This article attempts to analyze Indonesia's New Order under its post-1965 military leadership in light of its political modernization. The discussion assumes that the ability of the ruling elite to implement political modernization depends upon four conditions : first, the ruling elite must be able to maintain national unity in a political and geographical sense; second, it must define national objectives appropriate to prevailing national conditions; third, it must formulate economic plans and organize an effective administration for their execution; and fourth, it must allow for political groups to function as long as they support the goals and directions of Indonesia as prescribed by the ruling elite.
 The current military elite has demonstrated its ability to restore and maintain national unity, and to define the appropriate national objectives through the new political symbols of "development" and "Panca Sila democracy." Since 1969 the regime has launched the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, by which the regime has sought to justify its own existence and which has functioned as a symbol of national unity to a great degree. This regime also has earned political legitimacy through the general elections of 1971,which resulted in the victory of its party, Golkar. Although these actions encourage Indonesia's political modernization, there are other factors which seem to stifle it. The regime has mobilized highly educated technocrats into economic planning, but they have encountered many difficulties in implementing it effectively. The Javanese-dominated "moderate" wing of the Army, which controls the post-1966 Indonesian government, has consolidated its political position by eliminating the Army's more "radical" leaders, weakening the Indonesian Nationalist and Muslim Parties, regrouping the nine political parties into two large ones, and placing Golkar under the control of the Defense and Security Department. Although the Suharto leadership has been strengthened temporarily by these actions, its lack of political generosity in maintaining competing groups within the political system appears to have stifled desirable political development in Indonesia. Although the Suharto government may tolerate a low level of political development, it can not afford failure in economic development. In short, the future of the current Five-Year Development Plan and its succeeding plans, which are so much a symbol of national unity, may well determine the political life of the regime.

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 During the reign of Rama V, the proclamation of the Canal Administration Law of 1870 and the Canal Construction Law of 1877 provided a development of the new policy on public works. In order to secure water transportation facilities for rice trading, the government directed its efforts to the maintenance of the trunk canals linking the local producing centers with the capital port. Furthermore, the government, recognizing abuses of the land system under the old regime, exercised administrative control over the large scale landholdings and encouraged peasants to open rice fields along the newly-excavated canals. Under these sociopolitical conditions of this period, canal systems, based on the traditional transportation-inundation canals, developed all over the deltaic high region on the east and west banks.
 In the 1880's, according to the development, to a certain extent, of a national economy, the character of canal construction chaged remarkably. Land which could be used for rice cultivation began to be recognized as a valuable commodity. So the government began to give permission to wealthy official nobles and Chinese for the excavation of private canals and private ownership of land adjoining them. In the case of dredging of the old canals, executors, mostly Chinese, were permitted also to charge transit taxes on cargo boats using the canals. Most of these privately-financed projects were carried out in the delta flat region where there had been swamp and marsh land not suitable for rice cultivation without canals. This newly-opened land was sold and leased to peasants. It may be said that the landlord-tenant farming near the newly excavated canals indicated by some scholars, was caused by the conditions of reclamation outlined above.
 The construction of the canal system based on the traditional transportation-inundation canals including the privately-financed canals, ceased around 1900. The government again brought canal projects under the direct control of the Krom Khlong established for introducing a more effective modern irrigation-transportation system in 1903.

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 The rice plants in the deltaic area of the Chao Phraya are classified into eight types, from I to VIII, based on the plant height.
 Type I occurs in a geological depression in the middle of the delta, called Trough, and is distinctively characterized by an extremely wide height range, varying from 150cm to 400cm (Figs. 2&3). Type II covers the Old Delta and has a reasonably wide height range and a rapid lateral change of plant height (Figs. 2&4). Type III grows all along the marginal zones of the deltaic area, and has a pattern of plant height distribution similar to Type II, though the average height is slightly shorter than Type II. Type IV to VIII are found in the Young Delta and are characterized by a narrow range and a smooth lateral change of plant height distribution (Figs. 2&5).
 The subdivision of the Young Delta divided according to Types IV to VIII demonstrates that the further inland one goes the taller the plants are (Fig. 2). This phenomenon is explained by the help of a simplified delta model in which a scarp, characteristic of all deltas, separates the Old and Young Deltas. During a large and prolonged flood, the water inundates the deltaic area, with the flood depth increasing as one goes inland (Fig. 7). The greatest depth occurs at the foot of the scarp. The existing distribution of the plant height in the Young Delta seems to be a reflection of the topo-hydrographic conditions mentioned above.

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