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Volume 33 (1982 - 198･･･
- Issue 4 Pages 2-
- Issue 3 Pages 2-
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- Issue 1 Pages 4-
Volume 33, Issue 1
Displaying 1-12 of 12 articles from this issue
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A Conceptual Framework[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 4-15
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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With Comparative Reference to the Japanese ExperienceSurichai Wun'gaeo1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 16-28
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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Tai Ching Ling1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 29-44
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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Michio Nakajima1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 48-63
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDurkheim constituted his sociology in a tense relation with existing social sciences. With respect to history, for example, he had a critical opinion.
Durkheim's view of history is based on the dichotomy between événement and institution. This dichotomy derives from his philosophical position which regards the existence of law a determinant factor of the scientific thought. According to his ideas, événement doesn't seem to occur from any law, and the domain of événement is refractory to science.
On the basis of this dichotomy, he criticized the traditional history which gave événement an excessive importance. This traditional view of history was typically expressed by Charles Seignobos. Against Seignobos, Durkheim insisted as follows : one cannot understand événement, if one doesn't recognize institution which is the structure of society. This idea is concretely expressed in his analysis of the World War I upon which has not been set due value. In my opinion, this analysis is one about the relation between mentalité (that is institution grasped in terms of collective psychology) and événement.
He defines sociology as the science of institution. And, his criticism of the traditional history exists at bottom when he regards the sociological explanation as the establishment of causal relations. In these senses, the place of the traditional history in Durkheim's sociology is important even if it is negative. In addition, his criticism of the traditional history coincides with the recent tendency in historical studies. This shows the historical significance of Durkheim.View full abstractDownload PDF (1936K) -
The Position of A. Schutz' phenomenological sociologyHideo Hama1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 64-77
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSThe purpose of this article is to reconstruct the total image of A. Schutz' phenomenological sociology. For this purpose I take up two fronts of its ; one is the debate with T. Parsons, and the other is the criticism of E. Husserl and J.-P. Sartre. These two fronts seem to have no relation, but they have the same root. We can see the original figure of Schutz' theory clearly here. I try to measure the position of Schutz' phenomenological sociology by 'triangular surveying'.
On the one hand, Schutz' phenomenological sociology identifies itself in contrast to the positivism. Parsons' action theory, because of his Neo-Kantian view of science falls into the myth of mistaking an ideal puppet for a living man. Contrary to Neo-Kantian positivism, Schutz returns to the subjective point of view of the living man in the prescientific life-world. In this sense Schutz' phenomenological sociology is first and above all projected as the 'critique of the knowledge'.
On the other hand, Schutz' phenomenological sociology identifies itself in contrast to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's attempt to account for the constitution of alter ego in the transcendental ego's consciousness has its radical consequence in Sartre's theory of the 'conflict of gaze'. The transcendentalism falls into another myth of transforming a living man into stone. Contrary to the transcendental solipsism, Schutz remains in the social world of everyday life where men encounter men.
Schutz' phenomenological sociology is 'phenomenologica' by its critique of the myth of positivism, and it is a 'sociology' by its negation of the myth of transcendentalism. Between the negation of positivism and that of transcendentalism appears the world of everyday life as the subjective and social reality, in Schutz' words, the sphere of 'mutual interaction in freedom'.View full abstractDownload PDF (1729K) -
[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 78-80
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 81-84
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 84-87
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 88-91
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 91-94
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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[in Japanese]1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 94-97
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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1982 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 98-121
Published: June 30, 1982
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
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