SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY

La Criminalite dans le Pays du Nord de la Bourgogne d'apres les Archives des Justices Seigneuriales

YOSHIO SHIGAKI

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 109-144,226-22
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_109

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Pour mieux comprendre la fonction reelle des justices criminelles des seigneurs dans le pays du Nord de la Bourgogne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles, j'ai pour but de depouiller et analyser les archives judiciaires (principalement Serie B^2 des Archives Departementales de la Cote-d'Or) au point de vue de la criminalite. On a toujours jusqu'ici etudie la criminalite des justices royales (Bailliage, Presidial et Parlement) et municipales pour negliger les justices seigneuriales qui ont continue a fonctionner comme premiere instance malgre la competition et la difficulte avec les justices royals. J'ai choisi les seigneuries composees par les documents seriels; le comte de Charny, la baronnie de Gemeaux, le comte de Montigny-sur-Armancon, la baronnie de Talmay, l'abbaye de Saint-Benigne, l'abbaye de Citeaux et l'abbaye de Fontenay. En controlant en principe les sentences et les proctsverbaux, j'ai pu finalement aboutir a extraire 533 proces criminels. Ce sont les donnees de base. La repartition de ceux-ci est suivante: 209 proces (39.2%) entre 1661 et 1715(le temps de Louis XIV), 213 (40.0%) entre 1715 et 1772 (en 1772 Louis XV a publie l'Edit farmeux concernant la renvoie du proces criminel de la justice seigneuriale au Bailliage) et 111 (20.8%) entre l772 et 1790. Voici la conclusion principale. Premierement, en ce qui concerne le modele de P. Chaunu, "de la violence au vol", le volume des crimes reels a depasse entre l772 et 1790 celui des crimes pesonnels. Le crime des violences a ete le point capital des crimes au temps de Louis XIV et de Louis XV. Mais il a ete en decroissance et par contre le vol a augmente de volume d la veille de la Revolution. Il est certain que le changement de la structure sociale a donne lieu a l'inversion du volume des infractions. Secondairement en depouillant les archives seigneuriales, on peut analyser evidemment la repartition saisonnitre du crime, les, accuses (sexe, contumace, complicite, repartition socio-professionnelle),la victimologie et la peine. C'est que la justice seigneuriale a fonctionne plus ou moins jusqu'a la Revolution. Donc on doit porter pleinement l'attention sur l'activite de cette justice et ne pas negliger la criminalite au premier degre du systeme judiciaire dans le royaume. Mais afin de parfaire l'etude sur la justice seigneuriale, il me rest enoutre a etudier le systeme, la procedure et le frais du proces. Les resultats sur ces problbmes seront publiees bientot.

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Japanese Monetary and Financial Policy in Manchuria

YOSHIMASA SHIBATA

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 145-173,225-22
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_145

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This article aims to analyze the formation of the Japanese monetary and financial policy in Manchuria from World War I to mid 1920s and to draw the real aspect of its function. In 1905 the Yokohama Specie Bank began to issue silver notes in Manchuria in order to withdraw the military notes issued by the Japanese Army. At this time the Yokohama Specie Bank was charged with the task of unification or monetary system on the basis of Japanese silver yen in Manchuria, where multifarious local currencies had been issued with fluctuating exchange rate. The silver notes became the legal tender in the Kwan-tung Leased Territory and in the South Manchuria Railway Zone. This policy, however was doomed to fail in a few years due to worldwide fluctuation of silver price. In 1917 the Bank of Korea which had previously established many branches in Manchuria was given the right to issue the sole legal tender, which was gold notes, in place of the silver notes of the Yokohama Specie Bank. But the silver notes continue to be utilized in the trade of soya-beans, which was the main product, even after the new decision. This change of policy which the Terauchi Cabinet decided meant appearance of a remodeled monetary and financial policy of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria. The Terauchi Cabinet, especially Financial Minister Shohda, intended to unify monetary system through gold notes of the Bank of Korea and to establish gold standard in Manchuria. After several years, however, a few contradictions of the policy of 1917manifested themselves. One of them was a contradiction in the unification policy by gold standard in a region where there was really a limping standard with more gold notes and less silver ones circulating at the same time. The problem resultant therefrom was twofold. (1) A great disturbance was raised in Dairen Soya-beans Exchange when they changed official market quotations from traditional, usual silver coin standard to gold standard for the purpose of making gold standard thoroughgoing in Manchuria. (2) The Bank of Korea suppressed remittance from Dairen to Japan by means of high prohibitive charge for remittance in viev of a great increase in the amount of money sent from Dairen to Japan owing to the fact that gold notes in Manchuria were cheaper than Japanese yen because of their trade relations. Another Manifestation of the contradiction was dificulties in which Japanese banks, particularly the Bank of Korea with the role of a central bank among the Japanese banks in Manchuria,were involved. But the Japanese government, faced with those problems, could not fundamentally amend the framework of the policy of 1917, and temporized till September 1931.

