The worldwide economic recession that started with the oil crisis in 1973 is so severe that it reminds us of the 1930s. Of course, it is not proper to simply compare the present situation with that of the 1930s since each era has its own background in the international arena. Nonetheless, there is no denying that the present worldwide recession, being accompanied by a marked surplus in productive capacity, has various aspects similar to those of the 1930s. Firstly, unemployment is looming large in major industrial countries, and the struggle over markets is intensifying among them to assume an aspect of all-out economic war. This is not limited to trade alone but has expanded to currency and exchange to such an extent that concern is now voiced that the multiple circulating mechanism of the world economy might crumble again as it did in the 1930s. In any event, we can no longer discuss international politics without regard to economics. In this sense, the present international situation seems very similar to that of the 1930s. At no time, of course, can politics be discussed separately from economics. Usually, however, politicians and scholars tend to be caught easily by the illusion of a separation between politics and economics, which has given rise to much confusion in the past. The most dangerous thing is to give definitive consideration to economics and to underestimate its effects on political and other matters, for, in real politics, economics can never be left aside as “mere economic matters.” We should realize that international politics and economics cannot be differentiated from one another in the modern age. From the view-point of this political economics, this paper attempts to analyze the “solidarity” or “conciliatory attitude” among major industrial countries through international discussion and negotiation over the share-out of world markets in the deep-seated worldwide recession, and to examine to what length such international solidarity is permitted to go.
It is our common knowledge that politics and economics are today interwoven strands in the fabric of world order. In fact, both politics and economics cannot be dissociated with each other in terms of dynamics of mutual influences. Current international affairs have clearly witnessed this complexed linkage. An important question is, however, to show the extent to which both are interrelated towards reconstructing an existing world system. This requires us to search for a new framework for analysis concerning international political economy. This is apparently a question of methodology: how theoretically should we approach to the emerging reality? The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to attempt to establish a promising methodology with respect to international political economy. First, we shall try to compare major schools as those of “interdependence”, “world order”, and “transnational politics”, thereby to demonstrate what weakness and strength could be observed in the three approaches. Secondly, an argument will be extended to structural changes in world politics. This is precisely because the implications of structural changes will have a great significance on the way in which the frame-work for analysis be pursued. Finally, a transnational approach will be particularly proposed as a new methodological perspective. The validity of politico-economic models will be tested on the basis of evidence adduced from the latest case of American-Japanese transnationalism.
(1) When evaluating the ties of interdependence from the standpoint afforded by two concepts of economics, the division of labor (exchange) and distribution, we may identify certain shifts in policies and attitudes in the industrialized and developing counties alike. The industrialized nations have become more dependent on one another through the division of work so far. As their horizontal division of work advances, however, attention is increasingly turned to the questions of distribution of production, employment and profit. The proliferating “trade frictions” and protectionism mirror the aspiration to protect national production and employment. But they also represent a demand for justice in distribution. On the other hand, the developing countries are drawn into the relationship of interdependence primarily in the form of receiving economic assistance from the industrialized nations, or part of the fruits of the latter's economic activities, and using such assistance as input for economic development. The gradual growth of light industries in the developing countries, however, has led them to claim more benefits from the division of work (exchange) with the industrialized countries. Here is the beginning of the adjustment problem for industries in the industrialized countries. What is under way is, therefore, a shift in the industrialized nations from the division of labor (exchange) to distribution, on the one hand, and a shift in the developing countries away from distribution toward the division of work (exchange), on the other. (2) Admittedly, these shifts are not yet complete. The division of labor among the industrialized countries (exchange) does not diminish in importance. Nor does the distribution from them to the developing countries (economic assistance). The cross influences coming from the shifts between the division of labor (exchange) and distribution in the industrialized and developing worlds form the background of intervention of “politics” into the economic relations of interdependence. Particularly after the late 1960s, natural resources supply was no longer regarded as a mere external data as it had used to be, but the “resources problem” assumed decisive importance to the fate of the world economy affecting the principles that once supported the world economic order. In the previous postwar