverty is more important in an emergency than protecting the bhikkhu’s normally expected means of life.

The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā argues on the basis of a sūtra which maintains that something is called mundane (*laukikī) because it changes and perishes. It takes up the question whether the noble path (āryamārga) is mundane so long as it is also conditioned. The noble path is never mundane. But the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā only presents the differences between the noble path and mundaneness, and it does not show any reasons for the differences.

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya cites suffering (duḥkha), the world (loka) and so on as synonyms for appropriative aggregates (upādānaskandha). It defines suffering as follows: suffering is because Āryas have an abhorrence of it, and the world, and suffering is because it perishes (lujyate). The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya argues that all conditioned things are suffering by suffering inherent in conditioning (saṃskāraduḥkhatā). The aspect of impermanent nature draws the aspect of suffering, but the path is not abhorrent to Āryas as it makes them quiet.

The Dharmaskandha, an early Sarvāstivādin text, mentions that the five appropriative aggregates are suffering since perishableness and change are inherent in them. It follows that appropriative aggregates attribute suffering because they are not calm, and against the mind of Āryas.

The Śālistamba-sūtra is one of the Mahāyāna sūtras devoted to the clarification of the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Although the Sanskrit text of the sūtra has not survived in its entirety, five Chinese (Taishō 708–712) and Tibetan translations are extant. One can render the compound śālistamba, comprised of the word śāli (“rice plant”) and stamba (“clump”), as “a clump of rice plant.” It is worth noting that the titles of the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the Śālistamba-sūtra do not always have the same meaning as the title of the original Sanskrit. The aim of this paper is to address why the Chinese and Tibetan translatiors did not always provide an accurate translation of the title of the Sanskrit text, examining the meanings of the Chinese and Tibetan words used to translate the titles of the Śālistamba-sūtra. A closer scrutiny of the titles reveals the following:

(1) Out of the five Chinese translations, the earliest one bears a title which is not a translation of the title Śālistamba-sūtra, i.e., Leben shengsi jing 了本生死經 (Taishō 708), and that by Shihu 施護 bears a title which is a transliteration of the Sanskrit śālistamba, namely, the Dasheng shelisuodanmo jing 大乘舍黎娑擔摩經 (Taishō 711). The rest (Taishō 709, 710, and 712) contain in their titles the word dao 稲 corresponding to the Sanskrit śāli, i.e, daoyu 稲芋, daogan 稲𦼮, daogan 稲芉, daogan 稲稈 and daoqian 稲芊. These words can be classified into three groups: (a) daoyu 稲芋 and daoqian 稲芊 (“a vigorous look of rice plant”), (b) daogan 稲𦼮 and daogan 稲稈 (“a stem or stalk of rice plant”), (c) daogan 稲芉 (“rice plant and a seed of adlay”). The word daogan 稲芉, which makes no sense, seems to be a scribal error for the word daoqian 稲芊.

(2) Tibetan translations of the Śālistamba-sūtra contain in their titles the words sā lu’i ljang pa (“rice seedling”). The word sā lu’i ljang pa does not correspond to the Sanskrit śālistamba (“a clump of rice plant).

In conclusion: (i) Chinese translations classified into Group (a) provide an accurate translation of the Sanskrit śālistamba. (ii) Group (b) and the Tibetan translations, whose titles are similar in meaning, contain in their titles words which are not used for the Sanskrit śālistamba. (iii) It is highly likely that the translators of the translations in question confused the word śālistamba (“ a clump of rice plant”) with the word śālistambha (“a stem of rice plant”), whose second member stambha means “a post, stem.” One may, therefore, reasonably suppose that the translators of Chinese translations classified into Group (b) and Tibetan translation translate the word śālistambha instead of śālistamba.

When a bhikṣu receives a new robe, the regulations require him to dye the robe three particular colors (huaise 壊色) before wearing it. Otherwise he commits a pāyattika 波逸提罪offense. The three colors are blue, mud, and qian 茜 (a madder or deep red) according to the Shisonglü 十誦律. However, the colors are rather blue, mud and mulan 木蘭 (magnolia) in the Shisong biqiu boluotimucha jieben 十誦比丘波羅提木叉戒本. There is one different color. In this paper, I discuss the particular colors focusing on qian and mulan.

According to the Indian Classics in general, the most important function of a king is to protect his people, which in certain situations takes a form of warfare against a foreign army or internal rebels. Some discourses can be found in Buddhist scriptures in and before the 7^th century CE that teach or describe ways or strategies for a king or warrior to deal with the diplomatic problem without resorting to warfare including killing. Those ways can be roughly divided into three types: (1) retreat from the role of warrior; (2) resolution without pitched battle; and (3) pitched battle without killing. Each type has subdivisions. The authors of the Buddhist scriptures selected certain strategies from those commonly found in the Indian scriptures on politics such as the Arthaśāstra and reformed them in accordance with the Buddhist precept against killing.

