Le capitalisme modern, debute a la fin du XVIII^e siecle, etait construit sur la base de la liberte du travail et la prohibition des coalitions professionnelles. Pendant premier temps, ce monde etait une image commune entre les producteurs independants. Mais, au fur et a mesure du developpement du capitalisme, la meme liberte des affaires economiques entraine de la concentration industrielle pour organiser scientifiquement et rationnellement la production capitaliste. Ce mouvement des capitaux, ayant pour but le progres de la productivite, est in-evitable en soi. Cependant, d'autre part, la concentration industrielle aboutit en fait au monopole de la production. C'est-a-dire, la formation des cartells ou trusts. Niant la liberte du travail en tant que principe d'ordre public, ce mouvement constitue un phenomene anti-social. Pour l'Etat, de concilier les interets de l'industrie et ceux de la societe, c'est le probleme tres grave de legislation industrielle. Selon M. SAINT-LEON, la formule de la solution varie necessairement d'un pays a un autre et dans un meme pays d'un temps a un autre. Le but de ce article est de rechercher cette formule au point de vue "discipline-industrielle". En ce qui concerne le cas de France, le changement historique de "discipline-industrielle" est decoupe en quatre periodes suivantes. Premiere periode: des annees 1776 a 1848, soit d'abolition de corporation par Turgot a la Revolution de 1848. L'institutionalisation de la regulation concurrentielle. Deuxieme periode: de 1848 a 1884, la transition d'individualisme a collectivisme. La promulgation de loi WALDECK-ROUSSEAU. La creation des syndicats professionnels. Troisieme periode: de 1884 a 1914, la lutte ouvriere contre "reglement d'atelier". La transion de contrat individuel(princcipe de "tete-a-tete") au contrat collectif. Vers l'Etat-Providence. Quatrieme periode: des annees entre Deux Guerres. Le developpement de mouvement associaniste. Comme ci-dessus, les ouvriers et patrons ont ete incorpores dans l'Etat. Mais, cette incorporation n'a pas le meme caractere que le "corporatisme" en Aleemagne et Italie.

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This essay focuses on the development from the rule and practice of fair trade, which serbed as a way of economic activity under free competition in the 19th century, to the state intervention against destructive competition and against monopoly from the viewpoint of fair trade principle after the World War I in Germany. The fair trade rule, which was established in 1896 as a law, Reichsgesetz zur Bekampfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, was by no means a system-atic regulation of competition by the government, but a way of economic activity like a habit for business under free competition. Such an advertisement and a praising, that was not really true, was regarded as nufair; incorrect marking of number, length, contents and weight of commodity as well as excessive price-cutting, which was much below the normal price(price of production, natural price), was considered as unfair also. As the rise of "heavy industries" was bringing the era of competitive capitalism to a close, and as small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in "finishing industries" (Fertigwarenindustrie) were compelled into the destructive competition after the World War I, the government of Weimar Republic attempted to intervene against the growth of monopolistic business positions. However it was after the crisis of 1929, especially under the government of National Socialism, that the state intervened in competition in order to protect the small and medium-sized enterprises. Das Gesetz uber die Errichtung von Zwangskartellen of 1933 intended to avoid the destructive competition among them by the governmental support of establishment of cartels in the finishing industries, which would maintain the "gerechten Preis" in the market. Das Wirtschaftsaufbaugesetz of 1934 enabled the state to organize the economic groups and put the market copetition in order from the viewpoint of fair trade.

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Industrial dicipline is made up of three elements, that is, labor discipline, industrial self-regulation and the public regulation of the industries. So it necessarily overlaps the problem of the integration of the society that is essentially composed of the "Government-Labor-Employers" relations. In this paper, by limiting the period covered to the one from the beginning of this century, when "New Factory System" and the industrial monopoly were formed, till the New Deal, I made it clear what types of the industrial discipline and the integration of the society were characteristic of the U.S.A. Anti-trust acts were the leading threads in my analysis of those relations. They concerned the regulation of the industries. In a broad sense, they represented the mode of "Government-Labor-Employers" relation also. Their changing method of applications and perspectives represented not only the mode of industrial discipline but also the pattern of social integration. The federal anti-trust regulation began in 1890. From then till the New Deal, how did it change? And how related was this change to the industrial discipline and the integration of the American society? In relation to that, what was the significance of the industrial regulation policies of the New Deal? I analyzed these issues in this paper.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Machandeau bill which was adopted at the National Diet but was not really applied to organize French economy in 1935. This bill was intended for a kind of compulsory cartel which was very popular in Italy, Germany and Japan in the 1930s. Facing the difficulties associated with the great crisis, French silk and leather industries wanted to organize their production by aid of government compulsory powers. And, the Marchandeau bill aimed to organize not only these two industries, but also all economic activities of France. This paper is composed of the following six sections: (1) Economic situations of the 1930s in France, (2) The motives of the Marchandeau bill, (3) Comparative study of the original Marchandeau bill and its amendment proposal, (4) Approval and disapproval on the Marchandeau bill, (5) Major points under discussion ato the National Diet and the Senate, and (6) Conclusion: historical significance of the Marchandeau bill. In the concluding section of this paper, the author stressed the reason why the Marchandeau bill was not successfully applied to French economy. The marchandeau bill failed because it aimed to abolish the market mechanism and to form cartelized econowy in France. But in France the article 419 of the criminal code prohibited cartel agreements among private companies. Moreover, many industrialists, Diet members. economists and others opposed the bill saying that it would abolish the free competition system. We can conclude that the Marchandeau bill failed because in France, even in 1935, there was a strong attachment to the system of free competition which had been originated by the French Revolution of 1789.

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If we could grasp 'industrial discipline' as relationships among firms, industrial relations between labor and management, and government intervention against such relations, 'industrial discipline' in this sense underwent a great change at the time of Great Depression. Freedom of trade and cartel contract which government officially permitted in the 1920s was restricted by the enactment of the Law of Control to Important Industries in 1931. Since then, government positively intervened in industrial oraganization by encouraging cartel and trust, and guiding their activities. On the other hand, the legal acknowledgment of freedom of trade(labor) union which was admitted in the level of administrarion in the '20s, was failed by the abolition of Trade Union Act-Bill in 1931. Since then labor policy was transformed from acknowledgment of trade(labor) union to its restriction. Thus the rapid transformation of 'industrial discipline' in the 1930s includes two phases: (1) Enlargement of restriction against 'freedom of trade and contract' among firms, (2) Change of labor policy from cooperetive direction to compulsory direction. The purpose of this paper is to focus on phase (1), and further to reseach the development of industrial organization policy in the 1930s. By doing so, we shall clarify the legal and functional features of industrial organization policy in Japan at that time. Conclusions of the research are as follows: (1) Although government intervention in industrial oranization was a world-wide tendency in this period, feature of intervention in Japan is that legal restriction in regard to market mechanism went ahead of the change of macro economic policy. Another feature is the positiveness of intervention. This means that the purpose of intervention was not only restriction of cut-throat competition, but also setting up of industry with scale economy or external economy. (2) The above features are based on following three factors: First, it is the character of industrial structure that heavy industries had comparative disadvantage in the world market, thus could not establish in market mechanism. Second, it is the character of industrial organization that cartel was prevailed, but competition was still at work in small and medium firms. Thirdly, it is the social factor that public opinion was not critical enough to restrain the freedom of trade.

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