国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2008 巻, 154 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
近現代の日本外交と強制力
  • 明治から平成まで
    佐道 明広
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_1-154_11
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    When considering the relationship between Japanese foreign policy and the military in modern times, it is not surprisingly that the political change before and after World War II becomes an issue. There are many individual issues to consider in each prewar and postwar period and it is not possible to touch upon all of them. However, some issues may become clear when considered in the prewar and postwar pretext, especially when focusing on military organization. Therefore, I would like to refer to issues that were problematic both in the prewar and postwar periods at this time.
    First, in prewar Japan leading up to involvement in World War II, the influence of the military was undeniably strong. However, military action did not have an unified objective and plan, but acted under the bureaucratic organization with its excessively opportunistic behavior. Moreover, the important decision to go to war against the U. S. and Britain itself can hardly be said to be based on reasonable political judgment. Possible causes for this include the decentralized characteristics of Meiji State, lack of leadership, and sectionalism of Japanese bureaucracy. The problem is that such issues which existed in the Meiji State system are not just a thing of the past, but can be seen in Japanese politics today characterized as “bureaucrat-cabinet system.”
    Civilian control of postwar Japan is actually “Bureaucrat Control,” from the standpoint that the civil-military relations in Japan must be recognized as civil-bureaucrat-military relations. Consequently, a viewpoint that considers the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and the military organization, is needed when studying government and military in Japan. As such, understanding the function and issues of the bureaucracy, and the relationship between the government and the bureaucratic organization in Japan, from a historical viewpoint is considered to be important. To do so, the issue of strategy must also be considered.
    The issue of strategy has inextricable importance in the consideration of foreign policy. So, how can the relationship between strategy and the military in Japanese foreign policy be viewed? Strategy can usually be divided into “national strategy (major strategy)” which pursues the national objective in a broad sense, and under that “military strategy” which focuses on ensuring security. That which is the most basic is “national strategy (major strategy).” In Japan, a clearly established “national strategy” through the prewar and postwar periods did not and does not exist. That Japan does not have a national strategy has become the backdrop of criticism. Moreover, in both the prewar and postwar periods, military strategies alone have been planned without any clear national strategy.
    I would like to mention about “Coercive Power” which has been raised as a special topic at this time. The word “military force” has been frequently used in this article, and the relationship between military force and foreign policy has been fundamental in this topic. However, currently, the use of military organization not only for state will, but also in the field of peace keeping, has increased. Furthermore, the use of a military organization, not only from the aspect of simply having hard power, but also focusing on its function as a self-absorbed organization has also increase. Therefore, rather than just simply using “military force,” the current issues are assumed to be more widely encompass the use of the word “coercive power.”
  • 関 誠
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_12-154_28
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.
    When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.
    Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.
    In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.
    In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.
    But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.
    In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.
    In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.
  • パリ平和会議からワシントン会議へ
    高杉 洋平
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_29-154_45
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the disarmament policy of the Imperial Japanese Army from the Paris Peace Conference to the Washington Conference.
    There are few studies about the disarmament policy of the Japanese Army in international disarmament conferences in the inter war period, dispite the fact that there are many studies about the disarmament policy of the Japanese Navy. And many studies about problems of Japanese Army disarmament have been discussed as pure domestic problems, especially about the Yamanasi Disarmament and the Ugaki Disarmament. Actually, international disarmament conferences in the inter war period achieved few successes in the army disarmament, but it doesn't mean that the Japanese Army had no interest in that sort of thing. If anything, the Japanese Army showed deep interest in the progress of international disarmament conferences.
    Before the Paris Peace Conference, the Japanese Army showed little concern about a disarmament. But, the Covenant which was established in the Paris Peace Conference had the article 8, the disarmament article. Since then, Japan, a permanent member of the League Council, had to comit international disarmament problems. Then the Japanese Army faced a real disarmament crisis almost for the first time. The Japanese Army sharply reacted this crisis and rejected the international disarmament practically on the pretext of national security.
