The machinery which the Kamakura Bakufu set up in Kyushu to govern a large area has been much studied from the point of view of institutional history, with priority given to its judicial aspect. In the present article, attention is given to two aspects which have been largely overlooked, namely, its close relationship with the office of county shugo 守護 (Protector) in Kyushu, and its connection with the "tokusei" (徳政 : political innovation), especially the protection of the estates of Shinto shrines. As to the first point, at least eleven counties saw their shugo replaced at the same time towards the end of 1275. This reshuffle formed part of the plan for a counter-attack on Ko-ryo, which had been used by the Yuan as a base for their invasion of Japan. In the reshuffle, the arrival in Kyushu of Kanesawa Sanemasa 金沢実政 as deputy for the shugo of the county of Buzen 豊前 was the starting-point of the political process leading to the establishment of the office of Chinzei-tandai 鎮西探題. There followed the arrival of Hojo Tokisada 北条時貞 as shugo of Hizen 肥前 in 1281 and the exercise of military power over the whole of Kyushu by Hojo Kanetoki 北条兼時, who was appointed shugo of Higo 肥後 in 1293. These appointments were made directly in response to the external tension caused by the Mongol invasion, and resulted in the extension of the influence of the Hojo clan. This process reached its peak when in a short space of time the offices of shugo of four counties, Hizen, Higo, Buzen and Osumi 大隅, were monopolized by Kanesawa Sanemasa, who returned to Kyushu as Chinzei-tandai in 1296, and his close relatives. The development of regional power, pointing to the future territorial government system under the shugo, had already begun. As for the second point, the Tokuso (得宗 : head of the Hojo clan) government, which dominated the Kamakura Bakufu, framed a series of policies called Koan-tokusei 弘安徳政 in 1284 after the Mongol invasion. These policies were an attempt to elevate the Bakufu into a central power ruling over the whole of Japan by having the Bakufu decide cases concerning the land-tenure problems of shrine estates and by organizing the people under the control of manor lords into a new feudal hierarchy. The policies were, however, upset by a coup-d'etat in November 1285 in which the leader of the innovatory movement, Adachi Yasumori 安達泰盛, was killed. What the post-coup Tokuso government inherited from the Koan-tokusei and developed still further was a policy of almost blind protection of the Shinto shrines. Although the Tokuso government was prematurely possessed of several characteristics of the Muromachi Bakufu, it did not attempt to reform the shogun-gokenin (将軍-御家人 : lord-vassal) relationship which was the institutional backbone of the Kamakura Bakufu. Lacking any legitimate claim to exercise domination over the gokenin, it sought to enhance its power by obtaining a huge material base. But this was only to estrange the vassals and to intensify the isolation of the government. The Tokuso government even feared that the Kanesawa family, which belonged to the Hojo clan, might extend its influence in Kyushu, and a step was taken to check the process by which the Kanesawa were becoming a territorial power. In this way, the government could not avoid continually giving rise to its own critics and opponents, and so it deepened its reliance on divine protection in order to escape from the sense of isolation.
The Ts'ai-cheng ch'u 財政処 was established in 1903 during the new regime period after the Boxer Incident to be a specialized agency for implementing fiscal reform, and was active over a period of four years. This was the point of departure for China's fiscal modernization, but clespite its great significance in this connection, neither the composition nor the functions of the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u have been made clear. In the present article I deal with the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u's composition, and have attempted individual investigation of the staff menbers assembled there. The staff members assembled at the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u numbered twelve in all, and they may be classified as follows ; there were those who had acquired their expertise in fiscal affairs while serving as officials in the Ministry of Revenue (Hu-pu 戸部) ; and those who had been recommended by Chang Chih-tung 張之洞, Liu K'un-i 劉坤一, Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱 and other enthusiastic promoters of the new regime within the bureaucracy. In general they were young officials of superior ability. Further, the investigation of these staff members reveals two striking characteristics. First, Prince Ch'ing (Ch'ing Ch'in-wang 慶親王) and Ch'u Hung-chi 瞿鴻〓, who had established the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u and subsequently became its heads, stood in a relationship of political antagonism towards each other. Secondly, Na-t'ung 那桐 and other members of the staff were in receipt of strong support from Japan. It would seem that one should pay attention to these two characteristics when examining the functions of the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u. The present article, in accordance with its aim of securing one area of the foundations for the study of the new regime, has gone no further than to elucidate the details of the establishment of the Ts'ai-cheng ch'u, and its composition.