In this paper, I examine the term sajjhāya- used in the Nikāyas to elucidate the meaning of recitation in early Buddhism. Concerning recitation in the Majjhima-nikāya, I consider the difference between the terms sajjhāya- and ajjhena-. In the four Nikāyas, sajjhāya- means repeating sūtras (or Vedas) aloud to learn and memorize them. In a few cases in the Jātaka, however, sajjhāya- is used to indicate singing to oneself or repeating. In the Saṃyutta-nikāya, although sūtra recitation (sajjhāya-) is one of the most fundamental practices of Buddhist monks, there is no need to cling to sūtra recitation after a monk has achieved dispassion. In the Majjhima-nikāya, ajjhena- appears where brahmins recite the Vedas, whereas sajjhāya- occurs in scenes in which Buddhist monks recite sūtras. Brahmins prescribe Veda recitation (ajjhena-) as one of the practices for the acquisition of merit, for attaining virtue; on the other hand, the Buddha Śākyamuni thought sūtra recitation (sajjhāya-) was a tool for the mind, to practice freeing the mind from hostility and ill will.

As previous studies have reported, Indra (Skt: Śakra; Pāli: Sakka), or lord of the gods in the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, visited the Buddha and listened to his teachings in the Sakkapañha-suttanta of the Dīgha-Nikāya (DN) No. 21, and its corresponding Chinese translations from Sanskrit Āgama sūtras.

Indra’s motivation for visiting the Buddha mentioned in DN is not concrete, because it is only stated that he had a zeal for meeting the Buddha. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend why he had this zeal. However, its commentary (aṭṭhakathā), the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, adds an explanation that he asked for relief from death because the five signs of decay occurred on his body.

That is to say, Indra’s motivation for visiting the Buddha is not explicitly explained in DN and its corresponding Chinese translations from Sanskrit Āgamas, but in the commentary on DN.

In this paper, I point out that Indra’s motivation is also described clearly in the story of Indra’s death in the Chinese translations of the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa and elsewhere. Some of these references were compiled earlier than the Pāli commentaries.

The Indian science of rhetoric (alaṅkāra) systematizes figures of speech. While a large number of classical works on Sanskrit rhetoric have been handed down to us, Pāli rhetoric has only one extant treatise: the Subodhālaṅkāra, written by Saṅgharakkhita. This paper discusses how metaphor is defined and how the theory of metaphor is developed in the Subodhālaṅkāra.

This paper concludes with the following two points. First, the definition of metaphor in the Subodhālaṅkāra is an eclectic mix of that in the Kāvyādarśa and the Kāvyaprakāśa, and the classification of the types of metaphor in the Subodhālaṅkāra is derived from that in the Kāvyālaṅkāra. Second, the method by which the Kāvyaprakāśa sorts out metaphors and similes presented in a compound justifies the idea that the examples of metaphorical compounds given by the Subodhālaṅkāra are correct cases of metaphors.

Tianzhu 天竺 is generally known as the old name of India. The oldest example is found in the Hou Han shu 後漢書 as Tianzhuguo 天竺国. There had existed numerous Chinese names of India such as Shendu 身毒 in the Shi ji 史記, and Tiandu 天篤 in the Han shu 漢書. After the Datang Xiyu ji 大唐西域記 was written, Yindu 印度 became the most general designation. The origin of Tianzhu is still unclear. This study aims to examine the results of preceding studies. The pioneering study was by Thomas Watters. He examined the origin of Tianzhu, and inferred the possibility that it was transmitted through Burma for the first time. Wu Qichang 呉其昌 is the most important scholar to study old Chinese names of India, and he followed Watter’s theory. Sugimoto Naojirō 杉本直治郎 was a Japanese pioneer in this field. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi is another important scholar who sought the origin of Shendu 身毒 by the phonological approach. The results of preceding investigations are each persuasive, but historical evidence is still required.

The aim of this paper is to examine how the Pratyabhijñā works were transmitted in South India, by focusing on the Īśvarapratyabhijñānvayadīpikā, a South Indian commentary on the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā.

The author of the Īśvarapratyabhijñānvayadīpikā is Nāthānanda. He was requested to compose it by his disciple Svaprabhānanda. Svaprabhānanda is identical to the author of the Śivādvaitamañjarī. According to the Hooli Vīraśaśaiva lineage, Svaprabhānanda could have lived around 1600, and hence his teacher, Nāthānanda, could have lived in the second half of the 16^th century.

