Whether authoritarian or democratic, the Indonesian state, which administers a population with different languages, ethnicities, religions, cultures, and histories, is continually confronted with the task and challenge of managing problems arising from divisions embedded in Indonesian society. This paper identifies four such major divisions—center-periphery, ethnic, religious, and class—and examines how these social divisions are being managed under the current decentralized democratic regime in comparison with Soeharto's centralized authoritarian regime.
 The paper argues that Soeharto fashioned his New Order regime with the state as his power base and the army as its backbone. Military officers occupied strategic positions in the civilian arm of the state as district chiefs, mayors, provincial governors, secretaries general, and ministers in the name of dual functions. Soeharto imposed his “national consensus” of Panca Sila Democracy on the Indonesian populace and banned all public discourses on religion, ethnicity, and class, while addressing the question of class divisions through a politics of stability and economic development that sought to transform political issues into problems of output and to neutralize class conflict in favor of a consensus on growth in an authoritarian manner; all of these were premised on the “virtue” of political stability leading to economic development leading in turn to rising living standards and further political stability.
 Under the current regime, these divisions can no longer be contained and are managed in an open, decentralized way. Social divisions, above all religious, now constitute a cornerstone of local as well as national party politics. Ethnic politics are a crucial factor in the distribution of resources and positions in decentralized Indonesia. And in class terms, state powers and resources that have been devolved from the central government to the districts and cities are being captured by “local” men of middle-class backgrounds. In this sense democratic politics has worked to the advantage of Indonesia's middle classes, although they are divided amongst themselves along religious and ethnic lines. The long-term hegemony of the middle classes, however, depends on sustained economic growth, particularly the state's ability to create employment for millions of new entrants into the labor market.

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The birth of the Yudhoyono presidency in October 2004 was a significant moment in Indonesia's political history. As the first national leader directly elected by popular voting, Yudhoyono has unprecedented political legitimacy and has been expected to implement various programs for democratic consolidation. What is the nature of this presidency and what are the major political challenges for his leadership? This essay attempts to clarify these issues by examining political developments during the last two years.
 It illustrates how the Yudhoyono administration differs in two respects from the three previous governments led by Habibie, Megawati, and Wahid: first, in the popular mandate given to Yudhoyono as the winner of direct presidential elections; and second, in the power shift in the parliament since 1999 which has ended the virtual dominance of Megawati's PDI-P party. Given these characteristics, the political environment of Yudhoyono's administration favors a breakthrough in democratic consolidation, and this essay argues that Yudhoyono's expected role is to transform the status of democracy from the first to the second phase. Several problems that emerged in the first phase of democratic change, such as widening corruption, ineffective civilian control of the military, and the rise of bossism in local politics, were largely byproducts of institutional reforms conducted by previous presidencies in their attempts to eliminate Suharto's authoritarian polity. The historically expected role of a national leader in the age of direct presidential election is to mobilize the political capital generated by his or her popular mandate to remove these byproducts—which may derail democracy—and to consolidate the political system free from the legacy of the Suharto era.
 It is still too early to fully evaluate whether Yudhoyono will achieve this historical role, but this essay tries to assess the mid-term progress (if any) by investigating government performance in three issue-areas, namely political sector reform, post-conflict recovery, and elections of local heads. Despite many good signs of change and breakthrough from the past, a dilemma is increasingly visible between Yudhoyono's popular mandate and the demands of realpolitik compromise, and this may shadow the long-run prospects of second phase agendas.

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“Assimilation” has been long considered characteristic of Suharto's “New Order” policy toward the Indonesian Chinese. On the other hand, it is well known that sharp differentiation between pribumi and non-pribumi also existed within the civil administration. This seeming contradiction illustrates one of the difficulties in understanding the state's attitude towards Chinese in Indonesia during the Suharto era.
 This study examined the archives of the Department of Home Affairs, the department charged to carry out policies toward those of Chinese descent, in order to provide a clearer picture of how its laws and policies were conceived and formulated. It was found that the establishment of BAKOM PKB and such programs as assimilation training in RT/RW were used to try to bureaucratically control and dominate this issue, especially under the Dirjen SOSPOL. This was an agency of extreme importance with an active role in policing not only the Chinese but also Communism, Islam, and those related to SARA issues.
 For the Department of Home Affairs, the Chinese issue was not just about National Unity but, more importantly, a measure to secure the Suharto presidency. Utilizing both assimilation and differentiation in that context was neither a failure nor a contradiction. It was a necessary combination in order to depoliticize the Chinese issue for the political stability of the regime.

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Indonesia's political reforms after the fall of Soeharto transferred much authority to the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR). Those elected to the representative body in the 1999 and 2004 general elections were some of the most important figures in Indonesian politics today, in contrast to the powerlessness of the parliament during Soeharto's authoritarian rule. This essay focuses on those who were elected to the DPR in the 1999 and 2004 elections and examines how the composition of the DPR was affected by the 2004 elections. By providing specific and comprehensive data of DPR member profiles, including sex, year and place of birth, religion, academic background, occupational background, political and party experience, and organization background, this essay hopes to share new insights into the character of party politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

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The ruling Golkar party dominated the political scene during the Suharto era, but recently political power has been contested among various parties, including Islamic parties that emerged in the 1999 election. Some analysis of that election is still focused on a dichotomy between secular and Islamic parties, the so-called “aliran” politics of the 1950s. There is also an argument that political elites formed during the Suharto era have persisted even after the “reformasi” in 1998. This article, through an analysis of profiles of members elected to the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in 1999 and 2004, argues that aliran politics has been fading away and that new politicians have been emerging slowly. Although no longer dominant, Golkar has widened its base and absorbed some Islamic votes, while the new Islamic parties attract the relatively higher educated and some business elites. Thus Islamization is not directly related to the emergence of Islamic parties. Old political elites have also maintained their influence within both secular and Islamic parties, and various organizations dating from the Suharto era have been recruiting local elites. The increasing number of swing votes, largely consisting of urban people, is accelerating the shift in political elites.

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The present study focuses on changes in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. It examines a dispute involving the central government, a provincial government, and Caltex Pacific Indonesia (CPI), a multinational company based in Riau, over an oil block called Coastal Pekanbaru Plains (CPP). After democratization and decentralization, a new pattern of Indonesian politics has been in the making, the characteristics of which enable provincial politicians to create political networks with those who are powerful in Jakarta. Such political networks—initiated from the provincial level—did not exist within the New Order state. However, the CPP conflict illustrates their limits. The governor of Riau, Saleh Djasit, in challenging a policy decided by the central government, proved less able to set up a political network with powerful local and national politicians. Without substantial political backing, his challenge led to defeat and the dispute directly resulted in a climate inhospitable to foreign investors.

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This article focuses on the political movement to establish the new province of Gorontalo, which was created by separation from North Sulawesi province in 2000. Establishing new autonomous regions is clearly a characteristic of the identity politics that has become so influential after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime, and the number of autonomous regions has increased quite rapidly. Usually, established local elites are the central figures in such movements. In the case of Gorontalo province, however, youth were the main players in the movement and they have been politically influential since the establishment of the new province. This has led to the birth of an entrepreneurial government that is quite foreign to the Gorontalo area.

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