Problems of distributive justice have drawn special attention recently.Many disciplines, including welfare economics, game theory, moral philosophy, and politics, have encountered and discussed the problems of distributive justice from their unique perspectives. By comparing these disciplines, through positive analysis, sociology and social psychology have contributed some essential ideas towards understanding distributive justice. In this paper, I plan to review briefly and try to examine critically the existing achievements of the sociological approach and to further develop the sociological approach to the problems of distributive justice.
Exchange theory (G. C. Homans) and equity theory (S. Adams etc.) founded the basic formulation of distributive justice. Their definition of distributive justice is; distributive justice is a phenomenon which has consistent correspondence between traits attributed to distributees (contribution, work ability, productivity, need, ) and reward distributed to them bya distributor (income, prestige,). More briefly, it is a consistent relation between inputs and outcomes among distrubution- units. Inconsistency among them amounts to distributive injustice. Equity theorists (S. Adams, E Walster) typified the ways to reestablish a state of distributive justice and offered some specific hypothesises. Of course these are some critics of their ideas. M. Deutsche pointed out four phases in the distributive procese, and criticized the superficiality of Homans-Equity formalization.
J. Berger and his Stanford group also criticized the narrow perspective of Homans-Equity formulation. They distinguish 'local comparison' and 'referential comparison' in the evaluation of the distribution state. In local comparison, the reference is based upon specified distributee in the same distributive boundary. By contrast, referential comparison is more general and objective. Since Homans-Equity formalization is confined to local comparison, they have some defects. For example, they couldn't distiguish 'collective injustice from individual injustice', ‘over-reward from lower-reward' in two distributees. By introducing two comparisons J. Berger et al. could overcome these defects, and could discuss more exclusively the movement of reforming social injustice thus enriching the approach.
In the latter half of the paper, I point out four problems which have not been discussed by Homans, Equity theorists and their critics.
Firstly I illustrate the process of distribution as a three stage process with three subinfluences between each two stages.
What mechanisms work when the norm of distributive justice is formed? For the development of the norm, it's necessary to treat plural distributive units as the correlated matters, to attribute the correct significance to each unit and then formulate an idea of the potencial norm.
Secondaly, I tentatively follow the process of normative development in the hypothetical setting. As a result, I discriminate six functions of the developmental process which I hope provide additional insights into the problem of distributive justice and formal sociology in general.
Thirdly, I provide several hypotheses concerning the conditions that encourage formalization and the exercise of the norm of distributive justice.
Fourthly, each norm of distributive justice has its boundary of adaptation, so a state of distributive justice is regarded as the complete exercise of the norm among distributive units in a certain boundary. Based on the idea of‘boundary', we can more generally discuss various types of recovery from a state of distributive injustice and the various tactical uses to get one's own advantages within such a system.
I hope, some discussions in this paper will contribute to a foundationof the general theory of distributive justice.
抄録全体を表示