The Communist Bloc as an international political phenomenon collapsed when the Soviet Union vanished in December 1991. It may be clear that the idea of socialism did not work effectively in the world of real politics. But there are many people in Japan who hesitate to state that the spirit of capitalism or capitalism modernization had gained the final victory in human life because human beings have been suffering from public hazards and environmental pollution which are considered as the result of the rapid development of capitalism moderniization. Additionally, the query on the meaning of the “state” or “nation” has been still at issue.
As it is well-known, Karl Marx proposed the idea of socialism in opposition to captalism and the “state”. From the sense of political science, Marx might be an utopian as most of originators of new thought had been. Marx regarded “society” as an ideal existence, realizing the spirit of the common law. Then, Lenin, temporarily, connected this idea of “society” with “the advanced guard of the proletarian class”, though he did not clarify “one party rule”. After that, Stalin replaced the advanced guard of the proletarian class with the sole leading party of the state. Thus the notorious nationalization of the party commenced. This phenomenon should be contraty to the idea of Marx, though he might have some responsibility with this transformation or change.
The most important thing to consider today should be to clarify the process and political phenomena in communist countries whereby Stalin could succeed in nationalizing the party. It may be possible to explain this with the rule of movement in political power, or as the immaturity of politics in Russia. Here, however, I would like to explain this considering the pressure of international politics. It might be irrational if a social scientist were to neglect the important influence of international circumstances on these developments. In the period of Lenin there was the menace of Imperialism surrounding the new-born state, and in the period of Stalin there was the fear from Fascist countries, though Stalin's response to them might be regarded as more than a little morbid. Also it may be unfair to blame the barracks communism of Mao Tse-tung without discussing the pressure from Japan and, later, the United States of America. Of course, we had better not attribute every cause to international circumstances. Perhaps external influence suould appear connected with some internal elements. So we must analyze the complicated relations of external and internal mutual influence. Still in the period of 20 Century the external elements have become greater and greater. From that point of view, I will compare the common phases of nationalization of the parties in Russian and East European countries and those in Asian countries, though their internal conditions are quite different.

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In the course of the past 3 years, the socialist system in the so-called Eastern World has completely broken down. What was the essential factor which brought about the collapse of that?
If we divide “socialism” into 3 elements: idea, movement and regime, we may safely point out, firstly, that the political, economic and social regime, founded after the Russian Revolution and consolidated by Joseph Stalin, has been initially rejected by the East European peoples, and eventually by the Russian people themselves. In marked contrast to the failure of the regime, the ideas and movements of socialism, which were raised against tyranny, exploitation and poverty in the early stages of capitalism, have enormously contributed to the betterment of workers' living conditions and the reduction of inequality within the society. Socialism as such will have almost eternal validity even in the future.
But it can also be maintained that the ideas of Karl Marx are not without responsibility for the recent collapse of the socialist regime, in the sense that they opened the way for the leaders of the former Soviet Union to introduce an economic system in which the value of labor was intended to be “directly” realized. That assumption, instead of freeing the people from money and market, has created a lot of huge unsurmountable difficulties, such as the total imbalance between supply and demand, the rampancy of the “second economy”, the unchangeable structure of subsidies, and the lack of a built-in economic mechanism for increasing efficiency. It seems that we have to reevaluate the thought of Eduard Bernstein, who claimed that “for me the movement means all, and which is called the last goal of socialism generally means null.”
The present paper tries to analyze further the problems of modern socialism in the context of other value premises: evaluation of European Civilization, and several aspects of the crisis of the contemporary world.

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The political processes of 1991 in the Soviet Union witnessed unique and historical developments. The USSR, communist party and socialist system disintegrated through the coup d'état of august and December when Gorbachev resigned from the post of the president of the USSR.
In these changes, the identity of socialism played an important role, because Perestroika of the Soviet System went beyond the socialist stages and new search for identity among various sections of the Soviet society accompanied with the disintergration of the communist party which had monopolized both political power and the legitimate ideology.
Particularly after the Eastern European revolution of 1989 and the crisis of Perestroika of 1990-91, not only radical reformists, but also conservative critics of Gorbachev no longer relied on socialist ideas and communist organization: this was amply demonstrated in the process of the August coup d'état. Failure of which was followed by the end of the communist party.
In this article, the author analyzes how new factions and groups emerged in the communist organizations in 1991-91; what were the ideas on which these organizations were based and to whom these appeals were addressed.
The impact of the termination of communist party activities, carried out by Yelitsin-Russian leadership, sometimes with the tacit endorsement by Gorbachev in the suummer-fall of 1991, the dissipiation of the communist factions and their search for new identity will be discussed in this article.