decades, that order was sustained by the power principle; the most powerful country imposes an economic order and is strong enough to pay the cost of preserving it. Specifically, this means that the U. S. had managed the free world, and its institutional under-pinnings were the IMF and GATT. The developing nations, however, have now come to assert the principle of sovereignty, using the leverage of United Nations-passed resolutions and the resources problem. The previous balance of costs and benefits concerning the maintenance of world economic order has been lost. Further, demands for fairness and justice are implicit in the assertion of the sovereignty principle, but there is practically no hope for adjusting them with a unified international criterion. Some industrialized countries have become less competitive in the course of trade liberalization. In certain instances, they assert the sovereignty principle or its variants with respect to trade among themselves. This is the case of trade frictions between industrialized countries. (3) The sovereignty principle is not always a source of conflict in the economic relations of interdependence. As long as it is accepted, however, it would be impossible to prevent totally the incidence of “trade frictions” and protectionism. In this sense, when the sovereignty principle is involed more strongly, the scope of international cooperation is restricted by that much. In other words, if we emphasize the sovereignty principle and discount economic rationalism or put politics forward economic rationality, we could obtain o
The subject of this paper is to point out through foreign behavior analysis of the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, new development strategies (independent, collective self-reliance and New International Order) of the Third World. Voting behavior analysis of the Third World explains the break up into groups within the international organization and the behavior restricted factors from national attributes by pattern analysis and behavior-attributes analysis through quantitative-multivariate (HAYASHI II/III) analysis of roll-call votes in the UNCTAD general assembly 1964-1972. For example, the advanced industrial states and LDCs have entirely different goals, because the advanced industrial states maintain the OIEO (Old International Economic Order) system and LDCs emphasize the NIEO system. As a result, the advanced industrial states and LDCs each assert different positions. The advanced inductrial states maitain that with increases in foreign aid they intend to decrease the economic gap with LDCs. Meanwhile LDCs enforce resources nationalism while at the same time LLDCs, having no countermeasures, assert with national slogans of “self-reliance”, an autarky economy. Thus, in general, group patterns in international organizations can be described as a trilateral structure. These results of analysis are relevant to “development” perceptions in foreign policy decision-making of the Third World and show that “dependencia” conditions are affected by international system characteristics. “Development” perceptions and “dependencia” conditions are important to development strategies of the Third World and it is useful to understand Third World conditions in the international system to make progress toward creating new development strategies. In new development strategies, “self-reliance” concepts are increasingly important, along with those of a “New International Order” and global interdependence. Development strategies of “self-reliance” do make sense and appear very important in establishing a new international “peace” order and in meeting basic human needs. But as each nation possesses its own individual goals and interests, these may also restricting factors, posing a dilemma in attempting to overcome the “law of Matthew” in the international economic structure. Therefore, the politics of “self-reliance, ” having a primary interest in achieving an NIEO system, must also assume responsibility in devising—more than just national strategies—a workable new economic network.
It is well known that in the 4th Middle East War, broken out in the fall of 1973 and lasted only 17 days of fighting, both the Arab states and Israel lost half of major weapons such as tanks and aircrafts they kept in an armament race based on imported arms. It was surely a hot war of attrition between regional military powers equipped with imported arms. Both the U. S. and the Soviet Union, also at that time, were apparently in favor of maintaining the status quo in that region, and thus tried (1) to preserve the military balance in peace time, (2) to keep the development of war under their control after it broke out, (3) to seek a settlemet under an international arrangement forged primarily by the U. S. and Soviet Union and, finally, after its settlement, (4) to export weapons to maintain a subsequent military balance in the affected region. It seemed that there was no change in both superpower's attitudes compared with those in the case of the 3rd Middle East War. At this time, however, there was essentially a new qualitative change which should not be overlooked in the light of the traditional framework of the arms trade. It was caused from the emergence of the oil strategy, resulting in the flow of a great deal of the “Oil Dollars” into the Middle East. Although the main aim of this paper is to consider recent trends of the arms trade with the Third World, this paper (1) refers, as the preliminaly work, to the development of the international transfer of arms with special attention to the change “from the military aid to the arms trade, ” (2) reviews recent trends of the arms trade, and (3) in conclusion, analyzes the new phase of the arms trade with the Third World, the change from the seller's market to the buyer's market.
