Since its establishment, Japan's Technical Intern Training Program has worked as a de facto guest-worker program for companies and industries short on labor. Previous studies on the employment of technical intern trainees focus on local industries that use this program to show why trainees are necessary and how they work. However, little is known about whether local differences exist in the use of the program, and if so, why. By investigating these issues, this study attempts to understand the factors shaping labor demand for technical intern trainees. Focusing on the seafood processing industry, the study obtains two sets of results. First, an analysis using the 2013 Census of Fisheries shows significant local differences in the introduction of technical intern trainees. Second, the interviews with managers of seafood processing companies in Town A in Kinki region reveal two interrelated factors, which dampen local demand for technical intern trainees. First, employers prefer local female part-time employees as flexible labor force for limited and unstable operations, and second, limited work options for local employees, and the relative ease with which employers with limited and unstable operations concede employees' requests for changing work shifts, both of which ensure that employers secure local workers. These results indicate that the type of production activity, in addition to the job characteristics of the industry, is a factor that shapes the demand for technical intern trainees. The study also discusses an implication of the program and the survival of local industries in the era of population decline and aging.

Japan, one of the world's fastest-aging societies, now faces the crucial question of how to secure care workers. The Japanese government predicts a labor shortage of 377,000 workers in the care industry by 2025. To address this problem, the government has opened its domestic market to foreign trainees entering Japan under the Technical Intern Training Program to work in care facilities, as well as foreign students entering the country under student visas to obtain national licenses as certified care workers. There are many things to be learned from Japan's experience of accepting foreign care workers, as well as many aspects to discuss in terms of how Japan should prepare to receive incoming foreign care workers in the future.

This article scrutinizes the challenges and issues that have arisen since Japan began to accept foreign care workers under its bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. This study found that 12.5% of EPA care workers have left Japan, even though they obtained national licenses that allow them to obtain permanent residence. This study found a difference in care expectations, with aging Asian countries using a medical model that represents a doctor-oriented cure. This conflicts with Japan's life model, which stresses a form of care that respects individual lifestyles. It is critical to bridge the gap in care settings between the medical and life models, as well as ensure proper training regarding the life model, not only to encourage foreign care workers to stay longer in Japan, but also to transfer the concept of the life model to the workers' countries of origin, from which many will arrive in the coming decades.

In this paper, we explore the specific aspects of Japan's new system for foreigners conducting housekeeping services (FCHS) in the National Strategy Special Zones of Kanagawa, Osaka, Tokyo, and Hyogo, within the context of Japan's foreign worker acceptance system from 2017 onwards. We examine this case in light of previous studies on female migrant workers against the background of migration theory, and analyze the concentration of power among stakeholders in the new power elite through the process of establishing this system at the macro and mezzo levels.

The Japanese Government planned FCHS to raise women's employment rates and ensure “women's success” as part of Japan's Revitalization Strategy (2014). This initiative was started to improve the “infrastructure of living” for initial acceptance of “advanced human resources.” This project is supposed to expand to living support outside of long-term care insurance after enforcement. Along with Japan's new governance-type immigration policy, some new power elites are responsible for developing and enforcing it; this policy is different from conventional foreign acceptance in two major ways. First, reproductive labor is being introduced to enhance international competitiveness, to further technical innovation, and to stimulate economic promotion in an economically mature country. However, foreign workers' acceptance into the production labor departments of the Special Economic Zones is usually focused on the “production area.” Secondly, accepting domestic workers signifies a turning point in terms of changing policy: whether to not accept foreign unskilled labor, or to change the legal position of reproductive and domestic workers in Japan.

This paper discusses how the category of “illegal residents” became legitimate in Japan and its consequences by tracing changes in the usage of categories referring to irregular migrants. In the 1980s, the number of migrants coming to Japan increased significantly. They were referred to as japayuki, female migrants who worked in the sex industry, or “foreign workers,” male migrant workers who were largely unskilled. These terms were used based on migrants' gender and occupation, rather than residential status.

However, in 1990, a revision of the immigration law created a distinction between “legal” and “illegal” foreign workers, which affected the stratification of migrant labor markets. In addition, for administrative purposes, the Japanese police introduced a category of “illegal residents” as “criminals.” Subsequently, although civil society criticized the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” and alternative categories such as “workers” and “residents,” this difference spread to other fields as well. Since the 2000s, the Japanese government has introduced some countermeasures targeting illegal residents as part of its actions supporting the “War on Terror” and against “foreign criminals.” The latter measures aimed to decrease the number of illegal residents by half in five years. In this manner, over time, the category of “illegal residents” diffused and became legitimate.

Today the government bases its policies regarding the exclusion of irregular migrants on the category of “illegal residents,” which strengthens the legitimate status of this category. In addition, this category affects the rise in public anxiety surrounding foreign criminals, which helps avoid arguments on the establishment of migration policy in Japan.

While the expansion of the knowledge economy still requires skilled migrants, a rise in nationalism has been gradually leading many countries to adopt more restrictive immigration policies. In the case of Japan, however, the government has further developed skilled migration policies due to the population aging and labor shortage. In 2012, the points-based preferential immigration treatment for highly skilled foreign professionals or the so-called “points system” was introduced to promote skilled migration by providing qualified workers with various incentives. Partly because of these policy initiatives, the number of skilled migrants has been growing. Nevertheless, this figure is limited compared with the numbers in other industrialized countries, as many skilled migrants leave Japan after several years.

Why does the number of skilled migrants in Japan remain small, and why do many of them leave the country after a short while? Building on the concept of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983), this paper analyzes why mimetic isomorphism has not brought about a convergence in outcome by addressing “non-migration policies” and “hidden agendas in migration policies” (Castles 2004). It also points out the implications and challenges of Japan's skilled migration by reviewing new policy developments, such as the regionalization of immigration through the National Strategic Special Zones. It concludes by presenting some future research agendas.

This paper examines educational achievement among 1.5 and second-generation migrants in Japan using analytical frameworks developed in the US and Western Europe, which emphasize the bifurcation of various migrant groups. Using 2010 census data and interviews with 79 Argentinian and Peruvian youth, we clarify two questions. First, how is the second generation bifurcated in terms of educational attainment? We find a clear pattern of inequality by nationality: Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese come first and are almost equal, while Filipinos, Brazilians, and Peruvians have a much lower rate of university enrollment (Vietnamese are located in-between). Second, which factors are related to educational attainment? Our data show that parental education and occupation are significantly related, but the age of migration to Japan is not. This is because most migrant students who attend college entered Japanese schools and suffered from adaptation problems, but did better academically in high school. At the same time, most of them passed the entrance exams with very good scores, which means that alternative paths are necessary to ensure educational opportunities for migrant youth.