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My aim in this paper is to delineate and explain political dynamics of “Reform from above” or “Counter-Reform” of Communist Party Regimes and self-organization of “Civil Society” in Poland and Hungary and to discuss the structure and meaning of the end of communism in East Central Europe.
Poland's Self-limiting Revolution—Solidarity movement in 1980-81—had a tremendous impact on democratization of the Soviet block countries in 1980s. It was then that the ideological legitimacy of Communist Party Regimes which was the greatest obstacle to democratization collapsed and “the beginning of the end of communism” became a reality. Because the political, economic and social crisis in Poland was a phenomenon common throughout Communist Party Regimes in the Soviet block countries, the experiences of Poland's Self-limiting Revolution and its suppression had a serious influence on party leadership in Poland as well as the Soviet block countries.
Then, one of the important key points to analyze regime change in the late 1980s towards 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe is reflections on magic triangle of “Counter-Reform”—Gorbachev's Perestroika in Soviet Union, Kadar's Reform in Hungary and Jaruzelski's Reform in Poland. Viewed in this light, my paper considers 1) the characteristics of Communist Party Regimes and its structural crisis; 2) the triangle of “Counter-Reform”; 3) the limits of “Counter-Reform” and its alternatives; and 4) the meaning of the end of communism in East Central Europe.

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In 1991, the socialist power, the Soviet Union finally collapsed 74 years after the Revolution. Despite this, China, another big socialist power, still maintains “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, rejecting M. Gorbachev as a renegade.
When the Chinese intelligentsia received socialism after the Russian Revolution, among the problems facing them were liberation from subjugation to foreign powers, extrication from poverty and realization of national unity. In 1950s, a new problem appeared, economic growth. Chinese communists selected socialism for the solution of these problems. Now what the historical significance of socialism is being asked, our questions are as follows; what was the utility of socialism for the solution of these problems, how was socialism transformed in the course of solving these problems and what kind of socialism exists now in China. The main purpose of this article is to give answers to such questions.
China accepted socialism (Marx-Leninism) as the thought, the movement and the political, economic and social system. In late 1950s it was the strategy for economic growth as well. Early communists, Li Da-zhao and Chen Du-xiu rather accepted Leninism as a theory of class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat and national liberation. Then, in 1940s, Mao Ze-dong sinified Marxism and socialism was transformed into “Nationalistic-Socialism” with a tinge of Chinese voluntarism.
In mid 1950s China built up its socialistic regime under the deep influence of the Soviet Union. That was a centralised “State-Socialism” (Etatism), under which everything was controlled by the Party amalgamated with the State. Thus “Nationalistic-Socialism” was turned into “State-Socialism”. It played not a little role in realizing national independence and unity and in overcoming poverty. But in the field of economic growth, it faced its limits. Mao intensified voluntarism to break the deadlock. The result was a tragic failure. As the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Proletarian Cultural Revolution” showed, his attempt ended in “Confucian-Socialism”, which was no better than an ugly amalgam of Socialism with added Chinese tradition.
Deng Xiao-ping's “Four Modenization Policy” in 1980s may be categorised as another species of Chinese socialism. But its monopolism in the political field and its utilitarianism in the economic field shows its essence as a “Dictatorship for Development” that could be seen in South Korea and Taiwan in 1970s. So, China has already stepped into the stage of “De-Socialism”.
In China, Socialism was realized as a movement and a system. But Mao's attempts and failures in later 1950s posed a question: whether it was right or not to have chosen Socialistic regime. The theory of “The First Stage of Socialism” in 1987 by ex-Secretary Zhao Zi-yang means that China has put off the realization of Socialism for 100 years.
Socialism has been transformed and changed variously in China. In a sense this was the consequence of wars, oppression and dire poverty. Yet the greatest misfortune to China was that she failed, from the start, in transplanting 20th century Socialism with its ideals and philanthropism that inspired young Li Da-zhao. What is worse, she could not alter her mental horizons. As for Democracy and Creativity, the situation remains equally oppressing and suffocating after 70 years.