The present deepening of the insoluble antagonisms of the world capitalist system is manifested in the growing collapse of the imperialist structure of the world politics, in the increasing disorganisation of its financial and monetary relations, in the growing economic, social and political instability of developed capitalist countries, in the aggravation of the contradictions inherent in the state-monopoly capitalism of developed capitalist countries, in the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions, in the increasing contradictions between the developed countries and the ‘Third World’, in the intensification of the working people's struggle for their political, economic and social rights, in the anti-imperialist struggle of the newly independent nations, and so on. Marxists argue that the theory of the general crisis of capitalism provides the most useful tool and methodology for analysing the world capitalist system, in terms of the Marxist thought concerning the contemporary epoch as the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide scale. The general crisis of capitalism is taking place in all the basic social spheres; economics, politics, . ideology and culture. In the paper I survey articles and books about the study and the controversy upon the theory of the general crisis of capitalism. The first part discusses the apologists for the capitalist system who declare the Marxist teaching to be untenable or obsolete. The second part examines the relationship between V. I. Lenin's Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism and the theory of the general crisis of capitalism. The third part deals with a lot of theoretical problems about the theory of the general crisis of capitalism. I come to the conclusion that the need for a detailed study of the theoretical category of the general crisis of capitalism demands a total analysis of the antagonistic contradictions of contemporary imperialism and the decisive tendencies in the development of the world revolution.
In terms of Japan's foreign policy, economic assistance to the developing countries has been very important recently. This indicates that the stability and development of the world economy, and North-South problem are becoming the major issues to urgently be solved in the world politics. The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the politico-economic implications of Japan's foreign aid in the post-war internal politics, (2) the relevance of Japan's economic aid to the increasing relations with neighboring country, (3) social changes in Southeast Asia and impacts of foreign assistance on the local community, and finally to suggest (4) a new direction of the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan. Japan's Conservative Government in post-war era has made use of the economic power as a diplomatic weapon and has practiced a realistic “Cold-War Diplomacy” following the United States' global policy until Nixon's visit to China in early 1972. However, such a diplomatic style as taken by the Conservatives was compelled to change because of U. S. -China summit and the ceasefire of Vietnam war. In particular, non-socialist Southeast Asian nations are strengthening stance to the big powers. Japan's development assistance has variously influenced on the indigenous economy and community in Southeast Asia. Some effects of Japanese aid to Southeast Asia are recognized in terms of the national development, but the sphere of contribution has been extremely limited. Because foreign capital and technology tended to flow into the power elites rather than grass-roots. The Western aid has failed to lessen the disparity between the rural and urban areas, and to improve the unequal income distribution between the landlord and the peasant. Gaps between the upper-class and the lower-class are claimed to widen more than before. The author concludes that Japanese assistance in the future should prefer (1) grant to loan, (2) rural development to industrial development, and should try to raise (3) the standard of living of the poorest people and their welfare as well as small farmers'. It depends on both training of uar younger generation for overseas activities and administrative reform for external economic cooperation whether Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia could be successful or not.
The aim of this essay is to examine the political aspects of Japan and United States' economic relations in the 1960's as reflected in the Joint Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which convened nine times during the period from 1961 to 1973. In general, the meetings centered on three themes, (1) the bilateral relations concerning not only trade and economic issues but political issues as well, (2) the multilateral relations concerning these same issues, especially those relations with West European countries and the Communist states such as China and the Soviet Union, and, (3) the cooperation in the development of and aid to Third World countries, especially those of south-east Asia. There was agreement on many points: cooperation in technological and cultural fields, problems involving Western European nations, and the allotment of aid to developing countries. However, practically no agreements were reached on the various problems regarding disequilibrium in trade between them in the latter 1960's In those days, Japanese-U. S. trade, which had previously favoured America, reversed itself so that the United States went into the red and Japan moved into the black. In addition, the Sato Government rejected a proposal for textile export restraints which the Nixon Administration considered vital. And finally, in 1971 came the blow of the so-called “Nixon dollar-shock”, followed by the surprising announcement of the visit of the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China. Thus, when we consider the origins of the various problems in economic relations between Japan and the U. S., we should go beyond the obvious friction generated by the textile exports issue. Rather we must delve more deeply into two very different to understand the problem fully, perspectives of political reality.