THE JAPANESE JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Online ISSN : 1348-6276
Print ISSN : 0387-7973
ISSN-L : 0387-7973
Volume 29, Issue 2
Displaying 1-8 of 8 articles from this issue
  • HIROYUKI YAMAGUCHI
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 83-91
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The present study was intended to investigate the characteristics of coalition formation processes in the competition for power precedence, focusing on the phase where motivation to defend status was dominant. Subjects, 90 male undergraduates, were divided into 30 groups of three persons each and were assigned to each rank order of power such as No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3. Then they were confronted with the task to form two-person-coalition to obtain new resources for promoting their power ranks. Although No. 1 always prefered No. 3 as a coalition partner and No. 3 always prefered No. 1, No. 2 changed his preferable partner depending on the probability that he could recover in future if he lose his status. While high probability motivated No. 2 strongly to promote his rank and to select No. 3 as his coalition partner, low probability motivated No. 2 intensely to defend his status and to make large concessions to No. 1 to let No. 1 select him. Consequently, No. 1-No. 3-coalitions were formed more frequently on high probability condition, but No. 1-No. 2-coalitions more frequently on low probability condition.
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  • TETSUO TAKIGAWA
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 93-105
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The choice behavior in 2-Alternative N-Person homogeneous games was exhaustively investigated using a questionnaire method.
    Two complete sets of 39 games, the one set was based on linear payoff functions (L condition), and the other on two-interval step-wise payoff functions Scondition, were chosen on the basis of a game classification method developed by Takigawa (1989).
    The 39 games all for 11 players were defined respectively by the combinations of each level of four endpoints of payoff functions. Each of the 39 games was made identifiable by 4 alphabets representing the level of the endpoint (A>B>C>D). For example, the N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma game is coded DBCA. The subjects participated consisted of 132 college students, each of whom was assigned randomly to either of the two conditions. Table 3 shows the choice distributions and the degree of difficulties rated by the subjects on a 7-point scale. There was little difference between the 2 conditions in the choice distributions and the degree of difficulties. An efficiency factor was calculated for each game in order to evaluate the subjects' choice in terms of collective payoff. Figs. 1 and 2 show the two dimensional distributions of the 39 games in each condition, where the ordinate denotes the efficiency and the abscissa the experienced degree of difficulty. Based on the obtained two dimensional distributions, each game was classified into one of the 4 categories, highdifficulty high-efficiency, high-difficulty lowefficiency, low-difficulty high-efficiency, and lowdifficulty lowefficiency categories. Some noteworthy non-trivial games such as BBBA, CABA, CBAD, and CBCA were found in addition to N-Person PD (DBCA). Seven decision motives were extracted from the reasons given by subjects for their choice of alternatives in each game. The extracted motives were: type of alternative, maximax, minimax, collective payoff, α comparison, β comparison, and maximization of difference. Table 4 shows the alternatives in each game chosen by each of the 7 motives.
    The types of dilemmas, the equivalent and the exclusive, can be discriminated in the framework of the decision motive model. The relations between the types of dilemmas and the conflict situations were also analyzed. Finally, some methodological problems in the experimental game studies were discussed.
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  • HIROMI SHINOTSUKA
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 107-121
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Resource size, group size, cost and other's strategy were manipulated in four experiments using a forest manager simulation game, in which players planted seedlings and harvested trees as they grew. The game was repeated so that there were more than 20 trials. Results indicated that the less resources there were, the less cooperation there was, but the cooperative aspect of players' behavior could be improved by introducing costs and/or stooges, employing some certain strategies. And the most intensive cooperation was obtained under two tree-two person condition, enabling for the“one for one person”quota effect to take place.
    Subjects reported their motives, strategies and estimations of ranking of the levels of cooperation among various resource sizes in their responses to questionnaire and in face-to-face discussions. The discrepancies between the cognition of subjects and the observed behaviors were discussed.
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  • KAORI SATO
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 123-128
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    A positive effect of trust on the level of cooperation has been repeatedly demonstrated in social dilemma experiments. However, such an effect of trust is expected only when members behave strategically. Since strategic considerations are less relevant in a situation with lower visibility of individual action, the effect of trust is hypothesized to diminish as visibility decreases. The hypothesis was tested in a 3-person iterated social dilemma experiment with feedback manipulation. The results of this experiment clearly supported the hypothesis. That is, trust by feedback interaction was significant, and simple main effect of trust was significant only in feedback condition, not in no feedback condition.
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  • Ulrich Mueller, [in Japanese]
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 129-139
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • KATSUHIDE MOROI
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 141-151
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This study examined a) the factor structure of coping strategies for loneliness and b) relation-ships among loneliness and coping strategies. Four scales were administered to undergraduate students (N=402). The scales were two versions of UCLA Loneliness Scale (short-term loneliness, long-term loneliness), Coping Strategies Scale, and Self-Esteem Scale. Two versions of UCLA Loneliness Scale were completed with different criteria (“during the past two weeks”versus“during the past one year”).
    The results were as follows.
    1) Short-term loneliness scores were higher for males than for females. They were highly correlated with long-term loneliness scores.
    2) The factor analysis of coping strategies produced seven factors for males, and six factors for females.
    3) Results of the multiple regression analyses indicated that interpersonal coping strategies were effective in reducing long-term loneliness, while passive acceptance coping prolonged loneliness.
    4) Based on the combined scores of short-term and long-term loneliness scores, subjects were divided into three groups of different levels of chronic loneliness. Results of discriminant analyses indicated that high-chronic-lonely group used interpersonal coping strategies less than low-chronic-lonely group.
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  • SHIGEO SAKURAI
    1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 153-159
    Published: December 20, 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This study was conducted to investigate the Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) in 66 Japanese sixth-grade children using the method of questionnaire on intrinsic motivation. The CET was proposed by Deci (1975) and it had to do with the effects of extrinsic rewards upon intrinsic motivation. In this study the subjects were randomly divided into 3 groups, i. e., verbal reward group, token reward group, and control group. The verbal reward group was praised every time they solved the puzzles. The token reward group was given a token card every time they solved the puzzles. The control group was only to solve them. After each treatment, they were asked 6 questions and they answered them on 5-point scale. Most of the results did not support the CET. Especially, the prediction on feeling of competence was not supported. Several problems were discussed for developing studies on the CET.
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  • 1989 Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 169
    Published: 1989
    Released on J-STAGE: August 25, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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