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The 7th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party held in June 1991 declared that Vietnam would steadily maintain “the road to socialism” in the ongoing crisis of the socialist countries. The Congress emphasized that the Vietnamese should follow this road because this is the road already chosen in the recent history of Vietnam.
In the modern history of international poltics, Vietnam has been always left out in the cold. This history of alienation urged the Vietnamese to choose socialism as the “dream” of a better tomorrow. In the era of the cold war, they fought as actual war for this choice. Therefore there is good reason for the Vietnamese not to accept any other road than that of socialism so long as this “memory of history” has not faded away.
This view of socialism, however, had become a foundation of the “socialism of sharing poverty”, which broadly equated socialism with people's perseverance in today's poverty for the “dream” of a better tomorrow. Social crises in Vietnam after the Vietnam war resulted in the Vietnamese Communists clear depature from this type of sccialism, which manifested itself in the 6th congress of the Party in 1986 under the slogan of “doi moi”.
After the 6th Congress the Vietnamese Communists seemed to sidetrack the problem of the yet-to-be “dream” for the time being and began to concentrate their efforts on reform in the real lives of the people. But this situation did not last long, because the collapse of the socialist regimes, in Eastern Europe has irritated the problem of “dream” among the Vietnamese and has revitalized their “memory of history”.
The Vietnamese insistence on the road to socialism, however, seems to be based on much more realistic calculation. The most important task for the Vietnamese is to boost the economy through promoting foreign investment and this task requires political stability. Some of the Vietnamese reformists argue that there is no way other than maintaining the “leading role” of the Communist Party to keep political stability so that the Vietnamese should follow the road to socialism. According to them, maintaining the road to socialism is the most realistic way for the Vietnamese to participate in the capitalist world economy.
Other radical reformists are afraid that this opinion equated socialism with the domination of the Communist Party. They advocate the introduction of a pluralistic political system and a much more humanistic type of socialism.

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This paper studies the movement to institute the “Democratic Base” in North Korea under the Soviet Forces after World War II. It intends to show that this movement was a particular developed form of the Korean Communist Movement defined as the “Movement for National Liberation”, which tried to surmount the Cold War by establishing a sovereign state with a united government over the whole Korean peninsula.
Originally the Korean Communist Movement developed as the Movement for National Liberation in order to end Japanese colonial rule and establish an independent nation. From this movement some parties emerged to assume leadership when Korea was liberated by the forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This post-liberation leadership tried to surmount the special difficulties of the divided occupation and form a united government with Korean sovereignty.
But the two super powers began to establish separate regimes following theoir intentions in each occupational area with the progress of the Cold War. The American army of occupation in South Korea suppressed the left elements under the influence of the Korean Communist Party and backed the right wing nationalistic elements such as Syng-man Rhee. By contrast the Soviets gave the Koreans the right of self-administration on the surface and pretended not to prevent them from governing their inner politics, but in reality Soviet policy pursued a “divide and rule” policy from the early stages of occupation. The Soviet Army of occupation in North Korea contrived to win the nationalist elements over to its side through the so-called “united front” policy, which was also used in Eastern Europe as “People's Democracy”. Behind the “united front” the Soviet Army had the communist parties follow its instructions and promoted Kim Il-sung to take the initiative and found a Party in the northern area only. After the famous “Trusteeship Imbroglio” the Soviet Army formed a political power headed by Kim Il-sung. With the development of the Cold War, Soviet style socioeconomic reforms were carried out by Kim Il-sung from 1946 only in the north. These policies by the two super powers finally gave birth to the crisis of a civil war between their client states.
In this difficult environment the most urgent problem for the Koreans was to escape such a war and form a united independent government over all of Korea. The assertion of the “Democratic Base” as a resolution of this problem was raised first by Kim Tu-bong, the president of the “Korean New Democratic Party” founded in February 1946, not Kim Il-sung, who has been thought to be its first advocate. Kim Tu-bong formally proposed the idea at the inaugural assembly of the “North Korean Worker's Party” in August 1946.
Kim Tu-bong was a prominent intellectual leader of the anti-Japanese independent movement by the “Korean Voluntary Army” centering around Yenan with close connections to the Chinese Communist Party. His idea and plan for establishing the “Democratic Base” was an application of his experiences in Yenan to North Korea, that is, to institute first the same style “Democratic Base” in the northern area similar to the one founded by Mao Tse-tung in Yenan and then, as a second step, extend it from there to the south through the “National United Front” policy. Adapting this policy to the situation under the Soviet forces he tried to establish a united government over both areas under Korean sovereignty, a priority in the Korean Communist Movement from its inception in the anti-Japanese independent conflict.
Today, in the “post-Cold War” world with “the Grand Failure” of Communism, it is critical to consider the role that the “Democratic Base” played in the Movement for National Liberation in the history of the