    But, circumstances of Japan such as the fall of the Russian Empire, the financial difficulties and especially the antimilitarism movement were against the Japanese Army. In these circumstances, some higher officers changed their traditional antidisarmament policy, and they sought people's support of the other millitary policies in exchange for the disarmament. TANAKA Giichi, the Minister of War, leaded them. Other officers, especially UEHARA Yusaku, the Chief of the Staff, folded fast to their antidisarmament policy.
    The Washinton Conference was the first stage of the political strife between these two factions. Before the opening of the Conference, in the biginning, Uehara group had holded the initiative, and established their own Disarmament Program, almost the antidisarmament program. Prime Minister HARA Takashi and his main Cabinet ministers were anxious about the Army's hard attitude, and appealed to Tanaka and YAMAGATA Aritomo, an elder general and statesman who was a cooperator with Hara, to take measures to solve this problem. Dispite the fact that Tanaka group was inferior to that of Uehara one in that time, Tanaka group moderated the Army's firm antidisarmament policy. Finally, Tanaka group succeeded in making Uehara group submit disarmament partly. Althought it was a lax program, disarmament was generally accepted by the whole Army. It was the first step toward genuine disarmament undertakings, the Yamanasi Disarmament and the Ugaki Disarmament.
  • 一九四七–五二年
    柴山 太
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_46-154_61
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947–1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.
    Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.
    Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'état, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.
  • 第一次防衛大綱策定から第二次防衛大綱策定まで
    千々和 泰明
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_62-154_78
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the “Concept of Basic Defense Capability” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (boei taiko), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.
    The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.
    In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (shoyo boeiryoku koso) or modifying the schedule form (beppyo) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.
    In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.
  • 文官優位制度を中心に
    小出 輝章
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_79-154_94
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the cold war era, Japanese political leaders decided most of defense policies without providing the military expert advice, so they seldom met with the military officers. The Internal Bureau supervised the Self-Defense Force (SDF) that consists of the Ground Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Force Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The Internal Bureau was responsible for defense policies with the SDF. In other words, the Internal Bureau's main role was not operation of the SDF but management of it, such as the defense build up plan and the administration of personnel affairs. Political leaders formally controlled the military.
    In the post cold war, the security environment surrounding Japan has changed defense policy considerably. The SDF missions and roles has expanded. Thus, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has reviewed “Positioning of Missions”. Defense of Japan 2007 says, “Among those operations historically positioned as Supplementary missions, the following were stipulated as primary missions.
    1) Activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of the international community including Japan, including international disasters relief operations, international peace cooperation operations, operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.
    2) Activities conductive to ensuring the peace and security of Japan in situations arising in areas surrounding Japan, such as rear area support and other activities based on the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law.
    3) Activities to ensure the safety of the livesand property pf the Japanese People, such as minesweeping and the evacuation of Japanese nationals abroad.”
    Organization of the MOD/SDF has changed to coupe with various missions. The MOD has reconstructed its internal bureaus in order to make various policies. It goes without saying that the SDF has been reconstructed.
    It is clear that political leaders, such as the Minister of Defense can't decide defense policies without the military expert advices. The Chief of Joint Staff Office and the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are military expert advisors to the Minister. So, Civil- Military relations has been changing in Japan.
  • 規範の相克と止揚、そして「積極主義」への転回
    藤重 博美
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_95-154_114
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper analyses Japan's security policy concerning the rising activism after the Cold War. In contrast to the traditional reluctance after World War II, Japan has become more and more willing to use its military power in the post-Cold War era. Today, Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF) participate in peacekeeping operations and take a greater responsibility not only for East Asian regional stability but also more broadly for global security issues. Why has such a tremendous turn in the course of security policy been possible? Material considerations alone cannot lead us to convincing explanations for seemingly ‘irrational’ features of national security policy. Hence, the study employs a constructivist approach that pays attention to ideational factors as well as material calculations. Inter alia, it focuses on the ‘military norm,’ i. e. a social expectation of an appropriate state behaviour regarding the use of military power.
