SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY
Online ISSN : 2423-9283
Print ISSN : 0038-0113
ISSN-L : 0038-0113
Volume 37, Issue 2
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
  • SUSUMU NISHITANI
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 113-134,216
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Egypt became a British colony as a result of the financial dificulties. It is the purpose of this paper to clarify the internal condition of Egypt which led to such a situation. At that time, there were three plans of grand scale: the Delta Barrages; the Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez Railroad; and the Suez Canal. It was financially impossible for the Egyptian government to materialize these plans in a short time, but the government ventured on these projects in a short period of fifteen years. it has been explained that such a venture was med possible by the changes of the ruling class (Khedive), the balance of power among European nations, and the international rivalry. We would, however, like to explain it by analyzing the judgement on the economic effects of these projects on the part of the Egyptian government. The Delta Barrages were constructed in the first place, because the economic effects of the plan would be superior to those of others, especially the railroad construction. This judgement was made on the assumption that the government would be able to maintain the monopoly of farm products. As a result of the collapse of the monopoly, the economic advantages of the Delta Barrages were bound to declin. In order to supplement the revenue, it became necessary to build the railroad and obtain income from the transit of foreign goods and passengers. It was, however, necessary to obtain foreign loans to construct the railroad at that time, and the dependance on foreign capital became inevitable. The construction of the Suez Canal would, it was anticipated, bring a considerable amount of income with a relatively small amount of investment. Actually, the Egyptian government had to spend more money than it had been estimated, and this again augmented the dependance on the foreign capital.
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  • MORIO SENOO
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 135-153,215
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Yamada-Hagaki is known as the oldest paper currency in Japan. Though it was a kind of private paper published by a local government, it circulated as an important money in the Ise district under the recognition of the Tokugawa government until the Meiji Restoration, which makes Yamada-Hagaki significant in the monetary history. The Tokugawa government tried to control the economy by forcing the circulation of three kinds of coinage as legal tender, and suppressed local currency which would endanger its policy. Especially, in the area under the direct rule of the Tokugawa government, the use of money except legal tender was prohibited. Why could Yamada-Hagaki survive in the Ise district, which was under the rule of the Tokugawa government? After discussing (1) the significance of Yamada-Hagaki in the monetary history, and (2) its transition from private to semi-public paper, we will treat the following points. (1) The time of its change to gold convertible note, (2) organization of the Hagaki guild, (3) the amount in circulation, (4) Matsuzaka-Hagaki, another paper currency, and (5) the increase of Yamada-Hagaki. We would especially like to touch upon the acceptability of Matsuzaka-Hagaki, which hindered the circulation of Yamada-Hagaki frequently.
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  • MASAKI TAKASHIMA
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 154-177,215-21
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    It is the purpose of this paper to clarify the reason why small national banks could play a role in the foreign trade finance. We would also like to show its effects on an individual bank. The attention will be focused upon the followings: (1) To re-confirm the characteristics of Korean trade by showing an example of documentary finance, (2) To clarify the characteristics of documentary finance in Korean trade, and (3) To shown the role of documentary finance in management of individual banks. First, we sill see that the existence of the 102the National Bank depended upon the documentary finance, then show the relationship between Korean trade and the finance of the bank. During the decade of the Meiji tenth, the finance of the 102th Bank did not concern with the imports of rice and beans-the important articles in Korean trade at that period-but with the exchange of the 18th National Bank of Nagasaki. In the Meiji twenties, the documentary finance of the 102th Bank expanded under the characteristic structure of Korean trade: lawns and shirtings from Nagasaki to Korea, and rice and beans from Korea to Osaka. However, Korean trade at that time was quite speculative, and the 102 Bank fell into trouble as a result of a failure in rice trade. The 18th Bank not only helped the 102th Bank financially, but also expanded its activity in Korea.
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  • NOBUTAKE KOIWA
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 178-197,214-21
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper tries to show how, when, by whom, and in what meaning was the word "Shokusan-kogyo" (Promotion of Industry) employed as an expression of industrial policy. It is a part of a larger study on the industrial policy in the early Meiji period. The word as a statement of the industrial policy was seldom used before the second decade of the Meiji era. At that time, the Japanese government was making an investigation of the conditions of Japanese industries in order to give answers to the questionaries by the British Legation. The classification of industries by the British Legation began to influence the various expressions of the industrial policy of the Japanese government, and it was during this period that the word Shokusan-Kogyo was gradually being employed. Those who used this expression were mostly government officials and its adherents called "Protectionists." By Shokusan-Kogyo they tried to convey the idea of promoting every kind of industries from the making of objet d'art to the manufacture of arms. It was quite convenient to use this expression for the government officials who recognized the failure of industrial policy adopted previously. The word Shokusan-Kogyo thus became a slogan of new industrial policy. The opponents, however, critisized the slogan, and the heated debates on the appraisal and modification of the policy followed. The depression as a result of the policy hurt those engaged in manufacturing, and they began to use the same slogan in order to obtain a relief policy. By the Meiji twentieth, Shokusan-Kogyo has become a cliche, and its political implication disappeared gradually.
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  • MATAJI MIYAMOTO
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 198-202
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • MASUMI TSUDA
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 203-205
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • MINORU KAWAKITA
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 205-208
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
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  • SHINICHI YONEKAWA
    Article type: Article
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 208-210
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Article type: Bibliography
    1971Volume 37Issue 2 Pages 213-216
    Published: August 20, 1971
    Released on J-STAGE: August 03, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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