The aim of this paper is to answer the following question about the first part of Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Judgement". Is it possible to understand the three successive paragraphs, the 16th, 17th and the 18th, as working as a unit? In other words, is it possible for us to discover a right viewpoint, from which these three paragraphs are regarded as controlled by a common theoretical motivation? I do answer in the affirmative. The Ideal of Beauty (§ 17), in my opinion, is no more and no less than an a-priori condition, on which the truth or falsity of an aesthetical judgement is (ideally) determined. This a-priori condition has two aspects, just as determination in general does. On the one hand this condition makes it possible for us to negate (ideally) the opponent judgement (§ 16). On the other it affords us a right to make a statement of taste in the mode of postulation, that is, in the mode of necessity (§ 18). In this way those three paragraphs are coordinated.

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In Plato's Hippias Major 292e6-7, we can find a self-predication sentence ; "The fine is always fine." (We have similar expressions in Protagoras 330c4-6, 330d8-e1, Lysis 220b6-7.) How should we interpret this sentence? We cannot give it any metaphysical meaning drawn from Plato's own theory of Form, which is explicit in his middle dialogues. "The fine" here should be the logical cause, not the one of the metaphysical essentials (cf. Paul Woodruff's Plato Hippias Major, p.150). So taking a sentence like "parthenos kale kalon" (287e4), we can safely paraphrase it in Woodruff's manner : "a fine girl is a fine thing." This can avoid reading the metaphysical meaning into the text. And I would like to make a new proposal for reading of 292e6-7 : "the fine thing is what is to be called fine." This is to emphasize the unique character of the self-predication sentences in the early dialogues. In the Socratic way of discourse, Socrates and his partner get involved into "trial and error" during their pursuit of the knowledge. What they can do then is to give their opinions which seem to them true (so-called "alethes doxa", cf. Meno 85c), and to get close examinations of them. And in this way they are getting closer to the knowledge. My interpretation well describes these activities.

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In European aesthetics in the first half of the eighteenth century "illusion theory" was predominant. This was founded on two basic postulates : 1) the copy, namely the work of art, should be 'transparent' in its representation of the original, 2) the 'address (i.e. skill) of the artist' arouses less interest as compared with "original'. The purpose of this paper is to show how Moses Mendelssohn, who had once accepted illusion theory in the Uber die Empfindungen (1755) and the Betrachtungen uber die Quellen...(1757), came to deny it, and what theoretical innovations he thence enabled. Lessing's explanation of the "vermischte Empfindungen" (see the Briefwechsel uber das Trauerspiel in 1757) made Mendelssohn aware of the insufficiency of the first postulate, and his own reflectiont on the sublime, especially on the 'subjective sublime' in the Uber das Erhabene... (1757) led him to deny the second postulate. The late Mendelssohn insisted : 1) the postulate of the transparency of representation is ill-founded because it does not take account of the representing subject, i.e. the recipient, 2) the work of art is a 'stamp of the abilities of the artist'. In conclusion : The traditional dualism 'original-copy' was about to transform itself into the modern scheme 'artist-work of art-recipient'.

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In diesem Aufsatz geht es um die Rekonstruktion der Entstehung des Goetheschen Symbolbegriffs. Er will unter Beweis stellen, dass dieser durch eidetische Anschauung bedingt ist. Unter eidetischer Anschauung versteht man eine wahrnehmungsmassige Vergegenwartigung subjektiv existenten Vorstellungsinhalts. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht Goethes Brief an Schiller vom 16. August 1797, in dem er sich zum ersten Mal mit dem Symbolbegriff befasst. Dabei lag Goethe daran, seine eigene Dichterexistenz gegenuber Schiller, dem Verfasser von Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, zu verteidigen. Er bezeichnet solche Gegenstande als "symbolisch", die seine Einbildungskraft ansprechen und so die eidetische Anschauung ermoglichen. Die eidetischen Anschauungsbilder werden dann im Inneren verarbeitet und idealisiert ("gegenstandliche Dichtung"). Aufgrund der Ergebnisse der Eidetikforschung von E.R. Jaensch lasst sich feststellen : Sowohl das unmittelbare Anschauen symbolischer Gegenstande als auch deren eidetische Anschauung werden von einer gewissen schopferischen Stimmung getragen. Um Schiller dies anzudeuten, verwendet Goethe mit offensichtlichem Fingerzeig auf dessen Typologie das Wort "sentimental". Die Sentimentalitat erwirkt eine gefuhlsmassige Verbindung mit den Gegenstanden. Diesem psychischen Zustand hat Jaensch den Terminus "Koharenzverhaltnis von innen und aussen" gegeben. Ruckblickend auf seinen Brief uber das Symbol sagte der alte Goethe, dass "ohne unmittelbare Vereinigung von Object und Subject kein lebendiges Kunstwerk zu Stande kommen kann." (An Schultz 18. Sept. 1831) Davon ausgehend vertrete ich die Auffassung : dem Goetheschen Symbolbegriff liegt die Vereinigung (συμβαλλειν=zusammenwerfen) von Objekt und Subjekt zugrunde.

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This is an attempt to decipher some representative discourses on the "failure of the avant-garde" and presume a latent structure of denial/repression/exclusion under the origin of modern art, a structure as the other side of self-formation of art with a newly gained myth of autonomy. In order to establish itself as a sublimated domain of high culture, art might have had to throw away everything that could not comfortably fit in with its self-definiton. Since moderinized "arts" fell into a generic category "Art, " this Art seems to have been increasingly marginalized and impoverished, and at the same time given more privileges (if only symbolic ones) in compensation. While the dualism between "high culture" and "low culture" is no longer grounded in reality as firmly as it was once, a renewed device, modernism, was invented to secure imaginary boundaries and to continue the process of autonomization ; a more refined and reinforced device of repression, which also is to include the rebellious avant-garde as a momentary release of the repressed. The interrelatedness of modernism and the avant-garde, then, will appear as a conflict between an aesthetics for control and an aesthetics for anarchy.

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No one could deny that "Minimal art" is one of the most significant movements of contemporary art in 1960s. Donald Judd, sometimes called one of the "Big Five" of Minimalists, strongly hated the name. His hate is natural for the originality of his works is often beyond the concept of Minimal Art. Judd, as "empiricist, " insists on the clarity and reality of his works, and the originality of his spatial (though not in traditional sense) works is in them. His refusal of 'composition' and 'illusion (of pictorial space)' is derived from this, because of indefinability of the former and falsity of the latter. But his works could be 'real' as long as they are visually identified and their 'clarity' means such visual identifiability. As if "What you see" were inevitably "what you see" (Frank Stella), for Judd, visual objects never loses their identities and also vision itself never do their subjective and intersubjective ones. In other words his works are created to be visually identified. The true innovation of Judd's works must be this radical identifiability because all past visual works consequently have been intended not to be visually identified, to leave behind some virtual elements of them.

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