    I will argue that the rise of two positive (encouraging) military norms (the Liberal Order and the Self-Defence Norms) has overwhelmed the traditional negative (prohibiting) norm (the Anti-Military Norm) during the last fifteen years (1990-2004). After the Cold War, the Liberal Order Norm has risen as the most dominant one at the international level: it encourages states to use their military power to uphold the world order, anchored by liberal values (e. g. democracy and the market economy). It was first conveyed to Japan in the early 1990s through the Gulf Crisis/War, and subsequently led to the dispatch of the Japanese peacekeepers. From the mid-1990s onwards, the traditional Self-Defence Norm has also been revived, reflecting the remaining possibility of inter-state conflict in East Asia. The rise of the two positive norms first resulted in the SDF's greater responsibility for regional stability, and finally led the SDF to become more actively involved in global security affairs (e. g. the peacebuilding mission in the post-war Iraq). Thus, not only has the traditional reluctance receded but also a new activism has emerged in Japan, thereby motivating the nation to assume an increasingly active military role.
  • 「脅威の均衡」論の検証
    川崎 剛
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_115-154_128
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    The study in Japan of modern Japanese foreign affairs has been dominated by diplomatic historians. Consequently, we still have a poor understanding as to how much Japanese diplomatic experiences actually support the general theories of international relations. This paper attempts to rectify the problem in the area of alliance formation. It tests Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat hypothesis while taking into account the “bandwagon for profit” argument advanced by Randall Schweller. Its core finding is that the Japanese cases overwhelmingly support the balance-of-threat hypothesis: Japan formed 12 alliances against threats out of its 14 threat-facing experiences (in the remaining 2 cases, Japan could not find alliance partners and did not bandwagon with the sources of threat). The paper also identifies one case of “bandwagon for profit” (the third Anglo-Japanese alliance). It furthermore has found many dual-purpose alliances in which Japan used its alliance not only as a military instrument against threats but also as a political tool to manage its hegemony over subordinate polities.
  • 広域緊急災害医療システムを例として
    神藤 猛
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_129-154_144
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, various challenges have emerged in crisis management as it relates to international political events. Asymmetric global threats, which are fundamentally different from the autonomous state-level interactions of the past, have created complex supranational issues, including the problem of terrorist and criminal organizations that operate without national boundaries.
    The current mutual dependency in international politics and economics has created a highly sensitive structure that is vulnerable to the rapid spread of regional conflicts. Thus, the expansion of regional instabilities can create critical situations that can shake the foundations of the international system, as well as individual nations. ‘Vulnerability’ in this case refers to the relative costs of changing the structure of an interdependent system. At present, there have also been challenges to the concept of the traditional nation-state pursuing its own autonomous political functions. Thus, the prevention and management of rapidly expanding asymmetric threats in problematic areas has now become the most urgent issue facing the present-day international community.
    In the new environment of crisis management and the transformation of external threats, Japan must also face the same problem as the nations of Europe in developing sophisticated information technologies and highly developed social structures in urban communities. Nations must now have the capability to face a wide range of crises, and although Japan is now capable of peacefully resolving conflicts among states, the framework for the process of handling such issues has not yet been established. Also, taking into account the characteristics of present asymmetric threats, such as their ubiquity and ease of transmission, the need for efficient international cooperation in developing pluralistic crisis management systems has become urgent.
    Crisis management in the post-9. 11 relegated military action to a secondary role in favor of addressing the social, economic and political causes of domestic and international crises and conflicts. A broader view of crisis management, including Military Operations Other Than War, blends diplomatic, developmental, intellectual, law enforcement, and administrative procedures with military functions, and gives special consideration to political, economic, and socio-psychological factors. Therefore, during the decisionmaking process, sufficient comprehension of the underlying sociological phenomena upon which an individual incident is based is necessary. A deep understanding of these basic elements, including war, as well as the characteristics of decision-making process in each nation, is indispensable for effective crisis management.
    This paper will to outline the basic structure of this newly-required, 21st-century crisis management system by objectively comparing network-centric wide-area emergency disaster medical systems to autonomous-dispersion crisis management systems which can rapidly respond to changes in strategic environments.
  • 海洋の安全と強制力の役割
    山崎 眞
    2008 年 2008 巻 154 号 p. 154_145-154_160
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.
    A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.
    And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.
    The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced “The Basic Law of the Sea” to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to “Oceanic basic plan” based on this law in April 2008.
    On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made “New Maritime Strategy” public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.
    It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.
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