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Development of the Ammonium Sulphate Industry in Japan

TSUNEO SUZUKI

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 174-199,224-22
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_174

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After the First World War, Japan's economy experienced a heavy industrialization, and especially chemical industries developed in connection with those industries that had already developed: agriculture, cotton industries, and war industries. But they had to compete with foreign industries in developing and consolidating their foundations. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Japan ammonium sulphate industry, which became independent of foreign firms in 1920s and '30s for price changes and for their decisions in technical problems. It can be said that the ammonium sulphate price inJapan had been determined by those in England, Germany, and America until 1932, when the gold standard was abolished in Japan. The price, therefore, moved in keeping with the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates as well; when the yen exchange rate became higher, it turned lower, and when the former lower, the latter higher. So the fall of price between 1929 and 31 was caused not only by the world crisis in 1929, but also by a high yen exchange rate. The falling rates of yen after 1932, on the contrary, let the price of ammonium sulphate soar to such an extent as if there were a tariff barrier. And in October 1932 when the association of ammonium sulphate producers (Ryuuan Haikyu Kumiai) was organized, they fixed a cartel price. Without protection of a tariff barrier, it was necessary for the Japanese ammonium sulphate firms to undersell foreign firms, find so they had to reduce the cost through technical methods. The largest part of the cost went for making hydrogen. Since they had no monopolistic advantage over each other with respect to the know-how, they tried to reduce the cost in terms of materials: electricity, coal, or coke. In selecting manufacturing techniques, they chose the most suitable method in relation to the groups of enterprise they belonged to. Some of them-Nihon Chisso Hiryo Co., Ltd. and Showa Hiryo Co., Ltd.-selected the methods of making hydrogen with electric power; and the others-Miike Chisso Kogyo Co, Ltd., Toyo Koatsu Co.,Ltd., and Sumitomo Kagaku Co.,Ltd.-selected those of making it with coal and coke. It can be said that no matter what kind of know-hows they might introduce almost none of them stood at advantage over the others. But it should be noticed that there was some difference in the ways they adopted the manufacturing techniques; the former group, called `Shniko Zaibatsu ' or new zaibatsu, adopted what were even at the stage of test plant in a smaller scale, and the latter, belonging to old zaibatsu, adopted what had already been developed and known for their merit.

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Recent Studies in France on Labour History

Ken-ichi Kinoshita

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 200-214
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_200

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Tsutomu Kitani, History of the Second German Empire

Eihachiro Sakai

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 215-217
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_215

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Koh-ichi Shimokawa, Business History of the Auto Industry in the U. S. A.

Kin-ichiro Toba

Article type: Article
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 218-220
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_218

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[title in Japanese]

Article type: Bibliography
1977 Volume 43 Issue 2 Pages 223-226
Published: August 30, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: July 22, 2017

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.20624/sehs.43.2_223

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