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The purpose of this article is to consider the evolution of international political theory in the post-world war II from the view of the rise and fall of communist society, and to construct the new paradigm in the post-communism era.
Because, a study of international political theory should start in the phenomenon of international politics, theoretical studies must suit the historical or empirical studies. Then, we must manage our studies in such a way that these theories are available to every phenomenon in international politics. Under these conditions, there is no limit to a theoretical evolution in the new era.
The conclusion of this article, seems to follow the former studies, which may be summarized as follows:
First, a theoretical study of international politics in the post-communism era should integrate micro and macro international political theory.
Second, a study of integration of the micro and the macro theory should produce feedback between the theoretical and the empirical analysis in the field where the both phenomena cross.
Thus, the ultimate aim of modern theoretical study is to assist scientists of international politics to discover the order in the post-communism era, and the order which is his scientist's personal share in the peace to be realized in the new era.

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The gist of francis Fukuyama's article ‘The End of History?’ is quite plain. The twentieth century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This does not imply the end of international conflict per se, but the likelihood of large-scale conflict between States will diminish.
Fukuyama's thesis would represent the advent of an ideologically homogeneous world. However, this change in the present political structure of the world is not the supersession of the sovereign States system itself. It would represent simply a transition from one phase of the sovereign States system (ideological heterogeneity) to another (ideological homogeneity). So, even if the world rests upon a single ideology, it would not reduce or eliminate conflicts of interest among States.
Fukuyama's prediction, which is highly regarded by the general public, is not completely reliable. First, he considers Stalinism as the whole of marxism and does not think about the possibility of other versions. Second, the present world is not ideologically homogeneous. Even the Muslim world, which is supposed to be a universal, homogeneous one, is filled with a large variety of competing ideologies. Third, the basic structure of the sovereign States system remains unchanged after the collapse of communism. Fourth, the uncertainty of the system, therefore, continues, and so history does not come to an end.
For all its drawbacks, Fukuyama's article was received favourably in Japan. For one thing, what is fascinating in his article is that Fukuyama has made a very confident prediction about a future for liberal democracy and based it on the authorities of historical philosophy, Hegel and Kojève. According to him, all human history is a phenomenal form of human self-consciousness. It may be too simple, but that simplicity has appealed to people. For another, it seems likely that his article may have appealed to the historical awareness of Japanese people: that is, their tendecy to admire vigour or natural force.
History is not a good tool for predicting the future. If it were the case, it would not be necessary to commit oneself either way over it. Whether the fortunes of socialism and history have come to a dead chilly end or not you never know; he may be right.

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There are meny answers to the following questions: Under what conditions does a political actor attempt to destroy an opponent thorough military means? Under what conditions does the actor engage in political compromise? However, most of them are not rooted in rigorous theoretical frameworks but are contradictory to each other. In other words, the situation of the “theory” of war and peace is a hodgepodge or at best a potpourri of mutually contradictory or irrelevant assertions. The present article, employing a rational-choice framework of Blainey and Wittman, resolves some of those contradictions. Seemingly contradictory theories of war and peace that are integrated within the framework are balance-of-power theory, interest theory, coststability theory, and misperception theory. Balance-of-power theory is based only on the consideration of military power; interest theory is built upon the disssatisfaction which actors have due to their interest structure; cost-stability theory says that high costs of war eliminate the possibility of war; and misperception theory is concerned with only perception and not with the elements upon which such perception is based. Although these theories are popular among the students of international relations, it is apparent that each of them alone cannot lead to any sound decision theory of war and compromise; decisions are based on all four elements. A rational-choice model helps conceptualize them in a consistent and coherent way; such integration not only provides conditions under which these four theories are valid but also presents new theoretical propositions as to war and compromise.

