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Volume 32 (1981 - 198･･･
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Volume 32, Issue 3
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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Yoshikazu Satoh1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 2-17
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: April 23, 2010
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSForty years from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century in Europe is now being called an “Era of rebellion against positivism”. The current of thoughts in social sciences at that time was dominated by pessimism, which rejected the historical view of the progress of civilization. While people looked with their sceptical eyes at an “instrumental reason” which had long been leading to the positivistic empirical sciences in the 19th century. They were, on the other hand, very interested in the problems of human consciousness and the symbolic world.
In this paper we will undertake an estimate of Alfred Schutz's theory of the constitutional phenomenology of natural attitude in its relation to the intellectual current of his days, so that we can understand correctly the meanings of Schutz's theory and its significance. We can see the basic point of his profound studies on “self-understanding” and “understanding of others”. It is characteristic of Schutz's theory that its method is “reflexive” and its perspective “ego-logical”. Therefore, it demonstrates a striking contrast with the positivistic empirical social sciences, of which the method is “inductive”, the perspective being “cosmological”.
I conclude as follows ;
(1) The construction of reality in terms of the constitutional phenomenology of natural attitude is not the same as the analysis of reality in terms of the standard positivistic social sciences.
(2) The contribution of Schutz's study is to give us useful knowledge about the structure of society, which presents itself like a “thingness”, and about the characteristics of the scientific concept formation.View full abstractDownload PDF (2071K) -
Takeshi Yamagishi1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 18-35
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSWe, both travellers and co-players on the stage of world-theatre successively perform realities.
Everywhere my body is always with me. I have my body through which I can experience my location and my insertion in the world. My body is the starting point of orientation, perspective, and action. It may be said that all dramas of everyday life happen outside or inside my body. Our unique body is the field of various expressions.
What is the basic problem for us in everyday life ? I think it is to live our life, that is, to build the world in which we can construct meaningful realities. There may be four main activities in our life. These are as follows : world-building, reality-construction, situation-definition, and identity building.
My body is the fundamental situation for me. My experience is both of the world and in the world. Through my body I have been involved into the intersubjective socio-cultural world. Everyday life-world is the world of role-playing and self-presentation, of communication and interaction, of common sense and folk ways.
Being born into the world means to experience our world and our body. It also means to experience Others and things. Man's experience of the world is always associated with the experience of himself.
It is urgent problem for us how to locate us in the world and to relate us to the world. Reality-construction may be defined as ordering of our world experiences. Also it may be defined as building of the meaningful world.
On the one hand our body is a physical object, but on the other hand our body is the phenomenal body. By the phenomenal body is meant the lived-body which is intimately connected with intentional consciousness and action.
Man is the body-subject. My body is the focus of lifelong social experiences.View full abstractDownload PDF (2271K) -
Reflections on A. Schutz's Three PostulatesSetsuo Yamaguchi1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 36-53
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: April 23, 2010
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSThe “phenomenological” sociology of Alfred Schutz has found many followers as the most promising way of understanding the social reality by reducing it to the sense-making activities of men and women. However, a careful examination of his argument reveals that it contains some difficulties of great concern : is his conception of the “scientific model of rational human actions” as the ideal-typical construct of social world compatible with the core doctrine of phenomenology ? How does this model come to interrelate with the problem of human freedom ? Doesn't his “Postulate of adequacy” suffer from a self-contradiction ? It seems to me that these difficulties come from his basic assumption that the methodological foundation of social sciences lies in the “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude”. In this paper, some reflections are made on the three postulates which, Schutz claims, validate the social scientific constructions in order to shed light on these difficulties inherent in his “phenomenological” sociology.View full abstractDownload PDF (2273K) -
Yumiko Ehara1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 54-69
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSThough the concept of “relevance” is one of the key concepts of Schutz's theory, it seems to be hard to understand to us. One of the reason why seems that he use the concept in various meanings in his various contexts.
First, to analyse his concept of “relevance”, I will try to follow his descriptions.
Second, by summarizing the interpretations given to the concept, I will show the fact that the meaning of his “relevance” could be interpreted into three different meanings as follows :
1. an attribute ascribed by an individual to selected aspects
2. function or action of selection
3. correlation of type or knowledge
Third, regarding “the problem of relevance”, we could consider it as the problem that is to clear many propositions underlining our daily thinking but never appearing in our “natural attitude”. Then, from what points of view did he approach the problem ? We can state that Schutz had two different view points- (1) Phenomenological reflection and (2) (Scientific) observer.
Thus the three different interpretations of his concept of “relevance” become to clear. He used his concept in three different ways corresponding three different viewpoints of (1) natural attitude, (2) phenomenological reflection, and (3) (scientific) observer.
Finally, I will point out the peculiar aspect of “the problem of relevance” and review how we could continue to consider his problemView full abstractDownload PDF (1900K) -
Takamichi Kajita1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 70-87
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSAlmost all the sociologists who maintained the modernization theory insisted that “ascription” would disappear or barely remain as “achievement” became predominant. Even now, this thesis is supported by many people. Such is the modernization theories' paradigm, and we can find this paradigm in many sociological theories such as Linton's, Tonnies', Durkheim's, Parsons'……
Now we are in the “achievement society”, in which achievement becomes the most powerful principle for distribution and allocation, and in which almost all the members become achievement-oriented. However, when we observe the actual with full attention, we can find unexpectedly the fact that there scarcely exists “achievement” in the strict sense and that many social problems related to “ascription” newly come on the scene.
We can find out two new fields for sociological investigation. The first is the “achieved ascription” that is the achievement which changed into ascription (e.g. credentialism). The second is the “ascribed achievement” that is the achievement supported by ascription (e.g. competition for achievement under the influence of language, ethnicity, social class….)
R. Linton and T. Parsons gave definitions of “Achievement” and “Ascription”. But Parsons later modified his terminology and converted Achievement/Ascription into Performance/Quality. Between Linton' s definition and Parsons', there is a subtle difference. When we try to cross two axes (Linton's Achievement-Ascription. and Parsons' Achievement -Ascription), we can discover four fields :
(I) L (Linton) -Achievement & P (Parsons) -Achievement, (II) L-Achievement & P-Ascription,
(III) L-Ascription & P-Ascription,
(IV) L-Ascription & P-Achievement.
In many sociological theories, I and III are analyzed explicitly, but II and IV are covert or are not indicated clearly. We can call II “achieved ascription” and IV “ascribed achievement”. These two are the fields which are in need of the most vigorous investigation in modern sociology.View full abstractDownload PDF (2375K) -
[in Japanese]1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 88-90
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDownload PDF (392K) -
[in Japanese]1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 91-95
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDownload PDF (566K) -
[in Japanese]1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 95-98
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDownload PDF (412K) -
[in Japanese]1981 Volume 32 Issue 3 Pages 98-101
Published: December 31, 1981
Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDownload PDF (468K)
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