In the Īśvarapratyabhijñānvayadīpikā, Nāthānanda often quotes and copies the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. This shows that the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī was regarded as the standard commentary in South India.

The Vyavahārasūtra, the text that prescribes the atonement rituals of the Jain ascetics and the rules for the operation of their order, has four types of commentaries. They are, in chronological order, 1) the Niryukti (in Prakrit), 2) the Bhāṣya (in Prakrit), 3) the Cūrṇi (in Prakrit and Sanskrit), and 4) the Ṭīkā (in Sanskrit). Of the four, the first two take the subsidiary role of the Sūtra. These are Sūtra-like texts that require further commentary. The Cūrṇi, a commentary on the Sūtra and the Niryukti/Bhāṣya, is a mixture of Prakrit and Sanskrit prose. The last one, the Ṭīkā, like the Cūrṇi, is a commentary on the Sūtra and the Niryukti Bhāṣya. In other words, there are two kinds of texts in the commentaries on the Sūtra and the Niryukti/Bhāṣya. By comparing the Cūrṇi with the Ṭīkā, this paper will show that Malayagiri, the author of the Ṭīkā, constructed his commentary in accordance with the description of the Cūrṇi.

Jain image worship has been mainly performed for statues of Tīrthaṃkaras and other figures in Jain temples. Most of the objects of worship represent some of the 24 Tīrthaṃkaras, such as Rishabha, Nemi and Pārśva. It is still unclear whether this kind of worship ritual existed from the beginning of Jainism, or whether the Jains introduced image worship from an external religious tradition. However, we can trace it in the literature to the 5th-7th century.

On the other hand, sixty-three great men, including the Tīrthaṃkaras and other essential figures based on the Jain tradition, have been described in the Jain hagiographical Carita literature. We can assume that hagiographies and image worship shared a similar tendency in their development, because both Carita literature and image worship targeted Tīrthaṃkaras and other saints.

This paper examines the changes in the treatment of saints in Jainism based on the descriptions of image worship in the Jain scriptural and Carita literature.

As Olivelle (1992, 83–85) indicated, regarding the person qualified for saṃnyāsa in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, śūdras and other lower-class persons or women are not allowed to renounce, and as for the three upper classes, even though kṣatriyas and vaiśyas are not excluded from saṃnyāsa, brāhmaṇas are primarily considered to be the persons entitled to renunciation.

In this paper, I examine the contents in the 5th chapter of the Jābāla-Upaniṣad, which is included in the older group of the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads; investigate whether there are any conditions for qualification if brāhmaṇas are eligible to renounce, and whether it is possible for unqualified persons to resort to saṃnyāsa; and finally identify the characteristics of the qualified persons.

As a result, it is considered that brāhmaṇas are qualified for saṃnyāsa. The life of wandering ascetics may be practiced in this world. Saṃnyāsa may also be fulfilled after death in accordance with brāhmaṇas’ resolve. On the other hand, it is possible for unqualified persons like kṣatriyas to resort to saṃnyāsa. The act that they abandon their bodies as they determine to renounce may ensure them qualification for saṃnyāsa and after death become saṃnyāsins. In addition, the result also shows that others’ approval is not required before saṃnyāsa, which suggests that to enter saṃnyāsa is left to the discretion of the persons who intend to renounce.

This is a study of the Vājapeya decribed in the Vādhūla-Śrautasūtra (VādhŚS), one of the oldest Śrautasūtras, based on its reliable manuscripts found in the 1990s. This kingship ritual is a variation of the Agniṣṭoma, extended with some additional unique elements such as a chariot race, royal consecration, and the climbing of the sacrificial post. VādhŚS puts the race and consecration before the climbing of the post, which is followed by the offering of the Marutvatīya-graha.

There are many notable prescriptions about the chariot race that are not found at all in other Śrautasūtras: 1. First, the sacrificer puts on clothes made of Tṛpā-grass; 2. After the Brahman-priest ascends the chariot-wheel reciting a mantra, the sacrificer recites a variation of the same mantra toward him; 3. Right before the race, the sacrificer distributes golden chips, reciting a variation of the so-called Ujjiti-mantra, and after the race, the Adhvaryu-priest offers libations reciting another variation; 4. The Avacchinnahoma should be offered if any accident takes place with the chariots or horses; 5. After the race, collecting golden chips, the sacrificer utters “ I trade this (= Surā-upayāma) for it (= vāja-, /probably reffering to the chips)”; 6. The Brahman-priest drinks of the Madhu-graha reciting a mantra of an unknown source.

All of these characteristic features found in the Vājapeya chapter not only clarify the uniqueness of the Vādhūla school, but also help to understand the Vājapeya in other schools.