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On 19 October 1965, Japan and the Soviet Union normalized their diplomatic relations after more than ten years of a state of war. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru of the Hatoyama administration played a significant role in the process of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. This article attempts to discuss the main features of his negotiating policy, relying on the materials which have recently become available in Britain, the United States and Japan.
The main negotiating purpose consistently held by Shigemitsu was to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union on the basis of solving the territorial problems. The prime minister insisted on early normalization by shelving such problems. Shigemitsu believed, however, that Hatoyama's formula would fail to solve them and would leave an intractable disturbing factor for future Soviet-Japanese relations. He regarded the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan as the minimum territorial condition for concluding the peace treaty. In order to obtain Soviet concessions, he started with the hardest demand for the whole of the Kuriles, but he was prepared to retreat gradually from this to the minimum condition.
Both domestic and external circumstances were not favourable for Shigemitsu's purpose. The conservative merger between the Liberals and the Democrats did not allow him to make any rapid territorial concessions. The US State Department headed by John Foster Dulles had been implying its displeasure with possible Japanese territorial concessions to Russia. Moreover, the Russians insisted that Japan should recognize their sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin, though they offered to return the Habomais and Shikotan in August 1955. These circumstances made Shigemitsu adopt cautious and slow negotiations, and, therefore, he decided to demand as a bargaining card the southern Kuriles in response to the Soviet offer.
In the summer of 1956 in Moscow, Shigemitsu as the plenipotentiary decided to conclude the peace treaty by accepting the Soviet terms in order to prevent Hatoyama's ‘Adenauer formula’, though he knew his decision would be severely attacked by his colleagues in Tokyo. Consequently, Shigemitsu's effort was blocked and later Hatoyama succeeded in normalization by shelving the territorial questions. As Shigemitsu expected, the unsolved territorial questions became a ‘thorn’ of later relations between the two countries. Considering that, Shigemitsu's negotiating policy could have set an alternative course of postwar Soviet-Japanese relations, though many defects can be pointed out in his diplomacy.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the methodologies of five key modern exponents of realism: E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Kenneth Waltz and Stanley Hoffmann. I explore the significance of each author's version of realism, focusing on the problems of: (1) understanding of the intentions of the actors; (2) explanation of causal relations; and (3) ethical judgments of human action.
First, Morgenthau and Aron differ considerably on their definition of theory. While Morgenthau sees in the quest for power the essence of all politics, Aron starts with the specific features of international relations, the state of war. Moreover, while Morgenthau attempts to give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy by using rational elements, such as national interests, Aron seeks to show both the limits of our knowledge and the conditions of historical choice. Morgenthau states, “to search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesman is both futile and deceptive.” However, Aron attaches greater importance to understanding meaning, or the gap between actors' intentions and consequences.
This difference in approach is made clearer by second-generation realists like Waltz and Hoffmann. While Morgenthau illuminates the moral problems in statecraft, Waltz pays no attention to the actor's dilemma. While Aron views international relations as the interactions of symbolic individuals, the diplomat and the soldier, Hoffmann attempts to study also nonstate actors which behave as if they had autonomy. Paying little attention to the gap between the superpowers' intentions and their consequences, Waltz insists on the durability of the bipolar system. On the other hand, emphasizing the diffusion of power in the international landscape, Hoffmann advocates the “world order” as a public philosophy. His theory is also an encouraging message to citizens.
Second, on the relations between international systems and actors, Aron-Hoffmann and Waltz differ remarkably. Aron characterizes international systems by the configuration of the relations of forces and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the states. Waltz, however, criticizes him for mingling elements at the unit level with elements at the system level. For Waltz, the states are fungible entities, comparable to Durkheim's individuals. International systems are forces whose origin is not the individual states but its collectivity, forces which are the real, and the determining causes of stability and war. Following Durkheim's rule of sociological method, Waltz believes that a single cause brings the same consequence. On the other hand, Aron's causal thinking is expressed in terms of probability or chance. In other words, what remains undetermined is what interests him most. Aron and Hoffmann believe that in human affairs necessity itself is of man's own making, although hisory may well be governed by forces beyond man's control.
Third, accepting the Weber's ethic of responsibility, each realist has different criteria for judging human action. As Michael Smith points out, the ethic of responsibility says nothing about how the leader weighs consequences, speaking only to his ability and willingness to face them. Carr and Morgenthau's concept of morality was proved inappropriate by reality. Carr's intuitionism, which was buttressed by his deterministic view of history, was to support the appeasement policy toward Hitler. Morgenthau's national interest was misunderstood by decision makers in Washington as a criteria which supported the resistance against the expansion of communism in all its forms.
It was Aron who correctly modified their criteria. He points out that realists fail to recognize the action of ideologies. According to Aron,

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