The purpose of this article is to examine the development of Soviet Marxism as an ideology of international politics. Marx and Engels, founders of Marxism, regarded the balance of power system of the 19th century Europe as an archenemy of international revolution. Lenin, who professed himself to be a legitimate successor of Marxism, shared his predecessors' hostile views on the European system.
With the acquisition of power, the Bolshevik leaders hoped at first for successive revolutions in Europe, but, once disappointed in it, they began to learn from traditional diplomacy. The adoption of Stalin's doctrine of “socialism in one country” not only cut the path to peaceful co-existance with capitalist countries. It also brought about a decisive turning point of Soviet political history, at which the task of building socialism in the Soviet Union was given precedance to the task of international revolution. Later in the 1930's, the Soviet Union took part in power political games for security, while it assigned to international communist movements a new task to prompt western democracies to cooperation with it against fascist powers. During 22 months following the conclusion of the non-aggression treaty of 1939 with Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union revived the logic of revolution to disguise its territorial claims for security. Hitler's war against the Soviet Union, however, changed the situation, and the Soviet Union pursued the policy of alliance with western powers, which led even to the liquidation of the Comintern in 1943.
In the post-War period, the Soviet leaders intended to promote national security, apparently assuming that friendship with western powers could be compatible with the forming of sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Faced by the growth of the United States as an overwhelming global power and the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Union tightened its control over East European countries through an
official reinterpretation of people's democracy, while instigating communist parties elsewhere to resist the “imperialistic, antidemocratic” camp. The intensification of the Cold War, which resulted in a protracted war in Korea, however, made the Soviet Union turn to the so-called peace offensive particularly leaning on the world wide clamour for peace. In an article contributed to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin set a certain value on international peace movements. It was only the beginning of the far-reaching change of the Soviet doctrine regarding international relations. After Stalin's death, the C. P. S. U. under the leadership of Khrushchev gave up the Lenin's theses on the inevitability of war, and struck out a new grand design for the victory of socialism through peaceful competition with leading capitalist countries. When that turned out to be an illusion, the Brezhnev regime resorted to a new strategy of promoting national security through
detente on the basis of military “balance”, and through strategically winning over selected developing countries. The doctrine of compatibility of
detente with “world, revolutionary process” is an ideology corresponding to this new line of policy.
The above discussion leads this writer to an opinion that the development of the Soviet ideology of international relations has essentially been subject to needs of the Soviet state with a self-imposed task of building socialism and even communism in one country. The Soviet doctrine of world situation, international revolution and western state system has suffered changes according as the Soviet Union has grown as a superpower under assumedly inimical circumstances.
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